Saturday, February 18, 2012

US (Fucked-up) Foreign Policy and I

Foreign Policy and I

Everything you always wanted to know about foreign policy and more

US (Fucked-up) Foreign Policy and I

Posting as Sid Harth (Change)
  • Sid Harth
    My dear Anthony Martin, I am Sid Harth.
    Do you believe that bad arithmetic and bad scenario is going to make any difference in US foreign policy?
    If that were the case, conservative PACs would save their money, rather than backing one or other war mongering GOP presidential nominee.
    Changes, such as you demand from the administration (of Democratic party) president, Barack Obama are coming slowly and gradually. Draw down in Iraq, back channel talks with Taliban in Afghanistan and quiet on the Pakistan front clearly indicates a marginal shift in US foreign policy.
    Some steam blowing over Iran and Syria is normal. Chinese visitor, Xi Jinping’s recent visit proved one more point. Show and tell game. Rough talk for the local consumption and friendly back slapping for the Chinese audience. That is normal too.
    The suggestion to reduce the overseas military bases is not new and may be the future proposition. Congress may determine which way to cut military expenditure, not Obama. That way, he comes out smiling….and I am Sid Harth@arabuhuru.org.
  • David Wright· Top Commenter
    OUTSTANDING column, Anthony. Right on the mark. I’ll have to share this one several places.
  • Lois Berger Schiavone· Top Commenter
    We could always lure our US companies back to our homeland. We can always call in the markers of debt we have extended. We can call back the bribes, the aid, the blood money that we’ve tossed in the air to those who would take from us then turn to stab us in the back. Then we can send a bill to Barry for all his money laundering of taxpayer’s money into his campaign chest. For someone who doesn’t have a clue about economic policy or restoring a once flourishing economy, he sure can raise money to corrupt a government and ruin a nation.
  • Beth Thornton
    May I just ask, “Don’t the Decision Makers in this world make their billions on weapons which are purchased by every nation in conflict? Especially the USA? Doesn’t this preclude our isolationism long term?” The rich & powerful insist that we be at war continually. And the US Feds are more beholden to them than its poor and elderly population.
  • Karla Marie Robinett · Top Commenter · Sunnyside High School
    Anthony, I understand what you’re saying and agree to a point. But what happens to the elderly and disabled who depend on Social Security and Medicare to live? Churches won’t take care of them, they can’t afford to. The same with family members especially in this economy. We need an answer to these questions before we start chopping.
    • Anthony G. Martin· Top Commenter
      Karla, the problem is if we don’t make deep cuts, there won’t be any SS or Medicare money for anyone at all. We will be just like Greece and other European nations who refuse to deal with entitlements and are thus doomed to complete economic collapse. To prevent that from happening, 2 things must be done at once. First, immediately raise to eligibility age for SS and Medicare to a more realistic age. When SS first started one had to be 65. Most male workers only lived an average of 65 years. No wonder the system had no trouble then. So, pick a realistic age, such as 72–implement it for those under 55 presently, meaning that if you are over 55 you don’t have to worry about delaying retirement. Second, implement means testing. If you are making a comfortable pension and living in retirement, then maybe you don’t need to draw SS at all. The program should be saved only for those elderly who have no other means to make it.
      Reply · 1 · Like · 3 hours ago
    • Karla Marie Robinett · Top Commenter · Sunnyside High School
      Anthony G. Martin ” The program should be saved only for those elderly who have no other means to make it.” Those are the folks I was concerned about. Your proposals make a lot of sense. The only problem is the people who pay into the system will balk if they get nothing from it. I guess we’ll cross that bridge when we come to it.
      Reply · Like · 3 hours ago
    • Anthony G. Martin· Top Commenter
      Well, it’s like this–we either make the changes and the program can be saved, or we refuse and the whole thing crumbles–no money for anybody at all. I am all for looking at privatizing SS so that all who pay in can get money out at retirement, but the Left loathes such an idea.
      Reply · Like · 3 hours ago

United States non-interventionism

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United States
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Non-interventionism, the diplomatic policy whereby a nation seeks to avoid alliances with other nations in order to avoid being drawn into wars not related to direct territorial self-defense, has had a long history in the United States. It is a form of “realism”.
Non-interventionism on the part of the United States over the course of its foreign policy, is more of a want to aggressively protect the United States’ interests than a want to shun the rest of the world.
Non-intervention, sometimes referred to as military non-interventionism, seems to some to be the antithesis of isolationism.[1] Maintaining the participation of the United States in global economic affairs is thought to likely boost trade and expand US diplomacy, in the view of Edward A. Olsen.[1]

Contents

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[edit] Early background

Thomas Paine is generally credited with instilling the first non-interventionist ideas into the American body politic; his work Common Sense contains many arguments in favor of avoiding alliances. These ideas introduced by Paine took such a firm foothold that the Second Continental Congress struggled against forming an alliance with France and only agreed to do so when it was apparent that the American Revolutionary War could be won in no other manner.
George Washington‘s farewell address is often cited as laying the foundation for a tradition of American non-interventionism:
The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

[edit] No entangling alliances (19th century)

President Thomas Jefferson extended Washington’s ideas in his March 4, 1801 inaugural address: “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.” Jefferson’s phrase “entangling alliances” is, incidentally, sometimes incorrectly attributed to Washington.[2]
In 1823, President James Monroe articulated what would come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine, which some have interpreted as non-interventionist in intent: “In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken part, nor does it comport with our policy, so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced that we resent injuries, or make preparations for our defense.”
After Tsar Alexander II put down the 1863 January Uprising in Poland, French Emperor Napoleon III asked the United States to “join in a protest to the Tsar.”[3] Secretary of State William H. Seward declined, “defending ‘our policy of non-intervention — straight, absolute, and peculiar as it may seem to other nations,’” and insisted that “[t]he American people must be content to recommend the cause of human progress by the wisdom with which they should exercise the powers of self-government, forbearing at all times, and in every way, from foreign alliances, intervention, and interference.”[3]
The United States’ policy of non-intervention was maintained throughout most of the 19th century. The first significant foreign intervention by the US was the Spanish-American War, which saw the US occupy and control the Philippines.
Wake Up, America! Civilization Calls, poster by James Montgomery Flagg, 1917

[edit] 20th century non-intervention

Theodore Roosevelt‘s administration is credited with inciting the Panamanian Revolt against Colombia in order to secure construction rights for the Panama Canal (begun in 1904).
United States President Woodrow Wilson, after winning reelection with the slogan “He kept us out of war,” promptly intervened in World War I. Yet non-interventionist sentiment remained; the U.S. Congress refused to endorse the Treaty of Versailles or the League of Nations.
Protest march to prevent American involvement in World War II before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

[edit] Non-Interventionism between the World Wars

In the wake of the First World War, the non-interventionist tendencies of US foreign policy were in full force. First, the United States Congress rejected president Woodrow Wilson’s most cherished condition of the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations. Many Americans felt that they did not need the rest of the world, and that they were fine making decisions concerning peace on their own.[4] Even though ‘anti-League’ was the policy of the nation, private citizens and lower diplomats either supported or observed the League.[5] This quasi-isolationism shows that the US was interested in foreign affairs, but was afraid that by pledging full support for the League, the United States would lose the ability to act on foreign policy as it pleased.
Although the United States was unwilling to commit to the League of Nations, they were willing to engage in foreign affairs on their own terms. In August 1928, fifteen nations signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, brainchild of American Secretary of State Frank Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand.[6] This pact that was said to have outlawed war and showed the United States commitment to international peace had its semantic flaws.[7] For example, it did not hold the United States to the conditions of any existing treaties, it still allowed European nations the right to self-defense, and it stated that if one nation broke the Pact, it would be up to the other signatories to enforce it.[8] The Kellogg-Briand Pact was more of a sign of good intentions on the part of the US, rather than a legitimate step towards the sustenance of world peace.
Non-interventionism took a new turn after the Crash of 1929. With the economic hysteria, the US began to focus solely on fixing its economy within its borders and ignored the outside world. As the world’s democratic powers were busy fixing their economies within their borders, the fascist powers of Europe and Asia silently moved their armies into a position to start World War II. With military victory came the spoils of war – a very draconian pummeling of Germany into submission, via the Treaty of Versailles. This near-total humiliation of Germany in the wake of World War I – as the treaty placed sole blame for the war on the nation – laid the groundwork for a pride-hungry German people to embrace Adolf Hitler’s rise to power.

[edit] Non-interventionism shortly before WWII

As Europe moved closer and closer to war in the late 1930s, the United States Congress was doing everything it could to prevent it. Between 1936 and 1937, much to the dismay of the pro-Britain President Roosevelt, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts. These Acts did everything they could to delay U.S. entry into a European war. These Acts were not aimed at keeping America out of a modern world war, but the previous one.[9] For example, in the final Neutrality Act, Americans could not sail on ships flying the flag of a belligerent nation or trade arms with warring nations, potential causes for U.S. entry into war.
On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland; Britain and France subsequently declared war on Germany, marking the start of World War II. In an address to the American People two days later, President Roosevelt assured the nation that he would do all he could to keep them out of war.[10] However, his words showed his true goals. “When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger,” Roosevelt said.[11] Even though he was intent on neutrality as the official policy of the United States, he still echoed the dangers of staying out of this war. He also cautioned the American people to not let their wish to avoid war at all costs supersede the security of the nation.[12]
The war in Europe split the American people into two distinct groups: non-interventionists and interventionists. The two sides argued over America’s involvement in this Second World War. The basic principle of the interventionist argument was fear of German invasion. By the summer of 1940, France had fallen to the Germans, and Britain was the only democratic stronghold between Germany and the United States.[13] Interventionists feared that if Britain fell, their security as a nation would shrink immediately.[14] They were also afraid of a world after this war, a world where they would have to coexist with the fascist power of Europe. In a 1940 speech, Roosevelt argued, “Some, indeed, still hold to the now somewhat obvious delusion that we … can safely permit the United States to become a lone island … in a world dominated by the philosophy of force.”[15] A national survey found that in the summer of 1940 67% of Americans believed that a German-Italian victory would endanger the United States, that if such an event occurred 88% supported “arm[ing] to the teeth at any expense to be prepared for any trouble”, and that 71% favored “the immediate adoption of compulsory military training for all young men”.[16]
Ultimately, the ideological rift between the ideals of the United States and the goals of the fascist powers is what made the core of the interventionist argument. “How could we sit back as spectators of a war against ourselves?”[17] writer Archibald MacLeish questioned. The reason why interventionists said we could not coexist with the fascist powers was not due to economic pressures or deficiencies in our armed forces but rather because it was the goal of fascist leaders to destroy the American ideology of democracy. In an address to the American people on December 29, 1940, President Roosevelt said, “…the Axis not merely admits but proclaims that there can be no ultimate peace between their philosophy of government and our philosophy of government.”[18]
However, there were still many who held on to the age-old tenets of non-interventionism. Although a minority, they were well organized, and had a powerful presence in Congress.[19] Non-interventionists rooted a significant portion of their arguments in historical precedent, citing events such as Washington’s farewell address and the failure of World War I.[20] “If we have strong defenses and understand and believe in what we are defending, we need fear nobody in this world,” Robert Hutschins, President of the University of Chicago, wrote in a 1940 essay.[21] Isolationists believed that our safety as a nation was more important than any foreign war.[22] The interesting thing is that the arguments the non-interventionists used in 1940 echoed the themes of Washington and Jefferson. Charles Lindbergh’s words in a 1940 speech, “…those of us who believe in an independent American destiny must … organize for strength,”[23] are not that different from Washington’s pleas for international isolation.
As 1940 became 1941, the actions of the Roosevelt administration made it more and more clear that the United States was on a course to war. This policy shift, driven by the President, came in two phases. The first came in 1939 with the passage of the Fourth Neutrality Act, which permitted the United States to trade arms with belligerent nations, as long as these nations came to America to retrieve the arms, and pay for them in cash.[19] This policy was quickly dubbed, ‘Cash and Carry.’[24] The second phase was the Lend-Lease Act of early 1941. This act allowed the President, “…to lend, lease, sell, or barter arms, ammunition, food, or any ‘defense article’ or any ‘defense information’ to ‘the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.’”[25] He used these two programs to side economically with the British and the French in their fight against the Nazis. In doing so, he made the American economy dependent upon an allied victory.

[edit] Overt military intervention since 1945

Both Republican and Democratic presidents since the 1950s have often been tasked with considering the use of military intervention as a tactic of foreign policy, including the following major examples: (with some policies continued by subsequent presidents)[26]

[edit] Covert intervention

See Covert United States foreign regime change actions
The US has intervened in the affairs of other countries through a number of secret operations. The U.S. government has conducted a number of covert operations in an effort to topple foreign governments, including both democratically-elected governments[27][28][29] and authoritarian regimes.[30][31]

[edit] Conservative policies

Rathbun (2008) compares three separate themes in conservative policies since the 1980s: conservatism, neoconservatism, and isolationism. These approaches are similar in that they all invoked the mantle of ‘realism’ and pursued foreign policy goals designed to promote national interests. Conservatives, however, were the only group that was “realist” in the academic sense in that they defined the national interest narrowly, strove for balances of power internationally, viewed international relations as amoral, and especially valued sovereignty. By contrast, neoconservatives based their foreign policy on nationalism, and isolationists sought to minimize any involvement in foreign affairs and raise new barriers to immigration.[32]

[edit] See also

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ a b >US national defense for the twenty-first century: the grand exit strategy By Edward A. Olsen p 181 line 10, 179 paragraph 2
  2. ^ http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres16.html
  3. ^ a b Raico, Ralph. America’s Will to War: The Turning Point, Mises Institute
  4. ^ Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York: The Free Press, 1957), 201
  5. ^ Ibid, 204 & 209
  6. ^ Ibid, 213
  7. ^ Ibid, 21.
  8. ^ Ibid, 214 & 215
  9. ^ Adler, Isolationist Impulse, 240.
  10. ^ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Fireside Chats,” Chat from 3 Sept. 1939, accessed via ‘The American Presidency Project’ online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php .
  11. ^ Ibid
  12. ^ Ibid
  13. ^ Adler, Isolationist Impulse, 259.
  14. ^ The Annals of America, vol. 16, (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 1968),6, N.B. The Annals of America is a multivolume collection of primary sources grouped by year.
  15. ^ Ibid, 8.
  16. ^ “What the U. S. A. Thinks”. Life: pp. 20. 1940-07-29. Retrieved November 10, 2011.
  17. ^ Ibid, 4
  18. ^ Roosevelt, Chat from 29 Dec. 1940.
  19. ^ a b Adler, Isolationist Impulse, 257.
  20. ^ Ibid, 284.
  21. ^ Annals of America, 71.
  22. ^ Ibid, 75
  23. ^ Ibid
  24. ^ Ibid, 257.
  25. ^ Ibid, 282.
  26. ^ Details and the debates see Julian Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security – From World War II to the War on Terrorism (2009); George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (2008)
  27. ^ “Special Report: Secret History of the CIA in Iran”. New York Times. 2000.
  28. ^ Vanity Fair April 2008, “The Gaza Bombshell”
  29. ^ Mark Perry; Alastair Crooke (2007-01-09). “No-goodniks and the Palestinian shootout”. Asia Times Online. Retrieved 2008-11-21.
  30. ^ Aburish, Said K. “Saddam Hussein, The Politics of Revenge”. PBS Frontline.
  31. ^ http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saddam/interviews/critchfield.html
  32. ^ Brian C. Rathbun, “Does One Right Make a Realist? Conservatism, Neoconservatism, and Isolationism in the Foreign Policy Ideology of American Elites,” Political Science Quarterly 2008 123(2): 271-299

[edit] References

 Constructs such as ibid., loc. cit. and idem are discouraged by Wikipedia’s style guide for footnotes, as they are easily broken. Please improve this article by replacing them with named references (quick guide), or an abbreviated title. (June 2010)
  • Adler, Selig. The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction. New York: The Free Press, 1957.
  • The Annals of America. vol. 16. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 1968.
  • Doenecke, Justus D. “American Isolationism, 1939-1941″ Journal of Libertarian Studies, Summer/Fall 1982, 6(3), pp. 201–216.
  • Doenecke, Justus D. “Explaining the Antiwar Movement, 1939-1941: The Next Assignment” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Winter 1986, 8(1), pp. 139–162.
  • Doenecke, Justus D. “Literature of Isolationism, 1972-1983: A Bibliographic Guide” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Spring 1983, 7(1), pp. 157–184.
  • Doenecke, Justus D. “Anti-Interventionism of Herbert Hoover” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Summer 1987, 8(2), pp. 311–340.
  • Gaddis, John Lewis. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004.
  • Nichols, Christopher McKnight. “Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age”. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011.
  • Roosevelt, Franklin D. “Fireside Chats.” 3 Sep. 1939, 29 Dec. 1940, 9 Dec. 1941.
  • Weinberg, Albert K. Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1935.
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End to Isolationism and Entry into War

End to Isolationism and Entry into War
After winning reelection, FDR felt confident in stepping up American aid to the Allies. He pushed for passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941, which allowed the president to lend or lease supplies to any nation deemed “vital to the defense of the United States,” such as Britain. FDR extended lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union after Germany invaded in November 1941. The U.S. also helped the Allies by tracking German submarines and warning the British of their location, and by convoying British ships carrying lend-lease supplies—that is, surrounding British ships with U.S. Navy vessels ordered to attack any menacing vessel.
In August 1941, FDR met with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on a British ship off Newfoundland. The two discussed military strategy and issued the Atlantic Charter, which outlined their ideal postwar world: among other provisions, it called for disarmament and freedom of the seas. In response to a German attack against a U.S. destroyer, Roosevelt issued the shoot-on-sight order in September 1941, which authorized American naval patrols to fire on all Axis ships found between the U.S. and Iceland. After American destroyers were twice attacked in October, Congress authorized the arming of merchant ships.
The final provocation for American entry into the war came from Japan, which had joined the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis in September 1940 by signing the Tripartite Pact. Japan’s desires to build an East Asian empire had alarmed the U.S. since Japan’s invasion of China in 1931. In September 1940, Japanese forces continued their invasion into French Indochina. The U.S. responded to this invasion as it had to other invasions in the past: it added items to a lengthy list of embargoed Japanese goods, and eventually froze all trade with Japan. In 1941, U.S. intelligence became aware of plans for a Japanese attack and sent out warnings to commanders of U.S. bases in the Pacific, but most American officials did not believe that the threat was immediate. These officials were proved wrong on December 7, 1941, when, in an attempt to destroy American sea power in the Pacific, Japanese planes bombed the U.S. base at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese destroyed nearly 200 aircraft, eight battleships, three cruisers, and three destroyers. Almost 2,400 Americans died. On December 8, the Senate voted unanimously in favor of FDR’s request for a declaration of war on Japan. The House passed the declaration over only one dissenting vote. On December 11, Germany and Italy joined Japan in war against the U.S.
The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the U.S. declared war against Japan on December 8. On December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the U.S., completing the entry of the U.S. into World War II.
On January 1, 1942, representatives of 26 nations signed the Declaration of the United Nations, pledging support for the Atlantic Charter and vowing not to make separate peace agreements with the Axis powers.
The War at Home
Although the U.S. had begun preparing for war during the summer of 1940, war production comprised only 15 percent of the nation’s industrial output in 1941, and U.S. armed forces were seriously understaffed and undersupplied. During the next four years, war production on the home front churned into high gear.
Expanding the Military
In 1942, FDR created the Joint Chiefs of Staff to oversee America’s rapidly expanding military. By the end of the war, more than 15 million men had served in the U.S. armed forces. About 350,000 women served as well, most in the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) and Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service in the navy (WAVES). The air force, a minor corps at the outset of the war, grew substantially and gained a measure of autonomy during the war. The Joint Chiefs also established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to assess the enemy’s assets and liabilities, conduct espionage, and gather information to be used in strategic planning.
Boosting Production
The U.S. mobilized industry to assist in the war effort. The War Production Board, created in 1942, oversaw the production of thousands of planes, tanks, and artillery pieces required for the war. The War Production Board allocated scarce resources and offered incentives for civilian firms to produce military goods. The last civilian car was produced in the U.S. in 1942, after which plants were redesigned to produce tanks, planes, weapons, and munitions. By the end of the war, the U.S. had built about 300,000 aircraft, 85,000 tanks, 375,000 artillery pieces, 2.5 million machine guns, and 90,000 sea ships—more war material than the four Axis powers, combined, had produced. This feat was accomplished through substantial investment of capital and the development of new, highly efficient manufacturing techniques.
During World War II, American industry shifted from producing civilian goods to military goods under the supervision of the War Production Board. Due to this shift in production, heavy investment, and new, efficient techniques, the U.S. produced more war material than all of the Axis powers combined.
War Economy
The federal budget multiplied tenfold between 1940 and 1945. U.S. expenditures during World War II totaled nearly twice the amount spent by the U.S. government in its previous 150 years of existence. Spending on war production precipitated a shift in American income distribution, with the share of national income allocated to the richest Americans decreasing and that allocated to the middle class doubling. The Revenue Act of 1942, passed to help pay for the war, increased taxes for the wealthiest Americans.
War spending, accompanied by the draft, ended the high rate of unemployment which had not rebounded from from the Great Depression. Organized labor grew strong and wealthy during World War II, with union membership growing by about 60 percent. Although most unions abided by a no-strike policy, unions secured new benefits (such as fewer hours and better health plans) for their members, partially as a concession from the National War Labor Board, which limited wage increases to avoid inflation. Union power suffered a setback when a series of coal miners’ strikes provoked Congress to pass the Smith-Connolly War Labor Disputes Act in June 1943, which limited the right to strike in key industries and allowed the president to take control of any firm beset by strikes.
The Office of Price Administration waged a battle against inflation and the over-use of resources. The OPA oversaw a rationing program designed to curb new purchases and conserve materials, in particular gas, sugar, coffee, butter, and meat. The American people largely complied with these efforts by forsaking many goods—for example, implementing “meatless Tuesdays”—and by planting “victory gardens” and conducting collection drives to gather materials for recycling. Another tactic aimed at financing the war was the sale of war bonds.
The Office of Price Administration oversaw a rationing program with which most Americans cooperated, giving up many goods and otherwise doing their part to support the war effort.
Controlling Information and Advertising the War
FDR relied on the Office of Censorship and the Office of War Information to regulate the communications of American citizens. The former, created shortly after the U.S. entry into the war, examined all letters sent overseas and worked with media firms to control information broadcast to the people. The latter, formed in June 1942, employed artists, writers, and advertisers to shape public opinion by explaining the reasons for U.S. entry in the war and by portraying the enemy as barbaric and cruel.
War advertising encouraged women to actively participate in the war effort. During World War II, even more so than in World War I, women entered the workforce to fill the vacancies left by men at war and aid in the production of war materials. The image of Rosie the Riveter, a muscle-bound woman with a rivet gun, was pervasive and effective. Increasing numbers of women entered the workforce to perform all sorts of jobs. The roles women played in the armed forces helped create new respect for the working woman. Women, however, were paid far less than working men, and traditional notions of gender roles prevailed throughout the war.
During World War II, women were encouraged to enter the workforce, and women aiding in the war effort were glorified. Although traditional notions about gender roles remained intact, female participation in the war was an important step toward greater respect for women in the U.S.
Japanese Internment
During World War II, the U.S. government rounded up more than 110,000 Japanese immigrants and U.S.-born Japanese-Americans and sent them to relocation centers guarded by military police. Military leaders, West Coast farmers, and others rationalized this policy as necessary to prevent acts of sabotage and espionage in support of Japan. In 1942, FDR authorized this relocation in Executive Order 9066, and in 1944 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the order in Korematsu v. U.S. In 1988, Congress voted to pay reparations of $20,000 to every internee still living.
Reelection and Succession
FDR ran for reelection once again in 1944, in the midst of World War II, with moderate Democrat Harry S. Truman as his running mate. FDR won an unprecedented fourth term, though by his narrowest margin ever. Shortly after Roosevelt’s fourth term began, he died of a cerebral hemorrhage in April 1945, leaving Truman to oversee the war effort.
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Home › Books & Reviews › Review Essays › The Myth of American Isolationism — Reinterpreting the Past

The Myth of American Isolationism — Reinterpreting the Past

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Knopf
1995
We have here a popular history of American foreign policy from the end of the nineteenth century almost up to the present. It centers around the great political and military leaders born in the decade 1880-90, in particular Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, George C. Marshall, and Douglas MacArthur. But this theme gets lost in the author’s inability to resist putting into the book everything he finds intriguing. He hops about from scene to scene and personality to personality like a historical Walter Winchell. We are told that Major Eisenhower often played golf with Major George Patton; that William G. Bullitt’s wife began drinking at breakfast; that at Ambassador Bullitt’s first meeting with Stalin the dictator gave him a hearty kiss, which Bullitt returned; that Marshall always refused to laugh at F.D.R.’s jokes, and suffered accordingly; and that John Foster Dulles had a sister who was “an enthusiastic Hitlerite.”
This is gossip-column history, with a stress on the colorful detail. No harm in that, perhaps. There are thousands of dull books on America’s involvement in foreign affairs during the twentieth century, and David Fromkin’s anecdotal approach may not come amiss.
My quarrel with this book concerns the assumptions on which it is based. Because American historians, and indeed Americans generally, widely share these assumptions, they are worth debating.
Toward the end of his book, Fromkin states: “Ever since 1898 [the beginning of the Spanish-American War], the fundamental question about American foreign relations had been whether the United States would choose to play a continuing role in world affairs.” The notion that the United States has a real choice in such a momentous decision is related to the beliefs that the United States is naturally isolationist and that, until the Second World War, isolationism was the norm in U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, as a result of the humiliations and frustrations of American involvement in Somalia, there have recently been suggestions in the media that the United States is about to return to isolationism.
THE ISOLATIONIST IMPULSE
I want to suggest a different point of view, which, oddly enough, Fromkin’s narrative confirms at various points. First, there is nothing unique, as many Americans seem to suppose, in the desire of a society with a strong cultural identity to minimize its foreign contacts. On the contrary, isolationism in this sense has been the norm whenever geography has made it feasible. A characteristic example is ancient Egypt, which, protected by deserts, tried to pursue an isolationist policy for 3,000 years with unparalleled success. In their ideograms and hieroglyphs, the Egyptians made an absolute distinction between themselves and others. To find a more modern example of a hermit state we need look no farther than Japan, which used its surrounding seas to pursue a policy of total isolation, again reflected in its ideograms. China, too, was isolationist for thousands of years, albeit an empire at the same time. Britain has been habitually isolationist even during the centuries when it was acquiring a quarter of the world. The British always regarded the English Channel as a cordon sanitaire to protect them from what they regarded as the continental disease of war. So, too, the Spanish were misled by the Pyrenees and the Russians by the great plains, into believing isolationism feasible, as well as desirable.
The United States, however, has always been an internationalist country. Given the sheer size of the Atlantic, with its temptation to hermitry, the early rulers of the United States were remarkably international-minded. The original 13 colonies had, as a rule, closer links with Europe than with each other, focusing on London and Paris rather than Boston and Philadelphia. Benjamin Franklin has perhaps a better claim to be called a cosmopolitan than any other eighteenth-century figure. He was no slouch as a diplomat; indeed, he believed strongly in negotiations and mutually advantageous treaties between nations. Had the British War Office allowed him, George Washington might easily have been a professional soldier in George III’s imperial army, pursuing a career in Europe or perhaps even India. America’s ruling elite was always far more open toward, interested in, and knowledgeable about the world (especially Europe) than the French Canadians to the north and the Spanish- and Portuguese-Americans to the south. At Ghent in 1814, the U.S. team that negotiated the end of the War of 1812 — John Quincy Adams, Albert Gallatin, Jonathan Russell, James Asheton Bayard, even Henry Clay — was every bit as globally conscious and well informed as its English counterpart.
The truth is that, despite the oceans on both sides, the United States was involved with Russia (because of Oregon and Alaska), China (because of trade), Spain, Britain, and other European powers from its earliest days. Isolationism in a strict sense was never an option, and there is no evidence that the American masses, let alone the elites, favored it, especially as immigration widened and deepened ties with Europe. It is true that the United States, through most of the nineteenth century, was concerned with expanding its presence in the Americas rather than with global politics. But exponents of “America First,” like John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and John L. O’Sullivan–who coined the phrase “Manifest Destiny” in the 1840s–were imperialists rather than isolationists. The only time imperialism was an issue in an American election was in 1900, when the Democrats used it to attack what they saw as President William McKinley’s expansionist policies. The voters’ approval of American imperialism, if that is what it was, was reflected in McKinley’s massive victory, by 292 to 155 electoral votes.
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Foreign policy: is non-intervention the same as ‘isolationism?’

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Conservative Examiner
Increasingly the central foreign policy issue facing the United States in an era of deadly national debt is the need to shift to a tactic of non-intervention within other nations around the world.
With a current debt load at over 15 trillion and steadily rising, it is becoming all too clear that the nation cannot afford to continue on its present path of providing a military safety shield to dozens of foreign nations.
Critics argue that the debt is nothing about which to worry, that it could be wiped out in a second by simply refusing to repay it. This is, indeed, an option, though not a preferable one. But even if such a blatant refusal to repay debt were implemented, the nation still would not have addressed the single largest expenditure driving the real debt–unfunded liabilities represented by Social Security and Medicare.
When unfunded liabilities are added to the 15 trillion base debt load, the U.S. faces a real debt of over 117 trillion dollars. Even if the 15 trillion in base debt were removed in an instant, the country would still be liable for the 102 trillion it owes its citizens in Social Security and Medicare payments, which it currently pays on borrowed funds.
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The U.S. debt load is now over 100% of its gross domestic product (GDP). And if the real debt figure is used, the nation’s liability is now at roughly 750% of the GDP.
This means that American debt is 7.5 times the market value of all final goods and services produced in the United States.
No nation on earth has ever survived even a fraction of such a debt load, much less one that equals 7.5 times the value of everything we produce.
Erasing the 15 trillion will not even make a dent in the real national debt, which will still stand at 102 trillion–nearly 7 times the value of all American goods and services combined.
And this brings us back to the original point about the debt. The U.S. can no longer afford to do business as usual, which means that programs that were previously viewed as sacred cows must be placed on the chopping block. One of those sacred cows is the current foreign policy of interventionism, foreign aid, and a military presence in practically every area on earth.
By closing half of the 900 U.S. military bases around the world, dropping foreign aid to zero, and switching to a strategy of non-interventionism, the nation could begin to make serious inroads into reducing the debt–all without a reduction in nuclear weapons systems, equipment, or non-civilian personnel.
Again, critics say that such as course is ‘isolationism,’ which historically always leads to war. But isolationism is devoid of all meaningful contact with other nations, especially our enemies. The goal is not isolation. If the U.S. returns to the view of the Framers that trade negotiations with anyone on earth who wishes to do business with us is a good thing, then the ‘isolationism’ claimed by critics is immediately negated.
And if the U.S. is willing to sit down at the negotiation table with our enemies, just as we have done with the old Soviet Union, Communist China, and others, then we will continue to influence decisions made by other nations in an atmosphere of non-violence. And we will also do ourselves a favor by showing utmost respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations, such as Israel’s ultimate right to defend itself from those around it who wish to wipe it from the face of the earth.
Such a stance will also prevent from happening the current debacle instigated by Obama Administration meddling in Islamic nations in the Middle East, which has served to do nothing more than create instability by replacing dictators with bad leaders who are part of Islamist extremism. A much more prudent course is a proactive diplomatic strategy that wishes to preserve stability in the region without military intervention but that also seeks to address U.S. concerns about human rights.
Thus, non-interventionism is not the same as isolationism. Participatory non-interventionist strategies require infinitely more diplomacy and proactive involvement than an isolationist society.
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The Munich Security Conference on Foreign Affairs, Feb. 5, 2012.
The Munich Security Conference on Foreign Affairs, Feb. 5, 2012.
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The Road to Pearl Harbor

50a. 1930s Isolationism

U.S. Marines in the Caribbean, 1913
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor Policy” was instituted to foster good relations from other countries within the same hemisphere. As a result, Marines stationed in the Caribbean — like those seen here — were withdrawn.
“Leave me alone,” seemed to be America’s attitude toward the rest of the world in the 1930s.
At the dawn of the ’30s, foreign policy was not a burning issue for the average American. The stock market had just crashed and each passing month brought greater and greater hardships. American involvement with Europe had brought war in 1917 and unpaid debt throughout the 1920s. Having grown weary with the course of world events, citizens were convinced the most important issues to be tackled were domestic. Foreign policy leaders of the 1930s once again led the country down its well-traveled path of isolationism.
The Hoover Administration set the tone for an isolationist foreign policy with the Hawley-Smoot Tariff. Trade often dominated international relations and the protective wall of the tariff left little to discuss. The Far East became an area of concern when the Japanese government ordered an attack on Chinese Manchuria. This invasion was a clear violation of the Nine Power Treaty, which prohibited nations from carving a special sphere of influence in China.
East Asia, 1903
Political boundaries in East Asia, seen here at the turn of the century, were increasingly challenged in the years leading up to World War II.
The Hoover Administration knew that any harsh action against Japan would be unpopular in the midst of the Great Depression. The official American response was the Stimson Doctrine, which refused to recognize any territory illegally occupied by Japan. As meek as this may sound, it went further toward condemning Japan than the government of Great Britain was willing to do.
One possibility for international economic cooperation failed at the London Conference of 1933. Leaders of European nations hoped to increase trade and stabilize international currencies. Roosevelt sent a “bombshell message” to the conference refusing any attempt to tie the American dollar to a gold standard. The conference dissolved with European delegates miffed at the lack of cooperation by the United States.
Roosevelt did realize that the Hawley-Smoot Tariff was forestalling American economic recovery. Toward this end, Congress did act to make United States trade policy more flexible. Under the Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934, Congress authorized the President to negotiate tariff rates with individual nations. Should a nation agree to reduce its barriers to trade with the United States, the President could reciprocate without the consent of Congress. In addition, FDR broke a 16-year-old diplomatic freeze with the Soviet Union by extending formal recognition. Roosevelt hoped to settle some nettlesome outstanding issues with the Soviets, and at the same time stimulate bilateral trade.
Japanese tank in Shanghai, 1932
The Japanese attack on Chinese Manchuria was in direct violation of the Nine Powers Treaty, which had been passed to prevent nations from establishing a special sphere of influence in China. Here a Japanese tank rolls through Shanghai, China.
Isolationists did not however designate the Western Hemisphere as a dangerous region. On the contrary, as tensions grew in Europe and Asia, a strong sense of Pan-Americanism swept the diplomatic circles. In the face of overseas adversity, strong hemispheric solidarity was attractive. To foster better relations with the nations to the south, Roosevelt declared a bold new Good Neighbor Policy. Marines stationed in Central America and the Caribbean were withdrawn. The (Theodore) Roosevelt Corollary, which proclaimed the right of the United States to intervene in Latin American affairs was renounced.
The United States would soon been intervening in something much bigger.
On the Web
Diplomacy of Isolationism
This U.S. Department of State webpage features background on the Five Powers Treaty, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and a summary of the Stimson Doctrine — the United States’ policy of isolation in response to Japanese aggression in Chinese Manchuria. There’s also a bit on the Japanese reaction to the Doctrine — they simply ignored it.Report broken link
Franklin Roosevelt: Foreign Affairs
From his early isolationist policies to the final days of World War II, FDR’s foreign policy is dissected at the American President website. Includes a few photos of FDR and links to Churchill, Marshall, and some of the other big names of 1930s and ’40s foreign policy.Report broken link
Cordell Hull Biography
Cordell Hull went from learning in a one-room school in Tennessee to steering U.S. foreign policy for 12 years as FDR’s Secretary of State. The Nobel Foundation presents this biography of Hull, winner of the 1945 Nobel Peace Prize and the man who helped lay the foundations of the Good Neighbor Policy.Report broken link
The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine
By stating that the United States was justified in using police power to end wrongdoing in the Western Hemisphere, Theodore Roosevelt rejected the Monroe Doctrine’s policy of non-intervention in Latin American affairs. Nearly 3 decades later, another Roosevelt — Franklin — would go against this corollary in favor of a Good Neighbor Policy. Read Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 address to Congress explaining the need for U.S. involvement in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere.Report broken link
The Isolationist Myth
Presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan claims that tariff protectionists Smoot and Hawley have unfairly been blamed for everything from starting the Depression to being responsible for WWII. In this essay from 1994, Buchanan argues that some ecomomic protectionism is good for America and that Smoot and Hawley’s protectionist tariff had nothing to do with starting WWII.Report broken link
Among the forces sent to aid China in its struggle against Japan was a squadron of “Flying Tigers” and a fellow who went by the name of “Vinegar Joe.”
Learn More…Report broken link
Senator Key Pittman was a key player in 1930s U.S. foreign policy. But the circumstances surrounding his death are chilling! It’s rumored that he died before his election and that his supporters kept his body in a bathtub filled with ice to hide the fact. All to keep his Senate seat under Democratic control.
Learn More…Report broken link
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HISTORY

Isolationism

World Affairs

Isolationism refers to America’s longstanding reluctance to become involved in European alliances and wars. Isolationists held the view that America’s perspective on the world was different from that of European societies and that America could advance the cause of freedom and democracy by means other than war.
American isolationism did not mean disengagement from the world stage. Isolationists were not averse to the idea that the United States should be a world player and even further its territorial, ideological and economic interests, particularly in the Western Hemisphere.
The colonial period
Pilgrims landing at Plymouth
The isolationist perspective dates to colonial days. The colonies were populated by many people who had fled from Europe, where there was religious persecution, economic privation and war. Their new homeland was looked upon as a place to make things better than the old ways. The sheer distance and rigors of the voyage from Europe tended to accentuate the remoteness of the New World from the Old. The roots of isolationism were well established years before independence, notwithstanding the alliance with France during the War for Independence.
Thomas Paine crystallized isolationist notions in his work Common Sense, which presents numerous arguments for shunning alliances. Paine’s tract exerted so much political influence that the Continental Congress strove against striking an alliance with France and acquiesced only when it appeared probable that the war for independence could not be won without one.
George Washington in his Farewell Address placed the accent on isolationism in a manner that would be long remembered:
“The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.”
Washington was promulgating a perspective that was already venerable and accepted by many. The United States terminated its alliance with France, after which America’s third president, Thomas Jefferson, admonished in his inaugural address, “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”
The 19th century
The United States remained politically isolated all through the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, an unusual feat in western history. Historians have attributed the fact to a geographical position at once separate and far removed from Europe.
During the 1800s, the United States spanned North America and commenced to piece together an empire in the Caribbean and the Pacific — without departing from the traditional perspective. It fought the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Spanish-American War without joining alliances or fighting in Europe.
The isolationist point of view was still viable in 1823 when President James Monroe gave voice to what would later be termed the Monroe Doctrine, “In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken part, nor does it comport with our policy, so to do.”
Nevertheless, pressures were mounting abroad that would undercut and demolish that policy near the mid-20th century. The advent of German and Japanese expansionism would threaten and later nearly snuff out the contented aloofness enjoyed by the United States. The United States’ occupation of the Philippines during the Spanish-American War thrust U.S. interests into the far western Pacific Ocean — Imperial Japan’s sphere of interest. Such improved transportation and communication as steamships, undersea cable, and radio linked the two continents. The growth of shipping and foreign trade slowly enhanced America’s world role.
There also were basic changes at home. The historic ascendancy of urban-based business, industry, and finance, and the sidelining of rural and small-town America — the bastion of isolationism — contributed to its eventual demise.
World War I
Germany’s unfettered submarine warfare against American ships during World War I provoked the U.S. into abandoning the neutrality it had upheld for so many years. The country’s resultant participation in World War I against the Central Powers marked its first major departure from isolationist policy. When the war ended, however, the United States was quick to leave behind its European commitment. Regardless of President Woodrow Wilson‘s efforts, the Senate repudiated the Treaty of Versailles that ended the war, and the United States failed to become a member of the League of Nations.
German sub sinks US ship Indeed, isolationism would persist for a few more decades. During the 1920s, American foreign affairs took a back seat. In addition, America tended to insulate itself in terms of trade. Tariffs were imposed on foreign goods to shield U.S. manufacturers.
America turned its back on Europe by restricting the number of immigrants permitted into the country. Until World War I, millions of people, mostly from Europe, had come to America to seek their fortune and perhaps flee poverty and persecution. Britons and Irishmen, Germans and Jews constituted the biggest groups. In 1921 the relatively liberal policy ended and quotas were introduced. By 1929 only 150,000 immigrants per year were allowed in.
During the 1920s and 1930s, the preponderance of Americans remained opposed to enmeshment in Europe’s alliances and wars. Isolationism was solid in hinterland and small-town America in the Midwest and Great Plains states, and among Republicans. It claimed numerous sympathizers among Irish- and German-Americans. William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska, Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin, and George W. Norris of Nebraska were among western agrarian progressives who argued fervently against involvement. Assuming an us-versus-them stance, they castigated various eastern, urban elites for their engagement in European affairs.
World War II
The year 1940 signaled a final turning point for isolationism. German military successes in Europe and the Battle of Britain prompted nationwide American rethinking about its posture toward the war. If Germany and Italy established hegemony in Europe and Africa, and Japan swept East Asia, many believed that the Western Hemisphere might be next. Even if America managed to repel invasions, its way of life might wither if it were forced to become a garrison state. By the autumn of 1940, many Americans believed it was necessary to help defeat the Axis — even if it meant open hostilities.
FDR signs declaration of war against Japan
Many others still backed the noninterventionist America First Committee in 1940 and 1941, but isolationists failed to derail the Roosevelt administration‘s plans to aid targets of Axis aggression with means short of war. Most Americans opposed any actual declaration of war on the Axis countries, but everything abruptly changed when Japan naval forces sneak-attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Germany and Italy declared war on the United States four days later. America galvanized itself for full-blown war against the Axis powers.
The demise of isolationism
The isolationist point of view did not completely disappear from American discourse, but never again did it figure prominently in American policies and affairs. Countervailing tendencies that would outlast the war were at work. During the war, the Roosevelt administration and other leaders inspired Americans to favor the establishment of the United Nations (1945), and following the war, the threat embodied by the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin dampened any comeback of isolationism.
The postwar world environment, in which the United States played a leading role, would change with the triumph of urban industry and finance, expanded education and information systems, advanced military technology, and leadership by internationalists. A few leaders would rise to speak of a return to America’s traditional policies of nonintervention, but in reality, traditional American isolationism was obsolete.

Off-site search results for “Isolationism”…

American Isolationism
… Great War? and why did she do this? Pages in this unit The USA in the 1920′s, Isolationism, Racism, Prohibition and Gangsterism, The “Roaring Twenties”, American History Links, The American Revolution, American History Activities   Year 7 …
http://www.schoolshistory.org.uk/america/isolationism.htm
Isolationism 1921-33
Powaski, Ronald E. Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901-1950. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991. Links: Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference, signed at Locarno, October 6, 1925; deposited with …
http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/ww2timeline/07/isolationism.html
European Isolationism – Alexander Hamilton Historical Society (AHHS)
If the U.S. erred too much on the side of isolationism prior to WWI and WWII, perhaps it has erred too much on the side of internationalism (permanent alliances) ever since. Perhaps, then, the robust mix of unilateral and multilateral foreign and …
http://www.hamiltonsociety.org/Word%20Web%20Pages/Walling%20–%20Europ …
American Isolationism Before World War II

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. – George Washington (U-S-History – Isolationism, par. 5)                          
Since the creation of this great country, a debate has raged back and forth whether to remain in a bubble on our separate continent from the rest of the world and to remain neutral, or to become involved in world affairs, and thus gain prestige, or destruction.  Since World War II, the United States has increasingly “meddled” in the affairs of other nations, such as many Latin and South American countries, the Middle East, and Vietnam to name a few.  Now, there is little of this non-intervention sentiment in the United States.  Leading up to World War II, though, was the period of perhaps the greatest anti-war surge in the United States.
Isolationism, the term for this anti-war sentiment, was led by many congressmen and other influential people, such as the well-known Charles A. Lindbergh.  They did not want America drawn into another World War, and so created the Neutrality Acts to punish warring nations. Roosevelt struggled greatly against Isolationism, but vowed to the American people that he would never send their sons into war, a promise that was soon broken.  When England was under attack from the Germans, Roosevelt convinced the American people to push aside Isolationism and give the British greatly needed war materials under the Lend-Lease Act. When Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution fled to the United States on the S. S. St. Louis, they were rejected and sent back because of the United States’ 1924 immigration policy limiting immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe.  The anti-war sentiments were nudged along by the Germans, who funded many congressmen to continue lobbying for Isolationist views.  Isolationism in American influenced American policy in the late 1930s and early 1940s and greatly delayed its entry into World War II.
            A great proponent of American Isolationism, and also a source of much criticism, was the famous aviator, Charles Lindbergh.  One author even refers to part of the isolationism debate as “eleven moths of oratory between Franklin Roosevelt and Charles Lindbergh” (Berg 413) when Lindbergh had first joined the America First Committee.  Lindbergh had his own views on America and the Germans.  “[…] It seemed to me essential to France and England, and even to America, that Germany be maintained as a bulwark against the Soviet Union” (Berg 376).  This prophetic view of American intervention fueled him to advocate an isolationist policy in America.
On September 11, 1941, Lindbergh spoke in Des Moines, Iowa, giving a lengthy speech urging the United States to not get involved in the War. He alluded to American debts from the First World War.  “As you all know, we were left with the debts of the last European war; and unless we are more cautious in the future than we have been in the past, we will be left with the debts of the present case” (Ranfranz, par. 20).  This is a reference back to the Nye Committee and its biased conclusions made about the U.S.’s involvement in World War I.  He then accused the British, the Jewish, and the Roosevelt administration of being “the three most important groups who have been pressing this country toward war” (Jenkins 127).  If, he suggests, any one of these three groups ceases pushing for war, our country will be safe.  “If any one of these groups—the British, the Jewish, or the administration—stops agitating for war, I believe there will be little danger of our involvement” (The History Channel, par. 1).  He also accused them of plotting a means of forcing the U. S. into the war.
When hostilities commenced in Europe, in 1939, it was realized by these groups that the American people had no intention of entering the war […] They planned: first, to prepare the United States for foreign war under the guise of American defense; second, to involve us in the war, step by step, without our realization; third, to create a series of incidents which would force us into the actual conflict. (Ranfranz, par. 34)
Lindbergh denounced war propaganda for influencing the American population.  “Our theaters soon became filled with plays portraying the glory of war.  Newsreels lost all semblance of objectivity.  Newspapers and magazines began to lose advertising if they carried anti-war articles” (Ranfranz, par. 36).  He lamented the bigotry towards “individuals who opposed intervention”.  Lindbergh then moved on to criticizing the Lend-Lease Act and the supposed “verge of war” it led the U. S. to.  “First, we agreed to sell arms to Europe; next, we agreed to loan arms to Europe; then we agreed to patrol the ocean for Europe; then we occupied a European island in the war zone” (Ranfranz, par. 43).  He then commented that it would be very difficult for America to be victorious in a war with Germany, stating that the German forces were “stronger than our own” (Ranfranz, par. 47).  This controversial comment was met by many boos in the middle of a speech full of relatively nothing but cheers.  This speech led to accusations of Lindbergh as an anti-Semite.  Also, his name was removed from his hometown watertower in Little Falls, Minnesota (The History Channel, par. 2).  This shows the great movement against isolationism and towards war among the American population nearing Pearl Harbor.  Earlier, though, there was much less resistance against the isolationists in America.
During the spring of 1934, Fortune magazine published an article connecting European politics with the armaments industry.  Then it discussed the activity of the American steel companies and the political ties in America.  This article prompted a Senate investigation headed by Senators Pittman and Nye, a very isolationist Republican of North Dakota.  The (incorrect) results of this investigation were that “American entry into the war was the work of wicked Wall Street bankers” (Perkins 96).  In response to this thesis, Congress quickly began work on “neutrality legislation” (96) to prevent the U.S. from being drawn into another war. These laws became known as the Neutrality Acts.  They “forbade American ships to sail into war zones or ports of belligerent nations, citizens to travel on merchant vessels belonging to belligerents, banks to lend money to nations at war, manufacturers to sell any armaments or other specified war-related products to warring countries” (Cooper 6).  The most amazing part of these acts, though, was the proposed “Ludlow Amendment”.  This amendment would allow the United States to go to war only after a national referendum.  “The American people, faced perhaps by some instant danger, were supposed to debate the issue in every part of the land, expose their divisions to the possible enemy, and fracture their national unity in time of peril by sharp and perhaps bitter discussion” (Perkins 101).  This obviously opinionated idea of the Ludlow Amendment gives a worst-case scenario showing how very flawed such an idea would be.  Although this extreme measure could put the country in grave danger, seventy-five percent of the public was in favor of such an idea in 1935, and still sixty-eight percent in 1938 (102).  “When the issue was brought to the floor of the House in [1938], it was clear that a great parliamentary battle impended.  The President spoke out against the proposal; so, too did the Secretary of State” (102).  In the House there were 209 votes for the amendment, and 188 votes against, not enough for the two-thirds vote required (102).  It is very serious, though, how very divided the House was on this outrageous matter.  It reflects how extremely distrustful the American people were of the President and how intense the anti-war sentiment was during that time period.  Dexter Perkins describes this:
The Ludlow amendment represents the isolationist sentiment in its most extreme form.  It was based on distrust of the executive on a conception of foreign policy which would have accentuated internal division and made effective action impossible, on that kind of fear of war which encourages others to war.  It was the high-water mark of the movement of American withdrawal. (102)
The Neutrality Acts greatly hindered both the aggressor and the victim nations in war.  Roosevelt made this connection and attempted to get Congress to allow loopholes in the act.  “[Roosevelt] recommended the stepping-up of defense appropriations and expressed the opinion that the neutrality legislation of 1937 might operate unevenly, might ‘actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim’” (106).  Basically, by cutting off support to both the aggressor and the victim, the victim would only grow weaker, while the aggressor would grow more powerful.  Once World War II began, this proved to be the case for Nazi Germany and Britain.  Britain was suffering much more greatly from the Neutrality Acts than Germany was.  Roosevelt’s beliefs about these acts greatly reflect his general motives during his last two terms in the Whitehouse.  He wanted to keep the isolationist American population happy while keeping the U. S. safe from foreign threats.  He believed that “the country would be more likely to keep out of the war if the arms embargo were repealed. […] If the democratic nations could win, there was less chance of the United States being involved than if Germany were victorious” (108).  He therefore “pursued a settled policy of weakening the Neutrality Acts” (Cooper 7) and helped out the Allied nations against the German aggressors.
This policy led to the creation of the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, a great achievement of Roosevelt against the flow of isolationism, but first came a prelude in the summer of 1940 – the bases-destroyers deal.  In this negotiation with Britain, America received many British bases “extending from Trinidad on the south to Newfoundland on the north” (Perkins 114).  This ingenious idea was accepted by the isolationists because the bases would strengthen the U.S., but also greatly aided the British navy.  “Almost half their destroyers had been damaged or demolished” (113).  A year later, the situation was much worse and Britain was in serious need of armaments, but this time the isolationists were harder to persuade.  Roosevelt, to sway the American people, made a comparison between Britain and a house burning down.  “He made a parable about a man whose house was on fire and a neighbor who lent his garden hose – without demanding payment for it – in order to put out the fire” (Daniels 320).  This comparison went over very well with the American people, and led him to continue this idea of aiding England.  The American people now understood that the British “wanted materials, not men” (321).  Isolationists, though, saw this idea as one step closer to war.  According to the Chicago Tribune, the Lend-Lease bill would “destroy the Republic” (321).  One Senator called it a “triple-A foreign policy: it will plough under every fourth American boy” (321).  Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana claimed the bill was “a bill to enable the President to fight an undeclared war with Germany” (Grapes 37).  The America First Committee was immediately against it, and Lindbergh drew great crowds to the Congressional Hearing for the bill (Daniels 321). 
Even the former isolationist Republican candidate for president, Wendell Willkie supported the bill.  In the Senate Caucus Room on February 11th, 1941, Willkie spoke in support of the Lend-Lease Act.  “He proposed sending Britain all American bombers except those needed for training.  He advocated a steady flow of more and more destroyers” (Daniels 322).  In retaliation, Senator Nye quoted Willkie’s earlier statement towards Roosevelt, “on the basis of his post performance with pledges to the people, you may expect war by April, 1941, if he is elected” (323).  After a long pause, Willkie shrugged and admitted, “It was a bit of campaign oratory” ruefully.  A roar of laughter went up among the room, and “Nye and his like seemed swept aside in the applause. […] Isolationist righteousness was routed” (323).  Soon after, the bill was signed into law.
Many opponents of the Lend-Lease Act, including Senator Wheeler of Montana realized that in order to send materials to the British across the Atlantic, armed convoys would be needed.  “[…] American warships would have to be assigned convoy duty.  That meant putting American ships and American lives in the line of fire and it increased the possibility of an armed exchange between German and U. S. naval forces” (Grapes 37).  This point, did, in fact, become reality on September 4th, 1941.  During this incident, the U. S. destroyer Greer exchanged fire with a German submarine (37-8).  “A week later, on September 11, Roosevelt reacted to this attack in a speech in which he announced that he had given orders to the Navy to ‘shoot on sight’ and warned that Axis warships entering the American defense zone did so ‘at their peril’” (Shirer 882).  More incidents like this occurred in coming months including two in October of 1941.  On the 17th, the USS Kearny was torpedoed by the Germans, and eleven American sailors were killed when the U. S. destroyer Reuban James was torpedoed on the 31st.  Following these attacks, “Roosevelt declared an unlimited national emergency” (Grapes 38) which many realized brought the U. S. very much closer to the joining the war than before.
The crowning “achievement” of isolationism was the incident of the S. S. St. Louis.  On May 13, 1939, the S. S. St. Louis left Hamburg, Germany with 937 passengers (one account, by Bryan Grapes, claims the number to be 936 passengers, but 937 is more likely), 930 of whom were Jewish refugees (Wiaik 6).  The ship’s destination was Havana, Cuba.  Fourteen days later, though, when they arrived at Havana, the Cuban government had revoked their landing permits and they were unable to land.  Instead, they sailed north to Florida where they waited off the coast of Miami, close enough to see the lights from the city at night.  The U. S. government, with full knowledge of the persecution that had come to these people, and the plight they faced if forced to return, sent them away.
This incident reflects the United States’ unwillingness to become entangled in European affairs.  The government could not admit the Jews into the country because of harsh immigration laws imposed in 1924 under the Coolidge administration.  Although by some accounts, this harsh act was completely unnecessary and was a terrible example of American indifference to the plight of the Jews, others speak of it differently.  According the Bryan Grapes, the American government greatly assisted the Jews in finding safe places to live, although not in the U. S.  “None […] of the passengers of the St. Louis were returned to Nazi Germany.  They were all resettled in democratic countries – 288 in the United Kingdom, and the rest in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark” (Grapes 211).  What he fails to state is that four out of five of these countries mentioned were taken over by the Nazis within a few years.  This incident is truly an error in judgement of the American government.  An exception should have been made to keep hundreds of people from suffering at the hands of the Nazis.
The Germans put great effort into keeping America out of the war.  They funded isolationist sentiments throughout the United States for a long period of time before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  The Germans not only saw the United States as a threat to join the war, but they also thought that if there was no chance whatsoever of U. S. entry, then England would finally give in to the Germans.  Therefore, the Germans went to great lengths to keep the U. S. neutral.  “In the United States the German Embassy, under the direction of Hans Thomsen, the chargé d’affaires, was spending every dollar it could lay its hands on to support the isolationists in keeping America out of the war and thus discourage Britain from continuing it” (Shirer 747).  Thomsen put particular effort into the party conventions occurring in 1940.  He tried influencing both parties to include anti-war planks, especially the Republicans (748).  According to German papers captured after their defeat, a Republican Congressman was paid $3,000 “to invite fifty isolationist Republican Congressmen to the Republican convention ‘So that they may work on the delegates in favor of an isolationist foreign policy’” (748).  This same individual also wanted $30,000 for full-page ads in American newspapers including one in the June 25th, 1940 New York Times (748).  In this ad, many Democratic Senators spoke against Roosevelt and a recent change of cabinet officials.  The advertisement begins, “The Democratic Party, we believe, is the interventionist and war party and is rushing us headlong into war in efforts to quarantine and police the world with American blood and treasure” (New York Times 19).  This is a reference to Roosevelt’s 1937 “Quarantine” speech, in the Midwest, where he “urged peaceful countries to unite and ‘quarantine’ international lawlessness” (U-S-History – Roosevelt, par. 8).  Senator Johnson of Colorado goes on to give his opinion that “[…] If the democratic Party fails to do its duty and makes the mistake of nominating an interventionist for the office of President, so far as I am concerned, my country will come before my Party” (New York Times 19).  This quote insinuates that the Democratic party, by renominating Roosevelt, is unpatriotic and will be ruining the United States, a very harsh jab at the Democrats, by a Democrat isolationist.  Another Senator quoted in this German-funded isolationist advertisement is Senator Walsh of Massachusetts, another Democrat isolationist.  He accuses the Roosevelt administration of not thinking of the poor or the majority of the American public, and of charging into war. 
[…] Oh, the tragedy of it, that a powerful group of men of property should be challenging the peace desires of the millions of poor people who toil and labor and sacrifice to whom war brings more poverty, whose children are made for generations to eat the bread of poverty of war (19).
Senator Walsh of Massachusetts, and Senator Joe Kennedy, also of Massachusetts, although being Democrats, were very influential isolationists.  This lack of sympathy towards Great Britain probably stems from their Irish backgrounds.
            These Senators were bribed into making statements betraying their parties, their countries, and themselves.  The German attempts to push the Presidency to Willkie failed, thankfully, and Roosevelt was able to bring about his ideas of Lend-Lease, to which Willkie joined in.  There was still a large group of the United States population that was isolationist, though, right up until the attack on Pearl Harbor.
            After World War I, the people of the victor nations were exhausted by the war.  This tiredness of war led to a great aversion for the war by the people of Britain, France, and the United States.  Among these countries “sentiments among politicians and the public turned rapidly and decisively in an anti-interventionist direction” (Cooper 5).  In Britain and France, this attitude became known as appeasement.  In America, it was called Isolationism.  This shift in attitudes led to many new laws proclaiming the United States’ neutrality in the world.  “Starting with the Senate’s surprise rejection of membership in the World Court in 1934 – which had previously been pushed by Republican presidents as well as now by the Democratic president, Franklin Roosevelt – both houses of Congress swung overwhelmingly isolationist” (6).  From 1934 on, isolationism grew steadily stronger with the creation of the Neutrality Acts, one after another, in 1935, ’36, and ’37.  Some historians believe isolationism was extreme throughout the late 30s because “The American people did not as yet feel insecure.  It was when fear was added to moral condemnation that their temper began to change and that in increasing measure they began to feel that they might be compelled in their own interest, to combat the advance of totalitarianism” (Perkins 105).  This opinion of isolationism as an idea that only thrives during times of safety is completely true.  Even today, the American people feel safe, so a great percent of the population feels no need to be at war with Iraq.  That is how the human mind works, and how it will continue to work in times of peace.
            Although it seemed to make sense at the time that the U. S. would be safe as long as it stayed out of the war, there is a moral dilemma that must be confronted.  This dilemma, whether to help those in need, was brought to the spotlight during the S. S. St. Louis incident, America made the wrong choice and turned away 937 people in need of shelter and protection.  The question is, when is it more important to protect the people of your fellow nations at your own nation’s expense?  This debate has continued ever since George Washington’s famous farewell address denouncing foreign “entanglements”.  These “entanglements” are what keep a nation alive and thriving in the world, and must be maintained to some degree.  Franklin Roosevelt realized that one day we must go to Germany, whether the American people are in favor of it or not.  He, therefore, tried to get America involved as quickly as possible, against the will of his apathetic nation.  Roosevelt said, wisely, “We must be the arsenal of democracy” (Daniels 321).  This was true only until Japan attacked our men at Pearl Harbor and killed isolationism in America.  This attack destroyed America’s false sense of security and turned us into much more than the arsenal of democracy.  We became the juggernaut of the free people of the world; ready to help all the people we turned away for years.  We repented for our American Isolationism.

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Works Cited
Regents Prep: U.S. History: Foreign Policy:
Isolationism
Following our involvement in World War One, the United States entered a nearly two decade long period of isolation from world affairs. The result was not only a rejection of leadership and membership in international organizations, but a restricting of our borders and an anti-foreign feeling among society.US Rejects the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations
The United States Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles for a variety of reasons. Politically, Democratic President Woodrow Wilsonwas unpopular with the Republicans who controlled the Senate. He had also failed to gather any input from them in negotiating the treaty and stubbornly refused to allow changes. Wilson’s poor health also stopped his active campaigning for the treaty among the American people.The provision that the Senate objected to the most was US membership in the League of Nations. The league was the creation of Wilson and was intended as an international peace-keeping organization, intended to prevent the reoccurrence of a wide scale conflict like the “War to end all wars” (WWI). Many were uneasy at the provisions of the League that called for common defense and the possible command of US forces by foreign leadership. These oppositions, along with the public’s desire to distance the US from foreign affairs, lead to the rejection of US membership. Without strong support from the US, the League seemed doomed for failure from the start and never achieved the lofty goals of world peace intended by its creator.
US Isolationism Takes Hold at Home
Restriction of Immigration – The United States had always been a nation formed by and for immigrants. The heritage of the nation is one of providing an opportunity for peoples from all over the world to strive for a better life in America. However, during the isolationist policies that followed the First World War, many called for a curbing of immigration as a way to reduce foreign influence on the nation.
Laws such as the Immigration Act of 1924 and the Emergency Quota Act severely restricted the numbers of immigrants allowed into the country.
Protectionist Policies – In an attempt to protect US businesses and curtail economic ties with much of the world, the US instituted a series of high tariffs in the 20′s and 30′s that limited imports. The reaction of many nations was to pass retaliatory tariffs on US products, resulting in a general breakdown of international trade. This isolation from the world economically would eventually be one of the contributing factors in the causing the Great Depression of the 1930′s.

…and I am Sid Harth@arabuhuru.org
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