Modi, Sharif shake hands, meet at Saarc retreat
KATHMANDU: Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistani premier Nawaz Sharif shook hands and met briefly during the retreat at the Saarc summit on Thursday, a day after Modi conspicuously avoided Sharif while he met five other South Asian leaders here."Yes, they have met and shook hands at the retreat," Nepal foreign minister Mahendra Bahadur Pandey said over phone from Dhulikhel, where the retreat is being held on the second day of the two-day Saarc summit.
Both the prime ministers have taken a tour in and around the resort which is famous for watching Himalayas.
Leaders will spend almost five hours at the retreat.
Nepal, the host country, is pushing for talks between India and Pakistan and at least a Saarc related energy accord.
But a planned meeting between two South Asian leaders has not taken place.
As of now, both leaders have not met separately at the retreat, but Nepal and other Saarc members are pushing them to sit for talks.
Multiple diplomatic sources said that both the prime ministers were seen talking during a reception hosted by Nepalese Prime Minister Sushil Koirala on Wednesday evening in honour of visiting Saarc heads of state and government.
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Both the prime ministers also spoke to each other in a waiting room.
Retreating together. SAARC leaders and aides at Retreat in Dhulikhel.
Both
Modi and Sharif were in the same row at dinner and were chatting with
each other, said a diplomat, adding that it was very personal and not
substantive.
Both Modi and Sharif also briefly shook hands after the inaugural session of the summit as well as in the holding room adjacent to the Saarc summit hall. Both Modi and Sharif were in the same row at dinner and were chatting with each other, said a diplomat, adding that it was very personal and not substantive.
Both Modi and Sharif also briefly shook hands after the inaugural session of the summit as well as in the holding room adjacent to the Saarc summit hall. आंतर राष्ट्रीय कुस्तीच्या स्पर्धेत मोदीमल उफ़्फ़ मल्ल याला शरीफ मल्लाने चीतपट केले. दोन्ही खांदे व पाठ तांबड्या मातीत रगडली. पराभव झाला तरी मोदिमल्ल किंचाळतो माझेच नाक वर. सारा मुर्खाचा बाजार हरे राम! ...and I am Sid Harth
I quoted portions of a published report, readilly
available on the internet. It is not my job to educate Modi Bhagats.
Media has thousand times more power to check the facts and perhaps more
smart researchers on their payroll. This problem of not providing a
structured commentary, along with a glitzy presentation in a short
article-space wise and absolutely cheap presentation has made readers
dumber than they need to be.
That's, in short is my comment.
...and I am Sid Harth
within
Asia
concurrent
with
robust
growth
in
North
America
and
W
estern
Europe
may
redirect
trade
ows
across
regions.
This
case
illustrates
the
need
we
described
earlier
to
distinguish
between
policy-induced
regionalism
and
that
stemming
primar-
ily
from
economic
forces.
How
important
the
Association
of
Southeast
Asian
Na-
tions
(ASEAN)
and
other
policy
initiatives
are
in
directing
commerce
should
become
clearer
as
the
economic
crisis
in
Asia
unfolds.
Also
indicative
of
regionalism’
s
growth
are
the
increasing
rates
at
which
PT
As
formed
and
states
joined
them
throughout
the
post–
W
orld
W
ar
II
period.
55
Figure
1
reports
the
number
of
regional
trading
arrangements
notiŽ
ed
to
the
General
Agree-
ment
on
Tariffs
and
Trade
(GA
TT)
from
1948
to
1994.
Clearly
,
the
frequency
of
PT
A
formation
has
uctuated.
Few
were
established
during
the
1940s
and
1950s,
a
surge
in
preferential
agreements
occurred
in
the
1960s
and
1970s,
and
the
incidence
of
PT
A
creation
again
trailed
off
in
the
1980s.
56
But
there
has
been
a
signiŽ
cant
rise
in
such
agreements
during
the
1990s;
and
more
than
50
percent
of
all
world
commerce
is
currently
conducted
within
PTAs.
57
Indeed,
they
have
become
so
pervasive
that
all
but
a
few
parties
to
the
W
orld
Trade
Organization
(WTO)
now
belong
to
at
least
one.
58
Regionalism,
then,
seems
to
have
occurred
in
two
waves
during
the
post–
W
orld
W
ar
II
era.
The
Ž
rst
took
place
from
the
late
1950s
through
the
1970s
and
was
marked
by
the
establishment
of
the
EEC,
EFT
A,
the
CMEA,
and
a
plethora
of
re-
gional
trade
blocs
formed
by
developing
countries.
These
arrangements
were
initi-
ated
against
the
backdrop
of
the
Cold
W
ar,
the
rash
of
decolonization
following
W
orld
W
ar
II,
and
a
multilateral
commercial
framework,
all
of
which
colored
their
economic
and
political
effects.
V
arious
LDCs
formed
preferential
arrangements
to
reduce
their
economic
and
political
dependence
on
advanced
industrial
countries.
Designed
to
discourage
imports
and
encourage
the
development
of
indigenous
indus-
tries,
such
arrangements
fostered
at
least
some
trade
diversion.
59
Moreover,
many
of
them
were
beset
by
considerable
con
ict
over
how
to
distribute
the
costs
and
beneŽ
ts
stemming
from
regional
integration,
how
to
compensate
distributional
losers,
and
how
to
allocate
industries
among
members.
60
Similarly
,
the
CMEA
represented
an
attempt
by
the
Soviet
Union
to
promote
economic
integration
among
its
political
allies,
foster
the
development
of
local
industries,
and
limit
economic
dependence
on
the
W
est.
Ultimately
,
it
did
little
to
enhance
the
welfare
of
participants.
61
In
contrast,
the
regional
arrangements
concluded
among
developed
countries—
especially
those
in
W
estern
Europe—
are
widely
viewed
as
trade-creating
institutions
that
also
contrib-
uted
to
political
cooperation.
62
55.
MansŽ
eld
1998.
56.
See
also
de
Melo
and
Panagariya
1993,
3.
57.
Serra
et
al.
1997,
8,
Ž
g.
2.
58.
World
Trade
Organization
1996,
38,
and
1995.
59.
For
example,
Pomfret
Regionalism
Since
W
orld
W
ar
II
Since
W
orld
W
ar
II,
states
have
continued
to
organize
commerce
on
a
regional
basis,
despite
the
existence
of
a
multilateral
economic
framework.
To
analyze
regional-
ism’
s
contemporary
growth,
some
studies
have
assessed
whether
trade
ows
are
becoming
increasingly
concentrated
within
geographically
speciŽ
ed
areas.
Others
have
addressed
the
extent
to
which
PT
As
shape
trade
ows
and
whether
their
in
u-
ence
is
rising.
Still
others
have
examined
whether
the
rates
at
which
PT
As
form
and
states
join
them
have
increased
over
time.
In
combination,
these
studies
indicate
that
commercial
regionalism
has
grown
considerably
over
the
past
Ž
fty
years.
As
shown
in
T
able
1—
which
presents
data
used
in
three
in
uential
studies
of
regionalism—
the
regional
concentration
of
trade
ows
generally
has
increased
since
the
end
of
W
orld
W
ar
II.
50
Much
of
this
overall
tendency
is
attributable
to
rising
trade
within
W
estern
Europe—
especially
among
parties
to
the
EC—
and
within
East
Asia.
Some
evidence
of
an
upward
drift
in
intraregional
commerce
also
exists
within
the
Andean
Pact,
the
Economic
Community
of
W
est
African
States
(ECOW
AS),
and
between
Australia
and
New
Zealand,
although
outside
of
the
former
two
groupings,
intraregional
trade
ows
have
not
grown
much
among
developing
countries.
One
central
reason
why
trade
is
so
highly
concentrated
within
many
regions
is
that
states
located
in
close
proximity
often
participate
in
the
same
PT
A.
51
That
the
effects
of
various
PT
As
on
commerce
have
risen
over
time
constitutes
further
evidence
of
regionalism’
s
growth.
52
As
the
data
in
Table
1
indicate,
the
in
uence
of
PT
As
on
trade
ows
has
been
far
from
uniform.
Some
PT
As,
like
the
EC,
seem
to
have
had
a
profound
effect,
whereas
others
have
had
little
impact.
53
But
the
data
also
indicate
that,
in
general,
trade
ows
have
tended
to
increase
over
time
among
states
that
are
members
of
a
PT
A
and
not
merely
located
in
the
same
geographic
region,
suggesting
that
policy
choices
are
at
least
partly
responsible
for
the
rise
of
regionalism
since
W
orld
W
ar
II.
East
Asia,
however,
is
an
interesting
exception.
V
irtually
no
commercial
agree-
ments
existed
among
East
Asian
countries
prior
to
the
mid-1990s,
but
rapid
eco-
nomic
growth
throughout
the
region
contributed
to
a
dramatic
increase
in
intra-
regional
trade
ows.
54
In
light
of
Asia’
s
recent
Ž
nancial
crisis,
it
will
be
interesting
to
see
whether
the
process
of
regionalization
continues.
Severe
economic
recession
50.
These
deŽ
ne
regionalism
in
somewhat
different
ways.
Anderson
and
Norheim
examine
broad
geo-
graphic
areas,
de
Melo
and
Panagariya
analyze
PTAs,
and
Frankel,
Stein,
and
W
ei
consider
a
combination
of
geographic
zones
and
PT
As.
See
Anderson
and
Norheim
1993;
de
Melo
and
Panagariya
1993;
and
Frankel,
Stein,
and
Wei
1995.
51.
On
the
effects
of
PTAs
on
trade
ows,
see,
for
example,
Aitken
1973;
Frankel
1993;
Frankel,
Stein,
and
Wei
1995;
Linnemann
1966;
Mans
W
orld
W
ars
I
and
II
tended
to
be
highly
preferential.
Some
were
created
to
consoli-
date
the
empires
of
major
powers,
including
the
customs
union
France
formed
with
members
of
its
empire
in
1928
and
the
Commonwealth
system
of
preferences
estab-
lished
by
Great
Britain
in
1932.
44
Most,
however,
were
formed
among
sovereign
states.
For
example,
Hungary
,
Romania,
Y
ugoslavia,
and
Bulgaria
each
negotiated
tariff
preferences
on
their
agricultural
trade
with
various
European
countries.
The
Rome
Agreement
of
1934
led
to
the
establishment
of
a
PT
A
involving
Italy
,
Austria,
and
Hungary
.
Belgium,
Denmark,
Finland,
Luxembourg,
the
Netherlands,
Norway
,
and
Sweden
concluded
a
series
of
economic
agreements
throughout
the
1930s.
Ger-
many
also
initiated
various
bilateral
trade
blocs
during
this
era.
Outside
of
Europe,
the
United
States
forged
almost
two
dozen
bilateral
commercial
agreements
during
the
mid-1930s,
many
of
which
involved
Latin
American
countries.
45
Longstanding
and
unresolved
debates
exist
about
whether
regionalism
deepened
the
economic
depression
of
the
interwar
period
and
contributed
to
political
tensions
culminating
in
W
orld
W
ar
II.
46
Contrasting
this
era
with
that
prior
to
W
orld
W
ar
I,
Irwin
presents
the
conventional
view:
‘
‘
In
the
nineteenth
century
,
a
network
of
trea-
ties
containing
the
most
favored
nation
(MFN)
clause
spurred
major
tariff
reductions
in
Europe
and
around
the
world,
[ushering]
in
a
harmonious
period
of
multilateral
free
trade
that
compares
favorably
with
.
.
.
the
recent
GA
TT
era.
In
the
interwar
period,
by
contrast,
discriminatory
trade
blocs
and
protectionist
bilateral
arrange-
ments
contributed
to
the
severe
contraction
of
world
trade
that
accompanied
the
Great
Depression.’
’
47
The
latter
wave
of
regionalism
is
often
associated
with
the
pursuit
of
beggar-thy-neighbor
policies
and
substantial
trade
diversion,
as
well
as
heightened
political
con
ict.
Scholars
frequently
attribute
the
rise
of
regionalism
during
the
interwar
period
to
states’
inability
to
arrive
at
multilateral
solutions
to
economic
problems.
As
A.
G.
Kenwood
and
A.
L.
Lougheed
note,
‘
‘
The
failure
to
achieve
international
agreement
on
matters
of
trade
and
Ž
nance
in
the
early
1930s
led
many
nations
to
consider
the
alternative
possibility
of
trade
liberalizing
agreements
on
a
regional
basis.’
’
48
In
part,
this
failure
can
be
traced
to
political
rivalries
among
the
major
powers
and
the
use
of
regional
trade
strategies
by
these
countries
for
mercantilist
purposes.
49
Hence,
al-
though
regionalism
was
not
new
,
both
the
political
context
in
which
it
arose
and
its
consequences
were
quite
different
than
before
W
orld
W
ar
I.
44.
Pollard
1974,
145.
45.
On
the
commercial
arrangements
discussed
in
this
paragraph,
see
Condliffe
1940,
chaps.
8–
9;
Hirschman
[1945]
1980;
Kenwood
and
Lougheed
1971,
211–
19;
and
Pollard
1974,
49.
Although
our
focus
is
on
commercial
regionalism,
it
should
be
noted
that
the
interwar
era
was
also
marked
by
the
existence
belief
that
regional
trade
arrangements
can
induce
members
to
undertake
and
consoli-
date
economic
reforms
and
that
these
reforms
are
likely
to
promote
multilateral
open-
ness.
31
However,
clear
limits
also
exist
on
the
ability
of
regional
agreements
to
bolster
multilateralism.
Bhagwati,
for
example,
maintains
that
although
the
Kemp-W
an
theo-
rem
demonstrates
that
PTAs
could
expand
until
free
trade
exists,
this
result
does
not
specify
the
likelihood
of
such
expansion
or
that
it
will
occur
in
a
welfare-enhancing
way
.
32
In
addition,
Bond
and
Syropoulos
argue
that
the
formation
of
customs
unions
may
render
multilateral
trade
liberalization
more
difficult
by
undercutting
multilat-
eral
enforcement.
33
But
Kyle
Bagwell
and
Robert
Staiger
show
that
PT
As
have
con-
tradictory
effects
on
the
global
trading
system.
They
claim
that
‘
‘
the
relative
strengths
of
these
.
.
.
effects
determine
the
impact
of
preferential
agreement
on
the
tariff
struc-
ture
under
the
multilateral
agreement,
and
.
.
.
preferential
trade
agreements
can
be
either
good
or
bad
for
multilateral
tariff
cooperation,
depending
on
the
param-
eters.’
’
34
They
do
conclude,
however,
that
‘
‘
it
is
precisely
when
the
multilateral
sys-
tem
is
working
poorly
that
preferential
agreements
can
have
their
most
desirable
effects
on
the
multilateral
system.’
’
35
Economic
analyses
indicate
that
regionalism’
s
welfare
implications
have
varied
starkly
over
time
and
across
PT
As.
As
Frankel
and
W
ei
conclude,
‘
‘
regionalism
can,
depending
on
the
circumstances,
be
associated
with
either
more
or
less
general
liber-
alization.’
’
36
In
what
follows,
we
argue
that
these
circumstances
involve
political
conditions
that
economic
studies
often
neglect.
Regionalism
can
also
have
important
political
consequences,
and
they
,
too,
have
been
given
short
shrift
in
many
economic
studies.
Lately
,
these
issues
have
attracted
growing
interest,
sparking
a
burgeoning
literature
on
the
political
economy
of
regionalism.
W
e
assess
this
literature
after
conducting
a
brief
overview
of
regionalism’
s
historical
evolution.
Regionalism
in
Historical
Perspective
Considerable
interest
has
been
expressed
in
how
the
preferential
economic
arrange-
ments
formed
after
W
orld
W
ar
II
have
affected
and
will
subsequently
in
uence
the
global
economy
.
W
e
focus
primarily
on
this
era
as
well;
however,
it
is
widely
recog-
nized
that
regionalism
is
not
just
a
recent
phenomenon.
Analyses
of
the
current
spate
of
PT
As
often
draw
on
historical
analogies
to
prior
episodes
of
regionalism.
Such
analogies
can
be
misleading
because
the
political
settings
in
which
these
episodes
arose
are
quite
different
from
the
current
setting.
To
develop
this
point,
it
is
useful
to
31.
See,
for
example,
Lawrence
1996;
and
Summers
1991.
32.
Bhagwati
1991,
60–
61;
and
1993.
33.
Bond
and
Syropoulos
1996b.
34.
Bagwell
and
Staiger
1997,
27.
35.
Ibid.,
28.
36.
Frankel
and
W
ei
1998,
216
Consistent
with
this
proposition,
a
series
of
simulations
by
Jeffrey
A.
Frankel,
Ernesto
Stein,
and
Shang-Jin
W
ei
reveal
that
world
welfare
is
reduced
when
two
or
three
PT
As
exist,
depending
on
the
height
of
the
external
tariffs
of
each
arrange-
ment.
20
T
.
N.
Srinivasan
and
Eric
Bond
and
Constantinos
Syropoulos,
however,
have
criticized
the
assumptions
underlying
Krugman’
s
analysis.
21
In
addition,
various
ob-
servers
have
argued
that
the
static
nature
of
his
model
limits
its
ability
to
explain
how
PT
As
expand
and
the
welfare
implications
of
this
process.
22
These
debates
further
re
ect
the
difficulty
that
economists
have
had
drawing
generalizations
about
the
welfare
effects
of
PT
As.
As
one
recent
survey
concludes,
‘
‘
analysis
of
the
terms
of
trade
effects
has
tended
toward
the
same
depressing
ambiguity
as
the
rest
of
customs
union
theory
.’
’
23
A
regional
trade
arrangement
can
also
in
uence
the
welfare
of
members
by
allow-
ing
Ž
rms
to
realize
economies
of
scale.
Over
three
decades
ago,
Jagdish
Bhagwati,
Charles
A.
Cooper
and
Benton
F
.
Massell,
and
Harry
Johnson
found
that
states
could
reduce
the
costs
of
achieving
any
given
level
of
import-competing
industrialization
by
forming
a
PT
A
within
which
scale
economies
could
be
exploited
and
then
discrimi-
nating
against
goods
emanating
from
outside
sources.
24
Indeed,
this
motivation
con-
tributed
to
the
spate
of
PT
As
established
by
less
developed
countries
(LDCs)
through-
out
the
1960s.
25
More
recent
studies
have
examined
how
scale
economies
within
regional
arrangements
can
foster
greater
specialization
and
competition
and
can
shift
the
location
of
production
among
members.
26
Although
these
analyses
indicate
that
PT
As
could
yield
economic
gains
for
members
and
adversely
affect
third
parties,
they
also
underscore
regionalism’
s
uncertain
welfare
implications.
27
Besides
its
static
welfare
effects,
economists
have
devoted
considerable
attention
to
whether
regionalism
will
accelerate
or
inhibit
multilateral
trade
liberalization,
an
issue
that
Bhagwati
refers
to
as
‘
‘
the
dynamic
time-path
question.’
’
28
Several
strands
of
research
suggest
that
regional
economic
arrangements
might
bolster
multilateral
openness.
First,
Murray
C.
Kemp
and
Henry
W
an
have
demonstrated
that
it
is
pos-
sible
for
any
group
of
countries
to
establish
a
PT
A
that
does
not
degrade
the
welfare
of
either
members
or
third
parties,
and
that
incentives
exist
for
the
union
to
expand
until
it
includes
all
states
(that
is,
until
global
free
trade
exists).
29
Second,
Krugman
and
Lawrence
H.
Summers
note
that
regional
institutions
reduce
the
number
of
ac-
tors
engaged
in
multilateral
negotiations,
thereby
muting
problems
of
bargaining
and
collective
action
that
can
hamper
such
negotiations.
30
Third,
there
is
a
widespread
20.
Frankel,
Stein,
and
Wei
1995.
21.
See
Bond
and
Syropoulos
1996a;
and
Srinivasan
1993.
22.
See
Bhagwati
and
Panagariya
1996,
47;
and
Srinivasan
1993.
23.
Gunter
1989,
16.
See
also
Baldwin
and
V
enabl
Consistent
with
this
proposition,
a
series
of
simulations
by
Jeffrey
A.
Frankel,
Ernesto
Stein,
and
Shang-Jin
W
ei
reveal
that
world
welfare
is
reduced
when
two
or
three
PT
As
exist,
depending
on
the
height
of
the
external
tariffs
of
each
arrange-
ment.
20
T
.
N.
Srinivasan
and
Eric
Bond
and
Constantinos
Syropoulos,
however,
have
criticized
the
assumptions
underlying
Krugman’
s
analysis.
21
In
addition,
various
ob-
servers
have
argued
that
the
static
nature
of
his
model
limits
its
ability
to
explain
how
PT
As
expand
and
the
welfare
implications
of
this
process.
22
These
debates
further
re
ect
the
difficulty
that
economists
have
had
drawing
generalizations
about
the
welfare
effects
of
PT
As.
As
one
recent
survey
concludes,
‘
‘
analysis
of
the
terms
of
trade
effects
has
tended
toward
the
same
depressing
ambiguity
as
the
rest
of
customs
union
theory
.’
’
23
A
regional
trade
arrangement
can
also
in
uence
the
welfare
of
members
by
allow-
ing
Ž
rms
to
realize
economies
of
scale.
Over
three
decades
ago,
Jagdish
Bhagwati,
Charles
A.
Cooper
and
Benton
F
.
Massell,
and
Harry
Johnson
found
that
states
could
reduce
the
costs
of
achieving
any
given
level
of
import-competing
industrialization
by
forming
a
PT
A
within
which
scale
economies
could
be
exploited
and
then
discrimi-
nating
against
goods
emanating
from
outside
sources.
24
Indeed,
this
motivation
con-
tributed
to
the
spate
of
PT
As
established
by
less
developed
countries
(LDCs)
through-
out
the
1960s.
25
More
recent
studies
have
examined
how
scale
economies
within
regional
arrangements
can
foster
greater
specialization
and
competition
and
can
shift
the
location
of
production
among
members.
26
Although
these
analyses
indicate
that
PT
As
could
yield
economic
gains
for
members
and
adversely
affect
third
parties,
they
also
underscore
regionalism’
s
uncertain
welfare
implications.
27
Besides
its
static
welfare
effects,
economists
have
devoted
considerable
attention
to
whether
regionalism
will
accelerate
or
inhibit
multilateral
trade
liberalization,
an
issue
that
Bhagwati
refers
to
as
‘
‘
the
dynamic
time-path
question.’
’
28
Several
strands
of
research
suggest
that
regional
economic
arrangements
might
bolster
multilateral
openness.
First,
Murray
C.
Kemp
and
Henry
W
an
have
demonstrated
that
it
is
pos-
sible
for
any
group
of
countries
to
establish
a
PT
A
that
does
not
degrade
the
welfare
of
either
members
or
third
parties,
and
that
incentives
exist
for
the
union
to
expand
until
it
includes
all
states
(that
is,
until
global
free
trade
exists).
29
Second,
Krugman
and
Lawrence
H.
Summers
note
that
regional
institutions
reduce
the
number
of
ac-
tors
engaged
in
multilateral
negotiations,
thereby
muting
problems
of
bargaining
and
collective
action
that
can
hamper
such
negotiations.
30
Third,
there
is
a
widespread
20.
Frankel,
Stein,
and
Wei
1995.
21.
See
Bond
and
Syropoulos
1996a;
and
Srinivasan
1993.
22.
See
Bhagwati
and
Panagariya
1996,
47;
and
Srinivasan
1993.
23.
Gunter
1989,
16.
See
also
Baldwin
and
V
enabl
of
supply
even
after
payment
of
the
duty
.
The
shift
in
the
locus
of
production
is
now
not
as
between
the
two
member
countries
but
as
between
a
low-cost
third
country
and
the
other,
high-cost,
member
country
.
15
Viner
demonstrated
that
a
customs
union’
s
static
welfare
effects
on
members
and
the
world
as
a
whole
depend
on
whether
it
creates
more
trade
than
it
diverts.
In
his
words,
‘
‘
Where
the
trade-creating
force
is
predominant,
one
of
the
members
at
least
must
beneŽ
t,
both
may
beneŽ
t,
the
two
combined
must
have
a
net
beneŽ
t,
and
the
world
at
large
beneŽ
ts.
.
.
.
Where
the
trade-diverting
effect
is
predominant,
one
at
least
of
the
member
countries
is
bound
to
be
injured,
both
may
be
injured,
the
two
combined
will
suffer
a
net
injury
,
and
there
will
be
injury
to
the
outside
world
and
to
the
world
at
large.’
’
16
V
iner
also
demonstrated
that
it
is
very
difficult
to
assess
these
effects
on
anything
other
than
a
case-by-case
basis.
Over
the
past
Ž
fty
years,
a
wide
variety
of
empirical
efforts
have
been
made
to
determine
whether
PT
As
are
trade
creating
or
trade
diverting.
As
we
discuss
later,
there
is
widespread
consensus
that
the
preferential
arrangements
forged
during
the
nineteenth
century
tended
to
be
trade
creating
and
that
those
established
between
W
orld
W
ars
I
and
II
tended
to
be
trade
diverting;
however,
there
is
a
striking
lack
of
consensus
on
this
score
about
the
PTAs
developed
since
W
orld
W
ar
II.
17
Even
if
a
PT
A
is
trade
diverting,
it
can
nonetheless
enhance
the
welfare
of
mem-
bers
by
affecting
their
terms
of
trade
and
their
capacity
to
realize
economies
of
scale.
Forming
a
PT
A
typically
improves
members’
terms
of
trade
vis-a
`-vis
the
rest
of
the
world,
since
the
arrangement
almost
always
has
more
market
power
than
any
constitu-
ent
party
.
At
the
same
time,
however,
Paul
Krugman
points
out
that
attempts
by
a
PT
A
to
exploit
its
market
power
may
backŽ
re
if
other
such
arrangements
exist,
since
‘
‘
the
blocs
may
beggar
each
other
.
That
is,
formation
of
blocs
can,
in
effect,
set
off
a
beggar-all
trade
war
that
leaves
everyone
worse
off.’
’
18
He
argues
that
these
beggar-
thy-neighbor
effects
are
minimized
when
the
number
of
trade
blocs
is
either
very
large
or
very
small.
19
The
existence
of
a
single
global
bloc
is
equivalent
to
a
free-
trade
system,
which
obviously
promotes
both
national
and
global
welfare.
In
a
world
composed
of
many
small
blocs,
little
trade
diversion
is
expected
because
the
optimal
tariff
for
each
bloc
is
quite
low
and
the
distortionary
effect
of
a
tariff
imposed
by
any
one
is
minimal.
By
contrast,
Krugman
claims
that
a
system
of
three
blocs
can
have
an
especially
adverse
impact
on
global
welfare.
Under
these
circumstances,
each
bloc
has
some
market
power,
the
potential
ow
of
interbloc
commerce
is
substantial,
and
trade
barriers
markedly
distort
such
commerce.
15.
Viner
1950,
43.
For
comprehensive
overviews
of
the
issues
addressed
in
this
section,
see
Baldwin
and
V
enables
1995;
Bhagwati
1991,
chap.
European
Community
[EC]/European
Union
[EU],
the
European
Free
Trade
Associa-
tion
[EFT
A],
NAFT
A,
and
the
Council
for
Mutual
Economic
Assistance
[CMEA]);
many
of
them
also
coordinate
members’
trade
policies
vis-a
`-vis
third
parties.
11
Among
the
various
types
of
PT
As
are
customs
unions,
which
eliminate
internal
trade
barriers
and
impose
a
common
external
tariff
(CET);
free
trade
areas
(FT
As),
which
eliminate
internal
trade
barriers,
but
do
not
establish
a
CET;
and
common
markets,
which
allow
the
free
movement
of
factors
of
production
and
Ž
nished
products
across
national
borders.
12
Since
much
of
the
contemporary
literature
on
regionalism
focuses
on
PT
As,
we
will
emphasize
them
in
the
following
analysis.
13
Existing
studies
frequently
consider
PT
As
as
a
group,
rather
than
differentiating
among
the
various
types
of
these
arrange-
ments
or
distinguishing
between
bilateral
arrangements
and
those
composed
of
more
than
two
parties.
T
o
cast
our
analysis
as
broadly
as
possible,
we
do
so
as
well,
although
some
of
the
institutional
variations
among
PT
As
will
be
addressed
later
in
this
article.
Economic
Analyses
of
Regionalism
Much
of
the
literature
on
regionalism
focuses
on
the
welfare
implications
of
PT
As,
both
for
members
and
the
world
as
a
whole.
Developed
primarily
by
economists,
this
research
serves
as
a
point
of
departure
for
the
following
analysis,
so
we
now
turn
to
a
brief
summary
of
it.
Preferential
trading
arrangements
have
a
two-sided
quality
,
lib-
eralizing
commerce
among
members
while
discriminating
against
third
parties.
14
Since
such
arrangements
rarely
eliminate
external
trade
barriers,
economists
con-
sider
them
inferior
to
arrangements
that
liberalize
trade
worldwide.
Just
how
inferior
PT
As
are
hinges
largely
on
whether
they
are
trade
creating
or
trade
diverting,
a
distinction
originally
drawn
by
Viner
.
As
he
explained:
There
will
be
commodities
.
.
.
for
which
one
of
the
members
of
the
customs
union
will
now
newly
import
from
the
other
but
which
it
formerly
did
not
import
at
all
because
the
price
of
the
protected
domestic
product
was
lower
than
the
price
at
any
foreign
source
plus
the
duty
.
This
shift
in
the
locus
of
production
as
between
the
two
countries
is
a
shift
from
a
high-cost
to
a
low-cost
point.
.
.
.
There
will
be
other
commodities
which
one
of
the
members
of
the
customs
union
will
now
newly
import
from
the
other
whereas
before
the
customs
union
it
im-
ported
them
from
a
third
country,
because
that
was
the
cheapest
possible
source
11.
See,
for
example,
Bhagwati
1993;
Bhagwati
and
Panagariya
1996,
4–
5;
de
Melo
and
Panagariya
1993;
and
Pomfret
1988.
12.
See
Anderson
and
Blackhurst
1993;
and
the
sources
in
footnote
11,
above.
13.
In
what
follows,
we
refer
to
regional
arrangements
and
PTAs
interchangeably,
which
is
consistent
with
much
of
the
existing
literature
on
regionalism.
14.
As
de
Melo
and
Panagariya
point
out,
‘
‘
because
under
regionalism
preferences
are
extended
only
to
partners,
it
is
discriminatory
.
At
remains
controversial.
Some
observers,
for
example,
consider
Asia-PaciŽ
c
a
single
region,
others
consider
it
an
amalgamation
of
two
regions,
and
still
others
consider
it
a
combination
of
more
than
two
regions.
Furthermore,
a
region
implies
more
than
just
close
physical
proximity
among
the
constituent
states.
The
United
States
and
Russia,
for
instance,
are
rarely
considered
inhabitants
of
the
same
region,
even
though
Russia’
s
eastern
coast
is
very
close
to
Alaska.
Besides
proximity
,
many
scholars
insist
that
members
of
a
common
region
also
share
cultural,
economic,
linguistic,
or
political
ties.
5
Re
ecting
this
position,
Kym
Anderson
and
Hege
Norheim
note
that
‘
‘
while
there
is
no
ideal
deŽ
nition
[of
a
region],
pragmatism
would
suggest
basing
the
deŽ
nition
on
the
major
continents
and
subdividing
them
somewhat
according
to
a
combination
of
cultural,
language,
religious,
and
stage-of-development
criteria.’
’
6
V
arious
studies,
however,
deŽ
ne
regions
largely
in
terms
of
these
nongeographic
criteria
and
place
relatively
little
emphasis
on
physical
location.
For
example,
France
and
the
Francophone
countries
of
Northwest
Africa
are
often
referred
to
as
a
regional
grouping
because
of
their
linguistic
similarities.
Also,
social
constructivists
have
argued
that
countries
sharing
a
communal
identity
comprise
a
region,
regardless
of
their
location.
7
In
the
latter
vein,
Peter
J.
Katzenstein
maintains
that
regional
‘
‘
geo-
graphic
designations
are
not
‘
real,’
‘
natural,’
or
‘
essential.’
They
are
socially
con-
structed
and
politically
contested
and
thus
open
to
change.’
’
8
More
common
among
scholars
who
deŽ
ne
regions
in
nongeographic
terms
is
a
focus
on
preferential
eco-
nomic
arrangements,
which
need
not
be
composed
of
states
in
close
proximity
(for
example,
the
United
States–
Israel
Free
Trade
Area
and
the
Lome
́
Convention).
Setting
aside
the
issue
of
how
a
region
should
be
deŽ
ned,
questions
remain
about
whether
regionalism
pertains
to
the
concentration
of
economic
ows
or
to
foreign
policy
coordination.
Some
analyses
deŽ
ne
regionalism
as
an
economic
process
whereby
economic
ows
grow
more
rapidly
among
a
given
group
of
states
(in
the
same
region)
than
between
these
states
and
those
located
elsewhere.
An
increase
in
intraregional
ows
may
stem
from
economic
forces,
like
a
higher
overall
rate
of
growth
within
than
outside
the
region,
as
well
as
from
foreign
economic
policies
that
liberalize
trade
among
the
constituent
states
and
discriminate
against
third
parties.
9
In
a
recent
study,
Albert
Fishlow
and
Stephan
Haggard
sharply
distinguish
be-
tween
regionalization,
which
refers
to
the
regional
concentration
of
economic
ows,
and
regionalism,
which
they
deŽ
ne
as
a
political
process
characterized
by
economic
policy
cooperation
and
coordination
among
countries.
10
DeŽ
ned
in
this
way
,
commer-
cial
regionalism
has
been
driven
largely
by
the
formation
and
spread
of
preferential
trading
arrangements
(PT
As).
These
arrangements
furnish
states
remains
controversial.
Some
observers,
for
example,
consider
Asia-PaciŽ
c
a
single
region,
others
consider
it
an
amalgamation
of
two
regions,
and
still
others
consider
it
a
combination
of
more
than
two
regions.
Furthermore,
a
region
implies
more
than
just
close
physical
proximity
among
the
constituent
states.
The
United
States
and
Russia,
for
instance,
are
rarely
considered
inhabitants
of
the
same
region,
even
though
Russia’
s
eastern
coast
is
very
close
to
Alaska.
Besides
proximity
,
many
scholars
insist
that
members
of
a
common
region
also
share
cultural,
economic,
linguistic,
or
political
ties.
5
Re
ecting
this
position,
Kym
Anderson
and
Hege
Norheim
note
that
‘
‘
while
there
is
no
ideal
deŽ
nition
[of
a
region],
pragmatism
would
suggest
basing
the
deŽ
nition
on
the
major
continents
and
subdividing
them
somewhat
according
to
a
combination
of
cultural,
language,
religious,
and
stage-of-development
criteria.’
’
6
V
arious
studies,
however,
deŽ
ne
regions
largely
in
terms
of
these
nongeographic
criteria
and
place
relatively
little
emphasis
on
physical
location.
For
example,
France
and
the
Francophone
countries
of
Northwest
Africa
are
often
referred
to
as
a
regional
grouping
because
of
their
linguistic
similarities.
Also,
social
constructivists
have
argued
that
countries
sharing
a
communal
identity
comprise
a
region,
regardless
of
their
location.
7
In
the
latter
vein,
Peter
J.
Katzenstein
maintains
that
regional
‘
‘
geo-
graphic
designations
are
not
‘
real,’
‘
natural,’
or
‘
essential.’
They
are
socially
con-
structed
and
politically
contested
and
thus
open
to
change.’
’
8
More
common
among
scholars
who
deŽ
ne
regions
in
nongeographic
terms
is
a
focus
on
preferential
eco-
nomic
arrangements,
which
need
not
be
composed
of
states
in
close
proximity
(for
example,
the
United
States–
Israel
Free
Trade
Area
and
the
Lome
́
Convention).
Setting
aside
the
issue
of
how
a
region
should
be
deŽ
ned,
questions
remain
about
whether
regionalism
pertains
to
the
concentration
of
economic
ows
or
to
foreign
policy
coordination.
Some
analyses
deŽ
ne
regionalism
as
an
economic
process
whereby
economic
ows
grow
more
rapidly
among
a
given
group
of
states
(in
the
same
region)
than
between
these
states
and
those
located
elsewhere.
An
increase
in
intraregional
ows
may
stem
from
economic
forces,
like
a
higher
overall
rate
of
growth
within
than
outside
the
region,
as
well
as
from
foreign
economic
policies
that
liberalize
trade
among
the
constituent
states
and
discriminate
against
third
parties.
9
In
a
recent
study,
Albert
Fishlow
and
Stephan
Haggard
sharply
distinguish
be-
tween
regionalization,
which
refers
to
the
regional
concentration
of
economic
ows,
and
regionalism,
which
they
deŽ
ne
as
a
political
process
characterized
by
economic
policy
cooperation
and
coordination
among
countries.
10
DeŽ
ned
in
this
way
,
commer-
cial
regionalism
has
been
driven
largely
by
the
formation
and
spread
of
preferential
trading
arrangements
(PT
As).
These
arrangements
furnish
states
institutions
affect
the
formation
of
regional
institutions,
the
particular
states
compos-
ing
them,
and
their
welfare
implications.
W
e
argue
that
these
analyses
provide
key
insights
into
regionalism’
s
causes
and
consequences.
They
also
demonstrate
the
risks
associated
with
ignoring
its
political
underpinnings.
At
the
same
time,
however,
re-
cent
research
leaves
various
important
theoretical
and
empirical
issues
unresolved,
including
which
political
factors
bear
most
heavily
on
regionalism
and
the
nature
of
their
effects.
The
resolution
of
these
issues
is
likely
to
help
clarify
whether
the
new
‘
‘
wave’
’
of
regionalism
will
be
benign
or
malign.
2
The
contemporary
spread
of
regional
trade
arrangements
is
not
without
historical
precedent.
Such
arrangements
promoted
com-
mercial
openness
during
the
nineteenth
century
,
but
they
also
contributed
to
eco-
nomic
instability
throughout
the
era
between
W
orld
W
ars
I
and
II.
Underlying
many
debates
about
regionalism
is
whether
the
current
wave
will
have
a
benign
cast,
like
the
wave
that
arose
during
the
nineteenth
century
,
or
a
malign
cast,
like
the
one
that
emerged
during
the
interwar
period.
Here,
we
argue
that
the
political
conditions
surrounding
the
contemporary
episode
augur
well
for
avoiding
many
of
regional-
ism’
s
more
pernicious
effects,
although
additional
research
on
this
topic
is
sorely
needed.
W
e
structure
our
analysis
around
four
central
questions.
First,
what
constitutes
a
region
and
how
should
regionalism
be
deŽ
ned?
Second,
why
has
the
pervasiveness
of
regional
trade
arrangements
waxed
and
waned
over
time?
Third,
why
do
countries
pursue
regional
trade
strategies,
instead
of
relying
solely
on
unilateral
or
multilateral
ones;
and
what
determines
their
choice
of
partners
in
regional
arrangements?
Fourth,
what
are
the
political
and
economic
consequences
of
commercial
regionalism?
Regionalism:
An
Elusive
Concept
Extensive
scholarly
interest
in
regionalism
has
yet
to
generate
a
widely
accepted
deŽ
nition
of
it.
Almost
Ž
fty
years
ago,
Jacob
V
iner
commented
that
‘
‘
economists
have
claimed
to
Ž
nd
use
in
the
concept
of
an
‘
economic
region,’
but
it
cannot
be
said
that
they
have
succeeded
in
Ž
nding
a
deŽ
nition
of
it
which
would
be
of
much
aid
.
.
.
in
deciding
whether
two
or
more
territories
were
in
the
same
economic
region.’
’
3
Since
then,
neither
economists
nor
political
scientists
have
made
much
headway
toward
settling
this
matter
.
4
Disputes
over
the
deŽ
nition
of
an
economic
region
and
regionalism
hinge
on
the
importance
of
geographic
proximity
and
on
the
relationship
between
economic
ows
and
policy
choices.
A
region
is
often
deŽ
ned
as
a
group
of
countries
located
in
the
same
geographically
speciŽ
ed
area.
Exactly
which
areas
constitute
regions,
however,
2.
Bhagwati
distinguishes
two
waves
of
regionalism
since
World
War
II.
The
Ž
rst
began
in
the
late
1950s
and
lasted
until
the
1970s;
the
second
began
in
the
mid-1980s.
These
waves
are
discussed
at
greater
length
later
in
this
art
The New Wave of Regionalism Edward D. MansŽeld and Helen V. Milner
Introduction
Economic regionalism appears to be growing rapidly. Why this has occurred and what bearing it will have
on
the
global
economy
are
issues
that
have
generated
considerable
interest
and
disagreement.
Some
observers
fear
that
regional
economic
institutions—
such
as
the
European
Union
(EU),
the
North
American
Free
Trade
Agree-
ment
(NAFT
A),
Mercosur,
and
the
organization
of
Asia-PaciŽ
c
Economic
Coopera-
tion
(APEC)—
will
erode
the
multilateral
system
that
has
guided
economic
relations
since
the
end
of
W
orld
W
ar
II,
promoting
protectionism
and
con
ict.
Others
argue
that
regional
institutions
will
foster
economic
openness
and
bolster
the
multilateral
system.
This
debate
has
stimulated
a
large
and
in
uential
body
of
research
by
econo-
mists
on
regionalism’
s
welfare
implications.
Economic
studies,
however,
generally
place
little
emphasis
on
the
political
condi-
tions
that
shape
regionalism.
Lately
,
many
scholars
have
acknowledged
the
draw-
backs
of
such
approaches
and
have
contributed
to
a
burgeoning
literature
that
sheds
new
light
on
how
political
factors
guide
the
formation
of
regional
institutions
and
their
economic
effects.
Our
purpose
is
to
evaluate
this
recent
literature.
Much
of
the
existing
research
on
regionalism
centers
on
international
trade
(al-
though
efforts
have
also
been
made
to
analyze
currency
markets,
capital
ows,
and
other
facets
of
international
economic
relations).
1
V
arious
recent
studies
indicate
that
whether
states
choose
to
enter
regional
trade
arrangements
and
the
economic
effects
of
these
arrangements
depend
on
the
preferences
of
national
policymakers
and
inter-
est
groups,
as
well
as
the
nature
and
strength
of
domestic
institutions.
Other
studies
focus
on
international
politics,
emphasizing
how
power
relations
and
multilateral
For
helpful
comments
on
earlier
drafts
of
this
article,
we
are
grateful
to
David
Baldwin,
Peter
Goure-
vitch,
Stephan
Haggard,
Peter
J.
Katzenstein,
David
A.
Lake,
Randall
L.
Schweller,
Beth
V
.
Y
arbrough,
and
three
anonymous
reviewers.
In
conducting
this
research,
MansŽ
eld
was
assisted
by
a
grant
from
the
Ohio
State
University
Office
of
Research
and
by
the
Hoover
Institution
at
Stanford
University
,
where
he
was
a
National
Fellow
during
1998–
99.
1.
On
this
issue,
see
Cohen
1997;
Lawrence
1996;
and
Padoan
1997.
International
Organization
53,
3,
Summer
1999,
pp.
589–
627
r
1999
by
The
IO
Foundation
and
the
Massachusetts
Institute
of
Technolog
As media is busy celebrating SAARC XVII event with all
their powers,ictures of smiling heads of the states-and all, somebody
has to address the basic issues for this particular summit's grand
failure. I guess, readers and particularly, Modi bhagats care less.
One thing at a time. Modi promises easier access to SAARC nations'
businessmen. What the hell that has to do with a weaker framework>
Let's leave Modi's so called leadership, his stature and his resolve
aside. All these are, mostly 'crowd-sourced, bogus and highly inflated
concepts. In real terms, he has not shown any such trends, unless I am
deaf, dumb and dead observer.
More to follow...
Both Modi and Sharif also briefly shook hands after the inaugural session of the summit as well as in the holding room adjacent to the Saarc summit hall. Both Modi and Sharif were in the same row at dinner and were chatting with each other, said a diplomat, adding that it was very personal and not substantive.
Both Modi and Sharif also briefly shook hands after the inaugural session of the summit as well as in the holding room adjacent to the Saarc summit hall. आंतर राष्ट्रीय कुस्तीच्या स्पर्धेत मोदीमल उफ़्फ़ मल्ल याला शरीफ मल्लाने चीतपट केले. दोन्ही खांदे व पाठ तांबड्या मातीत रगडली. पराभव झाला तरी मोदिमल्ल किंचाळतो माझेच नाक वर. सारा मुर्खाचा बाजार हरे राम! ...and I am Sid Harth
...and I am Sid Harth
