Modi's Fishy Underwater Ballet Everything looks nice on a ...
https://plus.google.com/.../posts/QhkcXZLEPtH
20 hours ago - Modi's Fishy Underwater Ballet
Everything looks nice on a piece of paper, especially on a newspaper.
India is a big (poor) country with million-plus non military ...India's first nuclear submarine heads for sea trials
India
has the Agni ballistic missiles and fighters jury-rigged to deliver
nukes but the triad’s underwater leg has remained elusive so far.
RELATED
NEW
DELHI: Over 40 years after India began its hunt for nuclear submarines,
the 6,000-tonne INS Arihant quietly sailed out of the harbour at
Visakhapatnam on a misty Monday morning to begin its extensive sea
trials.
While it was "a baby step" towards making the country's first indigenous nuclear submarine fully-operational, given that INS Arihant will now first undergo a whole host of surface sorties and then "dived" ones with test-firing of its ballistic missiles over the next 18 months, it did mark a significant milestone towards building a long-awaited credible nuclear weapons triad.
India has the Agni ballistic missiles and fighters jury-rigged to deliver nukes but the triad's underwater leg has remained elusive so far. It will be in place only once INS Arihant followed by its two under-construction sister submarines - one christened INS Aridhaman and the other just S-4 at present - are ready to undertake "deterrent patrols" by prowling underwater for months at end ready to let loose their missiles if required.
The launch of INS Arihant's sea-acceptance trials (SATs), which were flagged off by defence minister Manohar Parrikar and Navy chief Admiral Robin Dhowan, comes a day after TOI reported the submarine was all set for them with its 83 MW pressurized light-water reactor attaining 100% power and the completion of its long-drawn harbour-acceptance trials (HATs).
The real test during the SATs will be the test-firing of its K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which has so far been tested only from submersible pontoons around a dozen times. The 750-km range K-15 - INS Arihant can carry 12 in its four silos -- is dwarfed by the well over 5,000-km SLBMs present with the US, Russia and China. But an over 2,000-km range K-4 SLBM, tested for the first time in March this year, is also in the works.
The criticality of SLBMs for deterrence can be gauged from the fact that even the US and Russia are ensuring that almost two-thirds of the strategic warheads they eventually retain under strategic arms reduction agreements are such missiles.
Already armed with five nuclear and 51 conventional submarines, China too is now on course to induct five JIN-class SSBNs (nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range ballistic missiles) with 7,400-km range JL-2 missiles.
The Indian Navy, in turn, wants at least three SSBNs and six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) in the long-term. It currently operates one SSN in the shape of INS Chakra, obtained on a 10-year lease for Russia for around $1 billion, while negotiations are underway to acquire another such boat. While these submarines have short-range cruise missiles, they are not armed with nuclear missiles because of international treaties like the Missile Technology Control Regime.
My dear ManoHAR Parrikar, you have a big problem. Money!
Bunch of idiots!
...and I am Sid Harth
NUCLEAR SCHOLARS INITIATIVE | 7
Analysis
The nuclear export control regimes have certain key features in common: secrecy, non-
binding guidelines, informal or
gan
i
za
tion
al structure, the lack of a basis in international
law, and a cartel-
like appearance. Tracing the existence of these similarities from the 1940s
to the 1990s through varying stages of nuclear export control regimes allows the in
fl
uences
on these regimes to be evaluated and examined. Six key formative pressures have acted
upon multilateral efforts to harmonize export controls. Two are internal or inherent to the
regime: membership and technology; three are external pressures: commercial interest,
geopolitics, and legitimacy; and the
fi
nal, commitment to nonproliferation, lies at the
intersection of internal and external forces.
MEMBERSHIP
Supplier regimes are often accused of having the wrong members, either including states that
are not committed to the groups’ ends or leaving out crucial suppliers.
26
There is currently
strong debate over how to determine new NSG membership.
27
Modern mechanisms like UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 have attempted to universalize certain export control
standards. Expansions in membership, however, have often been damaging or even fatal to
the supplier regimes. Letting in too many new members undermines the features of limited
membership that make it successful—
what Michael Wilmshurst, one of the key British nego-
tiators in the NSG in the 1970s, describes as the “feeling of identity and co-
operation” is lost.
28
The Western Suppliers Group met for the last time in 1967, largely overtaken by the
negotiations over Article III of the NPT. Most of the members expressed a desire to meet
again once those negotiations
were completed. On the other hand, the South African repre-
sentative, in agreeing that no further meeting should be held, remarked “that the member-
ship of fourteen nations was now too large for genuinely private discussions.”
29
The
fi
nal
Western Suppliers Group (now calling itself the Nuclear Suppliers Group or NSG) meeting
had involved the “usual nine”—
the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Belgium, Austra-
lia, South Africa, West Germany, and Japan—
plus
fi
ve new members: Switzerland, Sweden,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. The unpopularity of South Africa on the international
stage due to apartheid may go some way in explaining its position, but it expressed a
pertinent problem with multilateral mechanisms in such a sensitive
fi
eld, combining
security and economic interests with tightly guarded technology. Small membership
improves the chances of successful cooperation by lowering some of the perceived costs of
cooperation and fostering a joint identity, both of which can make consensus easier to
26. Seema Gahlaut and Victor Zaborsky, “Do Export Control Regimes Have Members They Really Need?,”
Comparative Strategy
23, no. 1 (2004): 73–
91.
27. Mark Hibbs and Toby Dalton, “Nuclear Suppliers Group: Don’t Rush
6 | SARAH WEINER
the Eu
ro
pe
an members
were increasingly uncomfortable with the negative reception of
the Club in the developing world, their key market.
21
The full NSG did not meet from 1978 until the early 1990s. In 1979, the Soviet
Union
invaded Af
ghan
i
stan, reigniting Cold War tensions. The U.S. position toward India and
Pakistan changed dramatically as they became strategically important allies in the region.
Nuclear trade was hit hard, and overcapacity on the supply side increased pressure to
fi
nd
a competitive edge by adding enrichment or repro
cessing as “sweeteners.”
22
In practice
this meant exporting sensitive nuclear technologies where commercially viable, not neces-
sarily where there was a low risk of proliferation.
23
A series of revelations concerning Iraq’s nuclear weapons program prompted the NSG
to meet again in 1992, leading to the introduction of a second trigger list, this time of
so-
called “dual use” items. The inclusion of dual-
use items was billed as a big step for-
ward in improving the effectiveness of nuclear export controls.
24
In 1994 the Group
introduced the “non-
proliferation clause,” requiring states to consider if they thought
their exports might lead to proliferation before making an export decision. This was the
fi
rst time a subjective and potentially discriminatory principle was introduced into the
guidelines, showing a marked difference from the 1970s. An outreach campaign
attempted to explain the NSG’s actions and motives and to invite new members in an
attempt to mitigate the harm done by the secrecy of the early years. As of mid-
2013, the
NSG has 48 participating states.
Problems remain, however. Levels of implementation vary widely across members, and
there is no systematic way of tracking or verifying effective implementation. Due to the
voluntary nature of the guidelines, they cannot be enforced, and the NSG has almost no
in
de
pen
dent character outside its member states. Unlike other organizations, it lacks a
secretariat or directorship; instead there is a rotating chair, a consultative group, an an-
nual plenary, and a point of contact with the Japa
nese Mission to the International Organi-
zations in Vienna. Despite its outreach efforts, the group still suffers from a lack of
legitimacy due to its status outside more established mechanisms of international law and
its perceived commercial, discriminatory character. Observers have also lamented a lack
of information sharing, either with similar organizations or within the group itself.
25
These are ongoing problems that have long plagued the group and are tied up with the
fundamental nature of multilateral export control regimes
NUCLEAR SCHOLARS INITIATIVE | 5
explosion. Even though it was clarifying aspects of a legally binding treaty, the committee
declared early on that it would only produce “understandings” for what the treaty obliga-
tions
were regarding sales to non-
NPT members (an NPT member had to have full-
scope
safeguards with the IAEA if it was a nonnuclear weapon state) and that its recommenda-
tions would be nonbinding.
17
THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP
India’s unexpected “peaceful nuclear explosion” in May 1974 focused U.S. attention on the
dangers posed by unrestrained export of nuclear technology. Deeming the Zangger Com-
mittee inadequate to meet the challenge, the United States induced six other Western
suppliers between 1975 and 1977 to agree on a set of guidelines for nuclear trade. The India
test played a catalytic role in a nonproliferation environment that already had signi
fi
cant
weaknesses: the Zangger Committee was unable to include important suppliers outside the
NPT regime, notably France and Japan, and the U.S. administration was not closely focused
on the nonproliferation issue.
18
After the test and a nonproliferation policy review con-
ducted under Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, which suggested France be included, the
United States changed tack and took the lead in arranging supplier club meetings. While
the U.S. response to India’s test was muted, the United States was deeply concerned about
proposed deals to supply Brazil and Pakistan with nuclear technology. Washington faced
reluctance from its partners, particularly those in Eu
rope.
19
France was traditionally
opposed to multilateral organizations and unenthusiastic about uniform export standards,
preferring to take a case-
by-
case approach.
Despite disagreements, the Group released
Guidelines on Nuclear Transfers
in 1977,
stating its intention to comply with the IAEA safeguards. The guidelines applied to a trigger
list of items whose export, to any state, would require national licensing and the applica-
tion of safeguards, as well as physical protection mea
sures and government assurances of
nondiversion to a weapons program. The United States also obtained an agreement from
the other members to exercise restraint in exporting enrichment and repro
cessing technol-
ogy but was unsuccessful in obtaining a ban on sales, as it had hoped. The guidelines also
did not stipulate full-
scope safeguards as a condition of supply, although some members
adopted this condition in the early 1980s. As successive U.S. administrations took a tougher
line on plutonium-
producing reactors, like those favored by Eu
ro
pe
an producers, the
fragile agreements reached in the early NSG came under increasing pressure.
20
The mem-
bers could not come to agreement on further conditions, such as full-
scope safeguards, and
17. Fritz W. Schmidt, “The Zangger Committee: Its History and Future Role,”
Nonproliferation Review
2, no.
1 (1994): 38–
44.
18. Samuel J. Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: T
4 | SARAH WEINER
Western nations started to meet to coordinate efforts to apply safeguards on bilateral sales
of uranium, especially to India and Japan, which
were seen as the “bad boys” of prolifera-
tion.
13
The United States wanted other states to have to apply the sort of controls the U.S.
Congress had implemented in 1954 for two reasons—
to prevent unsafeguarded sales to
India and Japan and to level the playing
fi
eld for U.S. industry. Britain and Canada, the
latter having initially only asked for assurances of peaceful use, began to ask for safe-
guards. These three had some success convincing South Africa and Australia, albeit reluc-
tantly, to ask for safeguards, whereas Belgium and France made deals that did not involve
safeguards. The group’s efforts continued to be limited, and despite meeting from 1958
through 1967, they obtained only a “gentleman’s agreement” to refrain from supply with-
out safeguards.
14
To some extent the Western Suppliers Group (WSG) was the NSG a de
cade early, but its
priorities
were limited to applying IAEA safeguards to bilateral sales of nuclear materials
and technology. Its members produced no guidelines document, although they did circu-
late a model contract containing the requirement for safeguards to be applied. The WSG
shared other notable features with the NSG—
it was secret, informal, and nonbinding.
Unlike the NSG, it was unable to pressure France into accepting uniform conditions of
supply. Its members began to develop a rudimentary trigger list, but no formal agreement
was reached, and the trigger list debate would be continued after the Non-
Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) came into force.
15
THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE
After the NPT came into force in 1970, Article III.2 required that states not provide “source
or special
fi
ssionable material . . .
or . . .
equipment or material especially designed or
prepared for the pro
cessing, use or production of special
fi
ssionable material” to a non-
nuclear weapons state without safeguards.
16
In order to ensure a uniform approach and to
determine treaty obligations on sales to nonmember states, the Zangger Committee was
formed to determine a precise list of the items that came under the NPT and would trigger
safeguards. The trigger list was aimed at reactors and did not include forms of enrichment,
production of heavy water, or fuel repro
cessing. The Zangger Committee published its
“understandings” and trigger list in 1974, just after India detonated a peaceful nuclea
NUCLEAR SCHOLARS INITIATIVE | 3
and information exchange on the understanding that neither would share that information
with a third party. Bertrand Goldschmidt characterizes it as the
fi
rst nonproliferation
treaty
8
; Richard Rhodes describes it as the
fi
rst act of proliferation by giving nuclear se-
crets to the British.
9
In a way both scholars are right, because the Quebec Agreement
allowed a limited degree of proliferation in return for greater control over further prolif-
eration. As well as the agreement not to share information, the Quebec Agreement set up a
trust between the parties to secure global supplies of uranium and deny it to potential
proliferators.
The Combined Development Trust (later Agency) arranged contracts for uranium and
thorium with Brazil, Belgium, Portugal, the Netherlands, India, and later South Africa and
Australia. Those contracts included an agreement that the supplier would not sell to a third
party without consulting the United States, giving the United States an option on all ura-
nium supplies and establishing a group of nations with very basic export controls. The
United States failed to reach an agreement with Sweden, which, after seeing the ends for
which uranium was being used in 1945, declined to part with its domestic supplies.
10
Nevertheless, it agreed not to export to a third country without informing the United States
and claimed its export licensing system would ensure this could not happen.
11
The Combined Development Agency (CDA) was secret until about 1956, when its name,
if not its entire purpose, was declassi
fi
ed. It relied almost entirely upon the economic
power of the United States, and rather than a negotiated diplomatic arrangement, it was a
system of industrial contracts and trade agreements. The arrangement between the domi-
nant three—
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada—
was described in British
rec
ords as “nothing more than a gentleman’s agreement”
12
designed to deny the materials
necessary for making a weapon to any other country, whether ally (France) or enemy (the
Soviet
Union). To that extent the CDA was a forebearer of later efforts. The fact that it
continued to operate even after relations between the United States and the United King-
dom concerning nuclear weapons technology had deteriorated, and while efforts toward
international control
were ongoing, is a recurring theme of such arrangements.
THE WESTERN SUPPLIERS GROUP
The CDA became increasingly in
effec
tive as global uranium supplies outstripped the
economic capacity of the United States. The Agency refused to renew its remaining con-
tracts with South Africa, Australia, and Belgium, leaving these countries in need of new
customers for their domestic uranium supplies. The newly minted International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) was developing its safeguards concept at the same time. A group of
8. Goldschmidt,
Atomic Complex
, 52.
9. Richard Rhodes,
The Making of the Atomic Bomb
(New York: Simon & Schust
2 | SARAH WEINER
The NSG and its guidelines have been controversial and po
liti
cally sensitive since their
inception, sparking accusations of discrimination and illegitimacy under international
law.
4
As an exclusive “club” of nuclear suppliers, the Group has been plagued by suspicions
of cartel formation and commercial self-
interest. Its decision to waive restrictions on
nuclear trade with India in 2008, under pressure from the United States following the
U.S.-
India civil nuclear agreement, prompted concerns over the future of the nonprolifera-
tion regime and the NSG’s role in it.
5
That India should be granted such an exemption is an
interesting irony in the history of the NSG, which was set up following India’s peaceful
nuclear explosion in 1974. The current pressures to allow India membership into the Group
and to extend a similar waiver to Pakistan come amid concern over the nuclear intentions
of Iran and North Korea and the still pending civil nuclear “re
nais
sance.” Given these
concerns, it has never been more important to understand the politics of nuclear supply.
There are six dominant pressures at work on efforts to establish common suppliers’
policies, and these have varied in importance over time. These forces are both internal and
external. Outside sources, such as the competition with commercial interests, the compet-
ing priorities from foreign and domestic politics, and legitimacy on the international stage,
are matched by internal aspects inherent to the Group itself—
its membership and the
technology it is endeavoring to control. Finally, the goal of nonproliferation and how prolif-
eration is viewed by member states plays a role. Six factors—
commerce, politics, legiti-
macy, membership, technology, and nonproliferation—
form a comprehensive analytical
framework. What pressures they bring to bear, how they are treated, the way they interact,
and how and when individual issues dominate will bring a powerful understanding to the
nature and actions of multilateral export control regimes.
Multilateral Nuclear Export Control Regimes
THE COMBINED DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, 1945–
1961
The early history of nuclear weapons development is one of U.S. unilateral denial and its
brief monopoly of the bomb, while other countries developed their own programs without
(willing) U.S. help. Nuclear technology does not lend itself easily to unilateralism, however,
and the United States discovered the limits of unilateral denial even before the decision to
use the bomb was made.
6
In order to complete the development of its nuclear weapon, the
United States needed British scientists and British help to access uranium in the Belgian
Congo; in return the British wanted to resume information sharing on the U.S. Manhattan
Project.
7
The result in 1943 was the Quebec Agreement, which reestablished cooperation
4. Ian Anthony, Christer Ahlstrom, and Vitaly Fedchenko,
Reforming Nuclear Export Controls: The Future of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group
, SIPRI Resear
|
1
A Gentleman’s Agreement
Isabelle Anstey
1
T
his paper will examine the pressures, incentives, and restraints that form the politics of
multilateral nuclear export control arrangements by examining the evolution of nuclear
supplier arrangements from the 1950s to the 1990s. Focusing on the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), this paper identi
fi
es six key pressures that shape the form and behavior of multilateral
nuclear export control regimes. A deeper understanding of these pressures and how they
resulted in the NSG offers a more nuanced backdrop against which to consider future policies
for nuclear export control.
Introduction
This paper will examine the pressures, incentives, and restraints that form the politics of
multilateral nuclear export control arrangements by examining the evolution of nuclear
supplier arrangements from the 1950s to the 1990s. The primary mechanism during this
time was the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) formed in 1975, a voluntary, secretive, elite
club of countries that offered nonbinding guidelines for national nuclear supply practice.
Very little has been written to date on the history of multilateral nuclear export control
regimes, and even less speci
fi
cally on the NSG itself. This gap was recognized by leading
nuclear studies scholar Scott Sagan in his 2011 article surveying the
fi
eld.
2
The majority of
work that exists focuses on ways to improve multilateral mechanisms and/or national
export controls. It is therefore forward-
looking and policy proscriptive in nature, rather
than historical and analytical. Researchers, in evaluating the nuclear export control regime,
have identi
fi
ed the nonbinding, voluntary nature of the guidelines as fundamental
fl
aws,
and some have called for a nuclear export treaty or similar universal, binding, veri
fi
ed
regime to control the trade in sensitive nuclear and dual-
use technology.
3
A deeper under-
standing of the pressures that form multilateral supplier arrangements through historical
analysis will offer a more nuanced backdrop against which to consider such future policies.
1. Isabelle Anstey is a Ph.D. candidate with the Centre for Science and Security Studies, Department of War
Studies, King’s College London.
2. Scott D. Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
,” Annual Review of Po
liti
cal Science
14
(2011): 239.
3. Jacob Blackford,
Multilateral Nuclear Export Controls After the AQ Khan Network
(Washington, DC:
Institute for Science and International Security, January 2005); and Andrea Viski, “International Nuclear Law
and Nuclear Export Controls,”
International Journal of Nuclear Law
3, no. 3 (2011): 216–
29
|
V
Introduction and
A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s
A
ddressing an increasingly complex array of nuclear weapons challenges in the future
will require talented young people with the necessary technical and policy expertise
to contribute to sound decisionmaking on nuclear issues over time. To that end, the CSIS
Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) runs a yearly Nuclear Scholars Initiative for graduate
students and young professionals. Those accepted into the program are hosted once per
month at CSIS in Washington, DC, where they participate in daylong workshops with se
nior
government o
ffi
cials and policy experts. Over the course of the six-
month program, Schol-
ars are required to prepare a research paper. This volume is a collection of those papers.
PONI owes many thanks to the outstanding Nuclear Scholars Class of 2013 for their
dedication and outstanding work. Special thanks are due to Dr. Clark Murdock, Dr. Richard
Wagner, and Ms. Amy Woolf for providing valuable feedback to the Nuclear Scholars about
their research and to Amb. Linton Brooks for chairing several meetings and serving as a
consistent mentor to the Class of 2013. PONI would also like to thank all the experts who
came to speak to the Nuclear Scholars during their workshop sessions. The Nuclear Scholars
Initiative could not function without the generosity of these knowledgeable individuals.
Lastly, PONI would like to thank our partners, especially the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency and the National Nuclear Security Administration, for their continued support.
Without them, the Nuclear Scholars Initiative would not be possible.
This material is based upon work supported by the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security
Administration under Award Number(s) DE-
NA0000344.
Disclaimer:
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States
Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes
any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, complete-
ness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or pro
cess disclosed, or represents that its use
would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any speci
fi
c commercial product, pro
cess, or
ser
vice by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its
endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views
and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessary state or re
fl
ect those of the United States Government
or any agency thereof
About CSIS
For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed
solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. As we celebrate this milestone,
CSIS scholars are developing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help
decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world.
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fi
t or
ga
ni
za
tion headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220
full-
time staff and large network of a
ffi
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nding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a
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CSIS does not take speci
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About the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues
Many of the most pressing national and international security challenges are tied to
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prevent their use by states and nonstate actors runs parallel with the need to maintain
certain nuclear capabilities and the intellectual assets that support them. Both tracks
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eld.
PONI maintains an enterprise-
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© 2014 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-
1-
4422-
2797-
2 (pb); 978-
1-
4422-
2798-
9 (eBook)
Nuclear Scholars
Initiative
A Collection of Papers from the 2013 Nuclear
Scholars Initiative
EDITOR
Sarah Weiner
AUTHORS
Isabelle Anstey
Lee Aversano
Jessica Bufford
Nilsu Goren
Jana Honkova
Graham W. Jenkins
Phyllis Ko
Rizwan Ladha
Jarret M. La
fl
eur
David K. Lartonoix
Adam Mount
Mira Rapp-
Hooper
Alicia L. Swift
David Thomas
Timothy J. Westmyer
Craig J. Wiener
Lauren Wilson
January 2014
Russia
K-141 Kursk: The Oscar II class sub sank in the Barents Sea on
August 12, 2000 after an explosion in the torpedo compartment. See Kursk
submarine disaster. All 118 men on board were lost. However, all except
the extreme bow section was later salvaged.
K-159: The hulk of the decommissioned Soviet-era November class
submarine sank in the Barents Sea on August 28, 2003, when a storm
ripped away the pontoons necessary to keep it afloat under tow. 9 men
perished in the accident.
Soviet Union
List of sunken nuclear submarines is located in Northwestern Federal
District
K-27
K-27
K-141
K-141
K-159
K-159
The location of sunken nuclear submarines in the Arctic
K-27: The only Project 645 submarine, it was irreparably damaged by a
reactor accident (control rod failure) on May 24, 1968. 9 were killed
in the reactor accident. After shutting down the reactor and sealing the
compartment, the Soviet Navy scuttled her in shallow water (108 ft (33
m)) in the Kara Sea on September 6, 1982,[1] contrary to the
recommendation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[2]
K-8: A Project 627 November class submarine was lost April 11, 1970
while being towed in rough seas following a fire on board. The submarine
was initially evacuated, but 52 reembarked for the towing operation.
All hands on board were lost (52), while 73 crewmen survived on the
rescue vessel.[1] Location: Bay of Biscay, 490 kilometres (260 nmi)
northwest of Spain in the North Atlantic Ocean.
K-219: A Project 667A Yankee I class sub was damaged by a missile
explosion October 3, 1986, then sank suddenly while being towed after
all surviving crewmen had transferred off. 6 crew members were killed.
Location: 950 kilometres (510 nmi) east of Bermuda in the North Atlantic
Ocean.
K-278 Komsomolets: The only Mike-class sub built sank due to a
raging fire April 7, 1989. All but 5 crewmen evacuated prior to sinking.
42 perished, many from smoke inhalation and exposure to the cold waters
of the Barents Sea. A total of 27 crew members survived.
Soviet submarine K-429 sank twice, but was raised after each
incident.
United States
Thresher (SSN-593), the first submarine in its class, sank April 10,
1963 during deep-diving trials after flooding, loss of propulsion, and
an attempt to blow the emergency ballast tanks failed, causing it to
exceed crush depth. All 129 men on board died. Location: 350 km (190
nmi) east of Cape Cod.
Scorpion (SSN-589), a Skipjack-class submarine, sank May 22, 1968,
evidently due to implosion upon reaching its crush depth. What caused
the Scorpion to descend to its crush depth is not known. All 99 men on
board died. Location: 740 kilometres (400 nmi) southwest of the Azores.
List of sunken nuclear submarines
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
See also: Nuclear submarine accidents
Eight nuclear submarines have sunk as a consequence of either accident
or extensive damage: two from the United States Navy, four from the
Soviet Navy, and two from the Russian Navy. Only three were lost with
all hands: two from the United States Navy and one from the Russian
Navy. All sank as a result of accident with the exception of K-27, which
was scuttled in the Kara Sea when repair was deemed impossible and
decommissioning too expensive. All of the Soviet/Russian submarines
belonged to the Northern Fleet. Although the Soviet submarine K-129
(Golf II) carried nuclear ballistic missiles when it sank, it was a
diesel-electric submarine and is not in the list below.
List of sunken nuclear submarines is located in North Atlantic
Thresher
Thresher
Scorpion
Scorpion
K-8
K-8
K-219
K-219
K-278
K-278
The location of sunken nuclear submarines in the Atlantic
Of the 8 sinkings, 2 were due to fires, 2 were due to explosions of
weapons systems, 1 was due to flooding, 1 was weather-related, and 1 was
sunk intentionally due to a damaged nuclear reactor. In 1 case, the
cause of sinking is unknown. All of the subs are in the Northern
Hemisphere, and there are none in either the Indian or Pacific
While it was "a baby step" towards making the country's first indigenous nuclear submarine fully-operational, given that INS Arihant will now first undergo a whole host of surface sorties and then "dived" ones with test-firing of its ballistic missiles over the next 18 months, it did mark a significant milestone towards building a long-awaited credible nuclear weapons triad.
India has the Agni ballistic missiles and fighters jury-rigged to deliver nukes but the triad's underwater leg has remained elusive so far. It will be in place only once INS Arihant followed by its two under-construction sister submarines - one christened INS Aridhaman and the other just S-4 at present - are ready to undertake "deterrent patrols" by prowling underwater for months at end ready to let loose their missiles if required.
The launch of INS Arihant's sea-acceptance trials (SATs), which were flagged off by defence minister Manohar Parrikar and Navy chief Admiral Robin Dhowan, comes a day after TOI reported the submarine was all set for them with its 83 MW pressurized light-water reactor attaining 100% power and the completion of its long-drawn harbour-acceptance trials (HATs).
The real test during the SATs will be the test-firing of its K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which has so far been tested only from submersible pontoons around a dozen times. The 750-km range K-15 - INS Arihant can carry 12 in its four silos -- is dwarfed by the well over 5,000-km SLBMs present with the US, Russia and China. But an over 2,000-km range K-4 SLBM, tested for the first time in March this year, is also in the works.
The criticality of SLBMs for deterrence can be gauged from the fact that even the US and Russia are ensuring that almost two-thirds of the strategic warheads they eventually retain under strategic arms reduction agreements are such missiles.
Already armed with five nuclear and 51 conventional submarines, China too is now on course to induct five JIN-class SSBNs (nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range ballistic missiles) with 7,400-km range JL-2 missiles.
The Indian Navy, in turn, wants at least three SSBNs and six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) in the long-term. It currently operates one SSN in the shape of INS Chakra, obtained on a 10-year lease for Russia for around $1 billion, while negotiations are underway to acquire another such boat. While these submarines have short-range cruise missiles, they are not armed with nuclear missiles because of international treaties like the Missile Technology Control Regime.
Recent Messages (31)
Is Modi ready for my previous, direct, question? Needless to say, Modi is busy doing his election campaigns in Jharkhand, of all the places on this good earth.
Punish the leaders who plundered Jharkhand: PM Modi tells voters
Bunch of idiots, U2 manoharrao Parrikarji> Do something nice for a change. Take sanyas.
...and I am Sid Harth
The U. S. Navy took two Type XXI and a handful of Japanese boats for study, and applied some lessons-learned to a fleet upgrade dubbed "Greater Underwater Propulsive Power" (GUPPY).
Fifty-two boats were modified: snorkels were added, guns removed, the superstructures streamlined, and battery-power greatly increased. Another nineteen boats received some improvements. The net result: greatly increased underwater speed and endurance.
1946
Dr. Philip Abelson proposed a marriage of the Walter hull form with a nuclear power plant. The Navy detailed eight engineers to the home of the Atomic Bomb, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to see what might be developed.
1947
Testing some newly-discovered peculiarities concerning the transmission of sound in the open ocean, a U. S. submarine was able to detect a destroyer at a distance of 105 miles and hear depth-charges exploding 600 miles away. This, and other research, led to the development of a deep-ocean array of hydrophones called SOSUS. One of the earliest installations could detect a snorkeling submarine at 500 miles.
1948
The U. S. Navy began experimenting with submarine-launched missiles, starting with a copy of the German V-1 buzz bomb.
Loon was tracked by radar and command-controlled from the submarine. However, erection of the launching ramp and preparation of the missile kept the submarine on the surface for five minutes; therefore, a hand-off control system was developed, whereby another submarine, 80 miles downrange, could take over for the last 55 miles of missile flight.
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1950
The Soviet Union moved to regain status as operator of the world's largest submarine fleet: over the following eight years, they built 235 "Whiskey" class, using the Type XXI as a template.
1950
"Pickerel" ran from Hong Kong to Pearl Harbor – twenty-one days, 5,194 miles, on snorkel.
1950
One of the officers detailed to Oak Ridge in 1946 assumed control of the Navy nuclear propulsion program (and kept control, until finally retired in 1982). Captain Rickover was a submariner and an engineer, with a passion for safety and an obsession for control. He was brilliant, and difficult – and made nuclear power a reality, not just in submarines, but in many major surface warships as well.
Just as with WWI, there was only one verified German submarine atrocity. In March, 1944, a U-boat commander, on his first combat mission, ordered his crew to kill all survivors of "Peleos" and try to pulverize all floating wreckage with hand-grenades. His motive: to hide the sinking from patrolling aircraft and thus conceal his own presence in the area. He, and two of his officers (who claimed they were only "following orders") were convicted and executed.
1945
Karl Doenitz, who started the war as commander of submarines, became Navy Chief of Staff in January, 1943, and ended the war as Hitler's chosen successor as Chief of State – even though he had never been a member of the Nazi Party. Hitler committed suicide on April 30; Doenitz assumed command on May 1 – and issued "cease fire" orders on May 3.
The 1945 Nuremberg War Crimes tribunal brought Doenitz up on charges, especially for "breeches of the international law of submarine warfare" for authorizing and encouraging unrestricted operations. The best witness in his defense: U. S. Admiral Chester Nimitz, who acknowledged that the United States Navy had authorized unrestricted operations against Japan, throughout the Pacific ocean area, from the first days of the war.
Nonetheless, Doenitz was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for being "fully prepared to wage war" – a specious charge, in the eyes of most observers; any military force should always be thus prepared. Most observers believed that he was being tried as a stand-in for the unavailable Adolph Hitler.
Japanese submarines scored a few important victories – the carriers "Yorktown" and "Wasp," and the last American surface warship sunk, the cruiser "Indianapolis" in late July, 1945; overall, however, they sank only about one-fifth as many ships as did the American submarine force.
On the last day of the Pacific war, Japan had only 33 submarines in commission (excluding midgets), seven of which were in the training command. Except for the midgets, the submarine force had become irrelevant.
The largest ship ever sunk by a submarine: the brand-new aircraft carrier "Shinano," 71,890 tons, November 28, by the U. S. submarine "Archerfish."
1945
The first Type XXIII went on war patrol in February. By the end of the European war – May 7 – six were in service, 53 were in the water, and 900 were under construction or on order.
The first Type XXI, U-2511, left Hamburg on war patrol on April 30; when she returned home to surrender, 30 Type XXI were in shakedown and training, 121 were in the water and another 1000 were under construction or on order.
U-3008, one of only two Type XXI U-boats to make a wartime patrol – albeit brief, as the war ended en route.
For some, the war ended too soon. With more hope than sense, Germany had more than 1,900 Type XXI and Type XXIII under construction or on order on the last day of the European war.
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1945
Germany's largest U-boat, the 1,700 ton Type XB minelayer U-234 – was at sea when the war ended, and surrendered in mid-ocean to an American destroyer escort. Her original destination had been Japan; her cargo included two complete ME-262 jet fighters (disassembled in crates, but with complete technical data) and 550 kilograms of Uranium 235 (or Uranium oxide -- sources differ), packed in lead containers. The reason the uranium was being sent to Japan has never been determined – or, at least, revealed.
1945
SCORECARD
GERMANY U-boats claimed 14.4 million tons, but Germany lost 821 U-boats. Allied aircraft were responsible for (or directly involved in) the loss of 433; surface ships, 252; mines, 34; accidents 45, submarines 25 (only one of which happened when both hunter and victim were submerged); unknown, 15, scuttled by their own crews, 14; interned in neutral ports, 2; sunk by shore battery, 1.
UNITED STATES: American submarines sank at least 1300 Japanese ships, 5.3 million tons, including one battleship, eight carriers, eleven cruisers and 180 smaller warships. The U. S. Navy lost 52 boats; 22 percent of the submarine personnel who went on patrol did not return. It was the highest casualty rate of any branch of service– but not as high as that of the German submarine force, which lost an astonishing 630 men out of every 1,000 who served in the U-boat fleet.
SOVIET RUSSIA: The Soviets started the war with the largest submarine fleet: 218. They added 54 and lost 109. They did not have much impact on the course of the war. However, S-13 was credited with the single greatest disaster in maritime history: the 1945 sinking of the German liner "Wilhelm Gustloff," engaged in an effort to get German soldiers out of the path of the advancing Red Army. There may have been more than 8,000 troops and civilians aboard; fewer than 1,000 were rescued.
Japan fielded the "Kaiten" torpedo, incorporating elements of the 24-inch, 40-knot version of the "Long Lance" with a control compartment into which the pilot was locked. Range: not more than five hours, no matter what. "Kaiten" were carried into battle by I-class submarines; the record is ambiguous. A fairly large number of "Kaiten" were sent into action; one American tanker and a small landing ship were sunk, perhaps also a destroyer escort, and two transports were damaged
In a reprise of the "Deutschland" efforts of World War I to move high-priority cargo through the blockade, the Japanese cargo-carrying I-52 (356 feet long, cruising range of 27,000 miles at 12 knots) was sent from Indonesia with a cargo of ruber, tin, opium, quinine, tungsten, molybdenum and 2 metric tons of gold bullion, bound for Nazi-occupied France.
Allied radio intercepts had pin-pointed a mid-ocean rendezvous with U-530, to transfer a coast pilot, a radar technician and some new radar equipment to assist I-52 in running the Allied gauntlet. Sunk on June 23, 1944, by an aircraft from the jeep-carrier USS BOGUE, I-52 was discovered in May, 1995 -- lying under 17,000 feet of water.
1944
The American verison of code-breaking, dubbed the "Pacific Ultra," allowed the fleet to plot Japanese merchant convoys in advance – no need for long open-ocean hunting expeditions. U. S. submarine production was scaled back radically early in the year – the already-existing submarine force was running out of targets. With perhaps 140 submarines operating in the Pacific, the U. S. Navy submarines sank more than 600 Japanese ships, 2.7 million tons – more than for the years 1941, 1942 and 1943 combined.
As the targets disappeared, many submarines were assigned to picket duty to rescue downed aviators making B-29 raids on Japan, or anyone else who happened along. A total of 540 were hauled aboard – including the youngest pilot in the U. S. Navy, Lt(jg) George H. W. Bush.
1943
Hoping to hide existing U-boats from the increasingly devastating air patrols, Germany perfected an idea that had been kicking around for a long time: use of a breathing tube to allow running on diesel power just below the surface, thus also keeping the batteries fully charged. They dubbed it the "snorkel." It was not a perfect solution: the tube could break if the boat was going too fast; the ball-float at the top would close if a wave passed over, thus shifting engine suction to the interior of the boat and occasionally popping a few eardrums. The snorkel also left a visible wake, and returned a pretty good radar blip. But it helped.
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1943
The Germans underestimated the industrial capacity of the United States. The prediction against which "Tonnage War" was by then being waged was that the 1943 ship-production of Great Britain and the U. S. together would be less than 8 million tons. The U. S. alone launched more than double that figure.
The Germans also underestimated the ability of the Allies to develop and implement highly-effective anti submarine weapons and tactics. During the year, the U. S. Navy established anti-submarine "Hunter-Killer" groups, centered on the small, "Jeep" carrier. Long-range aircraft, such as the B-24 adapted for anti-submarine efforts, went into service. Among other efforts, they put an end to the "Milk Cow." The rendezvous were too easy to spot by air patrol. Of nine Type XIV in service in June, 1943, seven had been sunk by August.
Also operational: the "hedgehog" – so-called because the array of twenty-four 65-pound projectiles looked like the bristles of a porcupine. Launched 230 yards in front of the surface warship, the projectiles would cover a 100-foot circle, and explode on contact. The wepaon proved to be highly effective.
By the end of May, 1943, the Germans had clearly lost the Battle of the Atlantic. In that month alone, 41 U-boats were sunk – 25 percent of current operational strength. Things got worse: in the last four months of the year, almost 5,000 ships sailed in Atlantic convoys; nine were lost. Sixty-two U-boats were destroyed.
1944
In June, a Hunter-Killer group became the first American force to capture an enemy warship on the high seas since the War of 1812. The Type IX boat, U-505, was forced to the surface by depth charges; quick action by a boarding party saved the boat from being scuttled by the crew. U-505 is now a permanent exhibit at Chicago's Museum of Science and Industry. In a small quirk of fate, it is only several dozen miles from the wreckage of the World War I UC-97.
Technological advances such as improved radar, the radar altimeter, the aircraft searchlight, and effective air-dropped depth charges began to enter the force. Before long, aircraft were accounting for 50 percent of all U-boat sinkings.
1942
By the end of the year, with the U-boat fleet clearly in trouble, Hitler authorized the design of a fully combat-capable Walter-cycle 1,600 ton U-boat, designated Type XVIII. Two prototypes were ordered. However, it was soon obvious that there was not enough time – or money – to turn this dream into reality. The design was converted into a conventionally-powered submarine – diesel on the surface, batteries for submerged running – and the rather large space intended for storage of the Perhydrol was given over to an extra-large bank of batteries.
Two classes were ordered: the 1,600-ton Type XXI, and a coastal version, the 230-ton XXIII. Type XXI had only half the range of the comparable Type IX, could manage bursts of 17 knots underwater (compared with 7 knots), dive to almost 1,000 feet (300 feet deeper), and remain totally submerged at economical creep speed for 11 days. With a sophisticated fire control system the Type XXI could launch an attack from a depth of 150 feet.
Type XXIII had twice the submerged speed and five times the underwater endurance of the small pre-war Type II. However, combat effectiveness was severely limited: two torpedoes, no reloads. All other submarine
The "Battle of the Atlantic" began in July, and continued for eleven months; the U-boats scored some 712 merchant victims. Ships were being sunk at more than twice the replacement rate, and new U-boats were joining the fleet at a rate of about one a day. Also in July, the Germans began deployment of a mid-ocean filling station. The Type XIV boat had a capacity for 700 tons of fuel and other supplies, rather than armaments. Dubbed the "Milk Cow," one could keep a dozen Type VII at sea for another month, or five Type IX for two months.
1942
On September 13, in what may be the most spectacular – albeit unplanned – submarine event of all time, the Japanese I-19 launched a spread of six torpedoes at the aircraft carrier "Wasp." Three hit, sinking the ship. The others continued running for twelve miles, into another task group, where one caused fatal damage to the destroyer "O'Brien" and other send the battleship "North Carolina" to the shipyard for two months. The sixth cruised on, into the unknown.
1942
Technological advances such as improved radar, the radar altimeter, the aircraft searchlight, and effective air-dropped depth charges began to enter the force. Before long, aircraft were accounting for 50 percent of all U-boat sinkings.
Japan began construction of the 5,223-ton I-400 class of submarine aircraft carrier, each of which carried three dive-bomber seaplanes. Designed for attacks against the Panama Canal and the West Coast of the United States. Twelve were planned; only two were built, and did not see any useful service.
Japanese submarines also made some attacks on the West Coast, lobbing shells at Santa Monica, California, and Astoria, Oregon. The attacks had minor effect, although Radio Tokyo gloated, "Americans know that the submarine shelling of the Pacific coast was a warning to the nation that the paradise created by George Washington is on the verge of destruction."
1942
Doenitz had hoped to send a blitzkrieg of U-boats against the East Coast of America, but Hitler, fearful of an Allied invasion of Norway, forced him to keep most of his assets closer to home. Nonetheless, he managed to get five long-range cruisers into position in January – where they found the whole coastline lit up like Times Square on New Year's Eve: no blackouts, all navigational aids aiding, all ships sailing with full navigational lights. It was high tourist season in Miami and the war was 3000 miles away; the northward-flowing Gulf Stream just a few miles offshore kept southward-bound ships close inshore, nicely silhouetted against a glowing Florida skyline. The score for two and a half months in American coastal waters: 98 ships. Coastal communities did not go under blackout until April.
As for the U. S. Navy: before the problems had been discovered, and fixed, an effort which took the first two years of the war, almost 4,000 torpedoes had been fired against the enemy – with marginal results. On one patrol "Halibut" fired 23 torpedoes; only one exploded (although one of the targets was sunk when the torpedo punched a hole through rusting hull plates). The U. S. score for all of 1942, 180 ships, 725,000 tons (about equal to a monthly U-boat total). The Japanese replaced 635,000 tons in the same period. As far as the undersea forces were concerned, it looked like it was going to be a long war.
On the first day of the war, 28 submarines of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet were in defensive positions around the Philippines. More submarines than the entire German U-boat fleet at the beginning of World War I; indeed, more submarines than had ever been assembled for one battle at the same time. They might as well have been in San Diego.
For the losing three-week Philippine campaign, with potential targets including seventy-six loaded transports and supply ships, the Americans averaged only two attacks per submarine, and sank only three Japanese ships. Only one American submarine was lost.
That is not meant as a compliment. Pre-war training had emphasized caution: "It is bad practice and is contrary to submarine doctrine," noted an official report of 1941, "to conduct an attack at periscope depth when aircraft are known to be in the vicinity." Of more significance: problems with torpedo supply, and design. As for supply: 1941 torpedo production was limited to 60 a month. For all of 1942, even with a war well underway, total production was 2,382. Submarine commanders, already too cautious, were cautioned not to waste their precious ammunition. For the year, they shot 2,010.
As for design: the Americans, British, Russians and Germans all had similar problems with their torpedoes. The depth settings were wrong; the fuses were inadequate; the torpedoes did not explode on contact. Example: during one period in 1940, U-boats launched four attacks on a battleship, 14 on cruisers, ten on destroyers, and ten on transports – with one transport sunk. The leading U-boat ace complained, "I cannot be expected to fight with a dummy rifle."
WORLD SUBMARINE HISTORY TIMELINE
PART FOUR: 1941-2000
Prepared for NOVA by Captain Brayton Harris, USN (Retired)
Author, The Navy Times Book of Submarines: A Political, Social and Military History
Everything looks nice on a piece of paper, especially on a newspaper. India is a big (poor) country with million-plus non military problems. Modi at helm proposing a strong (military-wise) nation is making suitable noises, here and there but has no idea, a firm plan or a structure to fulfil his so called 'vision.' Under the monetary and economic stress, as of today, tomorrow and thousands of tomorrows, how can he keep such falsehood floating? I am asking Parrikar, et al. Modi, U2.
Cold War Timeline. From 1945 to 1991, the Cold War dominated international affairs. The global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union took many forms. But overshading all was the threat of nuclear war. Submarine & Cold War History
Submarines have a long history before the Cold War began in the 1940s. The first American example was built during the Revolution, and the first successful sinking of a surface vessel by a submarine dates to the Civil War. However, the development of the nuclear-powered submarine in the 1950s by the United States and its incorporation into the strategic triad of defensive weapons altered global politics significantly, and its presence in the world's waters remains a powerful deterrent to nuclear warfare today.
Copyright © 2000, The National Museum of American History
...and I am Sid Harth
