Commentary
Time to End the Cuba Embargo
The U.S. government has waged economic war against the Castro regime
for half a century. The policy may have been worth a try during the Cold
War, but the embargo has failed to liberate the Cuban people. It is
time to end sanctions against Havana.
Decades ago the Castro brothers lead a revolt against a nasty authoritarian, Fulgencio Batista. After coming to power in 1959, they created a police state, targeted U.S. commerce, nationalized American assets, and allied with the Soviet Union. Although Cuba was but a small island nation, the Cold War magnified its perceived importance.
Washington reduced Cuban sugar import quotas in July 1960. Subsequently U.S. exports were limited, diplomatic ties were severed, travel was restricted, Cuban imports were banned, Havana’s American assets were frozen, and almost all travel to Cuba was banned. Washington also pressed its allies to impose sanctions.
These various measures had no evident effect, other than to intensify Cuba’s reliance on the Soviet Union. Yet the collapse of the latter nation had no impact on U.S. policy. In 1992, Congress banned American subsidiaries from doing business in Cuba and in 1996, it penalized foreign firms that trafficked in expropriated U.S. property. Executives from such companies even were banned from traveling to America.
On occasion Washington relaxed one aspect or another of the embargo, but in general continued to tighten restrictions, even over Cuban Americans. Enforcement is not easy, but Uncle Sam tries his best. For instance, according to the Government Accountability Office, Customs and Border Protection increased its secondary inspection of passengers arriving from Cuba to reflect an increased risk of embargo violations after the 2004 rule changes, which, among other things, eliminated the allowance for travelers to import a small amount of Cuban products for personal consumption.
Three years ago, President Barack Obama loosened regulations on Cuban Americans, as well as telecommunications between the United States and Cuba. However, the law sharply constrains the president’s discretion. Moreover, UN Ambassador Susan Rice said that the embargo will continue until Cuba is free.
It is far past time to end the embargo.
During the Cold War, Cuba offered a potential advanced military outpost for the Soviet Union. Indeed, that role led to the Cuban missile crisis. With the failure of the U.S.-supported Bay of Pigs invasion, economic pressure appeared to be Washington’s best strategy for ousting the Castro dictatorship.
However, the end of the Cold War left Cuba strategically irrelevant. It is a poor country with little ability to harm the United States. The Castro regime might still encourage unrest, but its survival has no measurable impact on any important U.S. interest.
The regime remains a humanitarian travesty, of course. Nor are Cubans the only victims: three years ago the regime jailed a State Department contractor for distributing satellite telephone equipment in Cuba. But Havana is not the only regime to violate human rights. Moreover, experience has long demonstrated that it is virtually impossible for outsiders to force democracy. Washington often has used sanctions and the Office of Foreign Assets Control currently is enforcing around 20 such programs, mostly to little effect.
The policy in Cuba obviously has failed. The regime remains in power. Indeed, it has consistently used the embargo to justify its own mismanagement, blaming poverty on America. Observed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: “It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they would lose all of their excuses for what hasn’t happened in Cuba in the last 50 years.” Similarly, Cuban exile Carlos Saladrigas of the Cuba Study Group argued that keeping the “embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden the hardliners.”
Cuban human rights activists also generally oppose sanctions. A decade ago I (legally) visited Havana, where I met Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, who suffered in communist prisons for eight years. He told me that the “sanctions policy gives the government a good alibi to justify the failure of the totalitarian model in Cuba.”
Indeed, it is only by posing as an opponent of Yanqui Imperialism that Fidel Castro has achieved an international reputation. If he had been ignored by Washington, he never would have been anything other than an obscure authoritarian windbag.
Unfortunately, embargo supporters never let reality get in the way of their arguments. In 1994, John Sweeney of the Heritage Foundation declared that “the embargo remains the only effective instrument available to the U.S. government in trying to force the economic and democratic concessions it has been demanding of Castro for over three decades. Maintaining the embargo will help end the Castro regime more quickly.” The latter’s collapse, he wrote, is more likely in the near term than ever before.
Almost two decades later, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, retains faith in the embargo: “The sanctions on the regime must remain in place and, in fact, should be strengthened, and not be altered.” One of the best definitions of insanity is continuing to do the same thing while expecting to achieve different results.
The embargo survives largely because of Florida’s political importance. Every presidential candidate wants to win the Sunshine State’s electoral votes, and the Cuban American community is a significant voting bloc.
But the political environment is changing. A younger, more liberal generation of Cuban Americans with no memory of life in Cuba is coming to the fore. Said Wayne Smith, a diplomat who served in Havana: “for the first time in years, maybe there is some chance for a change in policy.” And there are now many more new young Cuban Americans who support a more sensible approach to Cuba.
Support for the Republican Party also is falling. According to some exit polls Barack Obama narrowly carried the Cuban American community in November, after receiving little more than a third of the vote four years ago. He received 60 percent of the votes of Cuban Americans born in the United States.
Barack Obama increased his votes among Cuban Americans after liberalizing contacts with the island. He also would have won the presidency without Florida, demonstrating that the state may not be essential politically.
Today even the GOP is no longer reliable. For instance, though Republican vice-presidential nominee Paul Ryan has defended the embargo in recent years, that appears to reflect ambition rather than conviction. Over the years he voted at least three times to lift the embargo, explaining: “The embargo doesnt work. It is a failed policy. It was probably justified when the Soviet Union existed and posed a threat through Cuba. I think its become more of a crutch for Castro to use to repress his people. All the problems he has, he blames the American embargo.”
There is essentially no international support for continuing the embargo. For instance, the European Union plans to explore improving relations with Havana. Spain’s Deputy Foreign Minister Gonzalo de Benito explained that the EU saw a positive evolution in Cuba. The hope, then, is to move forward in the relationship between the European Union and Cuba.
The administration should move now, before congressmen are focused on the next election. President Obama should propose legislation to drop (or at least significantly loosen) the embargo. He also could use his authority to relax sanctions by, for instance, granting more licenses to visit the island.
Ending the embargo would have obvious economic benefits for both Cubans and Americans. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates American losses alone from the embargo as much as $1.2 billion annually.
Expanding economic opportunities also might increase pressure within Cuba for further economic reform. So far the regime has taken small steps, but rejected significant change. Moreover, thrusting more Americans into Cuban society could help undermine the ruling system. Despite Fidel Castro’s decline, Cuban politics remains largely static. A few human rights activists have been released, while Raul Castro has used party purges to entrench loyal elites.
Lifting the embargo would be no panacea. Other countries invest in and trade with Cuba to no obvious political impact. And the lack of widespread economic reform makes it easier for the regime rather than the people to collect the benefits of trade, in contrast to China. Still, more U.S. contact would have an impact. Argued trade specialist Dan Griswold, “American tourists would boost the earnings of Cubans who rent rooms, drive taxis, sell art, and operate restaurants in their homes. Those dollars would then find their way to the hundreds of freely priced farmers markets, to carpenters, repairmen, tutors, food venders, and other entrepreneurs.”
The Castro dictatorship ultimately will end up in history’s dustbin. But it will continue to cause much human hardship along the way.
The Heritage Foundation’s John Sweeney complained nearly two decades ago that “the United States must not abandon the Cuban people by relaxing or lifting the trade embargo against the communist regime.” But the dead hand of half a century of failed policy is the worst breach of faith with the Cuban people.
Lifting sanctions would be a victory not for Fidel Castro, but for the power of free people to spread liberty. As Griswold argued, “commercial engagement is the best way to encourage more open societies abroad.” Of course, there are no guarantees. But lifting the embargo would have a greater likelihood of success than continuing a policy which has failed. Some day the Cuban people will be free. Allowing more contact with Americans likely would make that day come sooner.
Decades ago the Castro brothers lead a revolt against a nasty authoritarian, Fulgencio Batista. After coming to power in 1959, they created a police state, targeted U.S. commerce, nationalized American assets, and allied with the Soviet Union. Although Cuba was but a small island nation, the Cold War magnified its perceived importance.
Washington reduced Cuban sugar import quotas in July 1960. Subsequently U.S. exports were limited, diplomatic ties were severed, travel was restricted, Cuban imports were banned, Havana’s American assets were frozen, and almost all travel to Cuba was banned. Washington also pressed its allies to impose sanctions.
These various measures had no evident effect, other than to intensify Cuba’s reliance on the Soviet Union. Yet the collapse of the latter nation had no impact on U.S. policy. In 1992, Congress banned American subsidiaries from doing business in Cuba and in 1996, it penalized foreign firms that trafficked in expropriated U.S. property. Executives from such companies even were banned from traveling to America.
On occasion Washington relaxed one aspect or another of the embargo, but in general continued to tighten restrictions, even over Cuban Americans. Enforcement is not easy, but Uncle Sam tries his best. For instance, according to the Government Accountability Office, Customs and Border Protection increased its secondary inspection of passengers arriving from Cuba to reflect an increased risk of embargo violations after the 2004 rule changes, which, among other things, eliminated the allowance for travelers to import a small amount of Cuban products for personal consumption.
Three years ago, President Barack Obama loosened regulations on Cuban Americans, as well as telecommunications between the United States and Cuba. However, the law sharply constrains the president’s discretion. Moreover, UN Ambassador Susan Rice said that the embargo will continue until Cuba is free.
It is far past time to end the embargo.
During the Cold War, Cuba offered a potential advanced military outpost for the Soviet Union. Indeed, that role led to the Cuban missile crisis. With the failure of the U.S.-supported Bay of Pigs invasion, economic pressure appeared to be Washington’s best strategy for ousting the Castro dictatorship.
However, the end of the Cold War left Cuba strategically irrelevant. It is a poor country with little ability to harm the United States. The Castro regime might still encourage unrest, but its survival has no measurable impact on any important U.S. interest.
The regime remains a humanitarian travesty, of course. Nor are Cubans the only victims: three years ago the regime jailed a State Department contractor for distributing satellite telephone equipment in Cuba. But Havana is not the only regime to violate human rights. Moreover, experience has long demonstrated that it is virtually impossible for outsiders to force democracy. Washington often has used sanctions and the Office of Foreign Assets Control currently is enforcing around 20 such programs, mostly to little effect.
The policy in Cuba obviously has failed. The regime remains in power. Indeed, it has consistently used the embargo to justify its own mismanagement, blaming poverty on America. Observed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: “It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they would lose all of their excuses for what hasn’t happened in Cuba in the last 50 years.” Similarly, Cuban exile Carlos Saladrigas of the Cuba Study Group argued that keeping the “embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden the hardliners.”
Cuban human rights activists also generally oppose sanctions. A decade ago I (legally) visited Havana, where I met Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, who suffered in communist prisons for eight years. He told me that the “sanctions policy gives the government a good alibi to justify the failure of the totalitarian model in Cuba.”
Indeed, it is only by posing as an opponent of Yanqui Imperialism that Fidel Castro has achieved an international reputation. If he had been ignored by Washington, he never would have been anything other than an obscure authoritarian windbag.
Unfortunately, embargo supporters never let reality get in the way of their arguments. In 1994, John Sweeney of the Heritage Foundation declared that “the embargo remains the only effective instrument available to the U.S. government in trying to force the economic and democratic concessions it has been demanding of Castro for over three decades. Maintaining the embargo will help end the Castro regime more quickly.” The latter’s collapse, he wrote, is more likely in the near term than ever before.
Almost two decades later, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, retains faith in the embargo: “The sanctions on the regime must remain in place and, in fact, should be strengthened, and not be altered.” One of the best definitions of insanity is continuing to do the same thing while expecting to achieve different results.
The embargo survives largely because of Florida’s political importance. Every presidential candidate wants to win the Sunshine State’s electoral votes, and the Cuban American community is a significant voting bloc.
But the political environment is changing. A younger, more liberal generation of Cuban Americans with no memory of life in Cuba is coming to the fore. Said Wayne Smith, a diplomat who served in Havana: “for the first time in years, maybe there is some chance for a change in policy.” And there are now many more new young Cuban Americans who support a more sensible approach to Cuba.
Support for the Republican Party also is falling. According to some exit polls Barack Obama narrowly carried the Cuban American community in November, after receiving little more than a third of the vote four years ago. He received 60 percent of the votes of Cuban Americans born in the United States.
Barack Obama increased his votes among Cuban Americans after liberalizing contacts with the island. He also would have won the presidency without Florida, demonstrating that the state may not be essential politically.
Today even the GOP is no longer reliable. For instance, though Republican vice-presidential nominee Paul Ryan has defended the embargo in recent years, that appears to reflect ambition rather than conviction. Over the years he voted at least three times to lift the embargo, explaining: “The embargo doesnt work. It is a failed policy. It was probably justified when the Soviet Union existed and posed a threat through Cuba. I think its become more of a crutch for Castro to use to repress his people. All the problems he has, he blames the American embargo.”
There is essentially no international support for continuing the embargo. For instance, the European Union plans to explore improving relations with Havana. Spain’s Deputy Foreign Minister Gonzalo de Benito explained that the EU saw a positive evolution in Cuba. The hope, then, is to move forward in the relationship between the European Union and Cuba.
The administration should move now, before congressmen are focused on the next election. President Obama should propose legislation to drop (or at least significantly loosen) the embargo. He also could use his authority to relax sanctions by, for instance, granting more licenses to visit the island.
Ending the embargo would have obvious economic benefits for both Cubans and Americans. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates American losses alone from the embargo as much as $1.2 billion annually.
Expanding economic opportunities also might increase pressure within Cuba for further economic reform. So far the regime has taken small steps, but rejected significant change. Moreover, thrusting more Americans into Cuban society could help undermine the ruling system. Despite Fidel Castro’s decline, Cuban politics remains largely static. A few human rights activists have been released, while Raul Castro has used party purges to entrench loyal elites.
Lifting the embargo would be no panacea. Other countries invest in and trade with Cuba to no obvious political impact. And the lack of widespread economic reform makes it easier for the regime rather than the people to collect the benefits of trade, in contrast to China. Still, more U.S. contact would have an impact. Argued trade specialist Dan Griswold, “American tourists would boost the earnings of Cubans who rent rooms, drive taxis, sell art, and operate restaurants in their homes. Those dollars would then find their way to the hundreds of freely priced farmers markets, to carpenters, repairmen, tutors, food venders, and other entrepreneurs.”
The Castro dictatorship ultimately will end up in history’s dustbin. But it will continue to cause much human hardship along the way.
The Heritage Foundation’s John Sweeney complained nearly two decades ago that “the United States must not abandon the Cuban people by relaxing or lifting the trade embargo against the communist regime.” But the dead hand of half a century of failed policy is the worst breach of faith with the Cuban people.
Lifting sanctions would be a victory not for Fidel Castro, but for the power of free people to spread liberty. As Griswold argued, “commercial engagement is the best way to encourage more open societies abroad.” Of course, there are no guarantees. But lifting the embargo would have a greater likelihood of success than continuing a policy which has failed. Some day the Cuban people will be free. Allowing more contact with Americans likely would make that day come sooner.
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to former US president Ronald Reagan.
Cato Institute
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Washington, DC 20001-5403
1000 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20001-5403
- Phone (202) 842 0200
Jaime Suchlicki
University of Miami
June 2000
IMPLICATIONS OF LIFTING THE U.S. EMBARGO AND TRAVEL BAN
Introduction
Opponents of U.S. policy toward Cuba claim that if the embargo and the travel ban are lifted, the Cuba
n people would benefit economically; American companies will penetrate a nd influence the Cuban market; the Communist system would begin to crumble and a transition to a democratic society would be accelerated.
These expectations are based on several incorrect assumptions. First, that Castro and the Cuban leadership
are naïve and inexperienced and, therefore, would allow tourists and investments from the U.S. to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments in the island. Second, that Cuba would open up and allow U.S. investments in all sectors of the economy, instead of selecting which companies could trade and invest.
Third, that Castro is so interested in close relations with the U.S. that he is willing to risk what has been upper-most in his mind for 40 years – total control of power and a legacy of opposition to “Yankee imperialism,” – in exchange for economic improvements for his people. During the Fifth Communist Party Congress in 1997, Castro emphasized “We will do what is necessary without renouncing our principles. We do not like capitalism and we will not abandon our Socialist system.”
Castro also reiterated his long-standing anti-American posture, accusing the U.S. of waging economic war against his government and calling for “military preparedness against imperialist hostility.” A change in U.S. policy toward Cuba may have different and unintended results. The lifting of the embargo and the travel ban without meaningful changes in Cuba will: Guarantee the continuation of the current totalitarian structures.
Strengthen state enterprises, since money will flow into businesses owned by the Cuban government.
Most businesses are owned in Cuba by the state and, in all foreign investments, the Cuban government retains a partnership interest.
Lead to greater repression and control since Castro and the leadership will fear that U.S. influence will subvert the revolution and weaken the Communist party’s hold on the Cuban people.
Delay instead of accelerate a transition to democracy on the island. Allow Castro to borrow from international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, etc. Since Cuba owes billions of dollars
to the former Soviet Union, to the Club of Paris, and to others, and has refused in the past to acknowledge or pay these debts, new loans will be wasted by Castro’s inefficient and wasteful system, and will be uncollectible. The reason Castro has been unable to pay back loans is not because of the U.S. embargo, but because his economic system stifles productivity and he continues to spend on the military, on adventures abroad, and on supporting a bankrupt welfare system on the island.
Perpetuate the rather extensive control that the military holds over the economy and foster the further development of “Mafia type” groups that manage and profit from important sectors of the economy, particularly tourism, biotechnology, and agriculture.
Negate the basic tenets of U.S. policy in Latin America which emphasize democracy, human rights, and market economies.
Send the wrong message to the enemies of the U.S.: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the U.S.; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the U.S. will “forget and forgive,” and
reward him with tourism, investments, and economic aid.
Specific Considerations Tourism If tourists are allowed to visit Cuba, the Castro government will follow the same practices of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in the past: tourists would have to obtain visas from the Cuban Interest Section in Washington; their travel would be controlled and channeled into
the tourist resorts built in the island away from the major centers of population; and tourists will be screened carefully to prevent "subversive propaganda" from entering the island.
American tourists will have limited contact with Cubans thus their influence would be limited Cuba's security apparatus tightly controls most of the tourist resortareas such as Varadero, Cayo Coco, etc. They are off-limits to the average Cuban. Employees in these resorts are carefully screened by the government and programmed to tell the visiting tourists Castro propaganda line.
Tourist dollars would be spent on products. i.e. rum, tobacco, etc. produced by state enterprises, and tourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by the Cuban government. The principal
airline-shuffling tourists around the island, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military.
Carlos Lage, the Czar of the Cuban economy, reiterated on April 2, 1998, that the economic objective of the Cuban government was " to strengthen state enterprises."
The Cuban government would select which U. S. airlines and cruise companies will be allowed to visit the island and which U.S. companies are permitted to invest in joint venture with Cuban State enterprises.
The economic impact of tourism, while providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, would be limited. Dollars will flow in small quantities to the Cuban poor; state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. Since Cuba lacks a well-developed native tourist infrastructure, a large percentage of the tourist dollars
spent on the island will be sent abroad by the foreign entities from Spain and Canada operating hotels and nightclubs.
A large influx of tourists into Cuba will have a dislocating effect on the economies of smaller Caribbean islands such as Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Bahamas, and Puerto Rico, highly dependent on tourism for their well being. Careful planning must take place, lest we create significant hardships and social
problems in these countries.
Since tourism will become a two-way affair, with Cubans visiting the U.S. in great numbers, it is likely that many will stay in the U.S. as illegal immigrants, complicating a rather thorny issue in American domestic politics. Trade
No foreign trade that is independent from the state is permitted in Cuba.
Cuba would export to the U.S. most of its products, cigars, rum, citrus, vegetables, nickel, seafood, biotechnology, etc. Yet, since all of these products are produced by Cuban state enterprises, with
workers being paid below comparable wages, and Cuba has great need for dollars, the Cuban government could dump products in the U.S. market at very low prices, and without regard for cost or economic rationality.
Many of these products will compete unfairly with U.S. agriculture
and manufactured products, or with products imported from the
Caribbean and elsewhere.
If the U.S. were to buy sugar from Cuba, it would be to the
detriment of U.S. or Caribbean producers.
Cuban products are not strategically important to the U.S., and are
in great abundance in the U.S. internal market, or from other
traditional U.S. trading partners.
There is little question about Cuba’s chronic need for U.S.
technology, products and services. Yet, need alone does not
determine the size or viability of a market. Cuba’s large foreign
debt, owed to both Western and former Socialist countries, the
abysmal performance of its economy, and the low prices for its
major exports make the “bountiful market” perception a perilous
mirage.
From the U.S. point of view, therefore, the reestablishment of
commercial ties with Cuba would be
at best problematic. It would
create severe market distortions
for the already precarious regional
economies of the Caribbean and Central America since the United
States would have to shift some of these countries’ sugar quota to
Cuba. It would provide the U.S. market with products that are of
little value and in abundant supply. And, while some U.S. firms
could benefit from a resumed trade
relationship, it would not help
in any significant way the overall U.S. economy. Cuba does not
have the potential to become an important client like China, Russia,
or even Vietnam.
Investments
Cuba has promoted investments in
tourism as its highest priority
and only recently has begun to promote investments in other
sectors. Cuba has not yet a
ttempted to link Foreign Direct
Investments (FDI) with technology
transfer. Nor has it permitted greater individual freedom in ec
onomic matters. While the Cuban
government is allowing some work
ers to operate independently,
these activities are highly regulated. Unlike China, Cuba has not
legalized private agriculture or manufacturing.
Investments will be directed
and approved by the Cuban
government. The Cuban government is unlikely to create a level
plain field for American companies,
allowing some to invest while
discriminating capriciously against others.
U. S. investments in Cuba would be limited, however, given the
lack of an extensive internal
market, the uncertainties surrounding
the long-term risk to foreign investment, an uncertain political
situation; and the opportunities provided by other markets in Latin
America and elsewhere. Modest
initial investments would be
directed primarily to exploiting Cuba's’ tourist, mining, and natural
resource industries.
The Cuban constitution still outlaws
foreign ownership of most
properties and forbids any Cubans
from participating in joint
ventures with foreigners.
Joint ventures are only permitted with state enterprises; many of
these are now under military control.
It is illegal for foreign companies
to hire or fire Cuban workers
directly. Hiring is done by the Ministry of Labor. Foreign
companies must pay the wages owed
to their employees directly to
the Cuban government in hard currency. The Cuban government
then pays out to the Cuban workers in Cuban pesos, which are worth 1/20 of a U.S. dollar, pocketing 90 percent of every dollar it
receives.
While Cuba's foreign investment
law provides protection against
government expropriation, all arbitration must take place in the
corrupt and arbitrary government offices where little protection is
given to the investor. There is no independent judicial system in
the island.
Foreign investors must also confront political uncertainties that do
not exist in many other countries. They must contend with the
possibility of the regime’s revers
ing policy, the legal questions
surrounding previously confiscated properties, and potential
sanctions against foreign investors
that cooperated with the Castro
government in the event that an anti-Castro government comes to
power.
Castro's opposition to market reforms will limit the extent to which
the private sector emerges and functions effectively, and thereby
will slow, if not prevent, attaining a measurable degree of economic
recovery. While Castro and hard-liners recognize the need for
economic recovery, they also see the likely erosion of political
power and control that accompanies the restructuring of the
economy along free-market rules. Adoption of market reforms may
well represent a solution to the economic crisis, but a full-blown
reform process carries with it the risk of loss of control over
society, as well as the economy, and threatens to alienate some of
the regime’s key constituencies. WHY MAINTAIN THE EMBARGO
The embargo should be held as a carrot to be lifted when Cuba
changes its current system and develops
a democratic society. The embargo
is not an anachronism but a legitimate instrument of U.S. policy for
achieving the goal of a free Cuba.
While most of the freely elected governments in Latin America pursue
moderate, neo-liberal economic policies, Castro has deliberately staked out a
position as the last defender of Marxism-Leninism. In October 1997 he held
a meeting in Havana of Communist leaders from all over the world to
reassert the supremacy of communist ideology and to plan for a “comeback”
when capitalism fails.
The lifting of the embargo now will be an important psychological
victory for Castro. It would be interpreted as a defeat for U.S. policy and as
an enforced acceptance of
the Castro regime as a
permanent neighbor in the
Caribbean.
The long held belief that through negotiations and incentives we can
influence Castro’s behavior has been
weakened by Castro’s unwillingness to
provide major concessions. Castro pr
efers to sacrifice the economic well
being of his people rather than cave in
to demands for a different Cuba.
Neither economic incentives nor punishment have worked with Castro in the
past. They are not likely to work in the future. Not all differences and problems in international affairs can be solved
through negotiations or can be solved at
all. There are disputes that are not
negotiable and can only be solved either through the use of force or through
prolonged patience until the leadership
disappears or situations change.
Ignoring or supporting regimes that
violate human rights and abuse
their population is an ill-advised policy.
The Castro era may be coming to an end if for no other reason than
biological realities. Fidel Castro
is seventy-three and deteriorating
physically. U.S. policy should stay the course and wait for Castro’s
disappearance.
The gradual lifting of the embargo now will condemn the Cuban
people to a longer dictatorship and
the perpetuation of a failed Marxist-
Leninist society.
The gradual lifting of the embargo entails a real danger that the U.S.
may implement irreversible policies to
ward Cuba while Castro provides no
concessions to the U.S. or concessions that he can reverse.
A piecemeal lifting of the embargo will guarantee the continuance of
the present totalitarian political structures and prevent a rapid transformation
of Cuba into a free and democratic society. The lifting of the travel ban wit
hout meaningful and irreversible
concessions from the Castro regime could provide the Castro brothers with
much needed foreign exchange. It would represent one of the first steps in
ending the U.S. embargo and prolong
the suffering of the Cuban people. SPECIFIC ISSUES
If the U.S. has relations with
China, why not with Cuba?
Relations with China were propelled by U.S. strategic and economic
interests 1) to counter growing Soviet
power; 2) to increase U.S. influence in
Southeast Asia; and 3) to tap the one billion-dollar China market.
Cuba is small, poor, and strategically and economically unimportant.
In Latin America, the U.S. has followed a regional policy that fosters
human rights, neo-liberal economic policies, and democratically elected
civilian governments. U.S.-Cuba
policy should be no different.
The U.S. has been willing to intervene militarily in Grenada, Panama,
and Haiti to restore democracy. In Chile it established a military embargo
against the Pinochet dictatorship. In
other countries it supported free and
transparent elections. Why should U.S.
policy toward Cuba be different?
Aren’t the Cubans also entitled to a free society?
The Cubans are suffering economically
because of the U.S. embargo.
The Cubans can buy any products, including food and medicine from
any country in the world. Dollar stores in Cuba have numerous U.S.
products, including Coca-Cola, and other symbols of American
consumerism. American dollars can
purchase almost anything in Cuba. There are shortages in Cuba of fru
its, vegetables, potatoes, bananas,
mangos, boniatos, and other foodstuffs that have been traditionally produced
locally. What do these shortages have to do with the U.S. embargo?
The reason for Cuba’s economic suffering is a Marxist system that
discourages incentives. As in Eastern Europe under Communism, the failed
Communist system is the cause of the economic suffering of the Cubans, not
the U.S. embargo.
Tourism, trade and investment will accelerate the downfall of Communism
in Cuba as it did in the Soviet Union.
There is no evidence that tourism, trade, or investment had anything to
do with
the collapse of communism. Tourism
peaked in the Soviet Union in
1980, almost a decade before the collapse of communism. In the Soviet
Union tourism was tightly controlled with few tourists having any contact
with Russians.
The collapse of Communism was the
result of a decaying system that
did not work, the corruption and inefficiency of the Communist Party, the
economic bankruptcy of the Soviet Union in part because of military
competition with the West, an unpopular war in Afghanistan, and the
reformist policies of Mikhail Gorbachev
that accelerated the process of
change. The driving force for capitalism in
Russia and China is not trade or
investment but a strong domestic market economy, tolerated by the
government and dominated by millions of
small entrepreneurs. The will to
liberalize the economy does not exist in Cuba.
Cuba is a potential economic bonanza for U.S. companies.
Given Cuba’s scant foreign exchange, its ability to buy U.S. products
remains very limited. Cuba’s major
exports, i.e. sugar, tobacco, nickel,
citrus, are neither economically nor strategically important to the United
States.
Lifting the embargo would create severe market distortions in the
already precarious economies of the Caribbean and Central America since
the U.S. would have to divert some portion of the existing sugar quota away
from these countries to accommodate Cuba. The impact of tourism diversion
toward Cuba would profoundly hurt the economies of the Caribbean and
Central American countries.
Cuba, cited as one of the worst political and commercial risks in the
world by several recently issued country
risk guides, lags far behind China
and Vietnam in establishing the necessary conditions for economic
development and successful corporate involvement. Current foreign
investments are small and limited to do
llar sectors of the economy such as
the tourist industry and mining. American companies are not “losing out.”
In a free Cuba, U.S. companies will quickly regain the prominent role they
held in pre-Castro Cuba. If we lift the Embargo, U.S.-Latin
American relations will improve.
Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. The
U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as
priority items trade, investment,
transfer of technology, migration,
drugs, environment, and intellectual
property rights. Cuba is not a priority item on this agenda.
While publicly many Latin American countries oppose the embargo,
privately they are extremely concerned that Cuba will divert investments
from their countries to the island, and particularly that tourism will flock to
Cuba, to the detriment of the Caribbean economies.
The Embargo has failed to overthrow Fidel Castro. Why not lift it now?
The embargo was never established to overthrow the Castro
government. The embargo was established to punish the Castro government
for the confiscation of
American properties and to
pressure it to slow down
its move into the Communist camp. The embargo has been maintained to
show that Marxist-Leninism does not work as an economic or political
system and to use it as a tool to extract human rights, economic and political
concessions from the current or future Cuban government
.
While not all embargoes have worked, the embargo imposed on the
apartheid regime of South Africa and the military embargo of the Pinochet
dictatorship in Chile did work and forced political changes in both countries.
India’s sanctions on Nepal in 1989 contributed to political reforms there.
The embargo of Iraq is forcing the Saddam Hussein dictatorship to provide
some concessions to Western nations. Without major internal reforms in Cuba, the Castro government and
the military, not the Cuban people, will be
the main beneficiary of the lifting
of the embargo. While some prosperity may trickle down to the Cuban
people, state enterprises, many now under military control, will benefit most.
The Castro regime will use this newly-acquired wealth to strengthen
its hold on the Cuban people, to rebuild
its military apparatus, and to engage
again in supporting anti-American terrorist and violent groups in Latin
America and elsewhere.
To trade and invest is a country’s right not an obligation. The U.S. can
trade with whomever they want. As soon as Cuba respects human rights,
releases political prisoners, holds free and internationally supervised
elections, the embargo should be lifted.
To lift it now is to provide Castro
with a gift he does not deserve. JAIME SUCHLICKI
is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History
and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban
and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the
founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past
decade he was also the editor of the prestigious
Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs
. He is currently the Latin
American Editor for Transaction Publishers and the author of
Cuba:
From Columbus to Castro
(1997), now in its fourth edition, and editor
with Irving L. Horowitz of
Cuban Communism
(1999). He is also the
author of
Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA
(1998). He is a highly
regarded consultant to both the private and public sector on Cuba and
Latin American affairs.
- ...and I am Sid Harth