7 security personnel including Army officer killed in J&K terror attack

M Saleem Pandit,TNN | Dec 5, 2014, 01.14 PM IST

READ MORE Uri|J&K militant attack|Army camp attack

4 Army men, 2 cops killed in militant attack

URI: At least seven security personnel including a lieutenant colonel and one assistant sub inspector of police were killed in a fidayeen attack launched by Pakistani infiltrators at 32-field regiment in Uri sector of Baramulla district in north Kashmir in the wee hours of Friday.

Five terrorists have also been killed in the gunbattle.

A senior Army officer who is commanding the operation against terrorists told TOI that the terrorists attacked the camp around 3am on Friday.

"The exact number of terrorists involved in the attack is not known. But the way these terrorists, believed to be from Pakistan, killed four security personnel on the road outside our Army camp makes us believe that they entered the camp from the gate through the road which is not made of concrete boundary."

The Army officer said, "One of our lieutenant colonels Sankalp Kumar of 24-Punjab regiment was killed in the exchange of fire besides three other soldiers. We have killed three terrorists so far and the operation against them is still going on."

The three soldiers killed in the gunbattle have been identified as AIS Mohammad Akbar Lone, head constable Abdul Majid and constable Sanjay Singh.

The operation against terrorists is being led by two officers Lt Col Gurawah Jain and Lt Col Surinder Singh.

Two to three militants were believed to have entered the camp where intense firing took place all morning. (Source: Twitter/ANI)

The officers confirmed that the Pakistani infiltrators divided themselves into two groups. While one group entered the Army camp, other engaged the troops at the gate.

"The infiltrators used small arms and followed it with UBGL fire," the Army officer said.

READ ALSO: Modi to campaign in third phase on December 8

The attack comes days ahead of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the state on December 8, where he is scheduled to address an election rally in Srinagar.

Uri goes to polls on December 9.

There has been no major incident of infiltration from Pakistani side in the area, except in the early 90s.

The Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and the trade between two parts of Kashmir are carried out through this point of LoC in Kashmir valley.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT S We thank the peer reviewers for reviewing this paper and providing us with valuable inputs to enrich this paper. We thank all our respondents who participated in this research, at last but not the least we would like to thank the editorial team and editor of this journal for their valuable inputs and suggestions time to time, which helped us to further improve this paper. REFERENCES Aassve A, I acovou M, Mencarini L (2005). Youth poverty in Europe: What do we know? Institute for Social and Economic Research. Asima H (2011). "The cost of conflict, The English Daily Greater Kashmir, " Census (2011). "Census Report 2011: Government of India." Dar MA (2011). "Socio - economic problems of youth due to prevailing situation in Kashmir : " A case study of District Pulwama" . Dissertation (MSW IGNOU) Unpublished". Naqshbandi and Amin 15 Deutsch MACP (eds.) (2000). The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice. San Francisco: Jossey - Ba ss. Development CCOA (1992). "A Matter of Time: Risk and Opportunity in the Nonschool Hours. Washington, DC: Task Force on Youth Devel opment and Community Programs". Fisher RJ (1990). "The social psychology of intergroup and international conflict resolut ion. New York: Springer - Verlag, 1990". Grove NJ, Zwi AB, Silove D, Tarantola D (2005). "Psychosocial health and human rights: Fair weather friends? Examining post - tsunami interventions in conflict - affected areas." Hoover HC (1944). " 31st President of the United States, "Illinois to the 23rd Republican National Convention " " Speech in Chicago, (27 June , 1944). Kleinfeld M (2009). "The political utility of the nonpolitical child in Sri Lanka's armed conflict." Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 99(5):874 - 883. MYA&S (201 1). "Report of working group on Adole s cent and Youth Development Department of Youth Affairs, M/O YA&S for formulation of 12th five - year plan (2012 - 20 17), Government of India ". Naqshbandi MM (2011). Child Labor in Kashmir, LAP Lambert Academic Publishin g. Naqshbandi MM, Sehgal R, ul Hassan F (2012). "Orphans in orphanages of Kashmir “and their Psychological problems”." Int. NGO J. 7(3):55 - 63. Quinn J (1995). "Positive effects of participation in youth organizations. In M. Rutter (Ed.), Psychosocial distu rbances in young people: Challenges for prevention. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press." Robertson Jr, RM (1997). "Walking the Talk: Organizational Modeling and Commitment to Youth and Staff Development." Child Welf. 76(5):577 - 589. Sehgal R (2011). Kashmir Conflict and Self - Determination . LAP Lambert Acad. Publ. pp. 30 - 32. Sofiya H (2012). "Conflict and Disappearances in Kashmir: A sociological Analysis." J . Soc . Kashmir, Dept . Sociol ., Univ . Kashmir 2:54 - 66. UN (2011). World Population Prospects: Th e 2010 Revision, Comprehensive Tables. ST/ESA/SER.A/313. V(I). "Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division". UN (2009). "World population Ageing, Department of Economic and Social A

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(vii) People in conflict hit zones should be freely allowed to perform their religious, social, cultural activities, so that feeling of belongingness can be created.

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(vi) Trainings of various vocational skills should b e provided to youth in conflict hit zones so that they find it easy to earn their bread and butter even in difficult times.

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(5)

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(iv) Children and women should be given due respect and safety.

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(iii) The economic security should be provided to the citizens falling in the conflict hit zone, so that their basic needs can be fulfilled.

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(ii) All the international treaties and United Nations declarations should be re spected by the nations who come under it, in the large interest of human beings.

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peace and safeguard to women and children. (i) Conflicts should be avoided at first place, for that matter resolution of conflict via peaceful dialogue should be preferred.

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Conclusion Since the independence of two nations India and Pakistan in 1947, Kashmir remained the center of conflict, Pakistan and India fought three wars over Kashmir. Though the nature of conflic t is different until 1989, with the downfall of the Soviet Union, India as its closest allies got affected and in 1989 insurgence in Kashmir forced India to deploy huge armed personals in the civilian areas of Kashmir, this move made civilians vulne rable and many lost their lives, became disabled psychologically as well as physically (Sehgal, 2011 ). Older men declare war. But it is youth that must fight and die. And it is youth who must inherit the tribulation, the sorrow and the triumphs that are t he aftermath of war (Hoover, 1944 ). This saying comes true about Kashmir where years ago older men started armed conflict and youth started losing their lives, psychological balance, avenues of employment and many more. Often young people are compelled to enroll themselves into armed conflict through individual hunger and poverty or through family economic strains. Other reasons why young people voluntarily enroll in armed conflicts include religious / ideological, social, community or family reasons, peer pressure, love for freedom and revenge. The youth are the most affected by the conflict, with the conflict in Kashmir since 1989 today‟s youth lost their childhood in the incidents of armed conflict, they could not be socialized in proper cultural and rel igious ethos of Kashmir. Due to exposure to the environment which was created with guns, killings and fear of conflict number of youth became involved in the struggle. The number of youth lost their lives, their beloved ones and many others are languishing in jails, detention centers and so many of them became psychological and physically disabled. All the aspects of their young likes have been affected; be it their cultural aspect, social aspect, religious aspect, psychological aspect, physical aspect, con flict broke down tradition community structure, disintegrated cultural norms and coping mechanism. In any conflict situation, civilians including children, women and youth, often witness traumatic events or are the victims of horrible atrocities like shoot ing, killing, displacement, loss of friends and close family members, loss of livelihood and income, exposure to sexual violence and psychological and emotional trauma, physical assaults and life threatening injuries. Conflict of any nature always has its impact on youth as youths are the people with fresh blood and are emotionally immature hence can be exploited easily, besides those the traumatic moments which they have gone through remaining with them till the end. This was observed that most of the yout h from conflict hit areas despite, them being intelligent are not able to deliver many at times. SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICY IMPLICATION The suggestions provided will help to improve lives of youth in the conflict hit zones, and also will help to b

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1 4 Int. J. Peace and Dev. Stud. [X 2 (2) = 45.23 P< 0.05, Cramer ‟s V= 0.43]. DISCUSSION Naqshbandi et al. (2012 ) revealed in their study that conflict has increased psychological problem among adolescents and same has been argued by (Asima, 2011 ) in her study that due to conflict people suffer physically, emotionally, economically etc., she further mentioned that yo uth in productive age due to conflict struggle for their identity and this identity crises cause many problems both psychological and economical also social. The same was found in this research paper that 53.8% of respondents reviled that they face identit y crises. Naqshbandi (2011 ) in his study mentions that conflict has given rise to the unemployment, with the result parents forced their children to join early laborhood. This study also showed that conflict has reason in the increase of unemployment among youth. In a report published in T a mi lNe t , 2002 it was shown that conflict is main cause of economic damage in Sri Lankan states where conflict was prevailing. This study also showed that conflict is responsible for the state‟s economic damage, wherein 7 9. 5 % of respondents expressed this. Grove et al. (2005 ) in their study argued that psychological problems increase among youth due to conflict zones the same was found by this study that psychological problems were at increase in the Kashmir due to ongoing c onflict and most among victims are Youth, 86 . 9 % of respondents expressed their views in support of this argument. Apart from psychological problem conflict brings physical, social, reli gious, educational etc ., problems, the data of this study clearly show ed that people feel conflict is directly responsible for their cultural, social, psychological and physical problems, many respondents reviled that drug addiction in Kashmir is offshoot of conflict as well as late marriages are results of it. The data anal ysis showed that youth suffer from psychological disorders due to conflict hence it can have a greater impact on their working capabilities and even of their academic capabilities. Family breakdown was also revealed during data analysis which means due to conflict family breakdown also takes place which again has bad impact of youth, the psychological and physical development of children can get hampered and some research has shown that children those who live in joint families are physically and psychologi cally strong than those who live in nuclear families.

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Analysis of Table 3 social impact shows: 77.2 % of respondents do not feel that conflict has played any role in social problem like late marriage; however 59.6 % of respondents mentioned that conflict has increased cultural degradation. 69.2 % of res pondents mentioned that conflict has played great role in family breakdown. 76.3 % of respondents revealed that people in their village or area have witnessed conflict in their lives. 71.8 % of respondents revealed that conflict has increased rate of drug a ddiction among youth. Analyzing the Crosstabulation 1 it was revealed that 97.3 % of female respondents mention that conflict has increased psychological problems among youth; however 77.6 % of male respondents also have same views . Analyzing this Cro sstabulation 2 show , 73.47 % of female respondents mentioned that conflict has played great role in unemployment of youth in Kashmir, whereas 66.06 % of male respondents also mentioned the same thing. However 33.94 % of male respondents mentioned that conflic t has not played any role in unemployment in Kashmir. This was supported with 26.53 % of female respondents. Analysis of this Crosstabulation 3 reveals that 74.83 % of female respondents mentioned conflict in Kashmir has played great role in family breakdown and this view was supported by 64.24 % of male respondents. The Chi - Square test shows statistical significant difference between male and female with regards to conflict in Kashmir played great role in family breakdown

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A total number 312 yo uth were approached deploying accidental sampling method and from each district 104 youth per district were approached. Scope of study Northwest state of India, Jammu and Kashmir with its borders touching Pakistan, Afghanistan and China, has three geogr aphical regions a) Jammu Province, b) Kashmir valley, and c) Ladakh Plateau. These three regions differ widely w ith regards to physical, socio - economic and cultural characteristics (Naqshbandi, 2011 ) . Jammu And Kashmir State is divided into two admin istrative divisions Jammu and Kashmir. The state has 22 districts, 87 Assembly Constituencies and 6 Parliamentary Constituencies with total Population; the total population of Jammu and Kashmir is 12.5 million ( Census, 2011 ) . Data analysis The data collected with the help of interview schedules was first manually scrutinized to ensure that all the interview schedules are properly filled. The total of 312 interview schedules was analyzed. The Statistical Pa ckage for Social Sciences program (SPSS) version 16.0 was used for further testing. T he frequency test was conducted to understand the ration . Further the cross tabulation was conducted to understand more facts. RESULTS Table 1 respondents profile gives outlook of respon dents. Analysis of Table 1 showed that; 52.9 % of respondents were male and 47.1 % of respondents were female. 44.6 % of respondents belong to age group of 20 to 25 years, 43.6 % of respondents belong to age group of 26 to 30 years and 11.5 % of respondents belong to 15 to 19 years. 46.8 % of respondents were having educational qualification of post graduate level, 45.8 $ of respondents were having educational qualification of Undergraduate level and 7.4 % of respondents were illiterate. 58.3 % of respondents belong to nuclear families and 41.7 % of respondents belong to joint families. Analysis of Table 2 psycho - economic impact reveals many interesting facts: 64.4 % of respondents revealed that they feel difficult to sustain in today‟s world due t o conflict surrounded them. 53. 8% of respondents mentioned they face identity crises due to living in conflict zone. 81.4 % of respondents revealed that conflict has greater negative impact on youth. 69.6 % of respondents mention that conflict plays greater role in youth unemployment. 63.8 % of respondents revealed that their

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Naqshbandi a nd Amin 11 Table 1. Respondents profile. Parameter Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative percent Gender ( Valid ) Male 165 52.9 52.9 52.9 Female 147 47.1 47.1 100.0 Age (years) ( Valid) 15 - 19 36 11.5 11.5 11.5 20 - 25 139 44.6 44.6 56.1 26 - 30 137 43.9 43.9 100.0 Educational qualification ( Valid) Illiterate 23 7.4 7.4 7.4 Undergraduate 143 45.8 45.8 53.2 Postgraduate 146 46.8 46.8 100.0 Family type ( Valid) Nuclear family 182 58.3 58.3 58.3 Joint family 130 41.7 41.7 100. 0 Total 312 100.0 100.0 education system got highly deteriorated resulting to the failure of youth in their future. Many youth are lying in jails and many are still missing, which resulted to the depression of their family members and suffer ings too (Dar, 2011 ) . RESEARCH METHODOLOGY The methodology used in this study was non - probability method with quantitative approach. Interview schedules were used to collect the data from the respondents . This was done so that both fractions of society illiterate and literate youth can be interviewed and views can be obtained. Tool formation and limitations The interview schedule was developed after intensive literature review, referring of previous interview schedules and questionnaires and discussio n with scholars. The interview schedule having close ended questions was used only to ensure the safety of the interviewers, and considering security point of view. The open ended questionnaires would have created trouble, and such similar ca ses were witne ssed already some research scholars. Data collection and sample The process of data collection with the help of interview schedules took approximat ely three months . The data was obtained from district Kupwara, Pulwama an d Srinagar.

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Thousands of Kashmiri youth suffer from psychological disorders, suicide rates are at increasing rate among young women and adolesce nt youth. The conflict situation has left behind a track of destruction, danger, and depression. Conflict bring the magnitude of loss and suffering to description in cold statistics, conflict in any form especially armed conflict always affect the youth t he future of any nation and hampers their efficiency to deliver (Sofiya, 2012 ) . There are cases of psychological and social unhealthy behavior of youth in areas affected with conflict. The core component to respond to conflict can be psycho - social recovery and well being. In an acute emergency, exacerbated by conflict, identifying and consolidating the links between psychosocial and human rights work is unlikely to be straightforward (Grove et al., 2005 ) . The conflict usually hampers the socio - psycho develo pment of youth, and its impact on society as a whol e is enormous, most of the time conflict rips apart the social fabric of the societies. With the people being killed, families torn apart, communities being displaced and divided, infrastructure being dama ged and destroyed and natural support systems crumble. It is recognized that violent conflict situations have devastating effects on any human being and can be particularly shattering for young people. Youth usually get affected in the conflict the most ap art from women and children, youth being in their developing stage actively forming identities and determining acceptable roles for themselves within their community and society as a whole. Conflict often destroys the safe environment provided by a house, a family, adequate nutrition, education and employment. Health risks increase during conflict, anxiety and depression, extreme stress, high - risk drug use and suicide are disturbing aspects of youth health that are particularly prevalent in societies experi encing conflict (Asima, 2011 ) . During the civilian conflict in Sri Lanka, the way children were used and its impact of their socio - psychological growth led many of them psychologically distracted or unhealthy. Research reveals how child centered tropes whe re used and how youth have been affected. A huge number of youth in their areas indulged in the conflict by one or other way. Their socio - psycho - educational growth suffered and most of these became victims of conflict (Kleinfeld, 2009 ) . Conflict highly imp acted the youth of Kashmir, their socio - psychological capabilities got affected , and lack of resources and unemployment added to depression of youth in conflict hit Kashmir leading them to drug addiction and other anti social activities. Fur ther

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10 Int. J. Peace and Dev. Stud. forces, thousands have been killed, and thousands became widows and orphans, social relations have been destroyed, and in addition to th ese people became psychologically ill, and are unable to carryout day to day activities. Family breakdown, family conflicts, unemployment, late marriages, orphanage culture, etc ., grow at fast rate in these situations of Kashmir. Most of the educated you th of Kashmir are Unemployed or underemployed. With the result most of them either switch to drugs or indulge in anti - social activities resulting damage of social and economic fiber (Dar, 2011 ) . Study objectives 1. To u nderstand the impact of conflict on social development of youth , 2. To u nderstand the impact of conflict on economic development of youth , 3. To a naly z e the psychological and other issues pertaining to youth due to conflict. LITERATURE REVIEW The literature review focused in two parts ; positive development of youth and affects of conflict on youth. Conducive atmosphere, services and various activities, help youth to transform into a positive adulthood life. Positive development of youth through various formal and informal opportunities and experiences provided to them by the nation and society help him grow strong and productive. Youth with good physical and mental status can contribute strongly to the development of their nation, rather than those with problems or at high risk (Robert son, 1997 ) . Conflict has played a great role in children being employed by various automobile shops and other sectors; conflict has made many young boys and girls‟ parent - less with the result they were forced to earn to survive. Conflict has also increased the number of orphans in Kashmir and many of such orphans left their schools at primary or middle school level to fetch their family needs (Naqshbandi , 2011 ) . Positive development of youth can be termed as ongoing growth process, in which all youth endeav or to meet their basic needs for their socio - psychological grooming and connects them to the larger community, youth development can be achieved by providing proper atmosphere for academic ac hievements, vocational training for skill development to earn, so cial and pe rsonal skills (soft skills) etc (Quinn, 1995 ) . Youth development helps young people to grow strong and develop inner strength and skills which are needed to cope with pressure that might lead to unhealthy and antiso cial behaviors. It helps them perfor m their duties in society according soci al norms. Healthy behaviors are one of the positive outcomes of positive youth development, but there are others including the production of self reliant, self confident etc. , positive developed youth are adults who can become responsible members of society and contribute to the development of society (Development, 1992 ) .

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Naqshbandi and Amin 9 Map 1. Map of youth population. demography, education, employment and health ( UNESCO ) . All United Nations statistics on youth are based on this definition, as illustrated by the annual yearbook of statistics published by the United Nations system on demography, education, employment and health (Aassve et al., 2005 ) . Within the category of “youth”, it is also important to distinguish between teenagers (aged between 13 and 19) and young adults (aged between 20 and 24), since the sociological, psychological and health problems they face may differ (DESA , 2002). Differe nt societies across the world have their own definition or meanings of youth, in some societies youth has an important gender dimension, boys and girls might experience being young in a considerably different way. Hence, in addition to being defined chrono logically (as a period of age between certain ages), youth is also defined functionally inv olving a process of transition. Y outh is also defined functionally (involving a process of transition from childhood to adulthood, marked by rituals or physical chan ges), as well as culturally (pertaining to the role that individuals play in a given social context). In from childhood to adulthood, marked by rituals or physical changes), as well as culturally (pertaining to the role that individuals play in a given soc ial context) (UNDP, 2006 ) . Conflict Conflict is such a term which , is used in various spheres of life, conflict arise with ideological differences, economic differences, value differences and power differences between two p eople, groups, teams, nations et c., conflict can occur at approach – approach (between two positive goals) , avoidance – avoidance (between two negative goals) and approach – avoidance (attracted and repelled by the same goal). Conflict whatever level takes place hampers human functioning. Conf lict could neither be good nor bad . H owever the conflict is handled determines either it could be constructive or destructive (Deutsch , 2000 ) . Conflict is defined as an incompatibility between two or more parties who are not able to live together in relati onship, despite number of attempts made to be together (Fisher, 1990 ) . Conflict in Kashmir The situation in Kashmir with the insurgence since 1989 things got affected. The prevailing condition since 1989 has not only deteriorated the social setup, but t he economic conditions as well (Sehgal, 2011 ) . With the conflict in civil are as and huge deployment of armed

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INTRODUCT ION Youth are considered the future of the nation, so the positive development of youth is very important for any nation to develop. Currently , most of the developing regions have young population , with children under age 15 accounting with 29 % of the po pulation and young p eople aged 15 to 24 accounting for a further 18 % . In fact, the numbers of children and young people in the developing regions are at all time high (1.6 billion children and 1.0 billion young people). The situation in the least developed countries is even more pressing because children under 15 constitute 4 0 % of their population and young peop le account for a further 20 % . In the developed regions, children and youth account for just 17 and 13 % of the population, respectively (U.N, 2011 ) . In Asia and the Pacific, youth makes up 61.8 % of the wo rld‟s total *Corresponding author. E youth population of 1.2 billion, an increase of 4 % as compared with 57.7 % in 2000 (U.N., 2009 ) . India has the largest youth popul ation in the world that is poised to increase further in the coming decade. 70% of India‟s population is below the age of 35 years (MYA&S, 2011 ) . India has the youth population including adolescents around 550 million ( Census, 2011 ) (Map 1) . Definition Youth The UN, for statistical consistency across regions, defines „youth‟, as those p eople between the ages of 15 and 24 years, without prejudice to other definitions by Member States. All UN statistics on youth are based on this definition, as illustrated by the annual yearbooks of statistics published by the United Nations system o

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International Journal of Peace and Development Studies Vol. 4 (1), pp. 8 - 15 , February 201 3 Available online at DOI: 10.5897/IJPDS2012.0147 ISSN 2141 - 6621 ©201 3 Academic Journals Full length Research Paper Conflict zone and developmental issues faced by youth : “A study from Kashmir” M . Mudasir Naqshban di* and Wakar Amin Department of Social Work, University of Kashmir, Hazratbal, Srinagar 190006, Jammu and Kashmir , India . Accepted 15 February, 2013 Conflict in an y of its forms affect s the human beings; Youth are the future leaders of any nation and impact of conflict hampers their efficiency of work and thinking; this study looks at the issues faced by the youth of Kashmir due to ongoing conflict, arose by infiltr ation after 1989. A study on youth aging between 15 to 30 years was conducted in three conflicted affected districts of Kashmir. Interview schedule was used to collect the responses of youth so that both illiterate and literate youth s can be interviewed. S urvey method was used to conduct this study, the questions were asked to youth in local language namely Kashmiri and back - translation (Brislin , 1970) procedure was used to ensure validity of the interview schedule. The study results make some interesting r evelations. It emerges that most of the youth thin k that issues like identity crises , unemployment, psychological stress, identity crises etc ., are all offshoots of conflict. In any conflict hit zone, the government and other agencies should ensure economi c security, safety of women and children, skill based education should be provided to youth and parents at their ends should properly do counselling to their children about good and bad. The study about the impact of conflict on youth reveals many facts an d also re - verified many others, the data collected from different distric ts of Kashmir Valley showed youth feels and sufferings they go through due to conflict .

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Naqshbandi MM (2011). Child Labor in Kashmir, LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. Naqshbandi MM, Sehgal R, ul Hassan F (2012). "Orphans in orphanages of Kashmir "and their Psychological problems"." Int. NGO J. 7(3):55-63. Quinn J (1995). "Positive effects of participation in youth organizations. In M. Rutter (Ed.), Psychosocial disturbances in young people: Challenges for prevention. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press." Robertson Jr, RM (1997). "Walking the Talk: Organizational Modeling and Commitment to Youth and Staff Development." Child Welf. 76(5):577-589. Sehgal R (2011). Kashmir Conflict and Self-Determination. LAP Lambert Acad. Publ. pp. 30-32. Sofiya H (2012). "Conflict and Disappearances in Kashmir: A sociological Analysis." J. Soc. Kashmir, Dept. Sociol., Univ. Kashmir 2:54-66. UN (2011). World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, Comprehensive Tables. ST/ESA/SER.A/313. V(I). "Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division". UN (2009). "World population Ageing, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, United Nations". UNDP (2006). "Youth and Violent conflict; Society and Development in crisis: United Nations Development Programme, USA".

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Article Number - 332CF3841212 Vol.4(1), pp. 8-15 , February 2013 DOI: 10.5897/IJPDS2012.0147 ISSN: 2141-6621 Conflict zone and developmental issues faced by youth: “A study from Kashmir” M. Mudasir Naqshbandi* and Wakar Amin Department of Social Work, University of Kashmir, Hazratbal, Srinagar 190006, Jammu and Kashmir, India. Conflict in any of its forms affects the human beings; Youth are the future leaders of any nation and impact of conflict hampers their efficiency of work and thinking; this study looks at the issues faced by the youth of Kashmir due to ongoing conflict, arose by infiltration after 1989. A study on youth aging between 15 to 30 years was conducted in three conflicted affected districts of Kashmir. Interview schedule was used to collect the responses of youth so that both illiterate and literate youths can be interviewed. Survey method was used to conduct this study, the questions were asked to youth in local language namely Kashmiri and back-translation (Brislin, 1970) procedure was used to ensure validity of the interview schedule. The study results make some interesting revelations. It emerges that most of the youth think that issues like identity crises, unemployment, psychological stress, identity crises etc., are all offshoots of conflict. In any conflict hit zone, the government and other agencies should ensure economic security, safety of women and children, skill based education should be provided to youth and parents at their ends should properly do counselling to their children about good and bad. The study about the impact of conflict on youth reveals many facts and also re-verified many others, the data collected from different districts of Kashmir Valley showed youth feels and sufferings they go through due to conflict. Key words: Youth, conflict, Kashmir, identity crises, unemployment, psychological. Aassve A, Iacovou M, Mencarini L (2005). Youth poverty in Europe: What do we know? Institute for Social and Economic Research. Asima H (2011). "The cost of conflict, The English Daily Greater Kashmir, " Census (2011). "Census Report 2011: Government of India." Dar MA (2011). "Socio-economic problems of youth due to prevailing situation in Kashmir: " A case study of District Pulwama". Dissertation (MSW IGNOU) Unpublished". Deutsch MACP (eds.) (2000). The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Development CCOA (1992). "A Matter of Time: Risk and Opportunity in the Nonschool Hours. Washington, DC: Task Force on Youth Development and Community Programs". Fisher RJ (1990). "The social psychology of intergroup and international conflict resolution. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990". Grove NJ, Zwi AB, Silove D, Tarantola D (2005). "Psychosocial health and human rights: Fair weather friends? Examining post-tsunami interventions in conflict-affected areas."

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100 lines of scholarly citations deleted Bunch of Idiots! ...and I am Sid Harth

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Dasgupta, C. (2005) „Jammu and Kashmir in the Political Union: The Politics of Autonomy,‟ in Dossani, R. and Rowen, H.S. (eds.) Prospects for Peace in South Asia.

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Chowdhary, R. (2010) „Multiple Identity Politics in Jammu and Kashmir,‟ in Chowdhary, R. (ed.), Identity Politics in Jammu and Kashmir . New Delhi: Vitasta Publishing Pvt. Ltd.

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Chowdhary, R. (2010) Identity Politics in Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi: VitastaPublishing Pvt. Ltd.

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Brass, P.A. (1991) Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. New Delhi: SagePublications.

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Behera, N.C. (2006) Demystifying Kashmir. Washington, D.C.: Brookings InstitutionPress.

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Behera, N.C. (2000) State, Identity and Violence. New Delhi: Center for Policy Research

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Ball, T. and Dagger, R. (2009) Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal. 7 th ed. NewYork: Pearson Education, Inc.

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Akbar, M.J. (1985) India: The Siege Within. Harmondsworth, United Kingdom: PenguinBooks.

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51 6. Bibliography 6.1 Bibliography- Texts  Acharya, A. and Achar ya, A. (2006) „Kashmir in the International System,‟ in Sidhu, W.P.S., Asif, B., and Samii, C. Kashmir: New Voices, New Approaches. Boulder: LynneRienner Publishers.

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50 because it helps to explain tough questions in life. There is usually one book that may act as a guidebook for life, such as the Qur‟an. For the religious nationalist, the Qur‟an clearly defines the law of the land and therefore they may deny democracy and opt instead for a theocracywhere laws are determined by the ummah . Pan-Islamism has influenced the Kashmiri separatistmovement and they are not only fighting against an oppressor, but fighting against perceivedHindu oppression. Likewise, religious nationalist parties within India have struck fear in theJammu and Kashmir Hindu population. The Amarnath land row was exploited by both Islamic aswell as Hindu nationalist leaders to mobilize people by appealing to their sense of religiousidentity. Based on the poll results, it worked. Communal religious politics is not always the bestway to mobilize support, and it may even backfire. When Pakistan tried to start an insurgency inKashmir after the missing relic at Hazratbal, t hey were awakened to the reality that Muslims‟ opposition to India was not a call to seek integration with an existing Islamic state. With thealienation of moderate Muslims and the rejection of Sufi Islam by extremist militants, therecould be no means through which to carry on a strictly Islamic-based insurgency. Likewise,however, with the Muslim identity having such a strong appeal to the masses, any attempt at acompletely secular national movement could probably not be sustained. Kashmiriyat andMuslimness are inseparable and the appeals to be Kashmiri and to be Muslim are a symbiotic relationship. To answer the title of this study: “To be a Kashmiri or to be a Muslim?” The answer is “both.”

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49 militancy in the late 1980s. In an attempt to secure the Valley for itself, Pakistan offered trainingand weapons to those wishing to fight the Indian security forces. When that failed to harness enough support, Pakistan‟s ISI drew from the mujahedin that had fought in Afghanistan. TheirIslamic ideals were suitable to waging a sustained militant movement which could eventuallylead to the secessionist of Kashmir to Pakistan. Although the Kashmiris are strong Muslimsthemselves, they soon became alienated when their brand of Islam was attacked. In addition, the jihadists were committing the same or even worse atrocities than their Indian oppressors. Yearslater the Kashmiris feel abandoned by the state government and the international community.The militancy has largely died down and the youth have resorted to throwing stones, which inreturn is being met with deadly force by the Indian security forces.. Since the moderate leadersare constantly being jailed, many of the youths are left leaderless or feeling as though radicalismis the only means of combating oppression. Although the people of Kashmir have a strong senseof Kashmiriyat , they also strongly identify themselves as Muslims. Being denied the right to self-determination on nationalist grounds, some of the Kashmiris have once again turned to Islamismas a means to regain their identity. Some of the separatists are very active on the internet andhave created social networking sites, where they voice their opinions. Some want to see Kashmirindependent from India, and other want to see Kashmiri turned into its own Islamic state; part of a new world order where Muslims rule the world. Most have called for peaceful protests, butsome have openly agitated for a renewed insurgency in Kashmir which would once again throwthe state into a full-fledged battleground.The findings of this study confirm that not only are nationalism and religion strong identitymarkers, but they are quite salient as well. These two identity markers fluctuate in level of importance to the individual as well as to the group. Religion is a very stable identity marker

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48 5. Conclusion The world has fluctuated between varying degrees of philosphical and ideological leanings.Although it is difficult to definitively distinguish between the periods of Enlightenment orRomanticism; or, modernism and postmodernism, it is generally accepted that the idea of anation becoming a political unit took shape after the French Revolution. During the Enlightenedyears, some men claimed that we could live in a utopia of universalism for mankind. The churchwould not influence the state, and all men of all nations could co-exist peacefully together.However, it would seem that just as the pen went to paper, nationalism ushered in a new erawhere nations would be formed on the basis of common religions, languages, and historicalbackgrounds. With the Treaty of Amritsar, the British granted Maharaja Singh a lump of territorywhich included Muslims of various sects, Sikhs, and Hindus which had already formed regionalidentities which may not have aligned with their religious affiliations. Hasty to depart, the Britishdivided the Subcontinent into generally Muslims and Indian domiciles. The state of Jammu andKashmir was stuck in the middle and was home to a conglomeration of people with all sorts of individual and group identities, which to this would not fit quite right in either India or Pakistan.The state itself is in disagreement about their political future. Parts of Jammu and Ladakh wish tointegrate into India, parts of Azad Kashmir wish to integrate fully into Pakistan, and the KashmirValley is in a struggle for independence. To make matters worse, the two key internationalplayers have been perceived as Pakistan and India, who have acquired nuclear weapons whichexacerbates the consequences of continued conflict over the already war-torn area. TheKashmirirs have faced oppression from the central government of India and have hadsuccessively corrupt state politicians whom they feel do not represent their best interests.Without access to a stable democratic forum to voice their dissent, Kashmiris had turned to

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47 the identities of people in such a way that often supersedes other factions of their identity. TheAmarnath agitation is one such situation that took on communal overtones even when in reality itwas simply a land dispute. The Amarnath agitation brought hostilities and divisiveness to thepeople of Jammu and Kashmir. Prior to the agitation, there was great discontentment with theway Srinagar seemed to exploit the other regions of the state for the benefits of the Valley.However, the significance is that although there were communal sentiments added to theseregional sentiments, the rightest Hindu parties expounded on this communal tension, which wasevident by the gains of the BJP in election results (Tremblay, 2009: 948). As had been the case inprevious incidents, the upheaval and communal tensions promoted by the Muslims encouraged asimilar response from the Hindus, and so on. Thus the ethnic marker of being from Jammu whichhad outweighed the ethnic marker of being Hindu was now reversed. Similarly, the secularpolitical movements which took on unprecedented communal overtones in the early 1990s onceagain had arisen in the common self-perceptions of the people. Therefore, the next generation of mobilized youth carried with them the dual sense of Muslimness and Kashmiriyat

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46 came first, is a difficult question to assess. Instead, it should be sufficient to say that the onemovement encouraged the other. How the BJP came to be recognized was because they wereagitating for a temple to be built in the fabled birthplace of the god Ram at the current site of aMuslim mosque in Ayodhya (Haynes, 1998: 175). Radical supporters of this idea destroyed thehistoric Babri mosque in December 1992 (Behera ,2006: 238). The destruction of the mosquewas viewed with pride by Hindu nationalists and “[t]he subsequent violence against Muslimswas carried out with the slogan that Muslims belonged properly in either “Pakistan” or „ qabaristan’ (the graveyard)” (Metcalf 2005: 221). Later, the BJP was blamed for anti -Muslimriots in the BJP-dominated state of Gujarat in 2003. In Kashmir both Hindu nationalists andsecularists rally around the state in an effort to promote their cause (Behera, 2006: 238). Asecularist might not want Kashmir to cede to Pakistan for fears of the state becoming Islamic; aHindu nationalist fears rule from Srinagar alienates and subjugates the Hindu and Buddhistminority. 4.6 Religiously or Politically Motivated Grievances? Whether or not a political movement is religiously-based or religiously influenced, when apolitical eli te comes under threat, “they will work to reframe issues of contention as religious issues, essentially attempting to outbid each other in an effort to establish religious credibilityand thus attract domestic and external support (Toft 2007: 98). In the case where a religion is astrong identity qualifier among a population, leaders may exploit this to gain legitimacy andlocal as well as international support. Toft explains how conflicts where religion is a peripheryissue can quickly gain steam and move to the center (2007: 106). Even though an issue may bebrought up on a non-religious basis, it can quickly be fed by communal angst which appeals to

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45 minorities as prescribed in the Quran and Sunna,” and called for Islamic socialism (Behera ,2006: 150). Similarly, the calls for freedom in Kashmir have not just been calls for independencefrom India, but have been calls for the freedom to be ruled under Islamic law. The rights of the poor that were hailed as a rallying point for Kashmiris under Abdullah‟s land reforms have been overshadowed by a succession of corrupt regimes in Srinagar and iron rule from New Delhi.Many activists on social networking sites are posting depictions of young men and boys beingkilled by Indian security forces or videos of Kashmiri youths being forced to parade through thestreets naked (JUGNU4, 2010). These images spawn comments which point to the fallacy of aso-called Indian democracy. When Schaffer visited the Valley as early as the 1970s, he describedSrinagar as a city under siege (2009: 100). When secularism has failed to end poverty anddemocracy has failed to manifest in Kashmir, Islamic law is the next natural option for which toturn. 4.5 Hindu Nationalism Various authors have described the rise of communalism as a direct consequence of religious- leaning political ideologies. Throughout India‟s h istory, there have been communalist partiesrepresented by Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims. The Muslim League, the proponents of Pakistanwere a communal Muslim group, and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is a large and hugelysuccessful party in India today which grew out of a small Hindu communalist movement(Haynes, 1998: 175). Religious nationalism in Kashmir did not manifest itself out of nowhere.Early Hindu political movements were similar to Islamic counterparts. They sought bettereducation for women, equality for members of all castes, and the alleviation of poverty in theirlocal communities (Haynes, 1998: 173). Later, however, the movement against Britishcolonialism acquired a religious flavoring. Whether Hindu nationalists or Muslim nationalists

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44 Muslims involved. Instead they hailed from the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) militantorganization which got its roots from the mujahedin active in Afghanistan and whose goalsinclude not only challenging India‟s sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir, but also proscribes to the establishment of a global Khilafa state (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2001). 4.4 Support for Islamic movements is not necessarily support against secular politicalmovements Although people identify with and are indeed able to be mobilized along religious communallines, it is quite possible that given a moderate alternative, they will take it. In chapter two,evidence made it clear that people were not necessarily taken with any radical ideology of members of the Muslim United Front, and although the elections of 1987 were clearly rigged,had they not been rigged, it is very well possible that even in a fair election the group would nothave done very well. Likewise, support for Islamic parties does not translate into support forviolent extremism. Violent extremism was only turned to when all options of becomingdemocratically elected failed. Also, groups such as Jamaat-i-Islami who have always beencommunal religious organizations might not have had as great of an appeal as they have had hadthere been other options.Another point to make, is that the call for shar’ia law is not necessary the same call for a shar’ia law as extremist groups such as the Taliban would like to implement. Contrary to popular belief, it is not about closing girls‟ schools or making women cover their faces as some movements in Pakistan are interpreting the law as being (Ahmad, 2009: 3). When the JKLF called for Islamiclaw, they were mostly calling for Islamic democracy, which would safeguard “the rights of

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43 voluntarily go with India (Schaffer, 2009: 29; Akbar, 1985: 244 5 ). The other significance of thepopularity of the NC and Abdullah leader up to and after independence is that it mobilizedpeople along secular lines which contributed to the identity of Kashmiriyat , a Kashmiri identitywhich was not contradictory to the identity of a secular Indian one which the INC was espousingbefore the rise of communal Hindu nationalism. It was this Kashmiri identity which led thepeople to disavow their religious identity (Behera, 2006: 27). As Malik points out, “[t]he Kashmir Valley was historically renowned for its absence of communal violence. While otherparts of the Indian subcontinent periodically succumbed to serious religious violence, Kashmir remained largely immune to this disease” (2005: 9). Although Malik goes further to claim that it was not some inseparable bond of the Kashmiri Pandits and Hindus, but a combination of factorsincluding co-dependence and geographical isolation from the rest of the Subcontinent, there wasno doubt that the Hindus and the Muslims lived in relative harmony until the entrance of communal politics (2005).Being denied a voice in a democratic forum, even the most peaceful of Muslims may resort toterrorism. As New York Times columnist, Thomas Friedman revealed after the attacks of 9/11, the key to combating terrorism was “participation in a secular, democratic political system” (Metcalf, 2005:216). Ironically, Friedman was comparing the 120 million strong Muslimpopulation of India to the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks who mostly hailed from autocratic and/or extremely corrupt and unstable „democratic‟ regimes: read Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Looking forward to the infamous 26/11 (11 November) attacks on Mumbai, there were no Indian 5 Akbar‟s bo ok, India: The Siege Within , is a good historical account of the rise of Sheikh Abdullah, but it seems to have a more positive „spin‟ on Abdullah‟s acceptance of Kashmir accession into the Indian Union than some other texts. In reality, it is difficult to evaluate whether or not the majority of Kashmiris would have voted for India in afree and fair plebiscite, but there was definitely a better chance of success at this point then in later points in Kashmir‟s history.

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42 4) Erosion of Muslim culture with the advent of secularization, modernization, andglobalization5) Better access to education, and news media outlets which made the people moreaware of their democratic and human rights6) Lack of economic opportunity, corrupt state and central institutions which siphonedaway money for economic development and industrialization7) A gun culture which made access to weapons easier, and exasperated by access to training camps and facilities that have been supported and even run by Pakistan‟s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)The scope of this study does not allow for an in-depth analysis of all of the above mentionedcauses, but it important to note that it is a toxic cocktail of the above mentioned causes whichhad the effect of an insurgency. Some of the points are analyzed in more detail below. 4.3 Don’t Mute the Moderate The first cause and one of the most important is the general „moral‟ of the story‟ as is clearlyobvious when taking a casual glimpse of the historical evidence found in chapter two. By notallowing free and fair elections, or a plebiscite on Kashmir at a time when Sheikh Abdullah andhis National Conference were clearly pro-India, this left the overly-cautious INC to miss theirwindow of opportunity. Although there was some regional variation between being pro-Pakistanor pro-India, Sir Own Dixon had brought forth the idea of a zonal plebiscite, which had it beenimplemented in 1950 4 when it was proposed might have seen a Kashmir that was willing to 4 For a more in- depth explanation of Dixon‟s plan for a zonal plebiscite and a discussion of the United Nations mediation efforts, see Schaffer, H.B. (2009) The Limits of Influence: America’s Role in Kashmir . Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institute Press.

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Lack of a democratic forum to voice legitimate political grievances against India andthe subsequent muting of the moderate Muslim voice, creating a vacuum which wasfilled by radical religious and political leaders2) Rise of Pan-Islamism after success of mujahedin against the Soviets in Afghanistan, jihad movement in Palestine, and Iranian revolution3) Rise of Hindu parties

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Since jihad usually has some ideologicalcomponent, the Kashmiri struggle for independence is as much a political movement as it is areligious one. Despite the fact that many of those asked personally about the movement inKashmir will deny the implications of Islam in their political movement, it is hard to deny inreality. 4.2 Explaining the Rise of Militancy in Kashmir Malik (2005), Schofield (2010), and other authors give an in-depth analysis of the rise of militancy at the end of the 1980s.

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41 Kashmiri groups generally see violent suppression of demonstrators by security forces, thisgroup sees the courageous Indian security forces facing off on a small army of violent protestorswho throw rocks and charge the forces, constant ly putting the Indians‟ lives at risk.The title of this section: „The Facebook Jihad,‟ is not necessarily derogative. Most people thatstudy anything about Islam will soon come to know that „jihad‟ is not necessarily a viole ntuprising against the infidel (Heywood, 2007: 295)

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40 secessionist movement in Kashmir today has exploited Facebook exactly for the latter. In fact,reading a blog on the web stressed the importance of this new tool as a means of unifying andsolidifying support for aazadi . The blog entry boasts, „S treet to Faceboo k.‟ In the entry, theauthor praises the success of mobilizing the masses in support of aazadi via online networking sites such as Facebook. “The days of letter writing are out with the wind,” the author proclaims (Talib, 2010). Most of the group sites on Facebook, however, are not just about voicing politicaldissent. They are equally a forum for moderate to radical Islamists. In addition to discussing theirpersonal encounters with the protest movements and how the presence of the Indian securityforces has affected their lives, Islam is consistently discussed in personal comments.Many of the Kashmir-based group sites clearly reflect the Islamic nature of their movement. Asone example, one such group site is called “Kashmir -An Integral Part of Global Islamic KhilafaS tate.” This group has a total of 3640 fans. They do not try to hide their Pan-Islamic agenda, andclaim that one day Muslims will once again rule the world (Administrator, 2010) Another groupthat offers regular updates on those killed in Kashmir, or posts pictures depicting acts of oppression or misery at the hands of Indian security forces is Frontline Kashmir. They say thatthey are a non-profit organization which claims to protest the genocide of the Kashmiris. The Facebook group was „liked‟ by 7437 people before being hacked into and taken down. A month later, the new site has over 4000 fans. This group posts upcoming protests, relays news of disturbances, shut-downs, curfews, and posts pictures of those who have been martyred byIndian security forces. There is a mix of politics and praise for Allah, but the movement appearsto be largely secular. 5683 peo ple like the group “Save KASHMIR. It Belongs to INDIA.” This group regularly posts about the Pandit efforts to return to Kashmir. Whereas the pro- aazadi

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39 Sayeed‟s PDP whom is “encouraging demonstrations against the government and the securityforces to embarrass the government…” (Protests in Indian Kashmir, 2010). Meanwhile, the supposedly „leaderless‟ and „illiterate‟ youths with internet access continue to hail Geelani, as well as Yasin Malik of the JKLF in frequent posts. New York Times correspondent Polgreenconfirms that these youths are often educated and have created Facebook groups (2010). KhalidKhan, a frequent poster on many of the groups I have been observing, holds an MBA and has ahigh-paying job . Polgreen quotes him as saying, “Stone pelting is a form of resistance to their acts of repression in the face of peaceful protest…[s]tones do not kill…[t]heir bullets kill” (2010). Many of the Kashmiri youths have taken to the internet to voice their dissent. They are not only disenchanted with the „democracy‟ of their state, but they are disgusted with the response of the world to their plight. When David Cameron visited India during the summer, he only criticized Pakistan‟s exporting of terror. Wanting to boost investment and trade with his hosts, he declined to raise the issue of human rights in the Valley (Kashmir burns again 2010).Mirwaiz Farooq expressed his disappointment, “Of all the foreign countries, Britain has moremoral responsibility for this mess” (ibid). Facebook is a social networking site that is used the world over by millions of people from aplethora of backgrounds. It is an icon of the age of globalization; connecting friends,acquaintances, friends of friends, relatives, and total strangers to each other based on commoninterests and common dislikes. It is used to meet new people, re-connect with past acquaintances,and even exploited as a tool for online dating. On Facebook, every user creates a personal profilewhich is then displayed for the whole world to see. Users can also create groups based onanything from a common interest in music to the promotion of political movements. The

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This may be worthwhile sincewhen Geelani called for peaceful demonstrations, the masses have largely been listening. Thereis also fear that if the more moderate leaders, such as the Mirwaiz Umer Farooq are detained andimprisoned, it will give rise to more radical, youthful leadership (Geelani, Mirwaiz detained inKashmir, 2010). Internal politics within the state have also been affected. Omar Abdullah, whosegovernment has cracked down on separatist leaders have been under fire by Mehbooba Mufti .

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The Indian as well as the state government‟s havecontinued to argue that the protest movements in the Valley today are a “continuation of the secessionist insurgency that began in 1989, and has been backed by Paki stan” (Stony Ground ,2010). Choudhary, of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) in New Delhi, arguesthat the current cries for aazadi are from a new generation of youths that have no leader (2010).

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38 organizing the protests and strikes by issuing protest calendars (Geelani Releases Fresh ProtestCalendar, 2010). The technically-savvy youth are then distributing the calendars and organizingtheir protest group on social media sites such as Facebook.Omar Abdullah, with the cooperation of Manmohan Singh are trying their hand at developmentprograms to help ease some of the everyday sufferings of the Kashmiri people. They are doingthis by promising increased employment and industry opportunities (A Cyclical Problem, 2010:47). Many officials in the Indian government have attributed the stone pelting movement to abunch of illiterate youths, who are pawns playing into the hands of Pakistan forces who aretrying to stir dissent (Polgreen, 2010).

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37 4. Analysis This final chapter will reflect on the background information and put it in terms of the theoreticalbackground in the second chapter. To do this, I will focus on the most recent politicalmovements as the context in which to place the theories of religious and nationalist identity. Forthis chapter, I will focus on the political movements post-Amarnath land dispute, placing special emphasis on the „youth‟ movements. I will utilize traditional academic sources and articles in addition to non-traditional sources such as blogs and social networking sites. 4.1 The Facebook Jihad In the 1930s, a young Sheikh Abdullah helped to form the Reading Room, which started aprolonged movement of Kashmiris protesting the harsh rule of Maharaja Singh. In 1989,disillusioned with the lack of democracy and economic opportunity, another generation of Kashmiris voted with Kalashnikovs and grenades in a bloody militant movement that told Indiato quit Kashmir. In 2010, nearly two decades later, the new generation of youths are defyingcurfew orders protesting in masses, and pelting stones at security forces that are responding withgunfire. As of this writing, 105 people have been killed in a bloody summer of violence, withthe latest casualty a 25 year old woman from Sopore succumbing to her injuries in a hospital on19 Sept. 2010 (Ahmad, 2010). After more than ten years, Indian military forces flooded the streets of Kashmir‟s summer capital, Srinagar, to combat stone pelting mobs who have been protesting with force ever since a 17-year old was killed by a tear gas shell on 11 June 2010(Protests in Indian Kashmir, 2010). The youths are throwing stones and the Indian security forcesare applying deadly force to subdue the mobs. Since then, curfews (some 24 hours) and politicalshut-downs in the Valley have been commonplace. The APHC leader, Geelani, has been

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36 of the APHC along with Yasin Malik of the JKLF created the Kashmir Action Committee whichorganized massive protests and demonstrations, uniting everyone from journalists and teachers toindustrialists and traders (Tremblay, 2009: 941). The results were tens of thousands of protestorsdisplaying their anger at India. With Muslims already fearing the erosion of their identity, storiesin local newspapers documenting the dramatic decline of Muslims in the Valley were floodingthe Valley. About a week after the protests had begun and with his position in danger, the orderwas withdraw by then Chief Minister Ghulum Nabi Azad (Ibid.)Incensed with defeat, the Jammu Hindus found the reversal of the land transfer to be a directblow to their identity and to their religion. The Hindus also formed a committee of their own,which unified the people of Jammu like the region had never before seen. The protestmovements were very violent; curfews were disobeyed, army troops were attacked, andgovernment property was destroyed (Tremblay, 2009: 942). The Amarnath land row broughtback to the fore not only regionalism, but a renewed cry for Hindu and Muslim nationalism thatis still heard loudly today. It is against this backdrop that a renewed call for aazadi can be heardin the Valley today.

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35 elections the appearance of legitimacy (Malik, 2005: 324). Since 1996, the separatist factionshave been boycotting elections and the ND, PDP, and other parties have been contending inthem. To bridge the gap, and as a means of appearing to represent the people of Kashmir, thepolitical parties have been running on the platform not in opposition to secession, but merely as anecessary step to better governance and stability in the Valley (Chowdhary, 2009: 11). By thetime the 2002 elections rolled around, people voluntarily voted because it was in their besteconomical interests to do so, but they continued to support and attend protests organized by theAPHC. Reflecting the mood of modern politics in Kashmir, one Valley voter declared, „ “We want aazadi, and at the same time, we also want aazadi from erratic power supply and bad roads. We are voting because we need to have out representatives who will address out local issues”‟ (Tremblay 2009: 944). In 2008, religious nationalism again became increasingly evident as the Muslim Kashmiris responded to a land dispute with Jammu‟s Hindus. The Amarnath agitation did for the newcentury what the Hazratbal incident did for the last in uniting Muslims along communal lines. InMay of 2008, the state government of Jammu and Kashmir approved the transfer a chunk of landto a Hindu shrine commission to aid in the holy pilgrimage, or yatra, of thousands of Hindus. 99acres of land were diverted to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) so as to accommodate thepilgrims (Tremblay, 2009: 924). This move, however, was greeted with great hostility inKashmir, whose Muslims generally believed the land diversion was part of a wider conspiracy toshift the demographic balance in the state, thus threatening Muslim identity. Moderates and moreradical factions as well as the people en masse vehemently demanded that the order to divert theland be withdrawn. Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Mirwaiz Omar Farooq of the most notable wings

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34 1995. Because the foreign terrorists were less scrupulous and indiscriminating against civiliantargets than their home-grown Kashmiri counterparts, support for the militancy waned and madeit easier for the Indian security forces to contain (Dasgupta, 2005: 253).In the early 1990s, there were a lot of non-state actors involved in militancy and politics inKashmir. By 1993, the Hizb- ul Mujahideen “was waging an Islamic movement against the Hindu Indian state in order to accede to Islamic Pakistan ” (Behera , 2006: 152). Accepting the ideologyof their parent organization, the Jamaat-i-Islami, the HUM now began to see the solution to theKashmir question as accession to Pakistan. Leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Syed Ali Geelani,claimed that an independent Kashmir was not feasible (Independent Kashmir not Feasible 2001).Despite the differences of opinion as to whether or not Kashmir should accede to Pakistan or bean independent state, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) for some time united thevarious separatist organization under the singular theme of fighting Indian rule (Kaur, 2006: 22).Formed in 1993, and still in operation today, the APHC split off into two groups in 2003 with amore moderate Mirwaiz-led group. The split was formed after Geelani protested the fielding of candidates in state assembly elections by a faction of the APHC (Kaur, 2006: 23).In 1996, state assembly elections were held for the first time in nine years and although the NC won the elections, another political party, the People‟s Democratic Party (PDP) emerged as the secular opposition to the NC, which was still dominated by the Abdullah family (Dasgupta,2005: 255). The results of the election were not very legitimate, however. Many voters stayedhome for fear of attacks from militants or as a result of simply being disillusioned with thepolitical process. Those that did turn up, however, were forced to by security forces to give the

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33 removed from the Indian struggles for independence from Britain, but associated withcontemporary liberation movements such as those against the tyranny in Eastern Europe, theemancipation of Afghanistan from the Soviets, and struggles for freedom in Central Asia(Behera, 2006: 146). They were also caught up in the Pan-Islamic movement and the resurgenceof Islam as described in the previous chapter.Pakistan, whom still wanted the state to cede to it as opposed to becoming an independent entity,began to defer assistance from the independence-motivated militants and instead began tosponsor irredentist groups which supported the Kashmir acce ssion to Pakistan. Pakistan‟s Inter -Services Intelligence (ISI) soon began to exploit the anti-India sentiment by supporting militantgroup that wanted accession to Pakistan (Behera, 2006: 150). In fact, Chandran asserts that theHizb-ul Mujahedin was created by Pakistan to sustain the conflict in Kashmir (2006: 50).Although the JKLF was primarily a secular movement, they were already using Islamic themesto mobilize political support and funding. Behera claims that the JKLF was “the main force behind the expulsion of the minority Pandit community, with many of its cadre implicated in the brutal killings of Kashmiri Pandits” (2006: 151).This paved the way for the HUM and other militant groups which advocated terrorism and violence as a means to an end in a holy war(ibid). The JKLF and other secular secessionist movements were further eclipsed by theformation of pro-Pakistan groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), which were supported by Pakistan‟s regimes and whose numbers were overwhelminglyPakistani (Chandran, 2006: 50). Increasingly, the makeup of the militants were foreign, andwhether due to the lack of support the foreign jihadists got from the local population or for a newwave of Indian military and paramilitary personnel, the militancy was essentially contained by

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32 National Conference-Congress alliance. He was re-elected in 1987 through rigged electionswhich alienated the new coalition of pro-Muslim parties, the Muslim United Front (MUF).People became disillusioned with the electoral process and when the MUF saw themselves ascheated of victory, they splintered off into militant groups (Dagsgupta, 2005: 250). 3 By 1987, a new generation of Kashmiris were politically active. They were well-educated andtired of being denied their political rights. Without the proper democratic channels to voice theirdiscontent, the Kashmiri youth resorted to an armed insurrection to obtain their dream of aazadi, or freedom, from India (Kazi, 2009: 84). With the help of and the inspiration of the successful mujahedin who fought against the Soviets a decade earlier in Afghanistan, a sustained militancywas fomented (Dasgupta, 2005: 251). Pakistan had already stepped up its efforts in Kashmir byretaining its mujahedin in militant training camps that it could use to infiltrate Kashmir. “The disillusioned Kashmiri youths who crossed over the Line of Control after the 1987 electionsfound that arrangements were already in place for training, arming, and financing a militant movement” (Dasgupta , 2005: 251). Armed with Kalashnikovs, grenades, and rocket launchers,the Kashmiri militants were able to overwhelm the state police. The assassination of NC leaders, terrorizing of the people who tried to vote and the subsequent Governor‟s and President‟s rule brought the democratic process to a standstill. The leading militant organization in the initialphase of militancy was the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), who supported anindependent Kashmir (Dasgupta, 2005: 252). Like those that started the „Quit Kashmir‟ movement against the Maharaja, these militants were primarily educated but unemployedKashmiri youth nationalists (Behera, 2006: 145). This new generation of Kashmiris was far 3 Although there was rigging of elections, the perception of the outcome of the elections led people to believe thatthere was a greater discrepancy than actually was the case

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31 assumptions that anti-Indian sentiment translated into pro-Pakistani sentiment were greatlymiscalculated. In fact, instead of welcoming the infiltrators, the Kashmiris were mostly eitherindifferent or outright hostile (Malik, 2005: 122). The Indians were quick to launch a counter-offensive and Pakistan was quickly defeated. Ayub Khan never recovered politically and wasoverthrown. Much the same happened to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto after his defeat from India in the1971 war which made Bangladesh an independent state and by the signing of the highlyunpopular Simla Agreement which made the ceasefire line a more or less permanent Line of Control. In his case, however, he was not only sacked but later executed (Ganguly, 2001: 79). 3.4 Aazadi, Insurgency, and Jihad The usual succession of corrupt Kashmir leaders and rigged elections which brought to poweronly those which supported the INC occurred in the state. Sheikh Abdullah did not return topower until after Indira Gandhi called for fresh elections in 1977 after the long state of emergency (Akbar 1985: 273). Again his reign was marred by corruption, cronyism andauthoritarianism. Between press censorship and the total lack of concern for parts of the stateoutside of the Vale led to widespread riots in Ladakh, Poonch city and Jammu, where eight demonstrators were killed (Malik 2005: 148). Even Mir Alfza Beg, Abdullah‟s fervent supporter was expelled from the National Conference for failure to swear a personal oath of loyalty toAbdullah (Malik, 2005: 147). Before his death in 1982, he appointed his son, Dr. FarooqAbdullah, as his successor. In relatively fair elections, Farooq Abdullah won by a landslide andin trying to separate himself from his father‟s reputation rejected an electoral alliance with Congress in an effort to retain the Kashmir identity of the National Conference (Dasgupta, 2005:249). However, after being deposed he found the only way to be restored to power was through a

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30 Bakshi reigned for ten years before finally being relieved of his position and slapped with 72charges of corruption (Schofield, 2006: 97). During this time, India faced a devastating defeat atthe hands of the Chinese until the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire in October of 1962.Shortly thereafter, India abandoned their policy of nonalignment and sought the United States formilitary assistance (Schaffer, 2009: 74). India and Pakistan were drawn into bilateral talks at thenudging of the United States, but shortly after Abdullah (during his short stint of freedom) hadconvinced the two Prime Ministers to meet, Nehru died 27 May, 1964. The new Prime MinisterLal Bahadur Shastri, who was busying himself with consolidating his new power base quicklyre-incarcerated Abdullah and without a firm support base the talks soon went sour (Schaffer2009: 104). A combination of the above listed events led to the calculations of Pakistan PrimeMinister Ayub Khan and the foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to infiltrate Kashmir in 1965.The most important event, however, was the disappearance of a holy relic, the Hair of theProphet, from the Hazratbal Shrine in 1963 (Behera, 2006: 42). The Action Committee wasformed to recover the relic and after its mysterious reappearance to confirm its authenticity. TheCommittee originally united the Muslims that wanted independence or autonomy with those thatwanted to join Pakistan, but it eventually split off with Mirwaiz Farooq (successor of Yusuf Shah) taking the name Awami Action Committee (Malik, 2005: 111). The theft of the relic led toincreased political activity among the Muslims and the agitation after the incident led thePakistani leaders to believe that the Kashmirirs were ripe for rebellion (Malik, 2005: 121).Knowing that India had increased their military capability, the military strategy of Pakistan wasto infiltrate several thousand men into Kashmir, distribute arms and encourage an armed revoltof the Kashmiris who have mobilized along religious lines and were generally fed up with theoppressive Indian rule (Ganguly, 2001: 40). Unfortunately, the Pakistan administration‟s

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29 formally shut Jammu out of representation in Srinagar. The Praja Parishad, who accusedAbdullah of trying to Islamicize the administration, effectively mobilized people of Jammu notonly along political lines, but along religious ones and violence broke out in the streets in 1952(Behera, 2006: 110). Being a Hindu nationalist organization with the support of the Hindulandlords and money lenders, the organization failed to appeal to the poorer masses of the people of Jammu who had benefited from Abdullah‟s land reforms (Behera , 2006: 111). Furthertensions arose between the Jammu-based Praja Parishad and the National Conference when theleader of the Praja Parishad, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, died of a heart attack in jail afterbeing arrested upon entering Jammu (Schofield, 2010: 81).In 1953, the corrupt administration of Sheikh Abdullah was finally put to a halt when he was arrested and his rival, Bakshi Ghulam Muhammed replaced him. Bakshi, known as “TheBuilder” was able to secure funds for much -needed educational and other infrastructuraldevelopment, but his administration was also highly corrupt (Schofield, 2010: 93). UnderBakshi, the Constituent Assembly formerly ratified Jammu a nd Kashmir‟s accession to India ,and in 1957, the state approved its own Constitution. Not content with the dubious declarationthat there was now no need for a plebiscite, Abdullah‟s right -hand man, Mir Afzal Beg, hadlaunched the All Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front (Akbar 1985: 252). After four years of being imprisoned, Abdullah was released, only to be incarcerated four months later on charges of conspiracy. This led to a new political movement in Pakistan called the Kashmir LiberationMovement (KLM) which was promptly put down by the government for fear of agitating India(Schofield, 2006: 95)

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28 much of the Valley and parts of Azad Kashmir are clearly demanding independence from eithercountry (Bradnock, 2010). 3.3 Post-Partition, Communal Politics, and Regionalism After independence, one of the first things Abdullah did do was to implement land reforms. The1950 Act for land reforms took large tracts of land away from Hindus as well as threatened theintegrity of monastery lands of the Buddhists in Ladakh (Malik 2005: 94; Schofield 2010: 74).The land reform act was greeted with hostility by the landowners who thought it was an act of Muslim discrimination against the minority Hindus in the state. This set the trend for reversediscrimination. Furthermore, although Abdullah and the communist parties of India supported Abdullah‟s reforms, prominent members of Nehru‟s Cabinet, most notably Sadar Patel and the Prime Minister preceding Abdullah, Meher Chand Mahajan, accused Abdullah of running aNazi-like regime from Srinagar (Malik, 2005: 92; Schofield, 2010: 77). His reign at the helm of government was marred by cronyism and corruption. The 1951 Kashmir elections were accusedof being r igged, and the NC won all 75 seats „unopposed‟ (Schofield , 2010: 79). The PrajaParishad, the local version of the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),boycotted the elections (Behera, 2006: 110).The Praja Parishad became increasingly more active in their protest of rule from Srinagar after the 1952 Delhi Accords which gave a more permanent acceptance of the „temporary‟ special status of autonomy the state had under the Indian Constitution Article 370 (Schofield 2010: 80).The accord gave the state a right to its own flag and had marginalized the Jammu representationin the state Assembly to just 45% of the seats, whereas Kashmir enjoyed 53%. This essentially

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27 led a revolt against the Dogras (ibid). The Maharaja attributed the revolt to infiltration fromPakistan, and although rumors of genocide against Muslims led to the entrance of Pathan (orPashtun) tribesmen from the NWFP, the revolt was essentially home-grown. In Jammu, about500,000 people – practically eliminating the Muslim population- died or fled to West Punjab. There they claimed that the atrocities there had been perpetrated “not only by uncontrolled bandsof hooligans but also by organized units of the Maharaja‟s army and police” (Schofield 2010:43). Throughout this chaos, Pakistan and India were both trying to secure Kashmir for theirrespective countries. Seeing the revolt in the districts were being exasperated by infiltrationsfrom not only tribesmen but from Pakistani soldiers on leave, the Maharaja finally decided toseek military aid from India and subsequently signed the Instrument of Accession to legitimizethe incursion of Indian troops into the state in October of 1947 (Ganguly, 2001: 16-17).Despite the fact that there was a Muslim majority in Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, thenewly appointed head of the state, was able to secure the support of the people of Kashmir based on his popular „Quit Kashmir‟ movement against the Dogra ruler and his proposed land reform policies. Pakistan, argues Akbar, was created by the religious Mullahs and elite landlords, not themasses (1985: 36). Since the Muslims of Kashmir already were weary of a history of oppressionby their Hindu landlords, many in Kashmir saw the state as an autonomous political unit withinIndia to be a more viable option for prosperity. Akbar even goes so far as to suggest that theoption of a plebiscite was not readily agreed to by Jinnah, for fear that the Muslims of the statewould voluntarily opt for India (1985: 226). In reality, even today there is no clear consensus asto whether or not the people of the state would vote to join India or Pakistan, especially since

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26 Other than home-grown political movements in Kashmir, the majority political party in British India also had a great influence on Kashmir‟s politics. Congress, the party of the first president, Jawaharlal Nehru as well as Mahatma Gandhi, was largely uninvolved in politics in the princelystates (Malik, 2005: 42). After 1938, however, Congress began to actively participate in politicalmovements in the states. Nehru, from a Pandit family that had migrated to Delhi, wasparticularly concerned for his ancestral homeland, and his rather emotional attachment toKashmir would greatly influence the dealings with the Kashmir issue well after independence(Akbar, 1985). In response to Congress‟s „Quit India‟ movement aimed at the British occupan ts, Sheikh Abdullah and his NC launched the „Quit Kashmir‟ movement against the rule of theMaharaja. „Quit Kashmir‟ declares that the Treaty of Amritsar does not legitimize the ru le of Hari Singh (Behera, 2006: 18). These and other tactics led to the on again off again incarcerationof Abdullah throughout his career. Although the Hindu Pandits of Kashmir were also at a loss due to Hindu Dogra rule, Nehru continued to be one of Abdullah‟s only Pandit supporters. The Hindu community still supported rule of the Maharaja as opposed to another alternative.Essentially, the Pandits chose their co-religionists over their ethnically similar counterparts, theKashmiri Muslims (Malik, 2005: 69).In the Spring of 1947, Poonchis mounted a no-tax campaign and the Maharaja responded bystrengthening his garrisons with Hindus and Sikhs and confiscated all weapons in the Poonchdistrict in July of that year (Schofield, 2010: 41). Ex-soldiers who formerly comprised themajority of the British Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir from Poonch and Mirpur districts procured weapons from tribes in the Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP). “In a belief that theMaharaja had passed an order to massacre the Muslims…” they organized an army of 50,000 and

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Third, when independence was declared in British India in 1947, and ever since then, there was no clear consensus from the people of the state of Jammu and Kashmir as to whether they would be happier in Pakistan or in India when the time came for the Maharaja to make the decision of joining one or the other.

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The split of the Muslim parties had several dynamics. First, there was an ideological dimension where the National conference (NC) supported secularism, whereas the Muslim Conference (MC)supported Islamism. Second, it split the state of Jammu and Kashmir along regional lines: the base of the NC was Kashmir, but MC supporters hailed from Jammu.

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The Muslim Conference did not die out however, but wasre vived by the more orthodox Mirwaiz-i-Kashmir in 1941. Jinnah attempted to unite the two forces, and even offered Abdullah a prominent position in the Islamic state of Pakistan, but he was in firm opposition to Islamic politics, and took a more nationalistic, secularist route topolitics in his fight against the oppressive Hari Singh (Akbar, 1985: 226).

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By 1939, the Muslim Conference, which welcomed non-Muslims into its ranks, was officially renamed the National Conference (Akbar, 1985: 224).

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movement which would be less based on religious lines and more focused on the class-based struggle of the wealthy landowners and the impoverished tillers of the land.

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24 sects of Muslims as equal in their struggle. The Ahrars, however, hated the Ahmadiyya/Qadiani sect of Islam because they did not believe them to be „real‟ Muslims. The Ahrars had sent in bands of Muslim protestors into Jammu and promoted communal violence there after provokingthe Hindus, which resulted in the ensuing clashes (Malik, 2005: 41).In addition to the majority Hindu, but secular Congress party, there were some more right-wingcommunal Hindu elements. Formed in the early 1900s, the Hindu Mahasabha was anorganization that preached the ideology of Hindutva. Hindutva basically declared that Hindusshould have their own country where Hinduism could flourish, and thus excluded Muslims fromhaving the right to live in India (Malik, 2005: 43). Like their Muslim communal counterparts, theMahasabha exploited the demographics of Jammu and Kashmir by implicating that if Hindus didnot retain control of their government, they would be exploited by the Muslim majority and losetheir socio-economic status. The Muslim and Hindu communalists successfully promotedreligious identifications.By 1932, the All-India Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference had elected Sheikh Abdullah astheir President, and consolidated the support of all the major Muslim political factions: theformer Reading Room, Jammu Young Men‟s Muslim Association, Mirwaiz -i-Kashmir Yusuf Shah, Mirwaiz of the Khanqah-i-Moalla Hamadani, and the Ahmadiyya/Qadiani community(Malik, 2005: 44). It was not long, however, before the Muslim Conference split into two mainr ival factions: “one led by Abdullah and supported by Mirwaiz Hamadani; the other by the Mirwaiz-i- Kashmir” (Malik , 2005: 45). Eventually, Abdullah grew further from the Mirwaiz-i- Kashmir‟s orthodox approach and began to side with Nehru in the promotion of a secular

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23 prominent members was Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas (Behera, 2006: 19). After some disturbancesin Jammu in 1931, including the alleged demolition of a mosque by the government, widespreadprotests finally prompted the Maharaja to meet the representatives of these groups, whosedemands up to this point had been previously ignored. Frustrated by the lack of economicopportunity and enraged by the killing of twenty-one protestors outside the jail where one of therepresentatives was being kept, anti-Hindu riots broke out in Jammu (Malik, 2005: 33). Althoughthe grievances the Muslims had were against the Hindu Dogra ruler and not Hinduism, the seedswere sown for communal violence along religious lines. Up to this point, Hindu-Muslim clasheswere largely unheard of in Kashmir, although they took place in other parts of British India. TheMuslim bourgeoisie took advantage of these clashes and turned a class-based conflict into onewith more religious overtones; where the Muslims were perceived as being oppressed and theHindus were viewed as exploitative (Malik, 2005: 38).After the incidents of 13 July, Muslims of Kashmir living in Punjab created the All-India MuslimKashmir Committee, whose President was Mirza Bashir Ahmed, head of the Ahmadiyyacommunity (Malik, 2005: 39). The significance of this movement as opposed to previouspolitical movements is that the Mirza encouraged the Muslim masses to mobilize politicallyalong religious lines, as opposed to secular lines. This was a driving force behind the formation of the Muslim Conference, who would later be at odds with Abdullah‟s National Conference. This group still, however sought to reach reform via the constitutional process, whereas anotherMuslim group, the Majlis-i-Ahrar promoted reform via violent measures (Malik, 2005: 40). TheMuslim Conference and the Ahrars were at odds from early on not only due to theirdisagreement in their approach to reform, but also because the Muslim Conference welcomed all

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22 with a ceasefire established January 1, 1949 (Ganguly, 2001: 17). Three wars later, the ceasefireline remains virtually intact and is known as the Line of control (LoC). Today the state is dividedbetween Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK) and Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK). Thestate of Jammu and Kashmir in IAK is comprised of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh. PAK iscomprised of the Northern Areas and Azad, or Free, Kashmir. 3.2 Early Kashmir Politics As stated earlier, the Kashmir Valley was sold to the Hindu Dogra ruler Maharaja Singh. TheDogras were resented by both the Kashmiri Muslims and the Pandits since they saw Jammu astheir home and Kashmir as their conquered territory (Malik, 2005: 24). Although historically, thePandits were given priority positions in clerical positions within the Valley since they tended tobe better-educated, their status was underscored by placements given to the Dogras of the Jammuregion. The Muslims of the region remained backwards in many ways. They had little access toeducation, and because of the ban on Muslims joining the state military forces, they saw littleopportunity for upward mobility. By the time the British were preparing to leave, the grievancesof the Muslims were long-standing. They faced exorbitant tax rates, could not own any of the land they tilled, and generally lived at „mere survival‟ level (Malik , 2005: 25). It could easily besaid that the reason Muslims did not receive good jobs was due to the lack of education, butwhen a group of graduates returned from British Indian universities well-educated and stillunable to secure jobs, they formed various political action committees. The most notable groupin Kashmir was the Fateh Kadal Reading Room, where Sheikh Muhammed Abdullah (the firstChief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir) launched his controversial political career. In Jammu, a similar organization, the Young Men‟s Musli m Association was formed. One of its most

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21 new state of Pakistan from the Muslim-majority areas of the subcontinent in 1946 (Behera, 2006:5). At that time, about half of the subcontinent was under direct British rule, whilst the other half comprised of princely states (roughly 46 percent of the subcontinent) which ruled autonomously,but under treaties with the colonizers (ibid). The last viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, gavethe edict to divide the portions under direct rule from Britain into Muslim-majority sectionswhich would cede to Pakistan and Hindu-majority areas which would become part of the newIndia (Ganguly, 2001: 15). The princely states would have the option of acceding to one or theother. It was the assumption that the autonomous states would base their decision on geographiclocation and demographic makeup. In fact, most of the states did accede in this manner, but therewere a few exceptions. The exceptions were Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Jammu and Kashmir. ForHyderabad and Junagadh there was a Hindu majority but a Muslim ruler. When the Muslim rulerof Junagadh opted for Pakistan, the Indian government resisted the position and demanded aplebiscite (Behera, 2005: 62). Not surprisingly the Hindu-majority voted for India. The state of Jammu and Kashmir is reversed. Although there is a substantial minority of Hindus (and otherreligions), Muslims are in the clear majority. However, when threatened with a rebellion on the state‟s eastern frontiers and with the invasion of tribesmen from Pakistan; the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, signed the Instrument of Accession agreeing to join India inexchange for Indian troops to reclaim the territory. Claiming that Pakistan was responsible for aninvasion of territory rightfully belonging to India, Jawaharlal Nehru (first President of India)decided to take the dispute to the United Nations. Although even the United States accepted thevalidity of the Instrument of Accession at first, they soon rescinded and left India feeling like ithad been treated as being on the same level as whom it thought was the aggressor state, Pakistan(Schaffer, 2009: 17). Eventually hostilities were ended between the two newly independent states

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20 exchange for “one horse, twelve goats…and three pairs of Kashmiri shawls” (Akbar , 1985: 220)annually. This agreement, known as the Treaty of Amri tsar, was a „gift‟ to the Singhs for their continued loyalty to the British government.Many casual observers may have seen that the Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims lived largely freeof institutionalized prejudices against one another, as is evident by the lack of conflict in the pre-partition years. However, it may be the case that the Kashmiri people as an ethnicity have takenon communal religious overtones as has been a tactic adopted by elites as a means to appeal to the people‟s religious identities. Rather than joining forces against a common foe and with astrong sense of Indian nationalism, politico-religious movements took root which divided thepopulation not along British-Indian lines, but along Hindu-Muslim lines. As Ganguly points out,this division may have been part of a divide and conquer strategy by the British (2001: 10).Perhaps the most organized and popular proponents of an independent India were the IndianNational Congress (INC). Although the INC did not specifically cater towards the Hindu masses,there was a substantial Muslim elite whom believed that the INC merely represented the Hindumajority and decided certain measures were necessary to ensure the interests of the substantialMuslim minority were addressed. Whether or not it was the intended outcome of the Britishdivide and conquer strategy, Mohammad Ali Jinnah defected from the popular Congress partyand formed his Muslim League in 1906 (Behera, 2006: 4). This move had the effect of consolidating Muslim support and although the Muslim League was able to have many of itsdemands met, such as a separate electorate, they still eventually called for an independent Islamic state of Pakistan. Great Britain accepted the Muslim League‟s proposal to carve out the

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19 3. Background for case Study Great Britain, which used to be the greatest empire, with far-reaching colonies in most of the time zones, was forced to give up most of its colonies after WWII emptied the country‟s deep coffers and gave rise to the new superpower of the Western bloc, the United States. Whilehastening to depart the subcontinent, the British wanted to do so as peacefully as possible, butensuring they left behind a legacy and some allies. The legacy that was left behind was the birthof two nations; India and Pakistan. 3.1 The Birth of Two Nations and Kashmir Stuck in the Middle The various regions of the state of Jammu and Kashmir have a diversity of religious, cultural,linguistic, tribal, and caste-based traditions (Chowdhary, 2010: 4). The state may be described asa crossroad of cultures, with pre-Aryan and non-Aryan races in Kashmir, Aryan race in Jammu,and Tibetan, Mongolian, and Dardic races in Ladakh (Puri, 2010: 28). The Kashmir Valley washistorically a great center of Hinduism until the Muslim ruler Sikander demanded that his Hindusubjects convert to Islam, leave, or die (Malik, 2005: 12). Most of the lower caste Hindus optedfor Islam, but the Brahmins, or priestly caste, went into exile or stayed and perished. After Sikander‟s death in 1414, his more moderate son permitted the Hindus to practice their religionand welcomed the Brahmins back from exile. These Brahmins are known today as KashmiriPandits. Until a second mass exodus of the Pandit community from the Valley in the 1990s, theKashmir Valley remained diverse with a substantial minority of Hindu Pandits. Now the Valleyis overwhelmingly Muslim. The borders of the state of Jammu and Kashmir as of 1947 wereestablished only in the mid nineteenth century. In 1846, the British offered the Hindu Dograruler, Gulab Singh, the Valley of Kashmir at the wholesale price of Rs 75 lakhs (750,000) and in

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18 Pan- Islamism movement. “The proponents of a transnational Islamic identity…” have a goal to“establish a grand Islamic [Khilafa] state stretching across the Middle East, Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia, similar to the Islamic Caliphate of medieval time” (Behera ,2006: 157). As mujahedin that were freed up from Afghanistan began to infiltrate Kashmir, joined, and subsequently eclipsed the indigenous political movements such as such as the JammuKashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which gave the secessionist movements in Kashmir apermanent, Islamic flavor (Behera, 2006: 154). Militant groups such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen(HUM) popularized the call for a Kashmir jihad and carried the message of bringing an Islamicrevolution to Kashmir (Behera, 2006: 155). The HUM, however, were of the Sunni-Deobanditradition of Islam and because Sufi Islam was a cultural root of Kashmiris, the local populationsoon grew weary of the foreign jihadists and their fundamental Islamic beliefs. In Kashmir, thereis an eclectic mix of Sunni and Sufi Islamic heritage. In the Kashmiri Sufi tradition, there arefestivals and offerings of prayers to Sufi saints at Sufi shrines. Collective resistance of the jihadists occurred when some 20,000 peasants defied a HUM ban on Kashmir‟s festival of lights by assembling at a shrine, the Char-i-Sharif, which was subsequently burned by the extremistmilitants (Behera, 2006: 163). The Kashmir secessionist movement is undoubtedly influenced bya resurgence in Islam, but moderate Kashmiris may be alienated by a strict interpretation of Islam that not only fails to mobilize them, but prompts the Kashmiris to fight them (Chandran,2006: 52).

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17 Within Islam, there are two major sects: Sunni and Shi‟a. Division between the two sects of Islam began over who was to be the leader, or caliph, of the Islamic community after Mohammed. “Sunnis conceived of the caliph as a kind of elected chief executive, while Shiites insisted that the caliph is an infallible imam, a divinely gifted leader who must be a member of the house of Ali (Mohammed‟s son -in- law)” (Ball and Dagger, 2009: 278). The state of Jammuis comprised of mostly Sunni Muslims while those Muslims in the Kashmir Valley followed aneclectic version of Sufi Islam (Behera, 2006: 107). There are primarily Shiites in the Kargilregion of Ladakh. According to a Chatham House survey, whereas those in the Sunni and Sufi-majority Kashmir Valley overwhelmingly would opt for an independent state, 80% of respondents in Kargil would vote to join India if a plebiscite were held today (2009: 17). Thefrustration this has for a coordinated movement of all Muslims for an independent state isapparent. Sectarian violence has taken place in Pakistan by Sunni groups which regard Shiites asapostates and seek to establish Pakistan as an Islamic state which follows the Sunni, or Deobandiinterpretation of Islam (Shapiro and Fair, 2010: 87). Shiites and Sunnis alike acknowledge nodivision of a separate church and state (Ball and Dagger, 2009: 278). Huntington observes, “[t]he revival of religion…provides a basis for identity an d commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations” (1993: 26). Malik recognizes the great influence of Pan-Islamism in the Kashmiri secessionist movements (2005). Malik describesthe Islamic resurgence as a factor in increasing hostilities against the Hindu Indian establishment (2005: 227). In the wake of the Iranian revolution and the mujahedin‟s success in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion was the rise of transnational Islamic movements (Behera, 2006: 146).In the late 1980s, the Kashmiris were well aware of global events and some were swept up in the

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16 Since the birth of a Muslim-majority Pakistan, there has been a rivalry between the democraticand the more religious parties on just how Islamic the state of Pakistan should be. Although Pakistan was formed to be a „state in the name of Islam,‟ it was not until General Zia -ul-Haq in 1977 “proclaimed the goal of making Pakistan a truly Islamic state that a steady growth of Islamization of both the state and society was witn essed…” (Jetly , 2009: xxi). Later, NawazSharif of an Islamic party proposed the implementation of shar’ia (Islamic) law (Synnot, 2009:68). This revival of religion in the public sphere was not only a tactic used by corrupt politiciansto gain legitimacy as a leader. It is a reflection of the popular mood.Although there are varying extremes on how to implement religious states, religious nationalists may be considered as „fundamentalists.‟ Heywood describes religious fundamentalism as being associated with dogmatism, authoritarianism, and a general sense of inflexibility (2007: 281). Although the term „fundamentalist‟ is very controversial, he argues that it always conveys theidea of a “religio - political movement…rather than simply the assertion of lite ral truth of sacred texts” (ibid). Ball and Dagger describe Islamic fundamentalism as an “extreme form of theIslamic religion” (2009: 277). For Muslims, Islam is a way of life, and therefore the words of the Prophet (or Sunna) must be adhered to, and Islamic, or shar’ia , law derived from the Qur‟an is essentially the law of the land (Ball and Dagger, 2009: 278) The Qur ‟ an spells out a „politicalreligion.‟ “The Qu r ‟an…is not just about the relationship of the individual to God, but about a politically organized community of believers, the umma, called by their sovereign” (Friedman ,2001: 128).

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15 2.5 Religious Identity and Religious Nationalism Out of all the markers of identity, religion acts as a “secure anchor for self - reliance” (Seul , 1999: 588). Seul further asserts that religion is “often at the core of individual and group identity”(ibid). Although a person‟s identity card may change over time, religions often provide a book which for some acts as a guidebook for life. When searching for answers in a complex world,religion offers ready-made answers that shape individual and group identity and act as a rallyingpoint for political mobilization (Seul, 1999: 559). In the post-modern world, religion is notmerely something that one practices in their home behind closed doors. It has become very mucha socio-politic al actor in a new war on secularization. Today the world‟s major religions have refused to be restricted to the private sphere (Haynes, 1998: 2). Religion today is infused withnationalist tendencies whereby a symbiotic relationship is formed to advance nationalist as well as religious goals. According to Friedman, “[r]eligious nationalists make politics into a religiousobligation” (2001: 126). Whereas a hallmark of Enlightenment philosophy and modernity are the separation of church and state, the religious nationalist seeks to bring religion back into thepublic sphere. This is especially true with the rise of Hindu nationalism and Islamic nationalismin the subcontinent, but it is also a new tradition of Western democracies (Haynes, 1998).Islamic natio nalism did not end with Jinnah‟s creation of Pakistan, but has continued to be a dominant feature from Northern Africa to the Middle East and Southwest and Central Asia. The resurgence of Islam across the globe has been a reaction to “modernity, socio -economic problems, the influence of the Iranian revolution, etc.” (Malik , 2005: 227).

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14 of political movements in the Valley and has contributed to the demand for a separate Kashmiristate. Prior to 1989, Kashmiri Muslims and Hindu Pandits (Brahmins) have resided together inrelative harmony. They claim to have common culture, traditions, etc. Therefore, it could be saidthat during this time, Kashmiriyat included both Hindus as well as Muslims. (Malik, 2005:9).Post 1989, however, major protest movements brought together the Muslim people as acommunity. After this, Kashmir saw a flood of Islamic militants from Pakistan in addition to thehome-grown Kashmiri militants, which not only brought back calls for freedom from India fromPakistani-based militant training camps, but calls to end secularization and modernization.During this time, there was a major exodus of Pandits out of the Valley for fear of prosecution byIslamic militants flooding Kashmir.Since the early 1990s, there has been a decline in the number of armed struggles for self- determination. In fact, Ozkirimli cites Laitin as arguing, “ „the popular belief that nationa lismand ethnic differences in and of themselves are dangerous is discredited by quantitative research‟” (2010: 1). Although there has been much scholarly attention on the role of ethnicity in armed conflicts, a quick review of many armed conflicts which may have been attributed toethnicity will reveal that any one identity marker differentiation alone is usually not enough tospark an armed conflict. In the conflicts that were a result of the breakup of Yugoslavia, theidentity markers were ethnicity as well as religion which separated combatants. As is discussedin the second chapter, there is a clear connection between the secessionist movements in theValley and Islamization. Where a secular call for freedom ends and a religious call for a Muslimstate begins, it is not very clear.

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13 self-determination struggles is highly controversial since recognition of an autonomous nation-state is regarded as de facto law. When Kosovo was internationally recognized as a people withthe right to their own country, states with their own secessionist movements such as China, India,and Russia expressed a great deal of anxiety (Lone, 2009: 3). After all, if Kosovo could beindependent from Serbia, could not Kashmir become independent of India or Pakistan?The peculiar situation of Kashmir today places part of the state in Pakistan and part in India. 2 Beyond the human rights violations and lack of autonomy Kashmir in Indian administeredKashmir (IAK) enjoys (explained in further detail in the next chapter), Azad Kashmir in Pakistanadministered Kashmir (PAK) feels alienated and resents the central government for interferencein their political affairs (Malik, 2005: 219). Most political leaders and many of the people activein the protest movement today want the two Kashmirs to be reunited and under the same bannerof an independent state. Over the years, many militant and political organizations have surfacedwith calls for in dependence or calling on Kashmir‟s accession to Pakistan. The Kashmiri people, although not agreeing on their chosen political destiny, do agree that theyare similar and have a common identity. Kashmiriyat , or Kashmiriness, is a term used to describethe unifying force of a common Kashmiri culture which shapes this identity and provides for thesense of Kashmiris as a nation. One of the striking features of Kashmiriyat is that it givesKashmiris a sense of oneness, not as Muslims, but as Kashmiris (Acharya and Acharya, 2006:162). The common identity of being part of a Kashmiri people, or nation, often overrides thefeeling of being Indian or Pakistan. It is this feeling of Kashmiriyat which has motivated the bulk 2 A small section of sparsely populated area of the state of Jammu and Kashmir is now under Chineseadministration

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12 Today the state of Jammu and Kashmir is a plural society that is divided by „segmentalcleavages.‟ According to Lijphart, segmental cleavages may be “religious, ideological, linguistic,regional, cultural, racial, or ethnic” (1977: 3) in nature. As explained previously, perceptions of a common identity can have a profound impact on the ability of elites to mobilize people byappealing to the belief in a common ethnic or cultural background. The perception of being anation is as much having a common history as it is having the sense of belonging to a commongeographical locality. In India today, various states within the Indian Union have lobbied andeven rioted as a means to achieve greater political autonomy. Within the state of Jammu andKashmir, there are varying concepts of identity which have given way to various regions allvying for very different political demands. Regionalism can be an important marker of identity.It can cut across religious lines and other markers of identity such as linguistics. In the state of Jammu and Kashmir, “Muslims as well as Hi ndus of one region not only perceive themselves asdifferent from their co-religionists of the other regions but also emphasizes their regional identity” (Chowdhary , 2010: 5). Those in Jammu and Ladakh seek greater integration with thestate of India, while the calls for freedom in the Kashmir Valley range from demands for greaterautonomy to recognition as an independent nation-state. 2.4 Kashmiriyat and Self-determination “Whatever political causes nationalism may be associated with; it advances these on the basis of a sense of collective identity …” (Heywood, 2007: 155). Today Kashmiris have a sense of common identity. They describe themselves as a people with the right to advance their ownpolitical destiny. According to international law, a group wishing to exercise the right to self- determination must be considered a „people‟ (Lone , 2009: 1). The term „people‟ in the context of

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11 2.3 Regionalism and Pluralism Arendt Lijphart discusses the concept of consociationalism in his book, Democracy in PluralSocieties (1975). Whereas some literature might suggest that a heterogeneous or plural societymay find nationalism in some common culture, etc, Lijphart argues that the only way otherwisetotally different societies can live together is if they are granted maximum autonomy and largely don‟t have to deal with one another. This is an especially important theory since colonialism places many diverse groups of people together who may have nothing in common. European colonizers had the tendency to create artificial states, which are “those in which political bordersdo not coincide with a division of nationalities desired by the people on the ground” (Alesina et.al, 2006). A hallmark of British colonialism was to draw arbitrary lines through homogenousregions and drawing borders around heterogeneous societies, often by making treaties withunrepresentative monarchs. This was how the modern Pakistan-Afghanistan border (The DurandLine) was drawn through the Pashtun nation (Synnot, 2009: 72). Lijphart and others explain thatwhere people were never meant to live together, they should not be forced to, and try to look forsolutions that can make everyone feel as though they have a voice in the political forum so as todecrease the likelihood of conflict in plural societies. Huntington points to the subcontinent as one of the „cultural fault lines‟ with the potential for sustained conflict (1993: 33). In his work, The Clash of Civilizations (1993), he identifies Islamic and Hindu as distinct civilizations (1993:25). Huntington argues that previous conflicts have been between nation-states (post-FrenchRevolution) and ideologies (Cold War- era). Now, he claims that conflict “will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another” (ibid). Not only is Pakistanand India divided by one of these „fault lines,‟ but so are the regions of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

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10 humanity progressing” (Malik, 1999: 1). Enlightened thought was a product of modernizationand secularization. Although enlightened thinkers realized the differences in men, theywelcomed change and wanted to see humans freed of the chains of the Church. They espoused doctrines of “equality, liberty, faith in human intelligence…and universal reason…” (Harvey ,1990: 13). Rousseau, as well as the German Romantic, Herder, broke away from the utopia of the Enlightenment and espoused post- modernist theory. Herder contended that it was God‟s will that men are different and that those differences should be celebrated by the division of man intoseparate nations (Malik, 1999: 2). Although Herder repudiated the universalism of theEnlightenment, he envisioned a quasi- pluralist order whereby “individuals would be free to pursue their diverse interests and form a variety of autonomous institutions to serve these interests” (Ozkirimli , 2010: 13). Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a disciple of Kant, placed greatemphasis on language as the marker that identifies a community as a nation (Ozkirimli, 2010:14). Whereas enlightenment thought is more instrumentalist in nature, and views the nation as alogical association of people, romantic theory is more primordialist in that the nation is based onethnicity or culture; a common language, religion, etc. (Malik, 1999: 3). Behera (2000) critiquesthe modernist approach to nationbuilding that the Indian state has taken. According to Behera,the modern-day Indian state is comprised of so many different communities that a looseassociation of states, or a sort of confederacy with a weak central government and devolvedpowers to state governments (which have already been divided along cultural/linguistic lines)would be key to solving secessionist issues and ease political unrest (2000: 13).

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9 or genetic diversification from other groups, but more of a sociological concept. In either case, the concept of race or ethnicity may be used as “a tool constructed to ga in material political or other advantage” (Malik , 2005: xv). Belief in a common heritage can be a great source of mobilization by political elites. For over half a century Kashmir has acted as a „laboratory‟ of two battling ideologies of nationbuilding. One theory, by that of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, professed the inability of Muslimsand Hindus to co-exist peacefully under majority Hindu rule. Jinnah proclaimed that Hindus and Muslims could not coexist peacefully under majority Hindu rule because, “the minor ities wouldbecome victims of Hindu subjugation, and that neither history nor culture would allow co- operation,” (Akbar , 1985: 19). The other theory is secularist rhetoric; the Western notion thatmulticultural societies can set aside their differences in the hopes of finding the common groundof a nation built on democratic, secular values. The latter theory of nationbuilding was adoptedfrom Britain by the leaders of the Indian National Congress (INC) party (Akbar, 1989: 18), thefounding fathers of the modern Indian nation-state; Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi.Both of these theories, whither based on the philosophies of Enlightenment, Romanticism,Modernism, Post-Modernism, or some other theoretical or theological assumptions has failed atbuilding the state that was intended upon the departure of the British from the subcontinent. 2.2 Enlightenment vs. Romanticism Prior to post-modern notions of nationalism, the prevalent philosophy was that of the modernist;E nlightenment. This philosophy “held that the universe was governed by a uniform, unvaryinglaw of nature; and that if the same law was applied to humanity society it would result in

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8 the Kashmir Valley. The general focus of this chapter will be on the identity markers nationalismand religion. In the case of the Kashmir dispute, these two identity markers are consistencyprevalent but inconsistently salient. Nationalism and religion appeal to the people of Kashmir ina very profound way and they are often intertwined and often inseparable. 2.1 Nationalism The term „nationalism‟ can be defined as, “the belief that the nation is the central principle of political organization” (Heywood , 2007: 143). A nation is generally referred to as a group of people which identify a common birthplace or origin (ibid). Nations generally perceivethemselves as sharing a common culture, which may not only be a common birthplace, but alsoinclude a common language, religion, and/or history (Heywood, 2007: 148). The roots of nationalism‟s evolution in to a term with political overtones can be traced back to Rousseau, whodeemed it the right of nations to seek self- determination; to be master‟s of their nation‟s political destiny (Ozkirimli, 2010: 12). A national identity emerged as the successor to the kingdom,whereby a people with a common heritage formed a community based on patriotism to a nation-state rather than allegiance to a ruler (Heywood, 2007: 144). Although what is deemed to be anation in the above terminology is generally a broad concept, two camps have emerged whichdefine the right to self- determination of a nation. The first, primordialism, “is the belief thatnationality is a „natural‟ part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight, or smell, and their nations have existed from time immemorial” (Ozkirimli , 2010: 49). In the primordial view,ethnic attachments are natural and instinctive phenomena of human existence (Malik, 2005: xv).The second, instrumentalism, prefers to view nationalism as less instinctive and more aconsequence of behaviors. To the instrumentalist, a nationality is not a consequence of biological

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7 2. Theoretical Framework Hoover describes identity as “a whole set of relationships between individual people and their surroundings in which they come to know themselves and to be known by others as individuals with particular repertories of skills, sensibilities, and responses” (1975: 6). Identities are formed at the individual or at the group level, with certain identity markers more salient than others. Asindividuals, we strive to seek a secure, positive self-identification, without which, we experience psychological discomfort or a complete personality breakdown “which may be experienced bythe individual as a threat to survival” (Seul , 1999: 554). As Seul describes, individuals carry with them a „personal identity card‟ which may consist of his or her values, attitudes, thoughts, goals,etc. as well as “one‟s group memberships, social influence, social interaction patterns, and roles” (1999: 555). By continually striving to achieve a positive self- image, the contents of one‟s identity card becomes fluid and dynamic, and although one tends to carry a core set of valuesthroughout his or her life, she or he may discard or adopt new markers of identity. The processesof social influence may be broken down into compliance, identification, and internalization. Compliance may be conforming to another individual‟s expectations in an attempt to secure a favorable opinion or outcome, identification occurs when one adopts behaviors of others, and internalization when someone adopts the behavior of another, but only as a consequence of one‟s internal values (ibid). The creation of a marker of identity is both an individual as well as acommunal endeavor, but the internalization of varying markers of identity is internally generated, and must appeal to some fundamental essence of one‟s being that already exists butmay be exasperated by the adoption of others‟ behaviors. This study will not delve significantly into the formation or development of individual or group identity, but will address a few markersof identity which tend to appeal to those in the struggle against perceived Indian occupation in

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6 frustration of having their voices being muffled in a political forum (Kazi, 2009: 87). It was onlythrough this disenchantment with the political process that harkened the introduction of extremistIslamist groups into the Valley.

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5 Much of the research for this study has been qualitative. The data primarily includes academic or journalistic books and articles on the events in addition to theoretical concepts from academicslocated within various texts and scholarly articles. Although the study is heavily weighted onthese sources, an effort has been made to include web-based media to give the study a morecontemporary and up-to-date view on the recent developments within the state. These sources arenews articles, articles from think tanks, etc. Since this study focused less on a solution bystudying key players to the conflict, but more on perceptions of the conflict and the politico-religious influences on self-identifications, this study also utilizes blog entries and personal andfactional web sites to bridge the gap between academic theory and the personal opinion of thoseinvolved. By far this study is qualitative, but it will include some borrowed quantitative data including survey results, census figures, and „official‟ government data on economic and military expenditures. 1.3 Value of Research The value of this research will hopefully be two-fold. One, it might give a little more insight intothe identities of the peoples of Kashmir, and thus what it is they actually want in a politicalclimate, which can held to shape a plausible solution to the issue. Two, the study could set a backdrop for further studies to see how people‟s identities are shaped and influenced by politico -religious institutions. Understanding how and why people identify and/or sympathize withmilitant movements can hopefully help policymakers and mediators better empathize with thediverse players involved in a conflict. It is not enough to strike down militancy in an effort toresolve a conflict. Furthermore, it is not enough to ignore factions that have not adoptedviolence, or assume their placation. Militant factions in Kashmir have arisen usually out of the

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4 1.2 Methodology The conflict in Kashmir has been unique in its ability to be studied from many theoretical anglesand perspectives due to the dynamics of the conflict as well as the duration. It can be seenthrough the lens of the realist as a struggle between India and Pakistan for dominance in thesubcontinent, as well as through the lens of an idealist, who believe the struggle is more about aclash of religion, culture, or identity. There is a plethora of well-documented literature from bothperspectives; however, the tendency seems to lean towards more journalistic accounts of historical and militant developments, rather than an analysis of the ideologies that drive thesedevelopments. There are quite a few books and articles that while offer historical backgroundalso analyze various aspects of self-identification among the people of the state in reference totheir self-perceptions in terms of religion, ethnicity, linguistic, or other cultural traditions. Thesestudies have greatly influenced the work of this study. There are however more recentdevelopments that have occurred in the state that have especially mobilized a younger generationof Kashmiris into political action via protests and demonstrations. For this study to be slightlyunique amidst all of the literature available, it will not only use historical, journalistic, and otherliterature accounts of the issue in common theoretical frameworks of the politics of identity andthe identity markers of religion and nationalism, but will also encompass the perspectives of those involved in the current secessionist/nationalistic movements. To do this, the study willincorporate forum postings and informal interviews alongside the traditional academicreferences. In addition to this qualitative data, the study will utilize quantitative data in the formof survey statistics.

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3 their cause for one of the above options. To complicate matters further, some factions are not somuch political as they are communal or religiously motivated. For most, there is a combinationof political and religious motivations. These have all contributed to the shaping and perception of identities based on regional, ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic differences.The purpose then of this study is to:1. Identify some of the theoretical frameworks that can and have been used to analyze theidentity of Kashmiris2. Examine how people identify themselves in terms of religion and nationality3. Analyze how political and militant movements are a result of these identifications4. Decipher which identity markers have the most salience in the post-2008 politicalmovementsThe overall aim of the research is not to come up with a solution to the Kashmir question. Giventhe short time span and space constraints of the study, it would be impractical to suggest anythorough solutions that would be readily adopted by any of the key players. Instead, the approachis to suggest that any viable solution to the Kashmir question needs to take into consideration themotives behind the political dissent. These motives are based on varying perceptions of identity;as a Muslim, a Hindu, a Buddhist; a Kashmiri, an Indian, a Pakistani, etc. Some perceptions maybe stronger than others any may weigh more heavily on personal decisions to support onepolitical movement over another.

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2 an integral part of the Union. Furthermore, the anti-India movements in the Kashmir Valleyalienates other parts of Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK), namely parts of Hindu-majorityJammu and the Buddhist-majority Ladakh (Behera, 2006). Although the movement is generallyperceived to be a political one, it has throughout its inception carried religious, communalovertones. This has been consistently reflected in the way political elites and parties mobilizesupport for their movements (Malik, 2005). Although the public supports movements based onwarranted grievances such as the exploitation of natural resources for the benefit of Delhi orcontinued manipulation of elections by New Delhi, the public is also appealed to based onindividual perceptions of identity on the basis of being Kashmiri as well as on the basis of beingMuslim. Just how much these identity perceptions benefit political movements, and to whatextent these political movements are determined by the perceived identity of Kashmiris will bediscussed in this study. Also, the saliency of identity markers such as religion or nationalism willbe analyzed by reflecting on the reaction the public has had to militancy, the security forces,governance, protest movements, the global Islamic resurgence, and other events that have had animpact on the political scene. 1.1 Aims of the Study Primarily, the goal of this study is the need to understand the Kashmir issue in terms of what it isthe inhabitants want by understanding the saliency of religious and nationalist identities of theKashmiri people. For some, they might want autonomy from India and Pakistan, for othersfurther integration to one or the other and for others still there is a call for completeindependence of one or all regions of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (Chowdhary, 2010).Given such drastically different desires, various political and militant movements have taken up

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1 To Be Kashmiri or To Be Muslim?An analysis of religious and nationalist movements in the Vale1. Introduction “It‟s so easy to be a Muslim or a Hindu in Kashmir, but it‟s so hard to be Kashmiri.” 1 1989 saw the beginnings of a massive mobilization of Kashmiris who rallied and demonstratedagainst their perceived oppressors, the Indian government. The local political parties echoed theirlong sought quest for regional autonomy from the long and stifling squeeze of the Centrist government. Alongside the calls for “ aazadi,” or freedom, from the masses was a full-scaleinsurgency. The militants were a kaleidoscope of foreign jihadists, local secessionists, and Pakistan‟s Inter -Services Intelligence (ISI) backed irredentist groups. Although the insurgencyhad seemed to putter out in the new century, the masses are again mobilized with renewed vigorand persistent calls for aazadi once again. Amidst a quasi-unification of secessionist parties andpolitical movements, they have taken to the streets in droves staging large protests, rallies andoften pelting stones at the security forces (Polgreen, 2010). The new generations of Kashmirisare educated, politically-minded, and technically savvy. In an era of globalization, they areadvertising their movement by plastering the World Wide Web with pictures of brutal Indiansecurity forces arresting and beating peaceful protestors. The new generation of protestors areblogging and posting on social networking sites such as Facebook.The resurgence of the secessionist movements has raised alarms in India as it threatens to disrupt the peace and to egg on her rival, Pakistan, who vehemently denies India‟s right to Kashmir as 1 „Ashima‟ as quoted on the Peace Direct website.

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MSc International ConflictTo Be Kashmiri or To Be Muslim?An Analysis of religious and nationalist movements in the Vale By Dustie Spencer2009/2010 Table of contents Abstract1. Introduction………................1 1.1 Aims of the Study……............2 1.2 Methodology……………………............4 1.3 Value of Research……............5 2. Theoretical Framework…………………………7 2.1 Nationalism……………………………………………………8 2.2 Enlightenment vs. Romanticism……9 2.3 Regionalism and Pluralism………..11 2.4 Kashmiriyat and Self-Determination……...12 2.5 Religious Identity and Religious Nationalism…….15 3. Background for Case Study……...19 3.1 The Birth of Two Nations and Kashmir Stuck in the Middle ………………………..19 3.2 Early Kashmir Politics………………….22 3.3 Post-Partition, Communal Politics and Regionalism ………………………………...28 3.4 Aazadi, Insurgency, and Jihad…31 4. Analysis……………………………………………………..37 4.1 The Facebook Jihad…………………………….37 4.2 Explaining the Rise of Militancy in Kashmir ………………………………………..41 4.3 Don‟t Mute the Moderate………………….42 4.4 Support for Islamic movements is not necessarily support against Secular Politicalmovements …………………………………………………………………………...44 4.5 Hindu Nationalism……………………………...45 4.6 Religiously or Politically Motivated Grievances?.465. Conclusion…………………………………………………….48 6. Bibliography……………………………………………..51 6.1 Bibliography- texts…………………………….51 6.2 Bibliography-Articles and websites……54

Source: TOI

...and I am Sid Harth

...and I am Sid Harth

Friday, December 5, 2014

Kashmir Incursion: No Solution

7 security personnel including Army officer killed in J&K terror attack

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