Wednesday, November 26, 2014

Vladimir Putin: Ready When EU are


NATO sees Russia ready for Ukraine incursion

AP | Nov 27, 2014, 04.05 AM IST

  KIEV: Russia still has enough troops along Ukraine's border to mount a major incursion, NATO's top commander said on Wednesday, and Moscow is using its military might to affect political developments inside Ukraine.

US Gen Philip Breedlove said a large number of Russian troops are also active inside Ukraine, training and advising separatist rebels.

Moscow has routinely denied it played any direct role in the conflict in Ukraine, which has claimed more than 4,000 lives.

Breedlove spoke during a brief visit to Kiev, where he met with top officials to discuss continued NATO assistance for Ukraine in its fight against Russian-backed separatists in the east.

``We are going to help Ukraine's military to increase its capacities and capabilities through interaction with US and European command,'' he said, adding that it ``will make them ever more interoperable with our forces.''

Ukraine has received multiple pledges of military support from Western nations, but has been frustrated by Washington's reluctance to promise any lethal equipment. But a senior aide to President Barack Obama said last week that he believes the US should consider giving lethal defensive equipment to Ukraine.

Tony Blinken, deputy US national security adviser, said he believed Washington ought to consider strengthening Ukrainian forces as a message to Moscow. Providing defensive military equipment to Ukraine has broad support in the US Congress.

The Ukrainian armed advance against rebel forces ground to a halt and was substantially reversed over the summer as government troops found themselves faced by a well-equipped and determined foe.

``This international border is completely wide open and maintained open by Russian forces, so that forces, supplies, money, fighters can move across at will,'' Breedlove said.

A truce was agreed in early September but fighting continues daily in several areas of eastern Ukraine 
Prabhat Kumar Singh • 881
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• Yekaterinburg, Russia • 53 mins ago
More lies and fabrications. Where are proofs?
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Sid Harth • 11737
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• Prabhat Kumar Singh • 3 mins ago
Brother, Prabhat Kumar Singh, You said it all. I wasted my time, I guess. Obama has no power to enter into basically, Putin's territory. Germany has been reluctant from the day, one. Ukraine has been a football for Western powers for as long as I remember. Make it a play ground for angry and hungry Europeans. Ukraine may survive, as a nation, provided, the powers that be, cede portion of their geographical real estate to Russia, or the Russian migrants, whose opinions vary from those of Ukraine government.
I don't feel comfortable with a suggested bifurcation, willingly or with a little help from Uncle Putin. It all started with Barack Obama's first term as a president. Hilary Clinton, being the Secretary of State, playing dirty games with Russian dissidents, over small or large, public demonstrations in Moscow. CIA is, mostly responsible to stage manage these events. Why are American presidents making Putin as an evil person?

You tell me. Take your time. No hurry. Putin is patient, so far. When at G20 summit in Australia, these Putin-haters, ignored him, they laid the foundation of Putin's future plans. One being, bloody their very red, Oops, blue noses. If I were Putin, I would drive them over a cliff.

...and I am Sid Harth
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Sid Harth • 2 mins ago
Sid Harth • 15 mins ago Europe News Kiev: Fighter Jets Shot Down From Russian Territory The Alleged Shoot-Down Comes After Last Week’s Malaysia Airlines Crash By Lukas I. Alpert And James Marson connect Updated July 23, 2014 11:14 a.m. ET Pro-Russia rebels have shot down two Ukrainian fighter jets over eastern Ukraine near the crash site of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, according to the Ukraine army spokesman. WSJ’s Lukas Alpert joins Simon Constable on the News Hub with the latest details. Photo: Google MOSCOW—Two Ukrainian warplanes were shot down Wednesday by antiaircraft missiles believed to be fired from Russian territory, a Ukrainian military spokesman said. The two planes were flying at an altitude of about 17,000 feet when they were hit by antiaircraft fire, the spokesman, Col. Andriy Lysenko, said. He added that weapons held by the separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine, where the planes went down, weren’t believed to reach that high. The high-powered antiaircraft unit that Ukraine alleges the separatists used to bring down Malaysia Airlines 3786.KU -2.17% Flight 17 last week is believed to have been transported back to Russia, Col. Lysenko said. Russia has consistently denied it has close ties or significant influence on the rebels, who have fought Ukraine’s army in the east for three months. “According to our preliminary information, they were downed from abroad,” Col. Lysenko said. Col. Lysenko’s claims about the planes being downed from Russian territory, which he emphasized represented a preliminary theory, contradicted earlier claims from the separatists. The Ukrainian defense ministry had also previously blamed the rebels. Their military leader said the rebels brought down the planes using shoulder-fired, surface to-air missiles. On Wednesday, pro-Russia separatists claimed to have shot down two Ukrainian fighter jets. This unverified video purports to show rebel fighters examining the remains. Sid Harth • 16 mins ago Ukraine: Putin Cannot be Trusted July 23, 2014 elcidharth
Sid Harth • 2 mins ago
Sid Harth • 14 mins ago The shoot-down of the jets marks the first time a plane has been brought down over Ukraine since the crash of the flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur that killed 298 civilians. Even after the crash, fighting has raged on. While Kiev has made significant advances against the rebels in recent days, it still faces considerable challenges in overcoming the heavily armed insurgents. The U.S. and Ukraine have presented the case that Flight 17 was brought down in a missile strike fire from a sophisticated Buk missile system likely provided by Russia. Russia has routinely denied any involvement in aiding the insurgency, and the rebels say they don’t have the weapons capable of bringing down a civilian airliner that had been flying at an altitude of 33,000 feet. A message posted on a social media page associated with rebel military leader Igor Girkin, who goes by the nom de guerre Igor Strelkov, claimed responsibility for destroying the two planes using MANPAD shoulder-fired, surface to-air missiles. Video posted on the site showed the remains of what appeared to be the planes smoldering in grassy fields. Ukraine has nearly halved the separatist-held territory in the last five weeks, but the heavily-armed insurgents have had steady success bringing down government aircraft. Before the crash of the Malaysia Airlines jet, the rebels had successfully shot down nearly a dozen Ukrainian military aircraft over the east of the country. The defense ministry said the two Su-25 planes were brought down near the villages of Savur-Mohyla and Dmytrivka, which sit close to the Russian border and are around 20 kilometers (12 miles) from Torez, where the civilian jet was brought down last Thursday. The pilots managed to successfully eject from the planes, the ministry said.
Sid Harth • 2 mins ago
Sid Harth • 13 mins ago The defense ministry said the planes had been providing aerial support to ground units fighting with the rebels along the Russian border. The area has been hotly contested for months and Ukraine has accused Russia of funneling heavy weaponry to the rebels through the porous border there. Earlier in the day, Mr. Strelkov told Russia’s LifeNews website that rebel fighters had abandoned two nearby key positions along the border at Kozhevnya and Chervona Zorya to avoid becoming surrounded. —Anton Troianovski contributed to this article. Write to James Marson at james.marson Source: WSJ
Sid Harth • 3 mins ago
Sid Harth • 13 mins ago Ukraine Says Two Jets Downed By Missiles Fired From Russia KIEV, Ukraine — Jul 23, 2014, 7:45 AM ET By AARON KATERSKY Aaron Katersky More from Aaron » Aaron Katersky Correspondent, ABC News PHOTO: Two Ukrainian Sukhoi SU-25 fighter jets were shot down today, the Ukrainiain defense ministry says. In this file photo, Sukhoi SU-25 planes fly over a Bagdhad airport earlier this month. Two Ukrainian Sukhoi SU-25 fighter jets were shot down today, the Ukrainiain defense ministry says. In this file photo, Sukhoi SU-25 planes fly over a Bagdhad airport earlier this month. Reuters Next Video New Evidence About Flight 17; Bodies of Fallen Passengers Go Home Two Ukrainian military jets were shot down today according to Ukrainian defense officials who charged that they were downed by missiles fired from the Russian side of the border. The planes, identified as Sukhoi SU-25 fighter jets, were hit in the Donetsk region of the country not far from where the Malaysian Airlines flight 17 was knocked out of the sky last week. It is also where Ukrainian forces are battling separatist rebels outside the city of Donetsk, one of the last separatist strongholds. The fate of the planes’ pilots was not immediately known. It happened at 12:30 p.m. Ukraine time (5:30 a.m. ET) while the planes were flying at roughly 6,000 feet, said a spokesperson for the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council.
Sid Harth • 3 mins ago
Sid Harth • 13 mins ago AP Graphics Bank PHOTO: Two jets were shot down near the Donetsk region, July 23, 2014. The spokesman said missiles were fired from Russian territory and repeated himself saying, “from across the border” in Russia.The Ukrainian rebels are ethnic Russians and the U.S. and other Western countries have accused Russia of fomenting instability in Ukraine and aiding the rebels by supplying weaponry and volunteers. The Sukhoi SU-25 are single seat combat fighter jets. That same type of jet was shot down by a missile July 16. The shoot-down of the jets over the town of Saur Mogila came in the same rebellious eastern part of the country where MH17 was shot down, killing 298 people on board. The MH17 flight was believed to have been shot down by a BUK anti-aircraft missile system. Shortly before word of today’s shoot-down came, the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt told ABC News that he’s very concerned Russia has not stopped the flow of heavy weapons into eastern Ukraine where ethnic Russians are trying to break away from Ukraine. The Slow, Sad Journey Home for Victims of Malaysia Airlines Tragedy Malaysia Airlines Wreckage ‘Significantly Altered’ Fighting is currently taking place on the outskirts of Donetsk, one of the separatists last strongholds. “We are very concerned that Russia has not pulled back on the flow of heavy weapons,” Pyatt said. “What needs to happen is Russia needs to stop sending weapons and fighters across the border.” 291 comments ABC News SiDevilIam
Sid Harth • 3 mins ago
Sid Harth • 12 mins ago EU holds off announcing new Russia sanctions Europe continues an incremental approach toward Moscow despite public outrage over MH17. Prime Minister of the United Kingdom • Russia • United Kingdom Mh17 mourners 2014 07 22Enlarge Mourning in Amsterdam after the MH17 crash. (John Thys/AFP/Getty Images) LISBON, Portugal — A meeting of European Union foreign ministers on Tuesday produced no immediate new sanctions in response to the killing of 298 people on flight MH17, but the EU says it is moving toward tougher measures that could include restricting defense exports and limiting Russia‘s access to capital markets. The EU is set to approve an expanded list of individuals, companies and entities to be hit with travel bans and asset freezes on Thursday. At the same time, EU experts will present proposals for wider sanctions, “including on access to capital markets, defense, dual use goods, and sensitive technologies, including in the energy sector,” said a statement from the 28 ministers after their meeting at EU headquarters in Brussels. Polish foreign minister Radek Sikorski — among the leading voices calling for strong European action — said the decision “should make President Putin realize that this time we’re for real, that this is serious.” However, the incremental nature of the European response is a disappointment to those who had hoped for quick action. Britain had appealed for an EU arms embargo while Lithuania asked for the Russian-backed groups who have seized parts of eastern Ukraine to be blacklisted as terrorist organizations. Frans Timmermans, the foreign minister of the Netherlands — which lost 193 people in the apparent missile strike over Ukraine — declined to directly answer a journalist’s question about whether he was satisfied with the EU decision. “I’m happy with the fact that so many of my colleagues expressed solidarity and support for the victims and their loved ones,” he said after the meeting. “I’m also happy that we did take a decision that is, I think, quite forceful and we reached this decision unanimously.”
Sid Harth • 4 mins ago
Sid Harth • 12 mins ago Getting unanimity on more direct action proved impossible. On the eve of the meeting, French President Francois Hollande made clear he would resist pressure from several EU nations to suspend the planned delivery to Russia of a high-tech warship — designed to carry surface-to-air missiles and attack helicopters — which is currently being constructed in a French shipyard. “The deal was concluded in 2011, the ship is almost finished and it must be delivered in October,” Hollande was quoted telling reporters in Paris. “The Russians have paid, we’d have to pay them back 1.1 billion [euros, or $1.5 billion].” Hollande did, however, suggest the delivery of a second Mistral class assault vessel planned for 2016 would depend on “Russia’s attitude.” Earlier on Monday, British Prime Minister David Cameron told parliament in London that it would be “unthinkable” for Britain to consider delivering a warship to Russia under similar circumstances. French officials retorted that Cameron should focus more on cracking down on Russia’s use of the City of London’s financial markets, BP energy deals and London’s role as a playground for Russian oligarchs. Britain’s finance minister, George Osbourne, on Monday said London was now prepared to take an economic hit in order to increase pressure on Putin. The range of areas the EU is looking at could include limiting Russian access to European capital markets, which could further harm the country’s recession-hit economy. Restricting so-called dual-use exports that might have military purposes and the sale of high-tech goods to Russia’s key energy sector could also have a serious impact. More from GlobalPost: Here’s all the evidence (so far) that pro-Russian separatists shot down MH17 And there may yet be an EU arms embargo, albeit one that excludes the French warships by covering only new military contracts. Italian Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini — who has been criticized for taking too soft a line due to Italy‘s close energy ties with Russia — said the imposition of economic sanctions looked “inevitable” unless Putin displays a major turnaround.
Sid Harth • 4 mins ago
Sid Harth • 12 mins ago To avoid sanctions, the EU wants the Kremlin to ensure that Russian-backed fighters in eastern Ukraine cooperate with the international investigation into the missile attack, end the flow of weapons and fighters over the border, and withdraw Russian forces massed close to Ukraine. But there will be no be automatic adoption of economic sanctions. Some officials said a new summit of EU leaders would be needed for that.
Sid Harth • 5 mins ago
Sid Harth • 11 mins ago Moscow’s aims were not limited to Crimea. There was obviously an intention to carve up Ukraine, with a “Novorossia” established in the east and south of the country, also giving Russia de facto veto power over the rump of Ukraine.In his triumphant presidential address in the Kremlin on March 18, Vladimir Putin laid out a revisionist vision of uniting all the lands where Russians live. This fuelled fears across large parts of Europe, as well as among his Eurasian partners in Belarus and Kazakhstan.Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister, added fuel to the fire by claiming that his country has the right to lands where its blood has been spilled, referring primarily to Crimea. This is a medieval concept, one that we hoped had been put paid to in 20th century. There is little doubt that Russia has been encouraging and supporting the armed gangs trying to take over parts of the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine, having failed with similar attempts in the south. “It is certainly true that Crimea had been part of Russia for nearly two centuries. But there are few places in Europe that have not been part of some other country at some point” A crucial part of this has been a brutal propaganda offensive, the like of which we have not seen for decades in Europe, and which has spread fear and division in Ukrainian society while seeking to whitewash Russian policy. Last autumn, Mr Putin consolidated all the information and “news” resources of Russia in order to create a more effective instrument in this respect. It has been said that, while in the past a war was initiated by an artillery barrage, today it is by a disinformation campaign. In Ukraine, propaganda supported an initial phase in which groups of so-called “green men” – armed men in distinctive combat fatigues but no revealing insignia – took control of some buildings in the east. In the past few weeks, however, especially after the separatists rejected a peace plan offered by Petro Poroshenko, the Ukrainian president, heavy weaponry has increasingly been turning up with them. Regular Russian forces have also been redeployed very close to Ukraine’s border. Since late June, the separatists have claimed to have the surface-to-air missile system now seen as the one that probably brought down MH17. If true, one can assume that they did not buy it at the local store; nor it is likely to have been operated by village volunteers. Three things are now imperative. The first is to identify, apprehend and bring to justice those directly and indirectly responsible for this outrageous act. The international community should not rest until that has been done. This includes trying to establish through an international commission a broad consensus on the facts of the case. The origin and the present whereabouts of the surface-to-air missile unit responsible for the outrage will be a critically important fact to establish. Russian co-operation or non-cooperation with this will be a te
Sid Harth • 5 mins ago
Sid Harth • 10 mins ago Sid HarthLess than a minute ago Modi’s BRICS Buddy, Putin in Trouble July 18, 2014 elcidharthmodiputinJuly 18, 2014 7:10 pm Putin’s credibility lies amid the wreckage of flight MH17 By Carl Bildt In the past a war was initiated by artillery, today it is by disinformation, writes Carl Bildt A pro-Russian separatist looks at wreckage from the nose section of a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 plane which was downed near the village of Rozsypne, in the Donetsk region July 18, 2014. World leaders demanded an international investigation into the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 with 298 people on board over eastern Ukraine in a tragedy that could mark a pivotal moment in the worst crisis between Russia and the West since the Cold War. REUTERS/Maxim Zmeyev (UKRAINE – Tags: POLITICS TRANSPORT DISASTER CIVIL UNREST)©Reuters When Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 was blown out of the clear sky over Ukraine by a surface-to-air-missile it was, without any doubt, an outrageous act of banditry that must not go unpunished. Let us be clear on one thing: the crisis over Ukraine, which has been escalating since late last summer, has been initiated and driven by Russia at each and every step. And whatever details emerge over the downing of the Malaysian airliner on Thursday, it is here that the ultimate responsibility lies. A year ago, after a lengthy silence on the subject, the Kremlin decided it simply could not accept that Ukraine sign a free-trade agreement with the EU that had been ready since 2012. Moscow initiated severe economic measures as well as a nasty propaganda campaign to force Kiev to ditch the agreement and, if possible, opt for the Kremlin-centred Eurasian Union it hoped to establish. But the EU agreement was the free and deliber
Sid Harth • 6 mins ago
Sid Harth • 9 mins ago Sid HarthLess than a minute ago Is Putin Sincere on Ukraine Crisis? July 22, 2014 elcidharthUkraine Says Two Jets Downed By Missiles Fired From Russia KIEV, Ukraine — Jul 23, 2014, 7:45 AM ET By AARON KATERSKYAaron Katersky More from Aaron » Aaron Katersky Correspondent, ABC News Two Ukrainian Sukhoi SU-25 fighter jets were shot down today, the Ukrainiain defense ministry says. In this file photo, Sukhoi SU-25 planes fly over a Bagdhad airport earlier this month. Reuters Next Video New Evidence About Flight 17; Bodies of Fallen Passengers Go Home Two Ukrainian military jets were shot down today according to Ukrainian defense officials who charged that they were downed by missiles fired from the Russian side of the border. The planes, identified as Sukhoi SU-25 fighter jets, were hit in the Donetsk region of the country not far from where the Malaysian Airlines flight 17 was knocked out of the sky last week. It is also where Ukrainian forces are battling separatist rebels outside the city of Donetsk, one of the last separatist strongholds. The fate of the planes’ pilots was not immediately known. It happened at 12:30 p.m. Ukraine time (5:30 a.m. ET) while the planes were flying at roughly 6,000 feet, said a spokesperson for the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council. PHOTO: Two jets were shot down near the Donetsk region, July 23, 2014. AP Graphics Bank
Sid Harth • 6 mins ago
Sid Harth • 9 mins ago PHOTO: Two jets were shot down near the Donetsk region, July 23, 2014. The spokesman said missiles were fired from Russian territory and repeated himself saying, “from across the border” in Russia.The Ukrainian rebels are ethnic Russians and the U.S. and other Western countries have accused Russia of fomenting instability in Ukraine and aiding the rebels by supplying weaponry and volunteers. The Sukhoi SU-25 are single seat combat fighter jets. That same type of jet was shot down by a missile July 16. The shoot-down of the jets over the town of Saur Mogila came in the same rebellious eastern part of the country where MH17 was shot down, killing 298 people on board. The MH17 flight was believed to have been shot down by a BUK anti-aircraft missile system. Shortly before word of today’s shoot-down came, the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt told ABC News that he’s very concerned Russia has not stopped the flow of heavy weapons into eastern Ukraine where ethnic Russians are trying to break away from Ukraine. The Slow, Sad Journey Home for Victims of Malaysia Airlines Tragedy Malaysia Airlines Wreckage ‘Significantly Altered’ Fighting is currently taking place on the outskirts of Donetsk, one of the separatists last strongholds. “We are very concerned that Russia has not pulled back on the flow of heavy weapons,” Pyatt said. “What needs to happen is Russia needs to stop sending weapons and fighters across the border.” Source: ABC
Sid Harth • 6 mins ago
Recent Messages (13) Sort By: Sid Harth • 21 secs ago Are you happy now? Said Sushma Swaraj. I am happy Sushmaji. Is ‘badasahebji’ happy? SS: Sahebji is in Australia. I am sweeping his ‘diwankhaanaa.’ Are you happy now, Mr Sid ‘smartypantsji?’ SH: No. Definitely not. Modi is having a ball and you are sweeping, Oops, weeping in Modi dawakhaanaa? SS: Not Dawakhaanaa, Diwankhaanaa. SH: Kayku? SS: Because I am a silly, stupid female person, accepting Modi’s dirty as dirty can be job. Happy now? NOTE: Sushma Swaraj (born 14 February 1952) is an Indian politician and the current Minister of External Affairs of India. She is the second woman to be India’s external affairs minister Hare Ram! …and I am Sid Harth
Sid Harth • 7 mins ago
व्लादिमिर has only one, (poor Putinji), उक्रेनत्व. November 16, 2014 / elcidharth Putin leaves G20 summit, hints at resolving Ukraine impasse Kounteya Sinha,TNN| Nov 17, 2014, 04.34 AM IST Putin leaves G20 summit, hints at resolving Ukraine impasse Putin said, “Today the situation in Ukraine in my view has good chances for resolution, no matter how strange it may sound, but certain structures had been established on both sides that could handle the tasks they are facing better.” RELATED G20: Australia, Britain tell Russian President Vladimir Putin to stop… Prime Minister Narendra Modi charmed by Australian Koala bear at G20 … Putin to leave G20 summit early after west blasts Russia G20 summit: Repatriation of black money kept abroad is a priority, PM… LONDON: Russian President Vladimir Putin left the G20 summit a day early on Sunday after assuring world leaders that there was a good chance of resolving the conflict in Ukraine.Justifying his early departure Putin said, “It will take nine hours to fly to Vladivostok and another eight hours to get to Moscow. I need four hours sleep before I get back to work on Monday. We have completed our business.”However, the summit feels that the real reason is the ‘tense’ 50-minute meeting between Putin and British Prime Minister David Cameron over the weekend and subsequent frosty meetings with other world leaders—German chancellor Angela Merkel and French president Francois Hollande. Putin said, “Today the situation in Ukraine in my view has good chances for resolution, no matter how strange it may sound, but certain structures had been established on both sides that could handle the tasks they are facing better.” Cameron informed Putin that the West is now considering further sanctions on Russia. EU is planning to meet later this week to extend the list of people subject to asset freezes. Western leaders squarely blamed Moscow for the tensions in Ukraine and threatened to slap more sanctions if it did not quell the crisis. Putin said, “Do they want to bankrupt our banks? In that case they will bankrupt Ukraine. Have they thought about what they are doing at all or not? Or has politics blinded them? As we know eyes constitute a peripheral part of brain. Was something switched off in their brains?” Putin spent as long as eight hours to meet top world leaders in one to one meetings on the margins of the summit. Cameron said after the latest round of meetings that a resolution might take time. However, he felt that Putin had acknowledged that Ukraine was a single political space. Cameron said: “We are very clear with Russia that the continued destabilisation of Ukraine is simply unacceptable. If Russia continues to destabilise Ukraine there will be further sanctions. There is a cost to sanctions, but there would be a far greater cost to allow a frozen conflict on the continent of Europe to be maintained. President Putin can see he is at a crossroads.”
Sid Harth • 7 mins ago
If we abandon Ukraine, the chance of meaningful domestic reforms in Russia will go to zero. Putin’s triumph will confirm him as the doubtless leader presiding over Russia’s reemergence from the ashes of the post-Soviet era. He will have overcome the Cold War Syndrome, and even the meager opposition to his rule will vanish, both because he will be emboldened to suppress it and because these opponents will be fatally discouraged by the total disengagement of the West. As Putin solidifies his popular neo-authoritarian regime, our relationship with Russia will continue to be adversarial but the prospect of improvement will disappear beyond the horizon because Russian politics will become even less democratic. Pushing back now is risky, and it will antagonize Russia. The effect on Putin’s regime is harder to predict because on one hand it will be yet another piece of evidence of Western hostility – which will work for him – but on the other hand it will be a conspicuous policy failure for him – and will so work against him. Although Putin will doubtless ride this out, it might be a while before he gambles again. As usual when it comes to Russia, time is our only hope for any permanent normalization of relations can only come from internal reforms there, and given Putin’s hold in the Kremlin, these can only come with time. Branislav L. Slantchev Professor of Political Science University of California, San Diego Content updated Thu, Apr 24, 2014 and © 2001-2014 by Branislav L. Slantchev
Sid Harth • 8 mins ago
Is this a price we want to pay? After all, the alternative is to abandon the Ukrainians – if not explicitly, then de facto by continuing rounds of empty sanctions and even emptier rhetoric — and then let even these die out in the name of securing Russia’s cooperation on matters of international importance (the escape clause that all Western leaders have already built into their strategies quite openly) or, more realistically, in the face of the blunt reality of our inability to restrain our own financial interests. So why not let Ukraine go? We should not let Ukraine go for several reasons. First, we encouraged them and we made promises to them. I am not going to waste time on the moral obligations we have incurred (although I happen to think they should matter), so let us look at cold interest. We have been known to abandon pro-Western attempts in Eastern Europe – Budapest and Prague anyone? – but we have better chances here provided we move first. If we abandon Ukraine, we will not return to the status quo “ante bellum”. Instead, we will enter a new age of Russian assertiveness, a period where Putin’s regime will be stronger than ever, and where the deterrent threat of NATO will likely be degraded substantially. This will require us to embark on a costly and nebulous neo-containment of indefinite duration. If, thus encouraged, Putin miscalculates or is pushed too far by the domestic jockeying for legitimacy, we might see ourselves involved in a shooting war to protect a NATO ally in the Baltics or face the complete collapse of this alliance. If we abandon Ukraine, Russia’s neighbors will reevaluate their relationship with Moscow, making Putin’s Eurasian dreams a reality. We shall thus have to face not only a resurgent Russia but also deal with loss of influence in the Middle and Far East. This will hamper our attempts to slow down nuclear proliferation, to stabilize countries that are breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism, and will simply make all our “friendships” more expensive as there will be another potential “friend” in the region for them to turn to. We will, to a large extent, resurrect the Cold War.
Sid Harth • 8 mins ago
All of this leads me to conclude that our current policies will not deter Putin from intimidating the Ukrainians, and if they stand firm – which, for all I know, they might – then they will have hell to pay. The only thing that can help Ukraine now is to call Putin’s bluff for it is one thing to intimidate the Ukrainian military (some of which might in fact be sympathetic with Russia), but it is quite another to confront openly a NATO force. If Kiev wants to preserve its Western tilt and keep the post-Crimean country intact, it must request military assistance from the West, perhaps to ensure the security of elections in the Eastern Provinces. This means putting NATO troops, several thousand of them, on the ground in Eastern Ukraine with ROE that oblige them to respond to military attacks with force. This is going to be a hard sell domestically, and it is not clear to me whether Kiev has the wherewithal to pull it off. But if they do and if we recognize our responsibilities in the region and respond, then Putin will have to confront a rather less tempting choice. He might continue to stoke provocations, but these are likely to die down rather quickly if the prospect of an overt Russian entry recedes. He might escalate by invading anyway. From the perspective of the Cold War Syndrome, such an action is quite possible and it might even be probable especially if we leave him no face-saving way out. Given the sizeable proposed NATO force, this invasion will have to be overt, with sufficiently large numbers to make aggression unmistakable, and will have to involve military action against Western troops. These factors should increase support for a military response so that NATO could push these invading forces out of Ukraine. There is a risk that this can escalate into a larger war, although it seems unlikely given the limited aim of securing Eastern Ukraine. But it is a risk we will have to run: one cannot expect to gain something by risking nothing in the type of high-stakes game we are playing. Even if we prevail peacefully and he backs down – which I think is the most likely outcome – it will be a blow to his legitimacy and prestige, which means that we will have to brace ourselves to deal with a revisionist Russia for years to come.
Sid Harth • 9 mins ago
The endgame of this threat also seems clear: given Western timidity so plainly on display in the Crimean episode and so often enunciated by all political leaders who fall over themselves to announce “sanctions” while simultaneously explicitly ruling out the use of military force, Kiev would stand alone against Moscow, and everyone knows that Ukraine cannot win against Russia. Kiev would thus either have to accept the effective dismemberment of the country as its price for relying on the West or would have to succumb to Russia after all. From Putin’s perspective, either one of these outcomes is preferable to letting Ukraine turn West unmolested. Without military muscle, our current policies are not going to alter this fact. Putin can weather temporary financial instability and his cronies’ loss of a few billion dollars for sanctions will only play into his hands. The strategy of sanctioning Putin’s closest allies implicitly relies on an expectation that they will somehow pressure him to alter his policies; otherwise, these sanctions are empty gestures. But this expectation assumes that Putin is dependent on the oligarchs, which I think has the reality of his regime exactly backwards: the elites can enjoy their tremendous wealth only as long as they support Putin; it is they who are desperately dependent on him. This means that these sanctions have zero chance of accomplishing anything. More extensive sanctions that actually hurt the economy will only benefit Putin because they will be sold (and seen) as the West punishing Russia for its pursuit of legitimate objectives. Annexing Crimea was the right thing to do from the Russian perspective, as would protecting Russians against Ukrainian “fascists”. Any economic suffering that the West manages to cause would strengthen Putin’s position by showing that he has been right all along. These sanctions, if they work, will have the perverse effect of strengthening his regime, which, unlike the Iranian (where some claim sanctions have been useful, in itself a doubtful assertion), enjoys widespread approval already. Thankfully, these sanctions are quite unlikely to work anyway because the flight of investments from Russia – caused no doubt by short-term panic – is going to open golden opportunities for new investments. There is a reason the monarchs of old managed to repeatedly default on their debts and still find willing bankers: in the wake of such calamities, the rulers tend to be ever more generous in their attempts to attract investors, which means that the first to come back will be amply rewarded for breaking ranks. The West will not be able to maintain the necessary unity and discipline to impose the type of sanctions that can really hurt Russia even in the short run, let alone in the medium to long run.
Sid Harth • 9 mins ago
Thus, Putin has to act internationally to maintain his domestic legitimacy. He has to act whenever Russian interests seem to be at stake. This is what led to the Russian interventions in Asia and the annexation of Crimea. In a sense, Putin is acting out of weakness for his regime has nothing else to rely on. Instead of making his policies wobbly, this weakness imbues them with a sort of desperation: they simply have to work for the sake of the government in Moscow. This means that Putin is very unlikely to retreat or moderate in the face of even substantial Western pressure – precisely the sort of thing that would completely ruin his legitimacy – and he is certainly not going to do so in the face of the feeble efforts we have made so far. From this perspective, Putin’s annexation of Crimea was a triumph. He identified Russian interests there, inflamed public opinion, and then moved in militarily but peacefully to give a chance to the majority of Crimeans to declare their overwhelming desire to rejoin Russia. This he did despite clear warnings by the West that we would “do something”, and in this sense he successfully defied the West, exposed the emptiness of its threats, and the dubious security provided by Western (read “NATO”) guarantees. So why not stop here? Why continue the escalation in Eastern Ukraine? Losing Ukraine to the West, which is how the events are viewed in Russia, is still a problem for Putin. His best bet right now is to intimidate the Ukrainians to elect a pro-Russian government. Putin’s implied promise is clear: if you do so, I will recognize it as the legitimate successor of the Yanukovich regime, I will provide the financial and economic help that it needs, and I will order my troops away from the border (and out of the country!) because Russians in Eastern Ukraine will obviously not need protecting from a pro-Russian government in Kiev. (No, Crimea will stay in Russia, I am afraid.) Putin’s not-so-implied threat is also clear: if you persist in your pro-Western ways, I will do everything we can to undermine the government, I will ruin the economy, I will foment instability until it gives me a pretext to invade the Eastern provinces.
Sid Harth • 10 mins ago
If the Cold War Syndrome blames the fall of the USSR for Russia’s current troubles and the instability of some of its neighbors, then what is the remedy? One possibility, of course, is to abandon the narrative altogether, conduce genuine political and economic reforms that would complete the country’s stalled transition to democracy and market capitalism. Given Putin’s popularity and grip on power, there is absolutely no hope for this to happen on his watch. Given the oligarchs dependence on his regime – and not, as our sanctions strategy implicitly assumes Putin’s dependence on the oligarchs – the elites will not oust him. Given the government’s investment in its military, it is highly doubtful that the army would desert it if some pro-democratic segments of the population decide to attempt a popular overthrow. In other words, the present style of neo-authoritarianism in Russia is not going anywhere in the foreseeable future. With meaningful reforms out of the question, the only remedy for overcoming the Cold War Syndrome must be the resurrection of the political and military clout of the Soviet Union, but this time in purely Russian form. The remedy is for Putin to invest in the armed forces and to roll back the West whenever it encroaches on Russian interests, which of course the West always does through its numerous protégés rather than directly. By restoring Russia’s power and influence, Putin could claim to rectify the economic imbalance and eventually deliver prosperity. But, in this remedy, first things first, and the first is to reassert Russian presence in its Eurasian basin. Failure to do so would invalidate the explicit and implicit promises and explanations that Putin has used to validate his regime and justify its anti-democratic and anti-market policies. Failure to do the one thing that he himself has identified as the reason for Russia’s woes would delegitimize his rule. But if Putin’s rule is secure from internal challenges, then why should he care about its legitimacy? It is, of course, one thing to hold onto power in the face of determined opposition – entirely possible, as numerous dictators would attest – it is quite another to be perceived as a legitimate government. For although coercive rule can be stable, it can be very costly and risky to the government, which will have to devote substantial resources to enforcing compliance with its policies. The benefit of legitimacy is that it significantly reduces the need for coercion, making governance far easier and safer. When legitimacy is based not on electoral procedures, ideology, or economic performance but on one’s ability to deploy the military and political resources of the nation in pursuit of foreign policy objectives, the government can easily be outflanked by voices clamoring that it is not doing enough. This makes Putin-style legitimacy a very dangerous motivation for it can push the government to do more simply to stay ahead of domestic critics.
Sid Harth • 10 mins ago
Why does the future presently look so bleak? For reasons I explained elsewhere, Putin is essentially engaged in a high-stakes game over the legitimacy of his regime. With no representative democracy to give voice to the multitudes and no economic prosperity (or at least visible sustained progress) to bribe them into trading off the absence of political liberty, Putin has based his rule on overcoming what I call the Cold War Syndrome, a fictitious malady said to afflict Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The diagnosis is simple: the fall of the USSR’s military shield has enabled the triumphant West to enclose Russia in a stifling encirclement, allying former republics and satellites through NATO and extending economic and political ties through membership in the European Union. Russia has been helpless in the face of this onslaught, and has been forced to retreat, abandoning places where it has had presence or influence for centuries. Not surprisingly, with the West doling out largesse to detach Russia’s former friends and allies, their economies have been Westernized too, and Russia has been hurt not merely politically, but economically as well. With its armies shrunk to second-rate power levels, and its economy reduced to exporting raw materials to underwrite Western prosperity, Russia has had to swallow one bitter pill after another. The latest Western atrocity in this narrative, of course, was the deposition of the legitimate pro-Russian Ukrainian government, and the imposition of Western lackeys in Kiev while Moscow could do nothing to prevent that. Although this reading of history is highly tendentious, it has just enough elements of truth to make it stick, especially when the message is relentlessly pumped by media loyal to Putin. For our part, we have our own share of the blame to bear for we have been willfully blind to the hostile environment we have contributed to creating. We can discuss how wise it was to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to try to extend missile defenses to Eastern Europe, and to expand NATO to basically every European country that asked for it (some out of fear of the Russians, but others out of desire to ascend to the EU), while simultaneously pursuing economic policies that have resulted in the bandit capitalism of the oligarchs. But this is neither here nor there for right now we need to decide how to move forward.
Sid Harth • 11 mins ago
Crisis in Ukraine, Part 2: The Cold War Syndrome by Branislav L. Slantchev Comments on the developing crisis in Ukraine April 23, 2014 As the situation in Eastern Ukraine is deteriorating by the hour, it is time to make one hard decision: how far are we prepared to go to defend the independence and, hopefully, eventual democratization of Ukraine? For one thing is clear: the way things are going now, we are looking at one of two very unpleasant outcomes: either Putin’s intimidation will succeed and the Ukrainians will elect a pro-Russian government returning the country back to the fold of greater Russia, or they will defy him, continue with their pro-Western reforms, prompting an escalation of violence in the East. Without direct Western military support, that escalation can only end with Russian occupation of these provinces, and perhaps their detachment from the country as “independent” enclaves. Either Ukraine keeps its remaining integrity and slides obediently into the Russian embrace or it gets dismembered with a rump western Ukraine heavily dependent on the West for its survival. Can these outcomes be avoided? Possibly, maybe even probably, but for this both we – by which I mean NATO – and the Ukrainians need to brace ourselves for a dangerous confrontation for we will need to play a risky strategy if we want to keep Ukraine whole and independent. For reasons I explain below, it seems to me that the only course of action with some chance of success in that regard is for the Ukrainian government to request NATO troops to help secure the Eastern provinces. I realize how potentially explosive this action might be, provided it is even feasible on the Ukrainian government’s side, but do we, and they, really have any other options?
Sid Harth • 11 mins ago
Fourth, we have to abandon all talk about an apocalyptic ideological struggle with Russia, about containing Russia, about the end of the post-Cold War era. The U.S. should not “lead the free world” into a global fight against tyranny or autocracy or whatever one chooses to call Putin’s regime. Despite the spike in popular support after the annexation of Crimea, Putin is presiding over a doomed regime. The diversionary foreign policy adventures cannot be sustained indefinitely; the regime must begin to deliver prosperity and real reforms or face increasing resistance and escalating need for repression. Aiding Putin in his attempts to shore up his legitimacy by providing conveniently threatening verbiage is counter-productive. Moreover, an American attempt to lead might actually weaken us by exposing fissure with Europe that right now we have been able to paper over. We certainly have no need for histrionic denunciations of evil Russian intent or declarations of Russia as geopolitical enemy No. 1, as McCain and others have done. On the other hand, it does no good to dismiss Russia as a mere “regional power,” as the President recently did. Russia might be a regional power, but Eurasia is a mighty big region, and one where many of our financial, economic, and security interests are concentrated. Iraq and Iran are “only” regional powers, but we are rightly concerned with those. North Korea might only be a local threat (and mostly to itself), but we rightly care about that too. Russia is more important than all of these combined, and not only because of its possession of nuclear weapons or because its military is superior. When it comes to Russia, Teddy Roosevelt had it right: we must speak softly and carry (unobtrusively) a big stick. Branislav L. Slantchev Professor of Political Science University of California, San Diego Content updated Thu, Apr 24, 2014 and © 2001-2014 by Branislav L. Slantchev
Sid Harth • 11 mins ago
This commitment to Ukraine cannot be limited to economic aid. It must involve military aid as well for the simple reason that in the next round of this game whoever moves first with respect to Eastern and Southern Ukraine will win. This part of Ukraine is no Crimea, but if Russian sympathizers there seize the opportunity to destabilize the region, Putin might just feel hemmed in by his own rhetoric that he would have to act. The Russian forces massed at the border with Ukraine might be there to ensure Kiev does not attempt to retake Crimea, they might be there to intimidate, but they also might be there to invade. If the Russians manufacture a pretext to intervene to “restore order” or “protect Russian-speakers”, it will be well-nigh impossible to dislodge them without a real fight, and I do not think we have the stomach for a real fight. If we do not, then neither will the Ukrainians, the government’s bluster notwithstanding. If the Ukrainians move first, with our backing, the Russians must be the ones to initiate the fighting, and I do not think they have the stomach for that either. Our goal must be to maneuver ourselves in a position where we have to fight if we are attacked, and let the Russians decide whether to attack. At the same time, we must insist that the government in Kiev abandon its provocative attempts to marginalize the Russian language and, by extension, the Russian-speakers. It may draw on Western Ukraine for its support, but it must not forget that it has a large country to govern, and that Russia will forever remain its neighbor. Third, we must not fret so much about Europe’s dependence on Russian oil, gas, or mineral resources. Yes, all of these can be used as political weapons, but there is a serious limit that even Putin must recognize. Russia needs these exports to support its economy and can hardly afford serious losses there. More importantly, if Putin overplays his hand, Western Europe will push harder toward finding alternatives. It will be expensive, but with clear evidence of Russian willingness to squeeze the chokepoints, Western governments will have all the popular support they need to pay these costs. They can wean themselves off Russia, and Putin will lose all non-military leverage he has. These exports are a weapon that can only be used against those too poor to have other options (e.g., Ukraine); it is likely to backfire if used on someone with the resources of Germany or France.
Sid Harth • 12 mins ago
In this respect, we must agree that Crimea, as part of Ukraine, is gone. Period. It is not going back. Transnistria might follow. There is nothing we can do about it, nor should we try. Unless the governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia suddenly start repressing or abusing their Russian minorities, there is no chance that Putin would go after them next. We must, however, commit to Ukraine even while realizing that this will be yet another proof of Western hostility to Russia. We must do so because the Ukrainians are desperately trying to break the stagnation of post-Soviet politics, and because we are their best chance of success. We must do so or risk the country degenerating into a Russian satellite. Without strong Western backing and aid, Kiev will have no chance of successful economic recovery, and will have to fall back on Russia for help. Needless to say, this will require political changes that will pull the country back toward Moscow. It is quite disheartening that the essential aid package has become hostage to politicking in Washington. We must commit to Ukraine because the failure to do so will have repercussions in other countries that border Russia. When you are a small country and have a restless neighbor whose internal politics might compel its government to respond to “threats” to “Russian-speakers”, threats real, imagined, or manufactured, then you have two options. You fall in line with what that neighbor wants from you and hope that it leaves you alone, or you rely on the protection of someone much more powerful than you, someone who can deter that neighbor. Small states have always existed at the sufferance of great powers, despite our post-20th century thinking to the contrary. If we “lose” Ukraine after we did so much to stir up trouble there, Russia’s small neighbors cannot help but wonder whether we would rather “lose” them as well than risk a confrontation with Putin. While it is true that losing Ukraine might be taken here as clear evidence of Russian aggression and move the U.S. government to commit to the defense of the rest, it is also possible (and, quite frankly, more probable) that at this point it would be too late because these others might feel compelled to fend for themselves instead of relying on the tender mercies of American (or European) steadfastness.
Sid Harth • 12 mins ago
If this interpretation is correct, Putin’s actions in Crimea were neither a part of an aggressive scheme to expand Russian influence nor an opportunistic land grab. They were mandated by his regime’s domestic weakness, which requires it to legitimize itself with appeals to Russian greatness and a Western menace. It is these legitimation devices that impelled Putin to act, and it is not surprising that the annexation has boosted his popularity at home. This is not a prelude to more conquests in the Baltics, and is hardly the beginning of another Cold War unless we care to make it so. So what are we to do? First, we have to recognize that our best, and only, hope with respect to Russia is, and always has been, internal reforms. As long as Russia remains non-democratic (especially with a stymied transition to a market economy), it will remain a problem. There is no military option for externally-imposed regime change, so we must rely on the Russians themselves to change their government. We may isolate Putin internationally to our heart’s content (and it is doubtful that we will succeed even in that), but it will not change anything internally. We may impose sanctions and stimulate capital flight, but hurting the Russian economy will not only prove an ineffective deterrent but give Putin’s regime a new lease on life for it will substantiate what he had been saying all along. When the large majority of Russians consider Putin’s actions in Crimea legitimate, a Western response that is designed to undo them or, failing that, punish Russia for them would simply be taken as evidence that the West is, after all, out to get Russia. If we go down that route, we must be prepared for a further strengthening of his authoritarian rule as the last vestiges of free speech disappear in Russia. The few remaining opponents who still believe in the West will be crushed, victims of our vocal exhortations not backed up by any real action, and Russia will remain antagonistic for decades. Second, we must admit to ourselves that we have been provocative and neglectful of Russian interests. We will have to deal with Russian assertiveness for the foreseeable future (not just in Europe, but in Asia, and the Arctic), and we will do much better if we at least make an effort to see how we might appear to the other side. We have been able to pursue an intelligent policy with respect to Taiwan, a policy that has been sensitive to China, and there should be no reason why we cannot do so in Ukraine.
Sid Harth • 13 mins ago
So why annex Crimea? To me, this abrupt annexation was desperate grasping at straws, not a coherent plan for expansion or aggression. It was an attempt to make the best of a situation that was deteriorating by the day, and likely to end up undermining the legitimacy of Putin’s own rule. It was produced by internal weakness, and is not an assertion of strength. To see this, consider the situation in Ukraine and what it meant for Moscow. The Kremlin had blamed the West for all the country’s ills and had justified its increased repression with the argument that it was being done to restore Russia’s rightful place under the sun. When the EU offered a deal to Ukraine, Moscow naturally tried to outbid the West because allowing Ukraine to “go West” would have essentially meant that Putin was an ineffective leader according to the logic of his own legitimation. When the anti-government protests erupted in Kiev, Moscow quickly moved to prop the pro-Russian regime of president Yanukovich, hoping that he would weather the storm. But then Yanukovich lost his nerve and agreed to a compromise with the opposition. This would have been the worst outcome for the Kremlin: the new, and very pro-Western, government would come to power legitimately, would probably obtain aid from the West, and in due time Ukraine would follow the other Eastern Europeans into the warm embraces of the European Union, and perhaps even into NATO, bringing Western ships close to the Crimea for the first time since the middle of the 19th century. At this point, Putin could stand aside and let this future unfold, exposing his own impotence in the process, or he could have acted to salvage as much as possible on terms that would affirm his legitimacy. Whether Putin had a heart-to-hear with Yanukovich at this point, I do not know, but I would be surprised if he did not. We all know what happened next: Yanukovich refused to honor his agreement, and fled instead, providing a pretext to consider the new government in Kiev illegitimate; after all, it could be portrayed as having seized power through violence. The new government also played into Putin’s hands at this point by turning overtly anti-Russian. Under the Kremlin’s legitimation philosophy, Russia had act to protect the interests of Russian-speakers against the illegitimate Western puppets ruling in Kiev. More importantly, by Putin’s own lights, he had made this bed, and now he had to lie in it. The hastily concocted referendum in Crimea could reassure domestic audiences in Russia that he was acting properly, and since the risks inherent in this action were minimal – not only the West immediately disavowed any intent to use military force but the Ukrainians themselves did – the action itself was foregone conclusion.
Sid Harth • 13 mins ago
Doomed, that is, unless it does something about it. There is a reason why Putin has continued to invest heavily in the Russian military. It might not be as powerful as its Soviet era predecessor, but it is more formidable than anything the Europeans could muster. This investment is consistent with a strategy of rebuilding Russian power to ensure that it is taken seriously by the West. It is also likely to be popular with voters who share his assessment of Russian decline. It is also likely to make the Europeans nervous and perhaps more sensitive to Russian needs. The other leg of this policy is renewed emphasis on Russia. Commentators almost invariably interpret this as crude Russian nationalism, but the reality is more complicated. Putin often refers not simply to Russians but to Russian-speaking people, and this is because the unifying cry is not based on Russian ethnicity but on Russian-ness, which (as in many other cases) is defined in terms of language and, to some degree, culture. The appeal to “Mother Russia” worked before the communists came, it worked (better than an appeal to communism) while they ruled, and it can work now. Despite the shrill ultra-nationalism embraced by some groups, the reality of a multi-ethnic Russia precludes any sort of mass appeal based exclusively on Russian ethnicity. It cannot be pan-Slavism and it cannot be Orthodox Christianity, for obvious reasons. This leaves the language as the defining characteristic, and incidentally explains why the new government in Kiev drafted legislation about Ukrainian as assertion of the country’s independence and identity. From our perspective, this is good news. Putin does not expound a global ideology like communism, so he is unlikely to meddle around the world just to poke the West. In fact, such a policy would likely be seen as a throwback to the days of communism and would lack legitimacy for that very reason. He is no territorial aggrandizer: to suggest that his paranoia is driving him to re-create a security belt of Russia-friendly states is a rather fanciful and anachronistic projection of 19th and 20th century concerns onto the landscape of the 21st. In fact, it is very likely that his recent actions will have precisely the opposite effect, driving Ukraine and perhaps even Belarus into closer cooperation with the West, not to mention Poland and the Baltics making their ties ever stronger.
Sid Harth • 14 mins ago
We were not so subtle to stretch our defensive umbrella even further by openly planning to install missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. It mattered little that President Bush claimed it was there to protect Europe against Iran, the Russians could, and did, see it was bolstering Europe’s defenses against them. Why would the Europeans need that, a Russian might have wondered, and why would the United States blithely ignore our concerns in the matter? Even when President Obama engaged in the famous “reset”, the new administration did not scrap the missile defense, as is usually argued. It merely scaled it down as a sop to Russia in an attempt to gain its cooperation for sanctions against Iran. The West has advanced eastward economically as well. Not only did the European Union open its doors to most of the former Eastern bloc, including the three Baltic states, as early as 2004, but has continued its expansion with the admission of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and Croatia just last year. With Serbian, Macedonian, and Montenegrin membership only a question of time, the EU will essentially encompass all of Eastern Europe, including former Soviet territories. While we like to point out the voluntary nature of this expansion and the prosperity that it has brought to many of the new members, a Russian can easily see this as the West using Russia’s weakness to meddle at its doorstep. Professor McFaul might claim that “We did not seek this confrontation,” but the fact remains that our actions have contributed to the climate that has made this confrontation possible. Are we going to delude ourselves into thinking that the EU extending an association agreement to Ukraine or the West declaring clear support for the anti-government protests in Kiev would have been greeted with equanimity in Moscow? We have essentially provided Putin with the bogeyman he needs to bolster his regime. His regime, non-democratic as it is, still needs to be legitimized with the general population or else it would require massive repression to sustain; repression, one might add, that the security forces might be unable or unwilling to engage in. The Chinese communists have abandoned ideology in favor of economic progress as a legitimation device, but Putin’s regime has lost both the ideological appeal and the possibility of delivering on economic prosperity. The only alternative to relaxing his grip on power is to satisfy the mass disillusionment with something to blame and something to aspire to. Putin has done both with a simple message: Russia has been marginalized deliberately by the West. The West, triumphant after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has used the opportunity to gain a foothold at Russia’s doorstep, luring former friends with money and coveted memberships in NATO and the EU. It has stifled the Russian economy, destabilized the country politically, and is actively seeking to relegate it to Third World status. Add to this the corrosive influence of
Sid Harth • 14 mins ago
Many Russians do, of course, recognize that the problem with the country is its unaccountable government and the network of crony oligarchies it has created. This is why they took to the streets in 2012. But the Kremlin seems to have reached the limit of what it could deliver within the confines of the system it has created. It was time for genuine reform, which would have meant going against concentrated entrenched interests of those with whom the government had formed a symbiotic mutual dependency. Genuine reforms had a snowflake’s chance in hell. Putin’s response was predictable: blame the demonstrators for destabilizing the country, accuse the money-making elites for not contributing to its prosperity, stifle the independent media, and tighten his grip on power. The new pliant media told the rest of the country fanciful stories that implicated the West (mostly the United States) in policies that had directly resulted in these troubles. Unfortunately, it was not difficult to cite examples of Western duplicity, greed, and aggressiveness. We like to pretend that we have done nothing to provoke this new anti-Western attitudes, but our behavior suggests otherwise. We were quick to expand NATO to the former Eastern bloc. While some, like Bulgaria, saw membership as an essential first step toward accession to the European Union, others, like Poland and the Baltic states, saw it as a protective shield against Russia. One look at the current map of NATO member countries in Europe and a comparison with the Cold War version of that same map shows that we have shifted the Iron Curtain east. We did not even bother to rename to alliance, leaving its anti-Soviet origins to haunt its current purposes. To a Russian, the eastward expansion of NATO can only mean one thing: it is the West’s attempt to hem in the country and to curtail its influence abroad. This Russian would, unfortunately, be almost entirely correct. This is not to say that NATO should not have expanded – it should have, and I am sure there are many in the East who now breathe a little easier for it – it is merely to state what should be obvious: that this expansion looked aggressive to Russia.
Sid Harth • 14 mins ago
To understand why Putin needs to legitimize the Crimean annexation on the terms that he did, we need look no further than the domestic plight of his regime. When the Cold War ended, much was promised, implicitly or explicitly, to the people of the former Eastern bloc. The decrepit communist rule was gone, and the new governments were to usher in an era of political liberalism, liberty, and economic prosperity. The Russians were no exception to this: their economy was to be integrated in the world and they were to play a cooperative part in dealing with global problems. Some countries, like Poland and Hungary, saw most of these promises fulfilled, and others, like Bulgaria, saw some hopes fulfilled but others frustrated. Russia, however, saw little of that wonderful future. Ensnared by a botched privatization that replaced communism with bandit capitalism, the economy faltered and eventually went into depression. Deprived of the military muscle of the Soviet Union, Russia not only ceased to be a threat to the West, it ceased to count for much in world affairs. In the United States policymakers and pundits bewailed the rising threat of China, a country much more deeply enmeshed with the West economically and much farther behind militarily than Russia, implicitly revealing their assessment of the hierarchy of world power. Russia had sunk to the status of a second-rate power, defeated by the West without being coopted. Nascent liberal politics is scant consolation for this sort of economic and military collapse. Without the institutions to support a transition to a functioning market economy that could have delivered prosperity, Russia transitioned into a kleptocracy where the government or government-linked cronies provide most of the means to such prosperity. The result, as depressingly inevitable as in Bulgaria, was that a politically-connected minority that is loyal to whoever is in power will reap most the benefits, a small entrepreneurial and well-educated elite will be able to prosper in the private sector, while the rest would have to find their own way to survive. In a system where the government runs the economy more or less directly – meaning that unelected bureaucrats dispose of public money – survival for the common people meant diving head first into the sprawling morass of corruption. For elites, the new system provided an opportunity to enrich themselves as long as they remained politically loyal or at least apolitical, and for the masses the new system provided almost none of the economic and social benefits of the lost communist era while simultaneously exacerbating some of its worst tendencies.
Sid Harth • 15 mins ago
Let us set aside the question of whether the referendum was legitimate. On one hand, it was clearly against the Ukrainian constitution, it was conducted with unseemly haste, in the presence of Russian (or Russian-backed) soldiers, and the choices on the ballot did not really allow voters to remain firmly in Ukraine. On the other hand, I very much doubt that the outcome would have been different if the referendum was held later in the year. Why? Because the Russians in Crimea had to choose between a non-democratic Russian government, and an unfriendly pro-Western and anti-Russian government in Kiev that had neither come to power by democratic means nor evinced intent to be tolerant of Russians. It would take years of good governance to assure them that it is better for them to remain part of Ukraine. A referendum is always a snapshot of current fears and desires, as any Western government that has called for snap elections to exploit a temporary spike or trough in support knows. In other words, legitimate or not, the referendum likely expressed genuine desire of the majority of the population in Crimea to detach themselves from Ukraine at the time it was held. Now, it is exceedingly unlikely that Kiev would have trampled on the rights of Russian-speakers in Crimea, the new government’s short-sighted commitment to the Ukrainian language aside. It is improbable that Kiev would have repressed them or given them less rights than what they will now have in Russia. But none of that matters. The protectionist racket is never about those who are said to need protection, it is a pretext that is designed to be served to other audiences, international and domestic, and the choice of pretext often reveals much about the external and internal configuration of interests that is driving the actual policy. How a state chooses to motivate its actions can tell us a lot about the constraints it is working under: what foreign powers it needs to reassure or appease, what domestic groups it needs to involve or marginalize. So why hold a referendum in the Crimea? Putin cannot have reasonably expected that it could convince a skeptical impartial observer, let alone a hostile and prejudiced West. It could be used by states who have no wish to get involved in a spat with Russia as an excuse to stay on the sidelines, but even this would not be very helpful since those that would matter most, like China or India, would not like the precedent such a referendum might set. It is, therefore, not a foreign audience that the referendum is seeking to persuade. It is, instead, aimed almost exclusively for domestic consumption.
Sid Harth • 15 mins ago
The problem with analogies, of course, is that they are not, or at least should not be, a substitute for analysis. The danger is that we accept the implicit premise of these analogy-based arguments – that they correctly describe Putin’s goals and strategy – and then fashion our response as the analogy suggests: act assertively to deter future aggression, a sort of neo-containment focused on bolstering the states that border Russia, particularly those with significant Russian ethnic minorities, isolating Russia internationally, and limiting our cooperation to areas – like Syria and Iran – where there might be common interest despite our differences. Our mistake, the argument goes, was to engage Russia (the Obama “reset” is frequently mentioned as the culprit) and in effect allow Putin to run wild. But these conclusions are only as good as the premises on which they are based, and these are a lot flimsier than the bold analogies suggest. I am the first to admit the obvious: none of us really know what Putin thinks or intends to do. We do, however, have enough evidence to indict all of the above analogies and conclusively dismiss most of them. Let me start with the obvious: the flimsy pretext of a Crimean referendum that nobody outside Russia could have been expected to recognize as legitimate. References to the Sudetenland and Munich notwithstanding, the Germans were amateurs at this: the Russians had been running the protection racket for centuries before Hitler. Now it is Russian-speakers (not even ethnic Russians!) who need protection, but before that there were the Slavs (against the Teutons and Hungarians). When there were no Slavs in opportune danger, there were the Christians (against the Turks). When communism made that justification a bit far-fetched, there were fellow anti-capitalist revolutionaries, who were conveniently not limited to Eastern Europe or the reaches of Christianity. In other words, there is much to the notion that Putin’s annexation of the Crimea to “protect” its Russian-speaking population from the “criminals in Kiev” is merely a fig-leaf for aggressive expansionist foreign policy.
Sid Harth • 16 mins ago
Crisis in Ukraine, Part 1: The Blinding Light of Bad Analogies by Branislav L. Slantchev Comments on the Russian annexation of Crimea March 27, 2014 Russia annexes Crimea using a hastily concocted referendum as a pretext. What are we – the United States, Europe, the West – to do? Nothing. We should do nothing. We should recognize this annexation for what it is – an outburst caused by internal weakness of Putin’s regime and an attempt to salvage something from a quickly deteriorating situation – and keep firmly in mind that our best hope for dealing with Russia is, and always has been, internal political reforms, which will not come if we turn hostile. If we pursue the coercive policies that currently dominate the agenda and succeed in isolating Putin’s Russia internationally (which, incidentally, is by no means assured), we shall play into his hands: the West will become the scape-goat for all subsequent economic trouble, with this behavior constituting prima facie evidence of hostility and intent to deprive Russia and its people from their rightful place under the sun. It will be used as justification to clamp down on pro-Western elements, and will stifle the chances for political reforms. We will end up pushing Russia over the top and creating another adversary for decades to come. Santayana famously said that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Our policy-makers and pundits seems to have taken that to heart, and have produced a stream of analysis and recommendations firmly rooted in the “lessons of history.” But history can be as much a prison as a guide, and if we allow ourselves to be shackled by its purported “lessons,” we will miss the opportunities for progress. Much of current rhetoric in the West is dominated by 19th and 20th century analogies. We are told that Putin is behaving like Hitler did in the Sudetenland in 1938 when he used the supposed plight of ethnic Germans as a pretext to dismember Czechoslovakia and gobble up the rest of the country shortly after. We are told that Putin is like the Russian tsars of old, bent on conquest or at the very least fixated on ensuring unimpeded access to the Black Sea. We are told that Putin is like the communists, suspicious of the West and deeply paranoid about being encircled by hostile powers, so he is rehashing their strategy, creating a protective belt of pro-Russian states (or, failing that, enclaves) as a buffer. We are told, by the former special assistant to the President and ambassador to Russia, that “similar to the last century, the ideological struggle between autocracy and democracy has returned to Europe.” We are told that we have ourselves to blame for this, much like England and France have themselves to blame in 1938: we failed to act assertively when Russia intervened in Georgia in 2008, Putin interpreted this as weakness, and was emboldened to pursue even more aggressive designs. We are told, by our own Secretary of State, that even if we
Sid Harth • 16 mins ago
PHOTO (TOP): British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, President Harry S. Truman and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin at the Berlin Conference, August 1, 1945. Courtesy of LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. PHOTO (INSERT 1): President Harry S. Truman. Courtesy of LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. PHOTO (INSERT 3): Anti-government protesters pass along bricks to help comrades to set up a barricade in central Kiev, February 20, 2014. REUTERS/David Mdzinarishvili PHOTO (INSERT 4): Elihu Root, December 15. 1922. Courtesy of LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.
Sid Harth • 17 mins ago
Europe rebuilt its house. The economic and political accomplishments of the EU are impressive. Now is the time to step back — far back — and let Europeans test their ability to defend their own turf and discipline their own citizens. As they will discover, this isn’t easy to do in ways consistent with post-Cold War values. They might not always get it “right.” But they will never learn how if the United States conveniently keeps doing it for them. What the United States can do is applaud. Washington can also sign on to sanctions levied by its best allies to contain a domestic conflagration, lest the fire breach international borders. The United States has exercised tremendous military leadership since 1947, but strong-arming has a limit. Its best and most enduring leadership has always been about getting its own affairs right. America makes democracy and free trade attractive by providing well for its own people. It furthers peaceful negotiation best by stigmatizing bad behavior. Elihu Root, secretary of war under two presidents and secretary of state for Theodore Roosevelt, was a consummate realist. But, as he said in 1921: “Cynics are always nearsighted, . . . the decisive facts lie beyond their range of vision.” If public opinion were properly harnessed, Root believed, it could do more than any battleship or bomber to curtail violence against innocent civilians. The judgment of the people, in support of the “fundamental rules of humanity,” is “the greatest power known to human history.” The most stable system is one all nations want, and most are prepared to defend. Placing the responsibility squarely on Europe and Russia to guide Ukraine toward peace is not a matter of cowardice. It’s a measure of courage.
Sid Harth • 17 mins ago
Welcome to Eastern Europe. This cultural tug-and-pull is as old as dirt. The Ukrainian national anthem ends on the words, “we, brothers, are of the Cossack nation.” Historically, the Cossacks ranged from Kiev to Kamchatka. Their horsemen were the tsar’s special forces from the 16th century to the 20th. Kiev was the first capital of Russia, centuries before Moscow. Ukrainians alone can determine where they stand between east and west. Their neighbors on either side will remain keenly interested. We should expect that. What might the United States do to ease the path of nations whose struggle for identity, coherence and reform has turned violent — and happen to be neighbors of Russia? Should Washington issue threats to make them “behave,” lest it look “weak?” The first thing Americans can do is to stop making these questions all about them. The United States is hardly weak. It possesses the world’s mightiest military and the largest economy. It has nothing to prove. The United States can weaken itself, however, if it continues overspending on world defense and under-investing in its own future. The problem with “realists” who insist that only America stands between the world and Armageddon is that they’re unrealistic. The role of permanent policeman, or even umpire, is not sustainable or smart in the long run. It is time to let the systems created through so much work over the past seven decades do their job. The United States dragged its European competitors out of poverty and chaos after World War Two because, as President Dwight D. Eisenhower observed, “Weakness could not cooperate, weakness could only beg.”
Sid Harth • 18 mins ago
Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State Analysis & Opinion | The Great Debate Ukraine: Obama must escape the ‘Cold War syndrome’ By Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman February 21, 2014 When it comes to the mounting crisis in Ukraine, President Barack Obama is stuck playing an old role. Since World War Two, U.S. presidents have steadfastly held to the same course when it comes to Russia. Obama is but the latest interpreter of the Truman Doctrine, which pledged the United States “to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.” When President Harry S. Truman threw down that challenge to Congress in 1947, he didn’t use the phrase “Cold War.” He didn’t name the Soviet Union. But everyone knew what he was talking about. Today, the communist “bloc” has vanished. The nuclear-powered rival that was determined to “bury” the West is no more. Russia competes cannily and strenuously with other nations, but has no economic, political or territorial interest in upending the world system. The United States needn’t — and shouldn’t — turn local struggles into a test of its own credibility and strength. Yet that old dynamic continues — as this Ukraine crisis demonstrates. It’s being painted as a battle between the West and Russia. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, duly elected in 2010, is using the nation’s police forces to suppress dissidents seeking a fuller democracy and stronger ties to the European Union. Both the EU and Russia are anxious for a closer relationship with Ukraine. Many look to see what United States will do. Obama has the opportunity to recast the role of the United States for the next seven decades. Instead of drawing tired red lines, he might consider scripting fresh visionary ones. There is never a perfect moment to begin anew, but Ukraine’s troubles would be a place to start. Ukraine represents the kind of issue likely to bedevil world affairs for the foreseeable future. Neither it nor its neighbors wish to conquer the world. That’s not a goal anymore. There are better opportunities. In the words of a German historian speaking last year at Stanford University, “We’ve found it’s more profitable to polish our BMWs than our jackboots.” But to participate in the world markets that have lifted millions from poverty, nations must perform on a demanding international stage. They have to meet global standards of accountability, peacefulness and transparency. It they’re a mess, onlookers avert their eyes — and close their wallets. Ukraine is an old nation, but an infant state. It attained sovereignty fewer than two decades ago. Its people have little experience of self-government, and they are internally divided. Some want closer ties to their Slavic kin. Some want closer ties to the glamorous West.
Sid Harth • 18 mins ago
Putin With Cold War Syndrome? November 21, 2014 / elcidharth elcidharth / Comments Off / Edit Putin With Cold War Syndrome? | So Sue me 44 mins ago – November 21, 2014; Godmen: Hindu Disease November 21, 2014; Show me the …. Ukraine: Obama must escape the ‘Cold War syndrome‘. Godmen: Hindu Disease | So Sue me 49 mins ago – Putin With Cold War Syndrome? November 21, 2014; Godmen: Hindu Disease November 21, 2014; Show me the Money, Kotakji November 20 … …and I am Sid Harth BRRRrrr.. Getting Cold in Putin’s Russia Friday, November 21, 2014 Milestones: 1945–1952 Kennan and Containment, 1947 George F. Kennan, a career Foreign Servic
Sid Harth • 21 mins ago
Mr. Putin has craftily assisted Europe in its illusions by consistently denying any role in the Ukrainian fighting, regularly referring to the Europeans as “our partners,” pinning the blame for the crisis on American “unilateralism,” and posing as a mediator between Kiev and the pro-Russian militias. His actions, however, reflect a primitive and aggressive brand of geopolitics that was not supposed to have survived the Cold War. In his comments on Thursday, Mr. Obama seemed intent first of all on restraining expectations of what the United States might do about either Ukraine or ISIS. Russia’s actions, he said, were “not really a shift,” and he was vague about tightening sanctions. Yet the pressure for intervening more directly in Ukraine by supplying the government in Kiev with weapons and intelligence is bound to grow, both within the Obama administration and among Eastern European states.
Sid Harth • 21 mins ago
The Convenient Lie The crisis in Ukraine has been underway now for half a year, and the Russian involvement, from the outright annexation of Crimea in March to the men, arms and convoys repeatedly reported spotted in the fighting in the southeastern industrial belt, has been obvious. But something seemed to change in the past week, when Mr. Putin amiably shook hands with President Petro O. Poroshenko on Tuesday, just two days before NATO reported that more than 1,000 Russian soldiers with artillery and other heavy weaponry were on the march inside Ukraine, and as rebels poised themselves for a new thrust along the Sea of Azov. Until now, Europe, and to a lesser degree the United States, had publicly sustained the myth that Russia was intent only on destabilizing Ukraine to deter it from shifting westward politically, rather than to gain control over its eastern provinces, and that Mr. Putin could be brought to the negotiating table through sanctions and censure. But the Russia-backed rebel drive toward the port of Mariupol could also open a land route from Russia to Crimea, underpinning Russian control of a broad section of Ukrainian territory that Mr. Putin has provocatively called by its old czarist name, “Novorossiya,” or “New Russia.” The West has been reluctant to acknowledge that Mr. Putin may be seeking actual control over the Donbass region, in part because breaking with Russia would endanger a major European energy source and lucrative trade deals, including the French sale of two Mistral-class assault ships to Moscow. More broadly, defining Russia as an enemy would mean an end to the post-Cold War world order based on the international rule of law — an order in which a democratizing Russia was to be a partner in integrating emerging economies, fighting terrorism and reining in rogue states.
Sid Harth • 21 mins ago
Obama-Putin Shadowboxing August 30, 2014 / elcidharth SundayReview | Quick History Putin Rushes In, Pretending Not to; Obama Stands Back By SERGE SCHMEMANNAUG. 29, 2014 obamaputinboxing Photo A camouflaged pro-Russian tank seen in the town of Novoazovsk, in eastern Ukraine, last Friday. Credit Sergei Grits/Associated Press When a state sends more than a thousand troops with mobile artillery and heavy equipment into a neighboring state and takes control of territory, that’s an invasion, right? Not according to NATO, which reported the Russian military movements in Ukraine this past week but depicted them only as increased Russian “interference.” And not according to President Obama, who saw Russia being only “a little more overt” in its support of secessionists in southeastern Ukraine. And certainly not according to President Vladimir V. Putin, whose lieutenants simply denied everything and labeled the evidence a Western “canard.” Spin, of course, is an elemental political tool, and for the West to call the invasion an invasion would require a response that neither Washington nor other Western capitals nor NATO are prepared for. But an invasion it is, and the fundamental challenge to the liberal world order that it poses will be high on NATO’s agenda when its leaders gather in Wales this week. As for Mr. Putin, the lie is an honored Soviet propaganda tool he has used since the start of the Russian campaign against Ukraine. The Russian leader is aware that acknowledging an invasion would not only sharply elevate the level of tension with the West, but would carry considerable domestic repercussions. Polls show that only 5 percent of Russians would support sending their troops into Ukraine. When Russia acknowledged that Ukraine had captured some Russian soldiers — Moscow said they accidentally wandered across the border — mothers and girlfriends of the prisoners immediately and loudly began demanding an explanation. The implausibly deniable invasion of Ukraine, to play on an old C.I.A. term, is not the only unconventional war facing the United States and NATO. There is also the question of what to do about ISIS, the brutal jihadist outfit marauding through Iraq and Syria. In brief comments on Ukraine and the Middle East on Thursday, President Obama said the United States had not yet formulated a strategy for dealing with ISIS inside Syria, but he confirmed he had asked Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel for options. But however reluctant he and the American public were to get militarily involved abroad, it was clear that neither the United States nor NATO could ignore the two threats. As NATO grapples with armed conflicts, international health authorities will be fighting their own unconventional war against the Ebola virus, which spread to a fifth West African country, Senegal, and, according to the World Health Organization, could eventually infect 20,000 people. In this struggle, too, finding a strategy was not always easy. Liberia’s misg
Sid Harth • 23 mins ago
“The security situation has worsened in recent days, tensions have risen and the crash site has become less and less accessible,” Pieter-Jaap Aalbersberg, head of the recovery mission, said yesterday in an e-mailed statement. “The experts are not able to perform their task adequately.” ...and I am Sid Harth
Sid Harth • 24 mins ago
Troop Estimates The government in Kiev has estimated that Russia has deployed 45,000 soldiers, 160 tanks and 192 warplanes among other equipment along its border, including soldiers stationed in Crimea. Even so, Russia may not be willing to enter into a military conflict, according to Stefan Meister, an analyst at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. “I can’t believe Russia would attack Ukraine, which would worsen the situation further and deepen the conflict with the West,” Meister said yesterday by phone. While Russia has repeatedly denied any involvement in the conflict, the U.S. and its EU allies say Putin is supplying the insurgents with weapons, manpower and financing and say he could stop the war if he reined in the separatists. Eighteen Ukrainian soldiers were killed and 54 wounded in fighting during the last 24 hours, Lysenko said yesterday. Three civilians were killed amid overnight shelling in Donetsk, a city of 1 million, with artillery fire damaging infrastructure and residential buildings, the city council said yesterday. The fighting is hampering efforts to examine the crash site of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, which the U.S. says was probably shot down last month with a missile fired by the insurgents. The rebels and Putin’s government blame Ukraine.
Sid Harth • 24 mins ago
‘Direct Aggression’ Russia’s Foreign Ministry on Aug. 5 called for a humanitarian mission to eastern Ukraine, which it said is on the verge of a “catastrophe.” Ukraine considers the proposal “cynical” and blames its neighbor for not allowing the military conflict to end, Andriy Lysenko, a spokesman for the country’s Security and Defense Council, said yesterday in Kiev. Ukraine would treat Russia dispatching peacekeepers as “direct aggression,” Hennadiy Zubko, first deputy chief of President Petro Poroshenko’s administration, told reporters. He described the conflict as a “war between Russian special forces, paid Russian mercenaries and Ukraine.” Putin will probably aim for a “fig leaf policy” with an incursion under the guise of a peacekeeping operation, according to Amanda Paul, an analyst at the European Policy Centre in Brussels. “As other conflicts in the former Soviet Union have shown, once there is a Russian military presence it usually never leaves,” she said by e-mail.
Sid Harth • 24 mins ago
“The latest Russian military buildup further escalates the situation and undermines efforts aimed at finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis,” she said by e-mail. “This is a dangerous situation.” Poland, a NATO member that borders Ukraine, has “reason to believe” the risk of an incursion is “greater than a few days ago,” Prime Minister Donald Tusk said yesterday in Warsaw. Merkel Call Statements by the U.S. and NATO on Russia amassing troops on the Ukrainian border amount to “disinformation,” the Moscow-based Interfax news service reported, citing Major General Igor Konashenkov, a spokesman for the Defense Ministry. Putin told German Chancellor Angela Merkel in a phone call yesterday evening that Ukraine’s government is at fault for the worsening crisis and that a “real political dialogue” is needed to resolve the conflict, according to a Kremlin statement. Putin struck back at U.S. and EU punishment over Ukraine, ordering restrictions on food imports from countries that have imposed sanctions “to protect national interests.” The Russian leader’s decree bans or limits food and agriculture imports for a year, with the government to draw up a list of restricted products, according to the Kremlin website.
Sid Harth • 25 mins ago
U.S. President Barack Obama said yesterday that sanctions “are working as intended in putting enormous pressure and strain on the Russian economy.” He again dismissed the idea of sending weapons to Ukraine’s military to help fight the rebels. ‘Terrible Violence’ Ukraine has been “fighting a group of separatists who have engaged in some terrible violence, but who can’t match the Ukrainian army,” Obama told reporters in Washington. “Now, if you start seeing an invasion by Russia, that’s obviously a different set of questions. We’re not there yet.” The escalation is rattling global investors. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index fell 0.6 percent to 1,056.77 yesterday, while gold futures jumped 1.8 percent to $1,308 in New York and yields on 10-year Treasuries touched the lowest level since May. NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu said yesterday that the alliance can “can see what Russia is doing on the ground,” calling its troop movements a “great concern.”
Sid Harth • 25 mins ago
Old wine in a new bottle? U.S. Joins Ukraine Incursion Concern as Putin Hits Back By James G. Neuger, Daria Marchak and Gopal Ratnam Aug 6, 2014 7:42 PM ET The U.S. joined NATO and Poland in warning about the risk of Russia sending troops into Ukraine. Russia called reports of a military buildup on its western border “groundless” and hit back at sanctions against it. The threat of an incursion is “reality,” U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said yesterday in Germany. Earlier, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization said there’s a threat of Russian troops crossing the border under the “pretext” of a humanitarian or peacekeeping mission. Russia ordered limits on food imports from nations that have sanctioned it. “When you see the buildup of these troops, the sophistication and training of these troops, the heavy military equipment that’s being put on the border, of course it’s a reality and it’s a possibility,” Hagel told reporters at the headquarters of the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany. The standoff over Ukraine is intensifying in the wake of tighter U.S. and European Union sanctions on Russia, with President Vladimir Putin ordering economic retaliation in the form of agricultural-import bans. In Ukraine’s easternmost regions, government troops are pressing ahead with an offensive against pro-Russian insurgents that prompted officials in Kiev to say this week that victory was near.    
Prabhat Kumar Singh • 880
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• Yekaterinburg, Russia • 49 mins ago
 
 
More lies and fabrications. Where are proofs?
   

Source: TOI

 ...and I am Sid Harth
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