Modi's Tribal Land Headache

Malaria, Maoists came together to fell CRPF men in Chhattisgarh

Deeptiman Tiwary,TNN | Dec 5, 2014, 05.11 AM IST

READ MORE Maoists|malaria|CRPF men in Chhattisgarh

The CRPF is now discussing if companies should have more commanding level officers so that they are not rendered leaderless in case of a mishap.

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NEW DELHI: Malaria and Maoists are the biggest enemies of security personnel in Chhattisgarh's Bastar region, so say anti-Naxal forces. On Monday, the two came together to claim 14 CRPF men in the village of Kasalpada in Chhattisgarh's Sukma district. The team that got caught in Maoist fire had gone to the area to prepare for aerial evacuation of six personnel suffering from malaria.

Sources in CRPF said a contingent of 200 men with 90 from the 223 Battalion was being led by IG (operations) H S Siddhu in the third phase of anti-Naxal operations launched on November 16 in the Chintagufa-Dornapal axis of the region. On Saturday, five CRPF men and one Chhattisgarh policeman were down with malaria. The team decided to evacuate them on Sunday but the BSF chopper could not come to the rescue.

On Sunday, the team doctor gave an opinion that if the men were not evacuated at the earliest, they could die. Thus, early Monday morning, the team decided to look for a suitable place where an IAF chopper could land and rescue the men. The team reached Kasalpada for it had an open field and hills abutting it. The village was thought to be a safe place to land a chopper. The team decided to sanitize the area.

However, the first stumbling block came from NTRO which failed to send a UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) to survey the area. "We had demanded a UAV for the sanitization process. But the UAV never reached. It lifted from Hyderabad and then went back by 1 pm without providing any help. Had we got its assistance, we would have known the presence of Maoists in the area. We have complained to the home ministry about this," a senior CRPF officer said.

However, as the 223 Battalion entered the field for sanitization exercise, it heard some gunshots. Siddhu discussed the matter with the battalion commander behind the village and decided to retreat, sensing Maoist presence. Siddhu's team retreated while the 223 Battalion commander began moving towards his team in the field. Just then, a volley of fire came from the hills abutting the village and the commander was separated from the team. The securitymen engaged them under the command of an assistant and a deputy commandant.

But a second volley of fire began from the village, something that was not expected. This killed both the commandants in the first burst and the team was rendered leaderless. Still, they kept fighting for four long hours (10.30 am to 2.30 pm), despite being clearly disadvantaged in the open field. Thirteen men fell to bullets on the spot, largely from the fire coming from the village. Another severely injured personnel bled to death while being carried to the Chintagufa camp.

The force is now discussing if companies should have more commanding level officers so that they are not rendered leaderless in case of a mishap.

Meanwhile, the six malaria-stricken men were later evacuated and are safe.

Sid Harth • 12 mins ago

The Naxalite insurgents claim to be fighting for the rights of the Indian aboriginals, or Adivasis, the scheduled castes and ‘other backward classes’.28 Caste in India is an immensely complex subject and difficult for outsiders to comprehend29. Briefly, caste is a complex hierarchical system of social organisation, based on stratified roles determined at birth. It is distinct from social class or race and sometimes leads to caste-based discrimination. The insurgency has spread sporadically out from West Bengal to cover a significant area of India’s most-heavily populated areas, which are predominantly agricultural and chronically impoverished. The inhabitants of these areas do not perceive themselves as benefiting in any significant way from the great economic advances and improvements in standards of living that many urban dwellers are enjoying.30 These are the exact communities that the Naxalites claim to be ‘liberating’ from oppressive capitalism. They have established a “People’s Government” and “People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army” with people’s militias, some of which are headed by female commanders. In organisational terms, they thus appear to be moving closer to a model such as Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and in behavioural terms too, as cadres often refrain from smoking and drinking.31 “Revolutionary People’s Committees” provide food and sustenance to cadres, who

Sid Harth • 13 mins ago

All of these may contribute to local objections, which are normally labelled ‘ethnic grievance’. Mining interests are becoming increasingly salient in the Naxalite conflict and a source of grievance that is exploited by the rebels.27

Sid Harth • 14 mins ago

The five most heavily affected states in this conflict have substantial mineral deposits and huge amounts of energy resources25 and there are carbon-based fuel supplies in other (nonaffected) areas of the country. The government admits that mineral resources are mostly found in tribal areas.26 Standard analyses of drivers for conflicts frequently examine their causal connections in unitary terms, without scrutinising other related factors.

Sid Harth • 16 mins ago

16. Collier, ‘Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity’ 17. Humphreys, ‘Food Security in Perspective’ 18. Skocpol, ‘States and Social Revolutions’ 19. ‘Resource rents’ are surplus values, or profits, arising after normal returns and costs have been taken into account for natural recourse extraction 20. Klare, ‘Resource Wars’ 21. Buhaug et al, ‘Ethno-Nationalist Civil Wars’ 22. According to the 2001 Census, scheduled castes form 16.2 per cent of India’s population and scheduled tribes 8.2 per cent. They tend to be poor, marginalised and under educated. (accessed 15 February, 2012) 23. Sahni, ‘What Maoists Want’, (accessed 15 February, 2012) 24. Source: Stratfor Global Intelligence, ‘India’s Naxalite Threat’ http://

Sid Harth • 17 mins ago

obstacles for Nepali development and political stability (along with the so far unrealised potential for social service benefits). Conflict Causation Collier16 suggests that economically undeveloped areas where opportunities for conflict outweigh the (perceived) drawbacks are at higher risk of insurgency, which often means that there is little distinction between rebels and criminals, if they are motivated mainly by financial profit. This argument is known as the ‘rebel greed hypothesis’17. Opportunities for direct financial profit may provide stronger motivations for conflict than political and ethnic grievances18. Paired with a lack of accountability in state institutions, resource rents19 often have the opposite effect (conflict and poverty) to that expected by the population (increased wealth and development) 20. Other factors such as exclusion of large ethnic groups, their physical distance from a country’s political centre and the presence of rough terrain have been positively correlated with conflict21. Given that Adivasis, or scheduled tribes [disadvantaged aboriginal and low-caste groups],22 form 8.2 per cent of India’s population and tend to dwell in more remote areas, this may help explain why the Naxalite conflict has mostly been concentrated along the “Red Corridor”, far from New Delhi. However, based on CPI (M) documents23, there is evidence the Naxalites are preparing to extend operations to new states including Rajasthan, Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Meghalaya. Figure 1 India’s Red Corridor of LWE activity24

Sid Harth • 18 mins ago

In a startlingly frank admission from a head of state, the Indian Prime Minister stated in September 2009 that the country is losing the battle against the Naxalites.13 The Naxalite insurgency deserves wider international scholarly attention; India is the world’s largest democracy and its second most populous country. There has been a movement towards mergers and consolidation of various LWE groups under the Naxalite banner.14 The largest merger was in 2004 when the People’s War (PW) and Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) merged to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist), also known as ‘CPI (M)’, but this pattern of mergers and splits has occurred numerous times since 1967. The Maoist insurgency is unusual for its long duration and the low intensity mortality rate. This however has reached cumulatively high numbers of deaths over the last decade,15 and become more indiscriminate. Given India’s enormous regional role, its increasing global economic influence and rising GDP, the Naxalites pose a real and insidious threat to the nation’s security that has implications for its position as a twenty-first century world power. India’s recent successes as an economic colossus, as strategic partner for Western interests and as a balance to Chinese and Pakistani regional and global influence depends upon adequate internal security and continued economic growth, both of which are threatened by the insurgency and the potential for further escalation. The Naxalite rebellion is indicative of complex social dynamics in a very large and diverse country and illustrates the challenge of applying conflict causation models from a realist perspective. There are many implications for other countries facing grass-roots insurgencies. For example, across the northern Himalayan border, the Maoists in Nepal conducted a much shorter campaign of violence (1996 to 2006) and after a Comprehensive Peace Accord, succeeded in taking control of the state in an unstable coalition government. This has resulted in severe 8. Press Information Bureau, ‘Naxal Problem Needs a Holistic Approach’ 9. Agrawal, ‘Naxalism: Causes and Cure’ 10. Singhal & Nilakantan, ‘Economic Costs of Naxalite Violence’, p.1 11. Suykens, ‘Naxalite and State Governance’ 12. Misra, ‘Insurgency in South Asia’ 13. British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘India is losing Maoist battle’ (8 August 2010) 14. Ramana, ‘Maoist Movement in India’ 15. Small Arms Survey, ‘India’s States of Armed Violence’, p.6

Sid Harth • 21 mins ago

the Government of India’s own figures were revised down to 83 affected districts from a high of 180 in 2009.8 Ajit Doval, the former director of the Intelligence Bureau, estimates Naxalite activity has affected 40 per cent of India’s territory and 35 per cent of its population9 (thus more than 420 million people). An insurgency on this huge scale deserves more rigorous analysis. Economic costs are high; from 1980 to 2000, LWE-affected states lost an average of 12.48 per cent of per capita net state domestic product.􀏭􀏬 There is a serious paucity of research and empirical data on specific elements of the Naxalite conflict.11 Research that focuses specifically on the Naxalite insurgency tends to be analytically restricted to issues of domestic politics and inequality, but a purely economic examination of conflict causation may be too narrow. Grievances, inequalities and drivers for conflict vary hugely over a country as big and heterogeneous as India. Successive Indian governments have resisted calling the Naxalite insurgency a ‘civil war’ and term it a law and order problem12 due to political and policy implications. All this takes place in a complex environment of multiple and conflicting stakeholders, reducing the validity of purely quantitative analyses of conflict causation.

Sid Harth • 22 mins ago

What started as a localised uprising in a single town has now spread to influence or affect twenty states in India, covering two hundred and twenty-three districts.7 The exact number of affected areas is contentious, given that LWE-hit districts receive central funds for Security Related Expenditure. In 2011, 􀍷􀍶 1. Buhaug et al, ‘Ethno-Nationalist Civil Wars’; Hauge & Ellingsen, ‘Beyo 1. Buhaug et al, ‘Ethno-Nationalist Civil Wars’; Hauge & Ellingsen, ‘Beyond Environmental Scarcity’; Lake & Rothchild, ‘Containing Fear’. For somewhat contrasting views, see Fearon & Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War’ or Sambanis, ‘Ethnic and Non-ethnic Civil Wars’. 2. King, ‘Ending Civil Wars’; Sambanis, ‘What is Civil War?’ 3. Chakravarti, ‘Travels in Naxalite Country’ 4. For example, Mason, ‘Caught in the crossfire’; Foran, ‘Theorizing Revolutions’ 5. British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘India’s Maoist Rebels’, July, 2010) 6. For example: Mahadevan, ‘Counterterrorism in India’. 7. Singh, ‘Naxal Chal

Sid Harth • 23 mins ago

Introduction In the decades following the end of the Cold War, civil and ethnic wars have become more prevalent than traditional inter-state war.1 The motivations for and the methods used to engage in civil conflict have altered. Scholars across different disciplines have not yet reached a comprehensive definition of civil war, nor come to a formal agreement on the total number of civil wars, due to lack of universally accepted characteristics.2 Civil warfare is generally funded through different mechanisms from inter-state war; unless there is third party interference or diaspora support, rebels must fund their own war efforts using methods such as capture of natural resource rents, support from local populations or extortion of businesses and other criminal activities. A long-standing left wing extremist (LWE) insurgency across India has led to the deaths, injuries or displacement of thousands of people, whilst being mostly overlooked by Western theorists. 3 Many academic analyses dealing with revolutions, insurgencies, and civil war do not mention the Naxalites whatsoever.4 The Naxalite conflict would likely be more well-known if global attention were less focused on events across the border in Pakistan and Afghanistan, or if a number of foreigners had been killed. The insurgency started in the town of Naxalbari in West Bengal state, and thus the rebels are often known as ‘Naxalites’ (interchangeably with ‘Maoists’, ‘extremists’, ‘rebels’, or ‘insurgents’). While all figures of the total number of combatants must be regarded as approximations, the BBC5 claims there are between 10,000 and 20,000 armed Naxalite cadres. India has struggled with violent separatism in Kashmir and the North-East states, Islamic terrorist groups and communalist Hindu-Moslem conflicts, all of which have made the international headlines and received much more scholarly and media attention6 but the Maoist Naxalites have engaged in a civil conflict with severe impacts since 1967.

Sid Harth • 29 mins ago

I have major issues about Mi Diya-log, making an 'ishtori,' where nothing is made clear, except the usual 'jargon,' repeated before, umpteen times, to nobody in particula. Naxal movement has reasons, at one time in the past. Any movement starts with a 'bang,' just check 'Moditva-a slightly altered, Hindutva, movement. Vulgarity aside, Modi-M-Brigade wants nothing less than elimination of so called Naxals. And to that aim, Modi throws few crumbs at the various police-forces. That itself is admitting that Naxals care less for more forces, intelligent forces or coordinated, if there is such thing as that, to wipe out (sll) tribal villages from the map of India. Not IN Modi's life. Problem starts with unjust treatment given to the former landholders. Landgrab started in British Raj and continued up to the present. Tribal population in more than six large states, need protection from other landgrabbers. Industrialists of all colors, shapes and their money power, duly supported by the states wanting to develop their underground mineral wealth. That wealth, all of it belongs to the tribal population. Pay them, in gold, not India's dilapidated Rupees. Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security Grievance, Mobilisation and State Response: An examination of the Naxalite Insurgency in India By Chas Morrison* This paper explores the Naxalite insurgency in India in terms of causal mechanisms that lead to the intensification of rural civil conflict by focusing specifically on grievance, mobilisation and government responses to rebellion. Realist theory is inadequate when analysing the causal factors of complex insurgencies and the mechanisms leading to their continuation. This case illustrates some aspects of intra-state conflict in a very large country, in terms of geography and population, and how the rebels have mobilised grievances at local level. New Delhi has addressed the conflict as both a development and a security challenge, and consequently has oscillated between repression and concession in its responses. This approach has resulted neither in reduction of grievances through adequate rural development, nor in consistent armed response to the Naxalite threat. Without a comprehensive and clear set of state responses, the violence is likely to continue. Key words: Naxalite, Maoist, India, insurgency, Grievance, Mobilisation, State response. Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security Vol. 2 | No. 1 | April 2012  Chas Morrison is Research Fellow at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry University. His current work focuses on Indian governance and security issues. He would like to thank Manish Jha for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Source: TOI

...and I am Sid Harth