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Sharpeville: A Massacre and Its Consequences
Oxford University Press, USA
2011
256 pp.
0192801856
$29.95
bakulaji@msn.com
SouthWorld
The aftermath of the massacreIn the history of nations there are always events that function as watershed. They are the peaks of a journey where things can be define either before or after them. In the long journey to freedom in South Africa there are many such events: the Zulu empire, the Great Trek, the British concentration camps to break Boer's resistance, the advent of apartheid... Then there is Sharpeville, a massacre that was waiting to happen, one of those events that define the history of a people. On March 21, 1960, a line of white policemen outside the Sharpeville's Police Station fired 1344 rounds into the crowd gathered in the public square. They were several thousand and they had gone there to protest against the Apartheid regime's racist 'pass laws'. When the guns fell silent, sixty-seven people were dead and one hundred and eighty six wounded. They were all shot in the back, hit while running away.
The Sharpeville Massacre was the end of a possible dialogue between the white minority and the black majority. It marked the start of armed resistance in South Africa, and prompted worldwide condemnation of South Africa. For years, people looked back at the Massacre, at the planned extermination of innocent people, to find the strength to continue the struggle. Others claimed it was an accident, something the Boer government did not plan. Shining away from an emotional reading of events, and basing his evaluation on documents and interviews with survivors, Tom Lodge explains how and why the Massacre occurred. In his book Sharpeville, an apartheid massacre and its consequences, Lodge guides the reader into the meander of the social and political background of the events, as well as the long-term consequences of the shootings.
The author offers a detailed account of the event, and provides the historical background to understand it in the backdrop of the simultaneous protest in Cape Town which fomented the political crisis that developed in the wake of the shootings. Lodge also offers good insights on the long term consequences of the 'pass laws' and the strife they caused. Sharpeville affected the perceptions of black and white political leadership in South Africa as well as South Africa's relationship with the rest of the world, and the development of an international Anti-Apartheid movement in the wake of the shootings.
In South Africa today, March 21 marks Human Rights Day. It is a public holiday and to many it is a day of mourning and memorial. Sharpeville is a good text to reconstruct what happened, but also to understand what can still go wrong in any society where human rights are not upheld. The book is no easy read. It commands full attention and the will to introspect in oneís own life. It is a professional account, historically correct and well researched. At the same time, it will be of great help to those who wish to read history with the purpose of educating future generations on the dangers of bigotry and false claims of superiority.
Tom Lodge, Sharpeville, an apartheid massacre and its consequences, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, pp. XII + 423.
Last modified on Thursday, 06 October 2011 21:48The Sharpeville Massacre was the end of a possible dialogue between the white minority and the black majority. It marked the start of armed resistance in South Africa, and prompted worldwide condemnation of South Africa. For years, people looked back at the Massacre, at the planned extermination of innocent people, to find the strength to continue the struggle. Others claimed it was an accident, something the Boer government did not plan. Shining away from an emotional reading of events, and basing his evaluation on documents and interviews with survivors, Tom Lodge explains how and why the Massacre occurred. In his book Sharpeville, an apartheid massacre and its consequences, Lodge guides the reader into the meander of the social and political background of the events, as well as the long-term consequences of the shootings.
The author offers a detailed account of the event, and provides the historical background to understand it in the backdrop of the simultaneous protest in Cape Town which fomented the political crisis that developed in the wake of the shootings. Lodge also offers good insights on the long term consequences of the 'pass laws' and the strife they caused. Sharpeville affected the perceptions of black and white political leadership in South Africa as well as South Africa's relationship with the rest of the world, and the development of an international Anti-Apartheid movement in the wake of the shootings.
In South Africa today, March 21 marks Human Rights Day. It is a public holiday and to many it is a day of mourning and memorial. Sharpeville is a good text to reconstruct what happened, but also to understand what can still go wrong in any society where human rights are not upheld. The book is no easy read. It commands full attention and the will to introspect in oneís own life. It is a professional account, historically correct and well researched. At the same time, it will be of great help to those who wish to read history with the purpose of educating future generations on the dangers of bigotry and false claims of superiority.
Tom Lodge, Sharpeville, an apartheid massacre and its consequences, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, pp. XII + 423.
Southworld
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Posted on Wednesday, 12 October 2011 14:56
Book review: Sharpeville by Tom Lodge
By Gemma Ware
A masterful work on the 1960 massacre and its impact on the anti-apartheid campaign
As ambulances carrying the dead and injured departed from the site of the Sharpeville massacre, the heavens opened, washing away the blood from the streets. History lives on in the detail, and Tom Lodge's masterful work on the killings brings it alive through the words of those who witnessed the chilling events of 21 March 1960.
His retelling of a well-known part of the anti-apartheid story is, at its heart, a history of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which had chosen that Monday morning as the start of its campaign of civil disobedience. Lodge traces the reasons for the PAC's splintering away from the African National Congress in 1959 under leader Robert Sobukwe, the social and political motivations behind Sharpeville's bands of young, unemployed 'Task Forces' that spurred on the 1960 protest, and the movement into fractious exile of those PAC leaders not imprisoned in the massacre's aftermath.
Alongside the international reaction to the killings and the birth of a global anti-apartheid movement, Lodge examines the Hendrik Verwoerd regime's reaction to Sharpeville and the political currency it gave their racist and repressive policies.
Most interesting is his treatment of Sharpeville's impact on the later stages of the anti-apartheid campaign. Fifty years on, Lodge explores how its memory plays a central role in the narrative of the South African struggle.
Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and its Consequences by Tom Lodge is published by Oxford University Press
Last Updated on Wednesday, 12 October 2011 15:31As ambulances carrying the dead and injured departed from the site of the Sharpeville massacre, the heavens opened, washing away the blood from the streets. History lives on in the detail, and Tom Lodge's masterful work on the killings brings it alive through the words of those who witnessed the chilling events of 21 March 1960.
His retelling of a well-known part of the anti-apartheid story is, at its heart, a history of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which had chosen that Monday morning as the start of its campaign of civil disobedience. Lodge traces the reasons for the PAC's splintering away from the African National Congress in 1959 under leader Robert Sobukwe, the social and political motivations behind Sharpeville's bands of young, unemployed 'Task Forces' that spurred on the 1960 protest, and the movement into fractious exile of those PAC leaders not imprisoned in the massacre's aftermath.Alongside the international reaction to the killings and the birth of a global anti-apartheid movement, Lodge examines the Hendrik Verwoerd regime's reaction to Sharpeville and the political currency it gave their racist and repressive policies.
Most interesting is his treatment of Sharpeville's impact on the later stages of the anti-apartheid campaign. Fifty years on, Lodge explores how its memory plays a central role in the narrative of the South African struggle.
Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and its Consequences by Tom Lodge is published by Oxford University Press
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Internal resistance to South African apartheid
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
apartheid system in South Africa came from several sectors of society and saw the creation of organisations dedicated variously to peaceful protests, passive resistance and armed insurrection. It came from both black activists like Steve Biko and Desmond Tutu as well as white activists like Harry Schwarz, Joe Slovo and Trevor Huddleston. By the 1980s there was continuous interplay between violent and non-violent action, and this interplay was a notable feature of the rebellion against apartheid from 1983 until South Africa's transition to democracy in 1994.[1]
Although its creation predated apartheid, the African National Congress (ANC) became the primary force in opposition to the government after its conservative leadership was superseded by the organisation's Youth League (ANCYL) in 1949. Led by Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo, elected to the ANC's National Executive that year, the ANCYL advocated a radical black nationalist programme which combined the Africanist ideas of Anton Lembede with those of Marxism. They brought the notion that white authority could only be overthrown through mass campaigns.
Once the ANCYL had taken control of the ANC, the organization advocated a policy of open defiance and resistance for the first time. This unleashed the 1950s Programme of Action, instituted in 1949, which laid emphasis on the right of the African people to freedom under the flag of African Nationalism. It laid out plans for strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience, resulting in occasionally violent clashes, with mass protests, stay-aways, boycotts and strikes predominating. The 1950 May Day stay-away was a strong, successful expression of black grievances.
In 1952 the Joint Planning Council, made up of members from the ANC, the South African Indian Congress as well as the Coloured People's Congress, agreed on a plan for the defiance of unfair laws. They wrote to the Prime Minister, DF Malan and demanded that he repeal the Pass Laws, the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Administration Act and other legislation, warning that refusal to do so would be met with a campaign of defiance. The Prime Minister was haughty in his rejoinder, referring the Council to the Native Affairs Department and threatening to treat insolence callously.
The Programme of Action was launched with the Defiance Campaign in June 1952. By defying the laws, the organisation hoped for mass arrests with which the government would be unable to cope. Nelson Mandela led a crowd of fifty men down the streets of a white area in Johannesburg after the 11 pm curfew that forbade black peoples' presence. The group was apprehended, but the rest of the country followed its example. Defiance spread throughout the country and black people disregarded racial laws by, for example, walking through "whites only" entries. At the campaign's zenith, in September 1952, more than 2,500 people from 24 different towns had been arrested for defying various laws.
By the end of the campaign, the government arrested 8,000 people, but was forced to temporarily relax its apartheid legislation. In addition, as a direct result of the campaign, membership of the ANC increased and attention was drawn to apartheid's injustices. Once things had calmed down, however, the government responded with an iron fist, taking several supreme measures—among which were the Unlawful Organisations Act, the Suppression of Communism Act, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Procedures Act. Thus, in the longer term, this spelt defeat for the resistance movement. In December 1952, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and eighteen others were tried under the Suppression of Communism Act for leading the Defiance Campaign. They received nine months' imprisonment, suspended for two years.
The Criminal Law Amendment Act stated that "[a]ny person who in any way whatsoever advises, encourages, incites, commands, aids or procures any other person [...] or uses language calculated to cause any other person to commit an offence by way of protest against a law [...] shall be guilty of an offence".[cite this quote]
The government also constricted the regulation on separate amenities. Protesters had argued to the courts that different amenities for different races ought to be of an equal standard. The Separate Amenities Act removed the façade of mere separation; it gave the owners of public amenities the right to bar people on the basis of colour or race and made it lawful for different races to be treated inequitably. Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela, Albert Luthuli and other famous ANC, Indian Congress and trade union chiefs were all vetoed under the Suppression of Communism Act. The proscription meant that the headship was now restricted to its homes and adjacent areas and they were banned from attending public gatherings.
Though cruelly limited, the movement was still able to struggle against the oppressive instruments of the state. More importantly, collaboration between the ANC and NIC had increased and strengthened through the Defiance Campaign. Support for the ANC and its endeavours increased. In August 1953, the ANC Cape conference suggested an Assembly of the people.
Meanwhile, on the global stage, India demanded that apartheid be challenged by the United Nations. It led to the establishment of a UN commission on apartheid. This first encouraged black South Africans in their campaign, but, after five months, the African and Indian Congresses opted to call it off because of the increasing number of riots, strikes and heavier sentences on those who took part. During the campaign, almost 8,000 black and Indian people had been detained. At the same time, however, ANC membership grew from 7,000 to 100,000, and the number of subdivisions went from fourteen at the start of the campaign to 87 at its end. There was also a change in headship. Shortly before the campaign's end, Albert Luthuli was elected as the new ANC president.
A National Convention of all South Africans was proposed by Professor ZK Matthews at the Cape ANC conference on 15 August 1953. The intention was to chew over the national problems on an all-inclusive basis and outline a manifesto of amity. In March 1954, the ANC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the Coloured People's Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats (SACOD) and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) met and founded the National Action Council for the Congress of the People. Delegates were drawn from each of these establishments and a nationwide organiser was assigned. A campaign was publicised for the drafting of a freedom charter, and a call was made for 10,000 unpaid assistants to help with the conscription of views from across the country and the organisation of the Congress of the People. Demands were documented and sent to the local board of the National Action Council in preparation for drafting the Charter.
The Congress of the People was held from 26 to 27 of June 1955 in Kliptown, just south of Johannesburg. Under the attentive gaze of the constabulary, 3,000 delegates gathered to revise and accept the Freedom Charter that had been endorsed by the ANC's National Executive on the eve of the Congress. Among the organisations present were the Indian Congress and the ANC. The Freedom Charter, which articulated a vision for South Africa radically different to the partition policy of apartheid, emphasising that South Africa should be a just and non-racial society. It called for a one-person-one-vote democracy within a single unified state and stated that all people should be treated equally before the law, that land should be "shared among those who work it" and that the people should "share in the country's wealth" -- a statement which has often been interpreted as a call for socialist nationalisation. The congress delegates had consented to almost all the sections of the charter when the police announced that they suspected treason and recorded the names and addresses of all those present.
In 1956 the Federation of South African Women was founded and led by Lilian Ngoyi and the more famous Helen Joseph. On 9 August that year, the women marched on the Union Buildings in Pretoria, protesting against the pass laws. On the morning of December 5, 1956, however, the police detained 156 Congress Alliance leaders. 104 African, 23 white, 21 Indian and eight Coloured people were charged with high treason and plotting a violent overthrow of the state, to be replaced by a communist government. The charge was based on statements and speeches made during both the Defiance Campaign and the Congress of the People. The Freedom Charter was used as proof of the Alliance's communist intent and their conspiracy to oust the government. The State relied greatly on the evidence of Professor Arthur Murray, an ostensible authority on Marxism and Communism. His evidence was that the ANC papers were full of such communist terms as "comrade" and "proletariat", often found in the writings of Lenin and Stalin. Halfway through the drawn-out trial, charges against 61 of the accused were withdrawn, and, five years after their arrest, the remaining thirty were acquitted after the court held that the state had failed to prove its case.
The Sharpeville Massacre helped shape ANC policy. Before Sharpeville those advocating the use of organized violence, such as Nelson Mandela, had been marginalized as too radical by the ANC's leadership. After Sharpeville Mandela was allowed to launch his guerilla struggle (called the "M" Plan). Hence, from 1961 the ANC adopted terrorist[4] tactics, such as intimidation, bombing, murder and sabotage. Although their units detonated bombs in restaurants, shopping centres, cinemas and in front of government buildings over the following years, the military wings of the ANC and PAC were never a military threat to the state.
Sharpeville signalled that the South African government was not going to yield to the mood of black nationalism then sweeping across Africa, and that white South Africans did not accept that they were "colonials" to be swept into the sea by "decolonization". Sharpeville thus foreshadowed the coming conflict between black nationalists and Afrikaner nationalists over the next thirty years.
In the wake of the shooting, a massive stay-away from work was organised and demonstrations continued. Prime Minister Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd declared a state of emergency, giving security forces the right to detain people without trial. Over 18,000 were arrested, including much of the ANC and PAC leadership, and both organizations were banned. The National Party government felt that outlawing the ANC and PAC would discontinue their operations. This was not the case. Some leaders went into exile abroad, while others stayed in South Africa and pursued the fight domestically. They went underground and initiated secret armed opposition groups.
The ANC and PAC ran campaigns of sabotage and terrorism through their armed wings, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, MK) and Poqo ("Pure" or "Alone"). The ANC leader, Chief Albert Luthuli, did not support an armed struggle, but there was growing backing for a violent struggle as people became more and more aggravated by the government's aversion to hearing them out. In June 1961 the ANC executive concurred on the formation of an armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), meaning "Spear of the Nation".
Nelson Mandela, who was the commander of the ANC's military wing (MK), had developed the "M Plan" (Mandela Plan), a programme of controlled sabotage, launching a guerilla war modelled upon the FLN's struggle in Algeria. Its policy involved the targeting of state buildings for sabotage without resorting to murder. On 16 December 1961 MK carried out its first acts of sabotage by assaulting post offices and other structures in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban. Many other acts of sabotage would take place over the next few years. In its first eighteen months, MK carried out about 200 acts of sabotage, but despite its policy, some deaths did occur. The headquarters were at Liliesleaf Farm in Rivonia, just outside Johannesburg.
Mandela began planning for MK members to be given military training outside South Africa and managed to slip past authorities as he himself moved in and out of the country, earning him the moniker "The Black Pimpernel". Mandela initially resisted arrest within South Africa, but in August 1962, after receiving some inside information, the police put up a roadblock and captured him. MK's success declined after this, and the police infiltrated the organisation.
A witch-hunt was launched against the dissident establishments. Many people were outlawed or placed under house arrest. In this way, the ANC net was shattered by the mid-1960s. Some people were held in detention, where they were often tormented or executed. In 1963, through a leak from informant Gerard Ludi, the police found the location of the MK headquarters at Lilliesleaf. In July, they raided the farm and arrested many major leaders of the ANC and MK, including Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and Ahmed Kathrada. They were detained and indicted with sabotage and attempting to bring down the government. At the same time, police collected evidence to be used in the trial, which enabled them to arrest other such people, like Denis Goldberg. Especially harmful was the information on Operation Mayibuye (Operation Comeback), a plan for bringing exiles back into the country. It also revealed that MK was planning to use guerrilla warfare.
Some ANC members, including Oliver Tambo, avoided capture and escaped South Africa to pursue the ANC's interests from beyond the country's boundaries. Tambo was to lead the ANC in exile for another thirty years. Many supporters also left South Africa for military training under MK.
The PAC's secretive martial arm was called Poqo, meaning "go it alone" or "pure" in the Xhosa tongue. Poqo was prepared to take lives in the quest for liberation. It murdered whites, police informants and black people who supported the government. It arranged a national revolution in order to conquer the white government, but poor organization and in-house nuisances crippled the PAC and Poqo.
The PAC did not have adequate direction. When Robert Sobukwe (jailed following the Sharpeville massacre) was discharged from Robben Island in 1969, he was placed under house arrest in Kimberley until he died in 1978. Police repeatedly lengthened his incarceration through the "Sobukwe clause", which permitted the state to detain people even after they had served their sentences. Many other PAC principals were taken into custody on 21 March 1960, and those released were hampered by bans.
The PAC's management difficulties also existed in exile. When they were outlawed, PAC leaders set up headquarters, in among places, Dar es Salaam, London and the United States. In 1962, Potlako Leballo (1915–1986) left the country for Maseru, Basutoland, and became the PAC's acting president. He and Mandela had arranged to meet but Mandela was arrested the day before Leballo reached Basutoland. When British intelligence in Maseru warned the South Africans that two female PAC couriers had crossed into South Africa to deliver letters the police confiscated correspondence addressed to 70 PAC cells. A wave arrests followed, and 3,246 PAC and Poqo members went to jail. This led to the crumpling of the PAC within South Africa, also because a large arms shipment from Ghana via Egypt failed to make a landing.
Leballo also annoyed external PAC leaders through his attempt, with Sobukwe's assent, to militarize the external party structure on Maoist Red Army lines. In 1968, the OAU Liberation Committee stepped in to back Leballo but the PAC was eventually expelled from Maseru (where it was allied to the opposition Basutoland Congress Party) and Lusaka (which was friendlier to the ANC). All in all, MK ran a far more successful guerilla campaign than Poqo. Between 1974 and 1976 Leballo trained the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) in Libya and then 500 Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) troops. American pressures split the PAC into a "reformist-diplomatic" group under Sibeko, Make, and Pokela; and a Maoist group under Leballo based in Ghana and Ugandan (Museveni) resistance controlled areas of Zaire (Congo). The 500 strong APLA force was destroyed by the Tanzanian military at Chunya on March 11, 1980 for refusing to accept the reformist-diplomatic leadership. Leballo was influential in the South African 1985 student risings and pivotal in removing Leabua Jonathan's regime in Lesotho, the stress of which caused his death. The PAC never recovered from the 1980 massacre of Leballo's troops and his death and won a paltry 1.2% of the vote in the 1994 South African election.
The widely-publicized Rivonia Trial began in October 1963. Ten men stood accused of treason, trying to depose the government and sabotage. Nelson Mandela was tried, along with those arrested at Lilliesleaf and another 24 co-conspirators. Many of these people, however, had already fled the country, Tambo being but one.
The ANC used the lawsuit to draw international interest to its cause. During the trial, Mandela gave his legendary "I am prepared to die" diatribe. In June 1964, eight were found guilty of terrorism, sabotage, planning and executing guerilla warfare, and working towards an armed invasion of the country. The treason charge was dropped. All eight were sentenced to life imprisonment. They did not get the death penalty, as this hazarded too much international criticism. Goldberg was sent to the Pretoria jail, and the other seven were all banished to the prison on Robben Island. Bram Fischer, the defence trial attorney, was himself arrested and tried shortly thereafter. The instructions that Mandela gave to make MK an African force were ignored: it continued to be organized and led by the SACP. Consequently there were serious mutinies in Angolan camps by Soweto and Cape student recruits angry at the corrupt and brutal consequences of minority control.
The trial was condemned by the United Nations Security Council, and was a major force in the introduction of international sanctions against the South African government. After Sharpeville the ANC and PAC were banned. The South African Communist Party denied it existed, having dissolved in 1950 to escape banning as the CPSA. Leaders like Mandela and Sobukwe were either in jail or in exile.
By incarcerating leaders of MK and the ANC, the government was able to break the potency of the ANC within South Africa's borders, and greatly affect its efficiency outside of them. The ANC faced many problems in the aftermath of the Rivonia Trial, its inner administration cruelly afflicted. Exiled leaders understood that conveying skilled guerrillas into South Africa would be complicated, as bordering states were unfriendly towards the ANC. Mozambique was still a Portuguese colony, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Bechuanaland (now Botswana) were still in colonial hands, and South West Africa (now Namibia) was controlled by the South African government. Thus, by 1964, the government had essentially broken the activist movements. The first armed invasion in South Africa's history by an African force was curiously the 1978 attack by the Lesotho Liberation (Army (LLA), a 178 strong force trained by Leballo, which was mostly wiped out in 1979. A second LLA was the creature of South African intelligence services backed by former CIA operatives (Ray Steiner Cline), former Rhodesian Army personnel, and anti-communist American and Asian organizations.
At the same time, international criticism of apartheid increased. The United Nations denounced the trial and commenced steps for the introduction of sanctions. The PAC and Poqo persisted in their activities through the late 1960s and 1970s, but, because of their use of violence, members were under continuous police surveillance, and there were few acts of damaging sabotage. The ANC looked into ways of infiltrating South Africa in spite of its dearth of internal structure.
Although the ANC attempted to reconstruct itself, there would be no real action until the 1970s, when striking militancy began to reappear. At the end of the 1960s, new organisations and ideas would form to confront apartheid. The next key act of opposition would come only in 1976, however, with the Soweto uprising.
The government's effort at defeating all opposition had been effective. The State of Emergency was de-proclaimed; the economy boomed; and the government began implementing apartheid by building the infrastructures of the ten separate Homelands, and relocating blacks into these homelands. In 1966, Verwoerd was stabbed to death in parliament, but his policies continued under B.J. Vorster and later P.W. Botha.
Prior to the 1960s, the NP government had been most effective in crushing anti-apartheid opposition within South Africa by outlawing movements like the ANC and PAC, and driving their leaders into exile or captivity. This planted the seeds for the struggle, particularly at such tertiary-education organisations as the University of the North and Zululand University. These institutions were fashioned out of the Extension of University Education Act of 1959, which guaranteed that black and white students would be taught individually and inequitably.
After the banning of the ANC and PAC, and the Rivonia Trial, the struggle within South Africa had been dealt a stern blow. The age bracket that had seen the Sharpeville Massacre had become apathetic in its gloom and despair. This changed in the late 1960s and most notably from the mid-1970s, when new devotion came from the latest, more radical generation. During this epoch, new anti-apartheid ideas and establishments were created, and they gathered support from across South Africa.
The surfacing of the South African Black Consciousness Movement was influenced by its American equivalent, the American Black Power movement, and directors such as Malcolm X. African heads like Kenneth Kaunda also stirred ideas of autonomy and Black Pride by means of their anti-colonialist writings. Scholars grew in assurance and became far more candid about the NP's bigoted policies and the repression of the black people.
During the 1970s, resistance gained force, first channelled through trade unions and strikes, and then spearheaded by the South African Students' Organisation, under the charismatic leadership of Steve Biko. A medical student, Biko was the main force behind the growth of South Africa's Black Consciousness Movement, which stressed the need for psychological liberation, black pride, and non-violent opposition to apartheid.[5]
Founded by Biko, the BC faction materialised out of the ideas of the civil rights movement and Black Power movement in the USA. The motto of the movement was "Black is Beautiful", first made popular by boxer Mohammed Ali. BC endorsed black pride and African customs, and did much to alter feelings of inadequacy, while also raising awareness of the fallacy of blacks being seen as inferior. It defied practices and merchandise that were meant to make black people "whiter", such as hair straighteners and skin lighteners. Western culture was toured as destructive and alien to Africa. Black people became conscious of their own distinctive identity and self-worth, and grew more outspoken about their right to freedom.
The National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) was the first student representative, but it had a principally white membership, and black students saw this as an impediment. White students had concerns more scholastic than political, and, although the administration was multi-racial, it was not tackling many of the issues of the mounting number of black students since 1960. This resulted in the 1967 creation of the University Christian Movement (UCM), an organisation rooted in African-American philosophy.
In July 1967, the annual NUSAS symposium took place at Rhodes University in Grahamstown. White students were permitted to dwell on university grounds, but black students were relegated to an abode further away in a church vestibule. This later led to the creation of the South African Students Organisation (SASO), under Steve Biko, in 1969.
The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) was an umbrella organisation for groups such as SASO. It was created in 1967, and among its members were the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), the black Community Programme (which directed welfare schemes for blacks), the Black People's Convention (which, at first, attempted to unite charitable associations like that for the Education and Cultural Advancement of African People of South Africa) and the South African Students Movement (SASM), which represented high-school learners. The BPC finally expanded into a political administration, with Steve Biko as its honorary president.
When the BCM's principles were illuminated, a number of fresh organisations, staunch in their endorsement of black liberation, came into being. AZAPO was only launched in 1978, a long time after the birth of the BCM, as a medium for its message.
The BCM drew most of its backing from high schools and tertiary institutions. Black Consciousness ethics were crucial in lifting consciousness amongst black people of their value and right to a better existence, along with the need to insist on these. The BCM's non-violent approach subsided in favour of a more radical element as its resolve to attain liberty was met with state hostility.
After the carnage in Soweto the ANC's Nelson Mandela grudgingly concurred that bloodshed was the only means left to convince the NP to accede to commands for an end to its apartheid policy. A subversive plan of terror was mapped out, with Steve Biko and the BCM to the fore. The BCM and other opinionated elements were prohibited during the 1970s because the government saw them as dangerous. Black Consciousness in South Africa adopted a drastic theory, much like socialism, as the liberation movement progressed to challenging class divisions and shifting from an ethnic stress to focusing more on non-racialism. The BCM became more worried about the destiny of the black people as workers, believing that "economic and political exploitation has reduced the black people into a class".
With Black Consciousness increasing throughout black communities, a number of other organisations were formed to combat apartheid. In 1972, the Black People's Convention was founded, and the black Allied Worker's Union, formed in 1973, focused on black labour matters. The black Community Programmes gave attention to the more global issues of black communities. School learners began to confront the Bantu education policy, designed to prepare them to be second-class citizens. They created the South African Student's Movement (SASM). It was particularly popular in Soweto, where the 1976 insurrection against Bantu Education would prove to be a crossroads in the fight against apartheid.
Taken into custody on 18 August 1977, Steve Biko was brutally tortured by unidentified security personnel until he lapsed into a coma. He went for three days without medical treatment and finally died in Pretoria. At the subsequent inquest, the magistrate ruled that no-one was to blame, but the South African Medical Association eventually took action against the doctors who had failed to treat Biko.
There was tremendous reaction both within and outside South Africa. Foreign countries imposed even more stringent sanctions than those which had come before, and the United Nations imposed an arms embargo. Young blacks inside South Africa committed themselves even more fervently to the struggle against apartheid, under the catchphrase "Liberation before education". Black communities became highly politicised.
The Black Consciousness Movement began to change its focus during the 1980s from being on issues of nation and community to issues of class and, perhaps as a result, had far less of an impact than in the mid-'seventies. Still, there is some evidence to suggest that it retained at least some influence, particularly in workers' organisations.
The role of Black Consciousness could be clearly seen in the approach of the National Forum, which believed that the struggle ought to hold little or no place for whites. This ideal, of blacks leading the resistance campaign, was an important aim of the traditional BC groups, and it shaped the thinking of many 'eighties activists, most notably the workforce. Furthermore, the NF focused on workers' issues, which became more and more important to BC supporters.
The Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) was the leading BC group of the 1980s. It got most of its support from young black men and women—many of them educated at colleges and universities. The organisation had a lot of support in Soweto and also amongst journalists, helping to popularise its views. It focused, too, on workers' issues, but it refused to form any ties with whites.
Although it did not achieve quite the same groundswell support that it had in the late 1970s, BC still influenced the thinking of a few resistance groups.
The decree was resented deeply by blacks as Afrikaans was widely viewed, in the words of Desmond Tutu, then Dean of Johannesburg as "the language of the oppressor". Teacher organizations such as the African Teachers Association of South Africa objected to the decree.
The resentment grew until April 30, 1976, when children at Orlando West Junior School in Soweto went on strike, refusing to go to school. Their rebellion then spread to many other schools in Soweto. Students formed an Action Committee (later known as the Soweto Students’ Representative Council) that organized a mass rally for June 16, 1976. The protest was intended to be peaceful.
In a confrontation with police, who had barricaded the road along the intended route, stones were thrown. Attempts to disperse the crowd with dogs and tear gas failed; when the police saw they were surrounded by the students, they fired shots into the crowd, at which point pandemonium broke out.
In the first day of rioting 23 people were killed in escalating violence. The following day 1,500 heavily armed police officers were deployed to Soweto. Crowd control methods used by South African police at the time included mainly dispersement techniques, and many of the officers shot indiscriminately, killing many people.
SASM gave support to its members with school work and exams, and with progress from lower school levels to university. Security forces pestered its members continually until, in 1973, some of its leaders fled the country. In 1974 and 1975, some affiliates were captured and tried under the Suppression of Communism and Terrorism Acts. This flagged the SASM's progress. Many school headmasters and -mistresses forbade the organisation from playing a role in their schools.
When the Southern Transvaal local Bantu Education Department concluded that all junior secondary black students had to be taught in Afrikaans in 1974, SASM limbs at Naledi High and Orlando West Secondary Schools opted to vent their grievances on school books and refused to attend their schools This form of struggle spread fast to other schools in Soweto and hit boiling point around 8 June 1976. When law enforcement attempted to arrest a regional SASM secretary, they were stoned and had their cars torched.
On 13 June 1976, nearly 400 SASM associates gathered and chose to start a movement for mass action. An Action Committee was shaped with two agents from each school in Soweto. This board became known as the Soweto Students' Representatives Council (SSRC). The protest was set aside for 16 June 1976, and the organisers were determined only to use aggression if they were assaulted by the police.
By 1963, one of the few envoys for tertiary students was the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). Although the organisation was meant to be non-racial and anti-government, it was made up primarily of white English students from customarily broad-minded universities such as those in Natal, Cape Town, the Witwatersrand and Grahamstown. These students were had compassion for the effort against the state. By 1967, however, NUSAS was forbidden from functioning on black universities, making it almost impossible for black Student Representative Councils to join the union.
In 1973, the world's fiscal boom came to an end. At the same time, labour action in South Africa was renewed, and there were a number of strikes in Durban. The abuse of black workers had been vogue, and, as a consequence, there were many black people being paid too little on which to live. A strike, commenced in January by 2,000 workers of the Coronation Brick and Tile Company for a pay raise (from under R10 to R20 a week), drew a lot hype and encouraged other workers to do the same. Strikes for higher wages, improved working conditions and the end of exploitation occurred throughout this period.
Police employed tear gas and violence against the strikers, but could not apprehend the masses of people involved. The strikers never chose individuals to stand for them, because these people would be the first to be detained. Blacks were not permitted trade unions, which meant that the government could not act against any particular individuals. Strikes usually concluded when income boosts were tendered, but these were generally lower than had initially been insisted upon.
The Durban strikes soon extended to other parts of the country. 1973 and 1974 saw a countrywide amplification of labour opposition. There was also an increasingly buoyancy among black workers as they found that the state did not retort as harshly as they had expected. They thus began to form trade unions, even though these remained illegitimate and unofficial.
After 1976, trade unions and their workers began to play a massive role in the fight against apartheid. With their thousands of members, the trade unions had great strength in numbers, and this they used to their advantage, campaigning for the rights of black workers and forcing the government to make changes to its apartheid policies. Importantly, trade unions filled the gap left by banned political parties. They assumed tremendous importance because they could act on a wide variety of issues and problems for their people—and not only work-related ones, as links between work issues and broader community grievances became more palpable.
Fewer trade-union officials (harassed less by the police and army) were jailed than political leaders in the townships. Union members could meet and make plans within the factory. In this way, trade unions played a pivotal role in the struggle against apartheid, and their efforts generally had wide community support.
In 1979, one year after Botha's accession to power, black trade unions were legalized, and their role in the resistance struggle grew to all-new proportions. Prior to 1979, black trade unions had had no legal clout in dealings with employers. All strikes that took place were illegal, but they did help to establish the trade unions and their collective cause. Although the legalisation of black trade unions gave workers the legal right to strike, it also gave the government a degree of control over them, as they all had to be registered and hand in their membership records to the government. They were not allowed to support political parties either, and it goes without saying that some trade unions did not comply.
Later in 1979, the FOSATU body was formed, followed by the Council of Unions of South Africa (COSAS). It was influenced strongly by the ideas of Black Consciousness and wanted to work to ensure black leadership of unions.
The establishment of the trade-union federations led to greater unity amongst the workers. The tremendous size of the federations gave them increased voice and power. 1980 saw thousands of black high-school and university students boycotting their schools, and a country-wide protest over wages, rents and bus fares. In 1982, there were 394 strikes involving 141,571 workers. FOSATU and CUSA grew from a mere 70,000 members in 1979 to 320,000 by 1983, the year of the establishment of first the National Forum and then the UDF. Both of these had an important impact, but the latter was far more influential.
With the establishment of the new constitution in 1984, the biggest and longest black uprising exploded in the Vaal Triangle. COSAS and FOSATU organised the longest stay-away in South African history, and, all told, there were 469 strikes that year, amounting to 378,000 hours in lost business time.
In accordance with the State of Emergency in 1985, COSAS was banned and many UDF leaders arrested. A meeting between white business leaders and those of the ANC in Zambia brought about the formation of COSATU in 1985. The newly-formed trade-union governing body, committed to improved working conditions and the fight against apartheid, organised a nationwide strike the following year, and a new State of Emergency was declared. It did not take long for COSATU's membership to grow to 500,000.
With South Africa facing a neigh-unprecedented shortage of skilled white labour, the government was forced to allow black people to fill the vacancies. This, in turn, led to an increase in spending on black, coloured and Indian education.
Still, there were divides amongst the trade-union faction, which had the membership of only ten per cent of the country's workforce. Not all trade unions joined the federations, while agricultural and domestic workers did not even have a trade union to join and were thus more liable. Nevertheless, by the end of this period, the unions had emerged as one of the most effective vehicles for black opposition.
Beyers Naudé left the pro-apartheid Dutch Reformed Church and founded the Christian Institute, bringing white and black people together. He, along with the Institute, were banned in 1977, but he later became the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches (SACC), a religious association which supported anti-apartheid activities. Significantly, it also refused to condemn violence as a means of ending apartheid.
Frank Chikane was another general secretary of the SACC. He was detained four times because of his criticism of the government and once allegedly had an attempt on his life, initiated by Adriaan Vlok, former Minister of Law and Order.
The charismatic Archbishop Desmond Tutu was yet another general secretary of the SACC. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in 1984 and used his position and popularity to denounce the government and its policies. On 29 February 1988 Tutu, and a number of other church leaders, were arrested during a protest in front of the parliamentary buildings in Cape Town.[6]
Alan Boesak led the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC). He was very influential in founding the UDF and was once jailed for a month after organising a march demanding the release of Nelson Mandela.
Although church leaders were not totally immune to prosecution, they were able to criticise the government more freely than the leaders of militant groups. They were pivotal in altering public opinion regarding apartheid policies.
Later in 1989, the MDM organised a number of peaceful marches against the State of Emergency (extended to four years now) in the major cities. Even though these marches were illegal, no-one was arrested—evidence that apartheid was coming to an end and that the government's hold was weakening.
Although the MDM emerged only very late into the struggle, it did add to the effective resistance that the government faced, organising a series of protests and further uniting the opposition movement. Certainly, it was characteristic of the "mass resistance" which characterised the 'eighties: many organisations were united, dealing with different aspects of the fight against apartheid and its implications.
Some aid workers present during the MDM's existence claim that it was actually little more than a socialist front organization for terrorists that would use violence to "bolster" support.[1]
Harry Schwarz was in minority opposition politics for over 40 years and was one of the most prominent opponents of the National Party and its policy of apartheid. After assisting in the 1948 general election, Schwarz and others formed the Torch Commando, an ex-soldiers' movement to protest against the disenfranchisement of the coloured people in South Africa. Beginning in the 1960s, when he was Leader of the Opposition in the Transvaal, he became well-known and achieved prominence as a race relations and economic reformist in the United Party. An early and powerful advocate of non-violent resistance, he signed the Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith with Mangosuthu Buthelezi in 1974, that enshrined the principles of peaceful negotiated transition of power and equality for all, the first of such agreements by black and white political leaders in South Africa. In 1975 he led a break away from the United Party, due to its lame duck approach to criticism of apartheid and became leader of the new Reform Party that led to the realignment of opposition politics in South Africa. Schwarz was one of the defence attorneys in the infamous Rivonia Trial, defending Jimmy Kantor, who was Nelson Mandela's lawyer until he too was arrested and charged. Through the 1970s and 1980s in Parliament he was amongst the most forthright and effective campaigners against apartheid, who was feared by many National Party ministers.
Helen Zille, an Afrikaner anti-apartheid activist, exposed a police cover-up regarding the death of Black Consciousness founder Steve Biko as a reporter for the Rand Daily Mail. Zille was active in the Black Sash, an organisation of white women formed in 1955 to oppose the removal of Coloured (mixed-race) voters from the Cape Province voters' roll. Even after that failure, however, it went on assisting blacks with issues such as pass laws, housing and unemployment.
Covert resistance was expressed by banned organisations like the largely white South African Communist Party, whose leader Joe Slovo was also Chief of Staff of the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. Whites also played a significant role in opposing apartheid during the 1980s through the United Democratic Front and End Conscription Campaign. The latter was formed in 1983 to oppose the conscription of white males into the South African military. The ECC's support-base was not particularly large, but the government still saw fit to ban it 1988.
The army played a major role in the government's maintenance of its apartheid policies. It was expanded considerably to fight the resistance, and more money was being spent on increasing its effectiveness. It is estimated that something between R4-billion and R5-billion was spent on defence in the mid-'eighties. Conscription was used to increase the size of the army, with stiff prison sentences imposed for draft evasion or desertion.[7] Only white males were conscripted, but volunteers from other races were also drawn in. The army was used to fight battles on South African borders and in neighbouring states, against the liberation movements and the countries that supported them. During the 1980s, the military was also used to repress township uprisings, which saw support for the ECC increase markedly.
Cultural opposition to apartheid came from internationally known writers like Breyten Breytenbach, André Brink and Alan Paton (who founded the Liberal Party of South Africa) and clerics like Beyers Naudé.
Some of the first violent resistance to the system was organised by the African Resistance Movement (ARM) who were responsible for setting off bombs at power stations and notably the Park Station bomb. The membership of this group was virtually all drawn from the marginalized white intellectual scene. Founded in the 1960s, many of ARM's members had been part of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). Unlike pro-peace opposition NUSAS, however, ARM was a radical organisation. Its backing came mostly from Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. By 1964, though, ARM ceased to exist, most of its members having been arrested or fled the country.
On 24 July 1964, Frederick John Harris, an associate of ARM, deposited a time bomb in the Johannesburg station. One person was slain, and 22 were injured. Harris explained that he had wanted to show that ARM was still in existence, but both ARM and the ANC slammed his actions. He was sentenced to death and executed in 1965.
At the same time South African women fought against gender discrimination and called for rights specific to women, such as family, children, gender equality and access to education. At a conference in Johannesburg in 1954, the Federation of South African Women adopted the "Women's Charter",[12] which focused on rights specific to women both as women and mothers. The Charter referred both to human rights, women's rights and asked for universal equality and national liberation. In 1955, in a document drafted in preparation for the Congress of People,[13] the FSAW made more demands, including free education for children, proper housing facilities and good working conditions, such as the abolition of child labor and a minimum wage.
The difficulty for these local movements was to raise global awareness in order to truly have an impact. Yet, their actions and demands gradually attracted the attention of the United Nations and put pressure on the international community. In 1954, Lilian Ngoyi attended the World Congress of Women in Lausanne, Switzerland.[14] Later, in 1975, the ANC was present at the 1975 United Nations Decade for Women in Copenhagen and in 1980 an essay on the role of women in the liberation movement[15] was prepared for the United Nations World Conference. This has been crucial in the recognition of Southern African women and their role in the anti-apartheid movement.
Among important activists during the liberation movement were Ida Ntwana, Lilian Ngoyi, Helen Joseph, Dorothy Nyembe.[16] Lilian Ngoyi joined the ANC National Executive and was elected first vice-president and later president of FSAW in 1959. Many of these leaders served long prison sentences.
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[edit] ANC
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Once the ANCYL had taken control of the ANC, the organization advocated a policy of open defiance and resistance for the first time. This unleashed the 1950s Programme of Action, instituted in 1949, which laid emphasis on the right of the African people to freedom under the flag of African Nationalism. It laid out plans for strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience, resulting in occasionally violent clashes, with mass protests, stay-aways, boycotts and strikes predominating. The 1950 May Day stay-away was a strong, successful expression of black grievances.
In 1952 the Joint Planning Council, made up of members from the ANC, the South African Indian Congress as well as the Coloured People's Congress, agreed on a plan for the defiance of unfair laws. They wrote to the Prime Minister, DF Malan and demanded that he repeal the Pass Laws, the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Administration Act and other legislation, warning that refusal to do so would be met with a campaign of defiance. The Prime Minister was haughty in his rejoinder, referring the Council to the Native Affairs Department and threatening to treat insolence callously.
The Programme of Action was launched with the Defiance Campaign in June 1952. By defying the laws, the organisation hoped for mass arrests with which the government would be unable to cope. Nelson Mandela led a crowd of fifty men down the streets of a white area in Johannesburg after the 11 pm curfew that forbade black peoples' presence. The group was apprehended, but the rest of the country followed its example. Defiance spread throughout the country and black people disregarded racial laws by, for example, walking through "whites only" entries. At the campaign's zenith, in September 1952, more than 2,500 people from 24 different towns had been arrested for defying various laws.
By the end of the campaign, the government arrested 8,000 people, but was forced to temporarily relax its apartheid legislation. In addition, as a direct result of the campaign, membership of the ANC increased and attention was drawn to apartheid's injustices. Once things had calmed down, however, the government responded with an iron fist, taking several supreme measures—among which were the Unlawful Organisations Act, the Suppression of Communism Act, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Procedures Act. Thus, in the longer term, this spelt defeat for the resistance movement. In December 1952, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and eighteen others were tried under the Suppression of Communism Act for leading the Defiance Campaign. They received nine months' imprisonment, suspended for two years.
The Criminal Law Amendment Act stated that "[a]ny person who in any way whatsoever advises, encourages, incites, commands, aids or procures any other person [...] or uses language calculated to cause any other person to commit an offence by way of protest against a law [...] shall be guilty of an offence".[cite this quote]
The government also constricted the regulation on separate amenities. Protesters had argued to the courts that different amenities for different races ought to be of an equal standard. The Separate Amenities Act removed the façade of mere separation; it gave the owners of public amenities the right to bar people on the basis of colour or race and made it lawful for different races to be treated inequitably. Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela, Albert Luthuli and other famous ANC, Indian Congress and trade union chiefs were all vetoed under the Suppression of Communism Act. The proscription meant that the headship was now restricted to its homes and adjacent areas and they were banned from attending public gatherings.
Though cruelly limited, the movement was still able to struggle against the oppressive instruments of the state. More importantly, collaboration between the ANC and NIC had increased and strengthened through the Defiance Campaign. Support for the ANC and its endeavours increased. In August 1953, the ANC Cape conference suggested an Assembly of the people.
Meanwhile, on the global stage, India demanded that apartheid be challenged by the United Nations. It led to the establishment of a UN commission on apartheid. This first encouraged black South Africans in their campaign, but, after five months, the African and Indian Congresses opted to call it off because of the increasing number of riots, strikes and heavier sentences on those who took part. During the campaign, almost 8,000 black and Indian people had been detained. At the same time, however, ANC membership grew from 7,000 to 100,000, and the number of subdivisions went from fourteen at the start of the campaign to 87 at its end. There was also a change in headship. Shortly before the campaign's end, Albert Luthuli was elected as the new ANC president.
A National Convention of all South Africans was proposed by Professor ZK Matthews at the Cape ANC conference on 15 August 1953. The intention was to chew over the national problems on an all-inclusive basis and outline a manifesto of amity. In March 1954, the ANC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the Coloured People's Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats (SACOD) and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) met and founded the National Action Council for the Congress of the People. Delegates were drawn from each of these establishments and a nationwide organiser was assigned. A campaign was publicised for the drafting of a freedom charter, and a call was made for 10,000 unpaid assistants to help with the conscription of views from across the country and the organisation of the Congress of the People. Demands were documented and sent to the local board of the National Action Council in preparation for drafting the Charter.
The Congress of the People was held from 26 to 27 of June 1955 in Kliptown, just south of Johannesburg. Under the attentive gaze of the constabulary, 3,000 delegates gathered to revise and accept the Freedom Charter that had been endorsed by the ANC's National Executive on the eve of the Congress. Among the organisations present were the Indian Congress and the ANC. The Freedom Charter, which articulated a vision for South Africa radically different to the partition policy of apartheid, emphasising that South Africa should be a just and non-racial society. It called for a one-person-one-vote democracy within a single unified state and stated that all people should be treated equally before the law, that land should be "shared among those who work it" and that the people should "share in the country's wealth" -- a statement which has often been interpreted as a call for socialist nationalisation. The congress delegates had consented to almost all the sections of the charter when the police announced that they suspected treason and recorded the names and addresses of all those present.
In 1956 the Federation of South African Women was founded and led by Lilian Ngoyi and the more famous Helen Joseph. On 9 August that year, the women marched on the Union Buildings in Pretoria, protesting against the pass laws. On the morning of December 5, 1956, however, the police detained 156 Congress Alliance leaders. 104 African, 23 white, 21 Indian and eight Coloured people were charged with high treason and plotting a violent overthrow of the state, to be replaced by a communist government. The charge was based on statements and speeches made during both the Defiance Campaign and the Congress of the People. The Freedom Charter was used as proof of the Alliance's communist intent and their conspiracy to oust the government. The State relied greatly on the evidence of Professor Arthur Murray, an ostensible authority on Marxism and Communism. His evidence was that the ANC papers were full of such communist terms as "comrade" and "proletariat", often found in the writings of Lenin and Stalin. Halfway through the drawn-out trial, charges against 61 of the accused were withdrawn, and, five years after their arrest, the remaining thirty were acquitted after the court held that the state had failed to prove its case.
[edit] PAC and the Sharpeville massacre
Main article: Sharpeville massacre
In 1959 a group of disenchanted ANC members broke away from the ANC and formed the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), saying the ANC was too strongly influenced by white communists. First on the PAC's agenda was a series of nationwide demonstrations against the pass laws. The PAC called for blacks to demonstrate against pass books on 21 March 1960. One of the mass demonstrations organized by the PAC took place at Sharpeville, a township near Vereeniging. Estimates of the size of the crowd vary from 3,000 to 20,000.[2][3] The crowd converged on the Sharpeville police station, singing and offering themselves up for arrest for not carrying their pass books. A group of about 300 police panicked and opened fire on the demonstrators after the crowd trampled down the fence surrounding the police station. They killed 69 people and injured 186. All the victims were black, and most of them had been shot in the back. Many witnesses stated that the crowd was not violent, but Colonel J. Pienaar, the senior police officer in charge on the day, said, "Hordes of natives surrounded the police station. My car was struck with a stone. If they do these things they must learn their lesson the hard way". The event became known as the Sharpeville massacre. In its aftermath the government banned the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).The Sharpeville Massacre helped shape ANC policy. Before Sharpeville those advocating the use of organized violence, such as Nelson Mandela, had been marginalized as too radical by the ANC's leadership. After Sharpeville Mandela was allowed to launch his guerilla struggle (called the "M" Plan). Hence, from 1961 the ANC adopted terrorist[4] tactics, such as intimidation, bombing, murder and sabotage. Although their units detonated bombs in restaurants, shopping centres, cinemas and in front of government buildings over the following years, the military wings of the ANC and PAC were never a military threat to the state.
[edit] Resistance goes underground
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In the wake of the shooting, a massive stay-away from work was organised and demonstrations continued. Prime Minister Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd declared a state of emergency, giving security forces the right to detain people without trial. Over 18,000 were arrested, including much of the ANC and PAC leadership, and both organizations were banned. The National Party government felt that outlawing the ANC and PAC would discontinue their operations. This was not the case. Some leaders went into exile abroad, while others stayed in South Africa and pursued the fight domestically. They went underground and initiated secret armed opposition groups.
The ANC and PAC ran campaigns of sabotage and terrorism through their armed wings, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, MK) and Poqo ("Pure" or "Alone"). The ANC leader, Chief Albert Luthuli, did not support an armed struggle, but there was growing backing for a violent struggle as people became more and more aggravated by the government's aversion to hearing them out. In June 1961 the ANC executive concurred on the formation of an armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), meaning "Spear of the Nation".
Nelson Mandela, who was the commander of the ANC's military wing (MK), had developed the "M Plan" (Mandela Plan), a programme of controlled sabotage, launching a guerilla war modelled upon the FLN's struggle in Algeria. Its policy involved the targeting of state buildings for sabotage without resorting to murder. On 16 December 1961 MK carried out its first acts of sabotage by assaulting post offices and other structures in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban. Many other acts of sabotage would take place over the next few years. In its first eighteen months, MK carried out about 200 acts of sabotage, but despite its policy, some deaths did occur. The headquarters were at Liliesleaf Farm in Rivonia, just outside Johannesburg.
Mandela began planning for MK members to be given military training outside South Africa and managed to slip past authorities as he himself moved in and out of the country, earning him the moniker "The Black Pimpernel". Mandela initially resisted arrest within South Africa, but in August 1962, after receiving some inside information, the police put up a roadblock and captured him. MK's success declined after this, and the police infiltrated the organisation.
A witch-hunt was launched against the dissident establishments. Many people were outlawed or placed under house arrest. In this way, the ANC net was shattered by the mid-1960s. Some people were held in detention, where they were often tormented or executed. In 1963, through a leak from informant Gerard Ludi, the police found the location of the MK headquarters at Lilliesleaf. In July, they raided the farm and arrested many major leaders of the ANC and MK, including Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and Ahmed Kathrada. They were detained and indicted with sabotage and attempting to bring down the government. At the same time, police collected evidence to be used in the trial, which enabled them to arrest other such people, like Denis Goldberg. Especially harmful was the information on Operation Mayibuye (Operation Comeback), a plan for bringing exiles back into the country. It also revealed that MK was planning to use guerrilla warfare.
Some ANC members, including Oliver Tambo, avoided capture and escaped South Africa to pursue the ANC's interests from beyond the country's boundaries. Tambo was to lead the ANC in exile for another thirty years. Many supporters also left South Africa for military training under MK.
The PAC's secretive martial arm was called Poqo, meaning "go it alone" or "pure" in the Xhosa tongue. Poqo was prepared to take lives in the quest for liberation. It murdered whites, police informants and black people who supported the government. It arranged a national revolution in order to conquer the white government, but poor organization and in-house nuisances crippled the PAC and Poqo.
The PAC did not have adequate direction. When Robert Sobukwe (jailed following the Sharpeville massacre) was discharged from Robben Island in 1969, he was placed under house arrest in Kimberley until he died in 1978. Police repeatedly lengthened his incarceration through the "Sobukwe clause", which permitted the state to detain people even after they had served their sentences. Many other PAC principals were taken into custody on 21 March 1960, and those released were hampered by bans.
The PAC's management difficulties also existed in exile. When they were outlawed, PAC leaders set up headquarters, in among places, Dar es Salaam, London and the United States. In 1962, Potlako Leballo (1915–1986) left the country for Maseru, Basutoland, and became the PAC's acting president. He and Mandela had arranged to meet but Mandela was arrested the day before Leballo reached Basutoland. When British intelligence in Maseru warned the South Africans that two female PAC couriers had crossed into South Africa to deliver letters the police confiscated correspondence addressed to 70 PAC cells. A wave arrests followed, and 3,246 PAC and Poqo members went to jail. This led to the crumpling of the PAC within South Africa, also because a large arms shipment from Ghana via Egypt failed to make a landing.
Leballo also annoyed external PAC leaders through his attempt, with Sobukwe's assent, to militarize the external party structure on Maoist Red Army lines. In 1968, the OAU Liberation Committee stepped in to back Leballo but the PAC was eventually expelled from Maseru (where it was allied to the opposition Basutoland Congress Party) and Lusaka (which was friendlier to the ANC). All in all, MK ran a far more successful guerilla campaign than Poqo. Between 1974 and 1976 Leballo trained the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) in Libya and then 500 Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) troops. American pressures split the PAC into a "reformist-diplomatic" group under Sibeko, Make, and Pokela; and a Maoist group under Leballo based in Ghana and Ugandan (Museveni) resistance controlled areas of Zaire (Congo). The 500 strong APLA force was destroyed by the Tanzanian military at Chunya on March 11, 1980 for refusing to accept the reformist-diplomatic leadership. Leballo was influential in the South African 1985 student risings and pivotal in removing Leabua Jonathan's regime in Lesotho, the stress of which caused his death. The PAC never recovered from the 1980 massacre of Leballo's troops and his death and won a paltry 1.2% of the vote in the 1994 South African election.
The widely-publicized Rivonia Trial began in October 1963. Ten men stood accused of treason, trying to depose the government and sabotage. Nelson Mandela was tried, along with those arrested at Lilliesleaf and another 24 co-conspirators. Many of these people, however, had already fled the country, Tambo being but one.
The ANC used the lawsuit to draw international interest to its cause. During the trial, Mandela gave his legendary "I am prepared to die" diatribe. In June 1964, eight were found guilty of terrorism, sabotage, planning and executing guerilla warfare, and working towards an armed invasion of the country. The treason charge was dropped. All eight were sentenced to life imprisonment. They did not get the death penalty, as this hazarded too much international criticism. Goldberg was sent to the Pretoria jail, and the other seven were all banished to the prison on Robben Island. Bram Fischer, the defence trial attorney, was himself arrested and tried shortly thereafter. The instructions that Mandela gave to make MK an African force were ignored: it continued to be organized and led by the SACP. Consequently there were serious mutinies in Angolan camps by Soweto and Cape student recruits angry at the corrupt and brutal consequences of minority control.
The trial was condemned by the United Nations Security Council, and was a major force in the introduction of international sanctions against the South African government. After Sharpeville the ANC and PAC were banned. The South African Communist Party denied it existed, having dissolved in 1950 to escape banning as the CPSA. Leaders like Mandela and Sobukwe were either in jail or in exile.
By incarcerating leaders of MK and the ANC, the government was able to break the potency of the ANC within South Africa's borders, and greatly affect its efficiency outside of them. The ANC faced many problems in the aftermath of the Rivonia Trial, its inner administration cruelly afflicted. Exiled leaders understood that conveying skilled guerrillas into South Africa would be complicated, as bordering states were unfriendly towards the ANC. Mozambique was still a Portuguese colony, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Bechuanaland (now Botswana) were still in colonial hands, and South West Africa (now Namibia) was controlled by the South African government. Thus, by 1964, the government had essentially broken the activist movements. The first armed invasion in South Africa's history by an African force was curiously the 1978 attack by the Lesotho Liberation (Army (LLA), a 178 strong force trained by Leballo, which was mostly wiped out in 1979. A second LLA was the creature of South African intelligence services backed by former CIA operatives (Ray Steiner Cline), former Rhodesian Army personnel, and anti-communist American and Asian organizations.
At the same time, international criticism of apartheid increased. The United Nations denounced the trial and commenced steps for the introduction of sanctions. The PAC and Poqo persisted in their activities through the late 1960s and 1970s, but, because of their use of violence, members were under continuous police surveillance, and there were few acts of damaging sabotage. The ANC looked into ways of infiltrating South Africa in spite of its dearth of internal structure.
Although the ANC attempted to reconstruct itself, there would be no real action until the 1970s, when striking militancy began to reappear. At the end of the 1960s, new organisations and ideas would form to confront apartheid. The next key act of opposition would come only in 1976, however, with the Soweto uprising.
The government's effort at defeating all opposition had been effective. The State of Emergency was de-proclaimed; the economy boomed; and the government began implementing apartheid by building the infrastructures of the ten separate Homelands, and relocating blacks into these homelands. In 1966, Verwoerd was stabbed to death in parliament, but his policies continued under B.J. Vorster and later P.W. Botha.
[edit] Black Consciousness Movement
Main article: Black Consciousness Movement
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After the banning of the ANC and PAC, and the Rivonia Trial, the struggle within South Africa had been dealt a stern blow. The age bracket that had seen the Sharpeville Massacre had become apathetic in its gloom and despair. This changed in the late 1960s and most notably from the mid-1970s, when new devotion came from the latest, more radical generation. During this epoch, new anti-apartheid ideas and establishments were created, and they gathered support from across South Africa.
The surfacing of the South African Black Consciousness Movement was influenced by its American equivalent, the American Black Power movement, and directors such as Malcolm X. African heads like Kenneth Kaunda also stirred ideas of autonomy and Black Pride by means of their anti-colonialist writings. Scholars grew in assurance and became far more candid about the NP's bigoted policies and the repression of the black people.
During the 1970s, resistance gained force, first channelled through trade unions and strikes, and then spearheaded by the South African Students' Organisation, under the charismatic leadership of Steve Biko. A medical student, Biko was the main force behind the growth of South Africa's Black Consciousness Movement, which stressed the need for psychological liberation, black pride, and non-violent opposition to apartheid.[5]
Founded by Biko, the BC faction materialised out of the ideas of the civil rights movement and Black Power movement in the USA. The motto of the movement was "Black is Beautiful", first made popular by boxer Mohammed Ali. BC endorsed black pride and African customs, and did much to alter feelings of inadequacy, while also raising awareness of the fallacy of blacks being seen as inferior. It defied practices and merchandise that were meant to make black people "whiter", such as hair straighteners and skin lighteners. Western culture was toured as destructive and alien to Africa. Black people became conscious of their own distinctive identity and self-worth, and grew more outspoken about their right to freedom.
The National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) was the first student representative, but it had a principally white membership, and black students saw this as an impediment. White students had concerns more scholastic than political, and, although the administration was multi-racial, it was not tackling many of the issues of the mounting number of black students since 1960. This resulted in the 1967 creation of the University Christian Movement (UCM), an organisation rooted in African-American philosophy.
In July 1967, the annual NUSAS symposium took place at Rhodes University in Grahamstown. White students were permitted to dwell on university grounds, but black students were relegated to an abode further away in a church vestibule. This later led to the creation of the South African Students Organisation (SASO), under Steve Biko, in 1969.
The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) was an umbrella organisation for groups such as SASO. It was created in 1967, and among its members were the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), the black Community Programme (which directed welfare schemes for blacks), the Black People's Convention (which, at first, attempted to unite charitable associations like that for the Education and Cultural Advancement of African People of South Africa) and the South African Students Movement (SASM), which represented high-school learners. The BPC finally expanded into a political administration, with Steve Biko as its honorary president.
When the BCM's principles were illuminated, a number of fresh organisations, staunch in their endorsement of black liberation, came into being. AZAPO was only launched in 1978, a long time after the birth of the BCM, as a medium for its message.
The BCM drew most of its backing from high schools and tertiary institutions. Black Consciousness ethics were crucial in lifting consciousness amongst black people of their value and right to a better existence, along with the need to insist on these. The BCM's non-violent approach subsided in favour of a more radical element as its resolve to attain liberty was met with state hostility.
After the carnage in Soweto the ANC's Nelson Mandela grudgingly concurred that bloodshed was the only means left to convince the NP to accede to commands for an end to its apartheid policy. A subversive plan of terror was mapped out, with Steve Biko and the BCM to the fore. The BCM and other opinionated elements were prohibited during the 1970s because the government saw them as dangerous. Black Consciousness in South Africa adopted a drastic theory, much like socialism, as the liberation movement progressed to challenging class divisions and shifting from an ethnic stress to focusing more on non-racialism. The BCM became more worried about the destiny of the black people as workers, believing that "economic and political exploitation has reduced the black people into a class".
With Black Consciousness increasing throughout black communities, a number of other organisations were formed to combat apartheid. In 1972, the Black People's Convention was founded, and the black Allied Worker's Union, formed in 1973, focused on black labour matters. The black Community Programmes gave attention to the more global issues of black communities. School learners began to confront the Bantu education policy, designed to prepare them to be second-class citizens. They created the South African Student's Movement (SASM). It was particularly popular in Soweto, where the 1976 insurrection against Bantu Education would prove to be a crossroads in the fight against apartheid.
Taken into custody on 18 August 1977, Steve Biko was brutally tortured by unidentified security personnel until he lapsed into a coma. He went for three days without medical treatment and finally died in Pretoria. At the subsequent inquest, the magistrate ruled that no-one was to blame, but the South African Medical Association eventually took action against the doctors who had failed to treat Biko.
There was tremendous reaction both within and outside South Africa. Foreign countries imposed even more stringent sanctions than those which had come before, and the United Nations imposed an arms embargo. Young blacks inside South Africa committed themselves even more fervently to the struggle against apartheid, under the catchphrase "Liberation before education". Black communities became highly politicised.
The Black Consciousness Movement began to change its focus during the 1980s from being on issues of nation and community to issues of class and, perhaps as a result, had far less of an impact than in the mid-'seventies. Still, there is some evidence to suggest that it retained at least some influence, particularly in workers' organisations.
The role of Black Consciousness could be clearly seen in the approach of the National Forum, which believed that the struggle ought to hold little or no place for whites. This ideal, of blacks leading the resistance campaign, was an important aim of the traditional BC groups, and it shaped the thinking of many 'eighties activists, most notably the workforce. Furthermore, the NF focused on workers' issues, which became more and more important to BC supporters.
The Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) was the leading BC group of the 1980s. It got most of its support from young black men and women—many of them educated at colleges and universities. The organisation had a lot of support in Soweto and also amongst journalists, helping to popularise its views. It focused, too, on workers' issues, but it refused to form any ties with whites.
Although it did not achieve quite the same groundswell support that it had in the late 1970s, BC still influenced the thinking of a few resistance groups.
[edit] The Soweto uprising
Main article: Soweto uprising
In 1974 the Afrikaans Medium Decree forced all black schools to use Afrikaans and English in a 50-50 mix as languages of instruction. The intention was to forcibly reverse the decline of Afrikaans among black Africans. The Afrikaner-dominated government used the clause of the 1909 Constitution that recognized only English and Afrikaans as official languages as pretext to do so.The decree was resented deeply by blacks as Afrikaans was widely viewed, in the words of Desmond Tutu, then Dean of Johannesburg as "the language of the oppressor". Teacher organizations such as the African Teachers Association of South Africa objected to the decree.
The resentment grew until April 30, 1976, when children at Orlando West Junior School in Soweto went on strike, refusing to go to school. Their rebellion then spread to many other schools in Soweto. Students formed an Action Committee (later known as the Soweto Students’ Representative Council) that organized a mass rally for June 16, 1976. The protest was intended to be peaceful.
In a confrontation with police, who had barricaded the road along the intended route, stones were thrown. Attempts to disperse the crowd with dogs and tear gas failed; when the police saw they were surrounded by the students, they fired shots into the crowd, at which point pandemonium broke out.
In the first day of rioting 23 people were killed in escalating violence. The following day 1,500 heavily armed police officers were deployed to Soweto. Crowd control methods used by South African police at the time included mainly dispersement techniques, and many of the officers shot indiscriminately, killing many people.
[edit] Student organisations
Student organisations played a significant role in the Soweto uprisings, and after 1976 protests by school children became frequent. There were two major urban school boycotts, in 1980 and 1983. Both involved black, Indian and coloured children, and both went on for months. There were also extended protests in rural areas in 1985 and 1986. In all of these areas, schools were closed and thousands of students, teachers and parents were arrested.[edit] South African Students Movement
Students from Orlando West and Diepkloof High Schools (both in Soweto) created the African Students Movement in 1970. This spread to the Eastern Cape and Transvaal, drawing other high schools. In March 1972, the South African Students Movement (SASM) was instituted.SASM gave support to its members with school work and exams, and with progress from lower school levels to university. Security forces pestered its members continually until, in 1973, some of its leaders fled the country. In 1974 and 1975, some affiliates were captured and tried under the Suppression of Communism and Terrorism Acts. This flagged the SASM's progress. Many school headmasters and -mistresses forbade the organisation from playing a role in their schools.
When the Southern Transvaal local Bantu Education Department concluded that all junior secondary black students had to be taught in Afrikaans in 1974, SASM limbs at Naledi High and Orlando West Secondary Schools opted to vent their grievances on school books and refused to attend their schools This form of struggle spread fast to other schools in Soweto and hit boiling point around 8 June 1976. When law enforcement attempted to arrest a regional SASM secretary, they were stoned and had their cars torched.
On 13 June 1976, nearly 400 SASM associates gathered and chose to start a movement for mass action. An Action Committee was shaped with two agents from each school in Soweto. This board became known as the Soweto Students' Representatives Council (SSRC). The protest was set aside for 16 June 1976, and the organisers were determined only to use aggression if they were assaulted by the police.
[edit] National Union of South African Students
Main article: National Union of South African Students
After the Sharpeville Massacre, some black student organisations came out but were short-lived under state proscription and antagonism from university powers. They were also unsuccessful in cooperating effectively with one another, resulting in a dearth of harmony and force.By 1963, one of the few envoys for tertiary students was the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). Although the organisation was meant to be non-racial and anti-government, it was made up primarily of white English students from customarily broad-minded universities such as those in Natal, Cape Town, the Witwatersrand and Grahamstown. These students were had compassion for the effort against the state. By 1967, however, NUSAS was forbidden from functioning on black universities, making it almost impossible for black Student Representative Councils to join the union.
[edit] South African Students Organisation
Main article: South African Students Organisation
Growing displeasure among black students and the expansion of Black Consciousness led to the incarnation of the South African Students Organisation (SASO) at Turfloop. In July 1969, Steve Biko became the organisation's inaugural head. This boosted the mood of the students and the Black Consciousness Movement. By means of the unified configuration of SASO, the principles of Black Consciousness came to the forefront as a fresh incentive for the strugglers.[edit] Congress of South African Students
The Congress of South African Students (COSAS) was aimed at coordinating the education struggle and organised strikes, boycotts and mass protests around community issues. After 1976 it made a number of demands from the Department of Education and Training (DET), including the scrapping of matric examination fees. It barred many DET officials from entering schools, demanded that all students pass their exams -- "pass one, pass all" -- and disrupted exams.[edit] National Education Crisis Committee
In 1986, following school boycotts, the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) was constituted from parents, teachers and students. It encouraged students to return to their studies, taking on forms of protest less disruptive to their education. Consumer boycotts were recommended instead and teachers and students were encouraged to work together to develop an alternative education system.[edit] Trade-Union movement
| This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (January 2008) |
Police employed tear gas and violence against the strikers, but could not apprehend the masses of people involved. The strikers never chose individuals to stand for them, because these people would be the first to be detained. Blacks were not permitted trade unions, which meant that the government could not act against any particular individuals. Strikes usually concluded when income boosts were tendered, but these were generally lower than had initially been insisted upon.
The Durban strikes soon extended to other parts of the country. 1973 and 1974 saw a countrywide amplification of labour opposition. There was also an increasingly buoyancy among black workers as they found that the state did not retort as harshly as they had expected. They thus began to form trade unions, even though these remained illegitimate and unofficial.
After 1976, trade unions and their workers began to play a massive role in the fight against apartheid. With their thousands of members, the trade unions had great strength in numbers, and this they used to their advantage, campaigning for the rights of black workers and forcing the government to make changes to its apartheid policies. Importantly, trade unions filled the gap left by banned political parties. They assumed tremendous importance because they could act on a wide variety of issues and problems for their people—and not only work-related ones, as links between work issues and broader community grievances became more palpable.
Fewer trade-union officials (harassed less by the police and army) were jailed than political leaders in the townships. Union members could meet and make plans within the factory. In this way, trade unions played a pivotal role in the struggle against apartheid, and their efforts generally had wide community support.
In 1979, one year after Botha's accession to power, black trade unions were legalized, and their role in the resistance struggle grew to all-new proportions. Prior to 1979, black trade unions had had no legal clout in dealings with employers. All strikes that took place were illegal, but they did help to establish the trade unions and their collective cause. Although the legalisation of black trade unions gave workers the legal right to strike, it also gave the government a degree of control over them, as they all had to be registered and hand in their membership records to the government. They were not allowed to support political parties either, and it goes without saying that some trade unions did not comply.
Later in 1979, the FOSATU body was formed, followed by the Council of Unions of South Africa (COSAS). It was influenced strongly by the ideas of Black Consciousness and wanted to work to ensure black leadership of unions.
The establishment of the trade-union federations led to greater unity amongst the workers. The tremendous size of the federations gave them increased voice and power. 1980 saw thousands of black high-school and university students boycotting their schools, and a country-wide protest over wages, rents and bus fares. In 1982, there were 394 strikes involving 141,571 workers. FOSATU and CUSA grew from a mere 70,000 members in 1979 to 320,000 by 1983, the year of the establishment of first the National Forum and then the UDF. Both of these had an important impact, but the latter was far more influential.
With the establishment of the new constitution in 1984, the biggest and longest black uprising exploded in the Vaal Triangle. COSAS and FOSATU organised the longest stay-away in South African history, and, all told, there were 469 strikes that year, amounting to 378,000 hours in lost business time.
In accordance with the State of Emergency in 1985, COSAS was banned and many UDF leaders arrested. A meeting between white business leaders and those of the ANC in Zambia brought about the formation of COSATU in 1985. The newly-formed trade-union governing body, committed to improved working conditions and the fight against apartheid, organised a nationwide strike the following year, and a new State of Emergency was declared. It did not take long for COSATU's membership to grow to 500,000.
With South Africa facing a neigh-unprecedented shortage of skilled white labour, the government was forced to allow black people to fill the vacancies. This, in turn, led to an increase in spending on black, coloured and Indian education.
Still, there were divides amongst the trade-union faction, which had the membership of only ten per cent of the country's workforce. Not all trade unions joined the federations, while agricultural and domestic workers did not even have a trade union to join and were thus more liable. Nevertheless, by the end of this period, the unions had emerged as one of the most effective vehicles for black opposition.
[edit] Churches
The government's suppression of anti-Apartheid political parties limited their influence but not church activism. The government was far less likely to attack or arrest religious leaders, allowing them to potentially be more politically active in the struggle. The government did, however, take action against some churches.Beyers Naudé left the pro-apartheid Dutch Reformed Church and founded the Christian Institute, bringing white and black people together. He, along with the Institute, were banned in 1977, but he later became the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches (SACC), a religious association which supported anti-apartheid activities. Significantly, it also refused to condemn violence as a means of ending apartheid.
Frank Chikane was another general secretary of the SACC. He was detained four times because of his criticism of the government and once allegedly had an attempt on his life, initiated by Adriaan Vlok, former Minister of Law and Order.
The charismatic Archbishop Desmond Tutu was yet another general secretary of the SACC. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in 1984 and used his position and popularity to denounce the government and its policies. On 29 February 1988 Tutu, and a number of other church leaders, were arrested during a protest in front of the parliamentary buildings in Cape Town.[6]
Alan Boesak led the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC). He was very influential in founding the UDF and was once jailed for a month after organising a march demanding the release of Nelson Mandela.
Although church leaders were not totally immune to prosecution, they were able to criticise the government more freely than the leaders of militant groups. They were pivotal in altering public opinion regarding apartheid policies.
[edit] MDM
The Mass Democratic Movement played a brief but very important role in the struggle. Formed in 1989, it was made up of an alliance between the UDF and COSATU, and organised a campaign aimed at ending segregation in hospitals, schools and beaches. The campaign proved successful and managed to bring segregation to an end. Some historians, however, argue that this occurred because the government had planned to end segregation anyway and did not, therefore, feel at all threatened by the MDM's action.Later in 1989, the MDM organised a number of peaceful marches against the State of Emergency (extended to four years now) in the major cities. Even though these marches were illegal, no-one was arrested—evidence that apartheid was coming to an end and that the government's hold was weakening.
Although the MDM emerged only very late into the struggle, it did add to the effective resistance that the government faced, organising a series of protests and further uniting the opposition movement. Certainly, it was characteristic of the "mass resistance" which characterised the 'eighties: many organisations were united, dealing with different aspects of the fight against apartheid and its implications.
Some aid workers present during the MDM's existence claim that it was actually little more than a socialist front organization for terrorists that would use violence to "bolster" support.[1]
[edit] White resistance
While the majority of white South African voters supported the apartheid system, a minority (mainly of non-Afrikaners) fervently opposed it. Although assassination attempts against government members were rare, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, called the "architect of grand apartheid", suffered two attempts on his life (the second of which was successful) on the hands of David Pratt and Dimitri Tsafendas, both legally considered white (although Tsafendas had a mother from Portuguese East Africa). The moderate United Party of Jan Smuts (the official opposition in 1948-1977) initially opposed the Nationalists' programme of apartheid, having favored the dismantling of racial segregation by the Fagan Commission, but eventually came to revert its policy and even criticised the NP government for "handing out" too much South African land to the bantustans. In parliamentary elections during the 1970s and 1980s between 15% and 20% of white voters voted for the liberal Progressive Party, whose main champion Helen Suzman for many years constituted the only MP consistently voting against apartheid legislation. Suzman's critics argue that she did not achieve any notable political successes, but helped to shore up claims by the Nationalists that internal, public criticism of apartheid was permitted. Suzman's supporters point to her use of her parliamentary privileges to help the poorest and most disempowered South Africans in any way she could.Harry Schwarz was in minority opposition politics for over 40 years and was one of the most prominent opponents of the National Party and its policy of apartheid. After assisting in the 1948 general election, Schwarz and others formed the Torch Commando, an ex-soldiers' movement to protest against the disenfranchisement of the coloured people in South Africa. Beginning in the 1960s, when he was Leader of the Opposition in the Transvaal, he became well-known and achieved prominence as a race relations and economic reformist in the United Party. An early and powerful advocate of non-violent resistance, he signed the Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith with Mangosuthu Buthelezi in 1974, that enshrined the principles of peaceful negotiated transition of power and equality for all, the first of such agreements by black and white political leaders in South Africa. In 1975 he led a break away from the United Party, due to its lame duck approach to criticism of apartheid and became leader of the new Reform Party that led to the realignment of opposition politics in South Africa. Schwarz was one of the defence attorneys in the infamous Rivonia Trial, defending Jimmy Kantor, who was Nelson Mandela's lawyer until he too was arrested and charged. Through the 1970s and 1980s in Parliament he was amongst the most forthright and effective campaigners against apartheid, who was feared by many National Party ministers.
Helen Zille, an Afrikaner anti-apartheid activist, exposed a police cover-up regarding the death of Black Consciousness founder Steve Biko as a reporter for the Rand Daily Mail. Zille was active in the Black Sash, an organisation of white women formed in 1955 to oppose the removal of Coloured (mixed-race) voters from the Cape Province voters' roll. Even after that failure, however, it went on assisting blacks with issues such as pass laws, housing and unemployment.
Covert resistance was expressed by banned organisations like the largely white South African Communist Party, whose leader Joe Slovo was also Chief of Staff of the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. Whites also played a significant role in opposing apartheid during the 1980s through the United Democratic Front and End Conscription Campaign. The latter was formed in 1983 to oppose the conscription of white males into the South African military. The ECC's support-base was not particularly large, but the government still saw fit to ban it 1988.
The army played a major role in the government's maintenance of its apartheid policies. It was expanded considerably to fight the resistance, and more money was being spent on increasing its effectiveness. It is estimated that something between R4-billion and R5-billion was spent on defence in the mid-'eighties. Conscription was used to increase the size of the army, with stiff prison sentences imposed for draft evasion or desertion.[7] Only white males were conscripted, but volunteers from other races were also drawn in. The army was used to fight battles on South African borders and in neighbouring states, against the liberation movements and the countries that supported them. During the 1980s, the military was also used to repress township uprisings, which saw support for the ECC increase markedly.
Cultural opposition to apartheid came from internationally known writers like Breyten Breytenbach, André Brink and Alan Paton (who founded the Liberal Party of South Africa) and clerics like Beyers Naudé.
Some of the first violent resistance to the system was organised by the African Resistance Movement (ARM) who were responsible for setting off bombs at power stations and notably the Park Station bomb. The membership of this group was virtually all drawn from the marginalized white intellectual scene. Founded in the 1960s, many of ARM's members had been part of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). Unlike pro-peace opposition NUSAS, however, ARM was a radical organisation. Its backing came mostly from Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. By 1964, though, ARM ceased to exist, most of its members having been arrested or fled the country.
On 24 July 1964, Frederick John Harris, an associate of ARM, deposited a time bomb in the Johannesburg station. One person was slain, and 22 were injured. Harris explained that he had wanted to show that ARM was still in existence, but both ARM and the ANC slammed his actions. He was sentenced to death and executed in 1965.
[edit] Role of women
South African women greatly participated in the anti-apartheid and liberation movements that took hold of South Africa. They demanded the independence of their country and their people. These female activists were rarely at the head of the main organizations, at least at the beginning of the movement, but were nonetheless prime actors. One of the earliest organization was The Bantu Women's League founded in 1913.[8] In the 1930s and 1940s, female activists were strongly present in trade union movements, which also served as a vehicle for future organization. In the 1950s, organizations specifically for women were created such as the ANC Women's League(ANCWL) or a Women's Council within the South West Africa People's Organization(SWAPO).[9] In April 1954, the more global Federation of South African Women (FSAW or FedSAW) was founded with the objective to fight against racism and oppression of women as well as to make African women understand that they had rights both as human beings and as women. While female actvists fought along men and participated to demonstrations and guerrilla movements, FSAW and ANCWL also acted independently and organized bus boycotts, campaigns against restrictive passes in 1956 in Pretoria and in Sharpeville in 1960.[10] 20.000 women attended these kind of demonstrations. Many participants were arrested, forced into exile or imprisoned such as Lilian Ngoyi. In 1958, 2000 women were arrested during an anti-pass campaign.[11] After the Sharpeville Massacre, however, many organizations such as FSAW were banned and went underground.At the same time South African women fought against gender discrimination and called for rights specific to women, such as family, children, gender equality and access to education. At a conference in Johannesburg in 1954, the Federation of South African Women adopted the "Women's Charter",[12] which focused on rights specific to women both as women and mothers. The Charter referred both to human rights, women's rights and asked for universal equality and national liberation. In 1955, in a document drafted in preparation for the Congress of People,[13] the FSAW made more demands, including free education for children, proper housing facilities and good working conditions, such as the abolition of child labor and a minimum wage.
The difficulty for these local movements was to raise global awareness in order to truly have an impact. Yet, their actions and demands gradually attracted the attention of the United Nations and put pressure on the international community. In 1954, Lilian Ngoyi attended the World Congress of Women in Lausanne, Switzerland.[14] Later, in 1975, the ANC was present at the 1975 United Nations Decade for Women in Copenhagen and in 1980 an essay on the role of women in the liberation movement[15] was prepared for the United Nations World Conference. This has been crucial in the recognition of Southern African women and their role in the anti-apartheid movement.
Among important activists during the liberation movement were Ida Ntwana, Lilian Ngoyi, Helen Joseph, Dorothy Nyembe.[16] Lilian Ngoyi joined the ANC National Executive and was elected first vice-president and later president of FSAW in 1959. Many of these leaders served long prison sentences.
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- ^ Tom Lodge, ‘Action against Apartheid in South Africa, 1983-94’, in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (eds.), Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 213-30. ISBN 978-0-19-955201-6.
- ^ Pogrund, Benjamin (1990). How Can Man Die Better: The Life of Robert Sobukwe.
- ^ David M. Sibeko (March 1976). "The Sharpeville Massacre: Its historic significance in the struggle against apartheid". United Nations Centre against Apartheid. Archived from the original on 2005-04-08. Retrieved 2005-08-20.
- ^ "African National Congress", US National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism web site
- ^ Slightly more contentious was the movement's decision to stop working with white liberals in multi-racial organisations.
- ^ http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=137105 Tutu, Other Clergy Arrested in Protest
- ^ John D. Battersby (March 28, 1988). "More Whites in South Africa Resisting the Draft". New York Times.
- ^ Bernstein, Hilda. For their Triumphs and for their Tears: Women in Apartheid South Africa(International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. Revised and enlarged edition, London, March 1985), pp. 86
- ^ Lachick and Urdang, pp.110
- ^ Rob Davied, Dan O'Meara and Sipho Dlamini. The Struggle For South Africa: A reference guide to movements, organizations and institution. Volume Two. (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1984), pp. 366
- ^ Bernstein, pp. 96
- ^ ANC/FSAW, Women's Charter.
- ^ ANC/FSAW, What Women Want, Compiled in Preparation for the Congress of the People, 1955.
- ^ ANC official website, Lilian Nogyi
- ^ ANC, Secretariat for the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women. The Role of Women in the Struggle Against Apartheid, 1980.
- ^ Bernstein, Hilda pp.100-101
- This page was last modified on 30 December 2011 at 18:39.
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Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 2 (author’s prepublication version)
2
Sharpeville
On 21 March 1960, white police in the town of
Sharpeville, South Africa, opened fire on a
large crowd of peaceful black protesters,
killing perhaps a hundred of them and injuring
many more. This massacre dramatically publicized
the protesters’ cause internationally.1
This case starkly illustrates how violent
attacks on peaceful protesters can be counterproductive.
I tell the Sharpeville story with
special attention to tactics that might increase
or decrease the scale of backfire. In the
conclusion, I note how these tactics relate to
the five main methods of inhibiting or expressing
outrage.
In 1960, whites ruled South Africa. In the
system called apartheid, blacks, who
composed most of the population, could not
vote and were given only the worst jobs at low
pay, so their standard of living was far below
that of whites. Blacks had separate, inferior
education. Their movement was restricted: to
travel, male blacks had to possess a “pass,”
analogous to an internal passport. By 1960,
pass documents were held in a “reference
book” that contained
the holder’s name, his tax receipt, his
permit to be in an urban area and to seek
work there, permits from the Labour
1. Philip Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity:
Sharpeville and its Massacre (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2001) is the
definitive treatment of the Sharpeville massacre.
The account here, except for material
about the international reaction, is drawn
largely from this source. For the purposes of a
backfire analysis, heavy reliance on Frankel’s
book is not problematic because Frankel did
not structure his study using a backfire
framework.
Bureau, the signature of his employer
each month, and other particulars … the
reference book must be shown on
demand to any policeman or any of the
fifteen different classes of officials who
require to see it. Failure to produce it on
demand constitutes an offence.2
Pass offences often led to fines or imprisonment,
with a thousand people charged every
day. For the black population, the pass laws
were a potent symbol of their oppression. The
rally in Sharpeville was a protest against these
laws.
Sharpeville was set up by the South African
government as a model community, with row
upon row of housing for blacks who would
travel to work in nearby cities. Residents of
the nearby black town of Topville — seen by
the government as too close to white suburbs
— were encouraged to relocate to Sharpeville.
Filled with many recently arrived families
seeking a better life, Sharpeville did not have a
strong local economy or traditions. There were
about 35,000 residents, of whom some 20,000
were children. It was like a large anonymous
suburb, stable and without a militant reputation.
Nevertheless, Sharpeville residents were
affected by the unrest sweeping the country.
For many decades, white rule in South Africa
had been met by resistance, including mass
opposition to pass laws from the early decades
of the twentieth century. The African National
Congress was the primary vehicle for black
opposition to apartheid. Through the 1950s,
the ANC was totally committed to nonvio-
2. Ambrose Reeves, Shooting at Sharpeville:
The Agony of South Africa (London: Victor
Gollancz, 1960), 51.
8 Justice Ignited
lence. For example, in 1959 the ANC called
for a one-month boycott of potatoes, which
were a suitable boycott target for both
economic and symbolic reasons. Thousands of
blacks, jailed for pass law violations, were put
under the supervision of farmers and made to
pick potatoes with their bare hands. Though
potatoes were a diet staple, the boycott was
taken up eagerly and continued for three
months before the ANC called it to a close.3
In the late 1950s, the ANC was increasingly
challenged by the Pan Africanist Congress
(PAC), which took a more militant stance. In
March 1960, the PAC organized protests
against the pass laws, with 21 March set as the
date for rallies around the country.
Being an anti-apartheid organizer was a
risky business. The South African Police were
well in control, with paid informers providing
information about activities of both the ANC
and PAC. Through their informers, police
were aware major protests were being planned
around the country, but were misled about the
date. PAC activists discovered the police
agents and fed them false information.4
In terms of black protest, Sharpeville was
quiescent compared to other areas. Nevertheless,
PAC activists were able to mobilize
support from a large proportion of the town
population. Over the weekend prior to the
rally, PAC activists went door to door telling
residents about the protest scheduled for
Monday. During the nights that weekend,
there were numerous spontaneous demonstrations
and clashes with police. Protesters
chanted and came armed with sticks; the
police attacked with whips and batons. In one
incident, numerous objects were thrown at
police, who attacked with batons. But the
crowd did not retreat or disperse and the police
fired 42 rounds, killing at least two residents.
Someone in a nearby house fired two shots,
missing police.
Despite the police’s greater arsenal and
killing power, and the fact that no police were
3. Albert Luthuli, Let My People Go (London:
Collins, 1962), 217–19.
4. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 64.
seriously harmed over the weekend, the
clashes and shots made them apprehensive,
fearing an impending bloodbath.5 Of course,
residents subject to police assaults might well
have been even more apprehensive. But it is
important to be aware of the state of mind of
the police in order to understand what was to
come.
On Monday morning, 21 March, only a few
residents left Sharpeville to go to work.
Instead, most of the town’s population
gradually joined the rally outside the police
station. The crowd eventually numbered
18,000 to 25,000, including many children.
The organizers of the rally had no welldeveloped
plan of action, nor any system for
crowd control. A few crowd members had
weapons, mainly sticks and knobkerries, clublike
weapons made from saplings with roots
on their ends. There was some antagonism
toward the police, but at the same time there
were elements of a carnival, “happy-go-lucky”
atmosphere. There was no plan to attack the
police station. The few weapons carried in the
crowd served to boost morale rather than to aid
an attack.6
In the Sharpeville police station, facing the
crowd, were some 400 police, half with
firearms, plus Saracen tanks with machine
guns. This was ample firepower to quell any
disturbance. Nevertheless, the police perceived
a threat from the large crowd as it pressed
against a thin wire barrier in front of the
station.
The police were poorly informed and seriously
stressed. The white police lived outside
Sharpeville, had few personal links with the
residents and had no sense of what animated
them. The police believed the crowd “lusted
for white blood,” seeing “cultural weapons”
such as knobkerries as tools for attack. This
was a serious misreading of the situation.7
The police, as well as being misinformed
and stressed from the weekend’s events, were
5. Ibid., 78–82, 86.
6. Ibid., 100.
7. Ibid., 100, 99.
Sharpeville 9
not well commanded. Police leaders were
unaware of the full weaponry held by the
police. (There were both white and black
police present, but only white police had
firearms.)
Poor organization and poor information on
both sides set the stage for disaster. On the
police side, there was poor coordination of
forces and a false belief that the crowd was
intent on attack. As hours went by and the
protest continued, the tired and stressed police
remained on duty. Meanwhile, most participants
in the rally were treating the event much
more lightly. At one point, an aircraft buzzed
the crowd, for unknown reasons. Far from
being intimidated, crowd members treated this
as part of the festivities.
At 1.30pm, a drunk in the crowd named
Geelbooi produced a small caliber pistol. A
friend tried to stop him and two shots were
fired into the air. At the same time, a key
police official named Spengler stumbled.
Some in the crowd leaned forward. A constable
helped Spengler to his feet. A few pebbles
were thrown from the crowd and one hit the
constable. The constable heard “shot” or
“short” and fired. Spengler deflected the
constable’s shot, but it was too late: the
constable’s shot triggered the police to fire
4000 rounds into the crowd, killing dozens of
people and wounding many more.
There are many views about these events,
with police claiming they were defending
against the threatening crowd and PAC
supporters believing the police intended mass
killing. My account here follows the detailed
historical reconstruction by Philip Frankel in
his authoritative book on the Sharpeville
massacre titled An Ordinary Atrocity.
According to Frankel, the massacre was not
premeditated. It was a mistake but, once firing
started, it continued, having unleashed deepseated
anxieties among the police.8
The official figure for the number of people
killed by the police was 69. Frankel notes that
this is certainly too low, as there were 24 or so
victims removed by the police, plus others
8. Ibid., 116–18.
who were injured, removed by family or
friends and who later died. It seems reasonable
to say perhaps a hundred died.9 Many more
were injured.
Just as important as the number of deaths
was the manner by which they occurred. Most
of the victims were shot in the back as they
fled from the police. The firing continued long
enough for some police to reload their
weapons and continue. Some police used softnosed
bullets that cause horrific exit wounds.
These antipersonnel bullets, commonly called
dumdums, had been banned by the 1899
Hague Declaration; any force that used them
would look very bad in world opinion.10
In 1960, South Africa was a respected
member of the international community. It had
a long established, well functioning system of
representative government, though crucially
limited to whites. It had a prosperous economy
— again mainly benefiting whites — and was
seen as a valuable trading partner. It had many
supporters internationally. At the same time,
there was considerable opposition to the
apartheid system, most obviously among the
black South Africans but also among segments
of the white population (especially the
English-speaking segment) and in many other
countries. Among opponents, apartheid was
seen as a system of racist oppression.
But only some perceived apartheid as
abominable. It had a fairly bland exterior.
Apartheid was a system of oppression and
exploitation but not one of brutal violence
conspicuous to outsiders. To be sure, the South
African police and military were essential to
implementation of government policies such
as the pass laws, but they mostly appeared as
agents of an administrative, routine lawenforcing
process, not as outrageous jackbooted
thugs.
To many people worldwide, apartheid was
abhorrent in itself as a system of racial oppression,
irrespective of the legalities by which
9. Ibid., 150–52.
10. Eric Prokosch, The Technology of Killing
A Military and Political History of Antipersonnel
Weapons (London: Zed, 1995).
10 Justice Ignited
this was achieved. But in 1960 this view was
shared by only a minority of western governments.
Colonialism was alive and well. Some
countries had gained independence from their
colonial rulers, such as India and Pakistan in
1947 and, in Africa, Ghana in 1957, but many
others remained colonies, including most of
black Africa. In Algeria, nationalists were
fighting a bloody war for independence from
France. In Vietnam, a liberation struggle was
under way against a regime propped up by the
U.S. military. Overshadowing the numerous
wars around the world was the cold war
confrontation between the two superpowers,
the Soviet Union and the United States, with
nuclear arsenals poised to launch devastating
strikes. In the late 1950s, a powerful peace
movement had sprung into existence to oppose
atmospheric nuclear testing and the nuclear
arms race.
In this context, South Africa seemed a pillar
of stability in Africa, where independence
movements were agitating for liberation from
colonial shackles. The shootings in Sharpeville
threatened to undermine international support
for South Africa, by providing a stimulus for
action by those already opposed to apartheid
and by weakening the moral position of the
South African government’s traditional allies.
The shootings, because they were readily
interpreted as a brutal attack by white police
against the black population, certainly had the
potential to be counterproductive for the South
African government, for the South African
Police as an organizational entity, and for the
individual police involved.
After the shooting, the immediate reaction
of the police was to protect themselves from
repercussions from their actions. Some of
them threw stones into the police station in
order to give the impression that the threat
from the crowd was greater than it had been:
the larger the threat, the more easily the
shootings could be justified.
The police immediately cordoned off the
town and took control of communication.
Journalists were kept out of the area, being
told the situation was too dangerous.11 These
11. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 134–35.
actions were taken before medical help was
sought. If news of the shootings had been
contained entirely or had only leaked out by
word of mouth in dribs and drabs, without an
authoritative account, this would have reduced
the adverse consequences for the attackers.
But the police efforts to control information
were too little and too late. Not only were
there numerous witnesses among Sharpeville
residents, but some journalists had come to
Sharpeville for the protest and took photographs
before, during, and after the massacre.
12 This sort of photojournalism was much
less common in 1960 than it is today:
It so happened that a reporter, using the
resourcefulness which is the stock-intrade
of the journalist’s profession, was
able to get — and to get away with —
some photographs of the Sharpeville
affray. The chance availability of this
dramatic record may have persuaded
editors here and there to give the accompanying
news story a prominent place on
their front pages, and these pictures were
seen by millions.13
Although the police could not contain news
about the massacre, their efforts at “information
management” are revealing. Crowd
members wanted to help the wounded but
were kept away by police, to reduce people’s
knowledge of what had happened, to prevent
new protests developing, and to reduce
adverse publicity.14
One goal of the police was to eliminate
information about the use of dumdums. They
removed the dead bodies of a couple of dozen
victims of these bullets. Some had survived
and been taken to hospital. Doctors reported
that most of the wounds were mid-body and
from the rear. Police went to the hospital and
12. Reeves’ book reproduces 30 photographs.
13. Peter Calvocoressi, South Africa and
World Opinion (London: Oxford University
Press, 1961), 2.
14. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 140–41.
Sharpeville 11
took away some of the wounded, especially
those with injuries indicating use of dumdums.
(This was justified on the grounds that these
individuals were security threats.) The police
conveniently “lost” evidence about use of
dumdums, “misplaced” evidence on the
ammunition rounds issued, used and not used.
Later, at the inquiry into the events, no experts
on dumdums were called. All in all, cover-up
of the use of dumdums was quite effective.15
From the point of view of most of the
world, the Sharpeville events involved
massive use of force against an unarmed and
nonthreatening crowd. The police’s heavy use
of firearms was seen as totally unjustified.
That some in the crowd had sticks and
knobkerries, and that some of them threw
stones, did little to challenge the perception
that the police had used massive lethal force
inappropriately. Albert Luthuli, leader of the
ANC, commented that
The guns of Sharpeville echoed across
the world, and nowhere except among
totalitarians was there any doubt about
the true nature of what had occurred.
The Government had placed beyond
question the implacable, wanton brutality
of their régime.16
From the police point of view, though, the
real threat came from the black population,
especially from the organizers of the rally.
This perception persisted after the shootings.
Police went through Sharpeville making many
arrests, including the supposed leaders of the
“disturbances” as well as many others. The
police beat many of those arrested as well as
others who were not arrested. According to
Frankel,
In the initial hours after the massacre
most of the police simply combed the
streets and vented their anger on often
hapless people who were treated ‘as if
they [the police] were the victims,’
15. Ibid., 147–48, 154–56.
16. Luthuli, Let My People Go, 222.
according to Saul Moise, an unfortunate
who fell foul of the patrols, was beaten
senseless for no apparent reason, thrown
into prison and then released three weeks
later without charges.17
Adding to the repression, armed groups of
white citizens ran patrols in black areas. The
police did not try to monitor these extra-legal
initiatives.
The international reaction to the massacre
was powerful and extensive. Peter Calvocoressi,
in his book South Africa and World
Opinion, said that, “First emotions were
everywhere much the same — horror, indignation,
disgust.”18 Governments condemned
the massacre. Anti-apartheid activists were
galvanized, obtaining much more support than
previously. Supporters of the regime were put
on the defensive. For example:
In Norway flags were flown at half-mast
on public buildings on the day of the
funeral of the Sharpeville victims. … the
Brazilian government banned a football
match in Rio de Janeiro against a South
African team; it also recalled its ambassador
from Pretoria. At a conference in
New Zealand the Prime Minister, Mr.
Walter Nash, asked his audience to stand
in silent memory of the dead and the
Indian House of Representatives also
paid this tribute …19
By comparison, the reaction inside South
Africa was muted. In the face of a government
clampdown on activists and all dissent, the
black population was demoralized rather than
17. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 156–57.
Frankel’s original quotation includes the
bracketed clarifier “[the SAP]” which I have
changed to “[the police].”
18. Calvocoressi, South Africa and World
Opinion, 34.
19. Ibid., 3–4.
12 Justice Ignited
energized by the events. Within Sharpeville
itself, apathy was more typical than outrage.20
The difference between international outrage
and the subdued response within South
Africa can be explained by several factors.
Black South Africans were already aware of
the iron fist of the apartheid state, through dayto-
day encounters with violence and humiliation.
For many, the massacre only confirmed
what they already knew and so did not cause
an explosion of resentment and further action.
Some critics of apartheid saw the massacre
as an expression of the true nature of the South
African state and immediately assumed the
Sharpeville events had been consciously
orchestrated by the police as an exercise of
premeditated killing for the purposes of
intimidation and brutality. Frankel, whose
views I have followed here, rejects both this
interpretation and the opposite one, promoted
by the police and government, that put the
blame on the demonstrators.
Unlike South African blacks, few international
observers were aware of the day-to-day
brutality of apartheid, given the carefully
managed image of legality and order conveyed
by the South African government and the
willingness of foreign governments and corporations
to ignore evidence that might disturb
their political and trading relationships with
South Africa. The Sharpeville killings broke
through this conventional image, nurtured by
ignorance and convenience, with a picture of
unmistakable and unconscionable violence.
“Sharpeville,” a word which became synonymous
with the massacre, served as an icon of
everything wrong with apartheid.
A second factor distinguishing South
African and foreign responses to the massacre
was racism. Within white South Africa, blacks
were commonly considered inherently inferior.
Apartheid was a system of institutionalized
oppression — with political, economic, legal,
social, and psychological dimensions — that
both reflected and enhanced perceptions of
white racial superiority and justified privilege.
The black population was so devalued that the
20. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 160–61.
killings did not generate widespread abhorrence.
The victims were perceived as
unworthy. Consequently, South African whites
“were staggered by the unanimity of the
world’s reaction to Sharpeville,” reacting with
“dazed incomprehension or truculent selfjustification.”
21
In contrast, in many foreign countries white
racism was neither so virulent nor so widespread.
To be sure, white racism was potent
internationally, but it had to confront an
increasingly powerful worldwide movement
for racial equality, which was supported by
ringing endorsements from the United Nations
and other bodies. The extermination policies
of Nazi Germany had discredited white racism
in the eyes of many, making it much harder to
overtly endorse racist policies, though much
overt and de facto racism persisted. Speaking
generally, many more people outside South
Africa saw the Sharpeville victims as equal
members of the human community, in other
words as victims worthy of respect and
empathy.
A third factor affecting the South African
and foreign responses was the potential for
intimidation. Within South Africa, police arrested
activists as the government strengthened
its capacity for repression, declaring a state of
emergency. This seems to have discouraged a
larger mobilization of resistance. Had the
ANC and PAC and other opponents of
apartheid been better organized, the massacre
might have triggered an expansion of resistance,
but, as noted, demoralization was more
common. Outside the country, on the other
hand, the South African police and state had
virtually no capacity for threatening or repressing
dissent. The risks of opposing
apartheid were far less, making possible a
rapid and very public expansion of opposition.
Peer pressure also played a role. Among
white South Africans, open support for black
equality was not easy. L. F. Beyers Naudé, a
South African minister and supporter of white
21. Colin Legum and Margaret Legum, South
Africa: Crisis for the West (London: Pall Mall
Press, 1964), 75.
Sharpeville 13
supremacy, began to reconsider his views after
the Sharpeville killings. In 1963 he resigned
from the ministry “to become a director of a
multi-racial Christian Institute.” As a result of
this challenge to apartheid, he and his family
suffered “the fate of every dissenter of
prominence in the Church: social ostracism,
reinforced by public attack.”22 Ambrose
Reeves, Bishop of Johannesburg, who wrote a
powerful book about the massacre, was
deported from the country.
In summary, there were three factors that
helped the massacre trigger a much larger
reaction outside South Africa than inside: less
familiarity outside the country with the
brutality of apartheid; a lower level of institutionalized
racism; and less vulnerability to
reprisals from the South African state.
Immediately after the massacre, the South
African government decided to hold an inquiry
into the events. Internally, the government
wanted to show the white population it was in
control of the situation. Externally, it wanted
to demonstrate that South Africa was not an
authoritarian state, to prevent damage to the
country’s reputation in diplomatic and trading
circles. So the Wessels Commission was set
up.
In setting up this commission, there was a
dilemma for the government. If the commission
was too independent, it might come up
with strong conclusions damning the police
and government, thus adding to the bad
publicity from the massacre. On the other
hand, if the commission was too subservient to
the government — if, for example, it
completely exonerated the police and put all
the blame on the protesters — then it would
have reduced its own credibility and done
nothing to placate international opinion.
According to Frankel, the government’s
preference for the commission was towards the
subservient end of the spectrum:
A pliant (or partially pliant) commission
which confirmed the vicious intent of the
Sharpeville mob and presented police
22. Ibid., 31.
responses as a natural, if over-reactive,
case of self defence could connect very
positively with the prevailing persecution
mentality among white South
Africans in the aftermath of the massacre
— including many who would not, other
than in these exceptional circumstances,
lend their support to the Nationalist
government … Ultimately, a sympathetic
commission — indeed any commission
— was essential to smoothing
the panic and fears of a vast array of
international interests with stakes in a
post-Sharpeville South Africa.23
The Wessels Commission did pretty much as
the government had hoped: it whitewashed the
massacre. It did not go into the details of
police’s shooting or use of ammunition; the
issue of dumdums was hardly pursued.
Potential black witnesses to the commission
came under strong pressures. Because of
police intimidation, few of them were willing
to testify, for fear of reprisals. They also came
under pressure from the PAC to follow a
“party line” that blamed the police for
premeditated murder and did not acknowledge
the role of fear and poor leadership among the
police. Finally, police simply lied to the
commission, having no fear of any punishment.
Police also destroyed, hid, and fabricated
evidence.
According to Frankel, the government
wanted the commission to move quickly, both
to reassure the international community about
the government’s concern and to catch the
victims while they were still in a state of shock
and therefore less able to testify effectively.
The commission seems to have lived up to
most of the government’s expectations, at least
in relation to its marginalization of the
victims’ voices. Concerning the commission’s
report, Frankel comments that:
its overall findings, read four decades
later, are so densely unintelligible, so
ridden with double-talk, qualifications,
23. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 188.
14 Justice Ignited
and refutable logic as to defy both legal
reasoning and ordinary comprehension.24
The commission’s report was both obscure
and relatively favorable to the police.
Sometimes it seems events are so obvious
that they “speak for themselves.” The Sharpeville
massacre became such a symbol of the
brutal reality of apartheid that it is easy to
assume its meaning was transparent to all but
the most prejudiced of observers. Yet a closer
look reveals complexities. What “actually
happened” was quickly obscured by the
divergent agendas of black activists and the
police, each of whom adopted simplistic, selfserving
accounts. It is fair to say there was a
struggle over the interpretation of events. Of
course, more nuanced treatments such as
Frankel’s are not faultless; history is always
open to rewriting on the basis of new evidence
and ways of thinking. But in the aftermath of
the massacre, the struggle over interpretation
was a matter of dire urgency for both supporters
and opponents of apartheid, with caricatures
serving as tools in a struggle for
allegiance.
But the struggle was more than a matter of
interpretation of an event. Also involved were
cover-ups and attempted cover-ups. A totally
effective cover-up makes an event invisible to
outsiders and makes interpretation irrelevant to
them (though still relevant to those in the
know); a partially effective cover-up, such as
concerning the use of dumdums, slants the
basis for making interpretations. Devaluation
of the victims profoundly affects the meaning
of the events. Similarly, an official investigation
such as the Wessels Commission transforms
meanings by giving the stamp of
approval to a particular interpretation.25
24. Ibid., 192.
25. Austin T. Turk, Political Criminality: The
Defiance and Defense of Authority (Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 146, says “The
Republic of South Africa may well have the
world’s most elaborate legal structure for the
repression of political resistance of all kinds.”
This is compatible with the role played by the
Finally, intimidation transforms both the
willingness of participants to contribute to a
struggle over meaning, as well as intervening
on one side in the struggle.
My account here mentions only a small part
of the copious detail provided in Frankel’s
book An Ordinary Atrocity. I’ve given special
attention to material relevant to backfire. One
thing is clear: the massacre did indeed backfire
on the South African government in the
international arena, energizing apartheid’s
opponents and putting its supporters on the
back foot. Had the government and the police
anticipated events in Sharpeville, there is little
doubt they would have done everything
possible to avoid the unprovoked and uncontrolled
shooting at an unarmed crowd that
appeared unconscionable to most neutral
observers, and turned “Sharpeville” into a
symbol of the brutality of apartheid.
Conclusion
The Sharpeville massacre was a disaster for
the South African government, particularly
because it damaged its international reputation.
The shooting of protesters, though intimidating
to them, had the wider long-term effect of
weakening the position of the white police and
government in ruling a majority black population.
So it is reasonable to say the shooting
backfired: it was worse for the government
than if it had not happened.
The police and government took a range of
steps to reduce outrage from the shooting.
These can be readily classified into the five
categories presented in chapter 1, as follows.
Cover-up. South African police cordoned
Sharpeville and tried to control communication
out of the town. This effort largely failed,
with information and photographs about the
massacre made available to the world.
The police removed evidence of the use of
dumdum bullets. Dead bodies with evidence of
dumdums were removed from the protest site,
surviving victims of dumdums were taken
Wessels Commission. I thank Jeff Ross for
this reference.
Sharpeville 15
from the hospital, and evidence of the issue
and firing of dumdum rounds was removed or
destroyed. This cover-up was fairly successful:
the issue of dumdums did not play a significant
role in the outrage over the massacre.
Devaluation. South African blacks were
devalued in the eyes of most South African
whites due to overt and institutionalized
racism. International observers, though, were
much less likely to have such a low opinion of
South African blacks. Indeed, the fact that the
massacre was carried out by white police
against black protesters made it a potent
symbol of racist brutality. White South
African racism thus muted outrage within the
country, whereas international anti-racism
magnified it.
Reinterpretation. The police perceived the
Sharpeville crowd as physically menacing and
the product of a deeper anti-white threat. Thus
it was easy for the authorities to endorse the
view that the primary responsibility for the
events was held by the crowd and its organizers,
dubbed “agitators.”
The Sharpeville protest was part of the
wider mobilization organized by PAC activists.
Again, this was perceived as a serious
threat to law-abiding citizens. However, this
picture of the crowd as the aggressor and the
police as victims who inadvertently used too
much firepower did not sell well in other
countries. On the other hand, PAC activists
and other black sympathizers portrayed the
Sharpeville events as premeditated murder.
This interpretation resonated with those
inclined to believe the worst about apartheid.
Official channels. After the massacre, the
government quickly established the Wessels
Commission to serve as a symbol of the
government’s commitment to justice, due
process, and the search for truth. In order to
reduce outrage without disturbing the status
quo, the commission had to be seen to be fair
and independent yet in reality produce a
whitewash. This seems to be pretty much what
happened, though it is unclear how much
effect the commission had on opinion inside
and outside the country.
Intimidation. Immediately after the massacre,
the police went through Sharpeville
beating and arresting residents. The government
soon declared a state of emergency,
giving legal backing for the increased repression
that was already occurring. Arrests and
threats also reduced the ability and willingness
to report on the use of dumdums. However,
intimidation had little effect on international
opinion.
Intimidation was effective in limiting testimony
to the Wessels Commission, helping
turn its report into a whitewash. Likewise,
cover-up reduced the commission’s access to
information.
Although the police and government used all
five methods of inhibiting outrage, in the end
they were mostly unsuccessful: the massacre
turned out to be counterproductive for them.
Shooting protesters in cold blood was widely
perceived as a gross injustice; once information
and images about the shooting were
communicated internationally, the efforts of
the government to blame the protesters and
give a semblance of justice through the
Wessels Commission were too little and too
late to undo the damage.
Acknowledgements
I thank Truda Gray, Philip Kitley, Jeff Ross,
Greg Scott, and Tom Weber for valuable
comments on drafts of this chapter
2
Sharpeville
On 21 March 1960, white police in the town of
Sharpeville, South Africa, opened fire on a
large crowd of peaceful black protesters,
killing perhaps a hundred of them and injuring
many more. This massacre dramatically publicized
the protesters’ cause internationally.1
This case starkly illustrates how violent
attacks on peaceful protesters can be counterproductive.
I tell the Sharpeville story with
special attention to tactics that might increase
or decrease the scale of backfire. In the
conclusion, I note how these tactics relate to
the five main methods of inhibiting or expressing
outrage.
In 1960, whites ruled South Africa. In the
system called apartheid, blacks, who
composed most of the population, could not
vote and were given only the worst jobs at low
pay, so their standard of living was far below
that of whites. Blacks had separate, inferior
education. Their movement was restricted: to
travel, male blacks had to possess a “pass,”
analogous to an internal passport. By 1960,
pass documents were held in a “reference
book” that contained
the holder’s name, his tax receipt, his
permit to be in an urban area and to seek
work there, permits from the Labour
1. Philip Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity:
Sharpeville and its Massacre (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2001) is the
definitive treatment of the Sharpeville massacre.
The account here, except for material
about the international reaction, is drawn
largely from this source. For the purposes of a
backfire analysis, heavy reliance on Frankel’s
book is not problematic because Frankel did
not structure his study using a backfire
framework.
Bureau, the signature of his employer
each month, and other particulars … the
reference book must be shown on
demand to any policeman or any of the
fifteen different classes of officials who
require to see it. Failure to produce it on
demand constitutes an offence.2
Pass offences often led to fines or imprisonment,
with a thousand people charged every
day. For the black population, the pass laws
were a potent symbol of their oppression. The
rally in Sharpeville was a protest against these
laws.
Sharpeville was set up by the South African
government as a model community, with row
upon row of housing for blacks who would
travel to work in nearby cities. Residents of
the nearby black town of Topville — seen by
the government as too close to white suburbs
— were encouraged to relocate to Sharpeville.
Filled with many recently arrived families
seeking a better life, Sharpeville did not have a
strong local economy or traditions. There were
about 35,000 residents, of whom some 20,000
were children. It was like a large anonymous
suburb, stable and without a militant reputation.
Nevertheless, Sharpeville residents were
affected by the unrest sweeping the country.
For many decades, white rule in South Africa
had been met by resistance, including mass
opposition to pass laws from the early decades
of the twentieth century. The African National
Congress was the primary vehicle for black
opposition to apartheid. Through the 1950s,
the ANC was totally committed to nonvio-
2. Ambrose Reeves, Shooting at Sharpeville:
The Agony of South Africa (London: Victor
Gollancz, 1960), 51.
8 Justice Ignited
lence. For example, in 1959 the ANC called
for a one-month boycott of potatoes, which
were a suitable boycott target for both
economic and symbolic reasons. Thousands of
blacks, jailed for pass law violations, were put
under the supervision of farmers and made to
pick potatoes with their bare hands. Though
potatoes were a diet staple, the boycott was
taken up eagerly and continued for three
months before the ANC called it to a close.3
In the late 1950s, the ANC was increasingly
challenged by the Pan Africanist Congress
(PAC), which took a more militant stance. In
March 1960, the PAC organized protests
against the pass laws, with 21 March set as the
date for rallies around the country.
Being an anti-apartheid organizer was a
risky business. The South African Police were
well in control, with paid informers providing
information about activities of both the ANC
and PAC. Through their informers, police
were aware major protests were being planned
around the country, but were misled about the
date. PAC activists discovered the police
agents and fed them false information.4
In terms of black protest, Sharpeville was
quiescent compared to other areas. Nevertheless,
PAC activists were able to mobilize
support from a large proportion of the town
population. Over the weekend prior to the
rally, PAC activists went door to door telling
residents about the protest scheduled for
Monday. During the nights that weekend,
there were numerous spontaneous demonstrations
and clashes with police. Protesters
chanted and came armed with sticks; the
police attacked with whips and batons. In one
incident, numerous objects were thrown at
police, who attacked with batons. But the
crowd did not retreat or disperse and the police
fired 42 rounds, killing at least two residents.
Someone in a nearby house fired two shots,
missing police.
Despite the police’s greater arsenal and
killing power, and the fact that no police were
3. Albert Luthuli, Let My People Go (London:
Collins, 1962), 217–19.
4. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 64.
seriously harmed over the weekend, the
clashes and shots made them apprehensive,
fearing an impending bloodbath.5 Of course,
residents subject to police assaults might well
have been even more apprehensive. But it is
important to be aware of the state of mind of
the police in order to understand what was to
come.
On Monday morning, 21 March, only a few
residents left Sharpeville to go to work.
Instead, most of the town’s population
gradually joined the rally outside the police
station. The crowd eventually numbered
18,000 to 25,000, including many children.
The organizers of the rally had no welldeveloped
plan of action, nor any system for
crowd control. A few crowd members had
weapons, mainly sticks and knobkerries, clublike
weapons made from saplings with roots
on their ends. There was some antagonism
toward the police, but at the same time there
were elements of a carnival, “happy-go-lucky”
atmosphere. There was no plan to attack the
police station. The few weapons carried in the
crowd served to boost morale rather than to aid
an attack.6
In the Sharpeville police station, facing the
crowd, were some 400 police, half with
firearms, plus Saracen tanks with machine
guns. This was ample firepower to quell any
disturbance. Nevertheless, the police perceived
a threat from the large crowd as it pressed
against a thin wire barrier in front of the
station.
The police were poorly informed and seriously
stressed. The white police lived outside
Sharpeville, had few personal links with the
residents and had no sense of what animated
them. The police believed the crowd “lusted
for white blood,” seeing “cultural weapons”
such as knobkerries as tools for attack. This
was a serious misreading of the situation.7
The police, as well as being misinformed
and stressed from the weekend’s events, were
5. Ibid., 78–82, 86.
6. Ibid., 100.
7. Ibid., 100, 99.
Sharpeville 9
not well commanded. Police leaders were
unaware of the full weaponry held by the
police. (There were both white and black
police present, but only white police had
firearms.)
Poor organization and poor information on
both sides set the stage for disaster. On the
police side, there was poor coordination of
forces and a false belief that the crowd was
intent on attack. As hours went by and the
protest continued, the tired and stressed police
remained on duty. Meanwhile, most participants
in the rally were treating the event much
more lightly. At one point, an aircraft buzzed
the crowd, for unknown reasons. Far from
being intimidated, crowd members treated this
as part of the festivities.
At 1.30pm, a drunk in the crowd named
Geelbooi produced a small caliber pistol. A
friend tried to stop him and two shots were
fired into the air. At the same time, a key
police official named Spengler stumbled.
Some in the crowd leaned forward. A constable
helped Spengler to his feet. A few pebbles
were thrown from the crowd and one hit the
constable. The constable heard “shot” or
“short” and fired. Spengler deflected the
constable’s shot, but it was too late: the
constable’s shot triggered the police to fire
4000 rounds into the crowd, killing dozens of
people and wounding many more.
There are many views about these events,
with police claiming they were defending
against the threatening crowd and PAC
supporters believing the police intended mass
killing. My account here follows the detailed
historical reconstruction by Philip Frankel in
his authoritative book on the Sharpeville
massacre titled An Ordinary Atrocity.
According to Frankel, the massacre was not
premeditated. It was a mistake but, once firing
started, it continued, having unleashed deepseated
anxieties among the police.8
The official figure for the number of people
killed by the police was 69. Frankel notes that
this is certainly too low, as there were 24 or so
victims removed by the police, plus others
8. Ibid., 116–18.
who were injured, removed by family or
friends and who later died. It seems reasonable
to say perhaps a hundred died.9 Many more
were injured.
Just as important as the number of deaths
was the manner by which they occurred. Most
of the victims were shot in the back as they
fled from the police. The firing continued long
enough for some police to reload their
weapons and continue. Some police used softnosed
bullets that cause horrific exit wounds.
These antipersonnel bullets, commonly called
dumdums, had been banned by the 1899
Hague Declaration; any force that used them
would look very bad in world opinion.10
In 1960, South Africa was a respected
member of the international community. It had
a long established, well functioning system of
representative government, though crucially
limited to whites. It had a prosperous economy
— again mainly benefiting whites — and was
seen as a valuable trading partner. It had many
supporters internationally. At the same time,
there was considerable opposition to the
apartheid system, most obviously among the
black South Africans but also among segments
of the white population (especially the
English-speaking segment) and in many other
countries. Among opponents, apartheid was
seen as a system of racist oppression.
But only some perceived apartheid as
abominable. It had a fairly bland exterior.
Apartheid was a system of oppression and
exploitation but not one of brutal violence
conspicuous to outsiders. To be sure, the South
African police and military were essential to
implementation of government policies such
as the pass laws, but they mostly appeared as
agents of an administrative, routine lawenforcing
process, not as outrageous jackbooted
thugs.
To many people worldwide, apartheid was
abhorrent in itself as a system of racial oppression,
irrespective of the legalities by which
9. Ibid., 150–52.
10. Eric Prokosch, The Technology of Killing
A Military and Political History of Antipersonnel
Weapons (London: Zed, 1995).
10 Justice Ignited
this was achieved. But in 1960 this view was
shared by only a minority of western governments.
Colonialism was alive and well. Some
countries had gained independence from their
colonial rulers, such as India and Pakistan in
1947 and, in Africa, Ghana in 1957, but many
others remained colonies, including most of
black Africa. In Algeria, nationalists were
fighting a bloody war for independence from
France. In Vietnam, a liberation struggle was
under way against a regime propped up by the
U.S. military. Overshadowing the numerous
wars around the world was the cold war
confrontation between the two superpowers,
the Soviet Union and the United States, with
nuclear arsenals poised to launch devastating
strikes. In the late 1950s, a powerful peace
movement had sprung into existence to oppose
atmospheric nuclear testing and the nuclear
arms race.
In this context, South Africa seemed a pillar
of stability in Africa, where independence
movements were agitating for liberation from
colonial shackles. The shootings in Sharpeville
threatened to undermine international support
for South Africa, by providing a stimulus for
action by those already opposed to apartheid
and by weakening the moral position of the
South African government’s traditional allies.
The shootings, because they were readily
interpreted as a brutal attack by white police
against the black population, certainly had the
potential to be counterproductive for the South
African government, for the South African
Police as an organizational entity, and for the
individual police involved.
After the shooting, the immediate reaction
of the police was to protect themselves from
repercussions from their actions. Some of
them threw stones into the police station in
order to give the impression that the threat
from the crowd was greater than it had been:
the larger the threat, the more easily the
shootings could be justified.
The police immediately cordoned off the
town and took control of communication.
Journalists were kept out of the area, being
told the situation was too dangerous.11 These
11. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 134–35.
actions were taken before medical help was
sought. If news of the shootings had been
contained entirely or had only leaked out by
word of mouth in dribs and drabs, without an
authoritative account, this would have reduced
the adverse consequences for the attackers.
But the police efforts to control information
were too little and too late. Not only were
there numerous witnesses among Sharpeville
residents, but some journalists had come to
Sharpeville for the protest and took photographs
before, during, and after the massacre.
12 This sort of photojournalism was much
less common in 1960 than it is today:
It so happened that a reporter, using the
resourcefulness which is the stock-intrade
of the journalist’s profession, was
able to get — and to get away with —
some photographs of the Sharpeville
affray. The chance availability of this
dramatic record may have persuaded
editors here and there to give the accompanying
news story a prominent place on
their front pages, and these pictures were
seen by millions.13
Although the police could not contain news
about the massacre, their efforts at “information
management” are revealing. Crowd
members wanted to help the wounded but
were kept away by police, to reduce people’s
knowledge of what had happened, to prevent
new protests developing, and to reduce
adverse publicity.14
One goal of the police was to eliminate
information about the use of dumdums. They
removed the dead bodies of a couple of dozen
victims of these bullets. Some had survived
and been taken to hospital. Doctors reported
that most of the wounds were mid-body and
from the rear. Police went to the hospital and
12. Reeves’ book reproduces 30 photographs.
13. Peter Calvocoressi, South Africa and
World Opinion (London: Oxford University
Press, 1961), 2.
14. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 140–41.
Sharpeville 11
took away some of the wounded, especially
those with injuries indicating use of dumdums.
(This was justified on the grounds that these
individuals were security threats.) The police
conveniently “lost” evidence about use of
dumdums, “misplaced” evidence on the
ammunition rounds issued, used and not used.
Later, at the inquiry into the events, no experts
on dumdums were called. All in all, cover-up
of the use of dumdums was quite effective.15
From the point of view of most of the
world, the Sharpeville events involved
massive use of force against an unarmed and
nonthreatening crowd. The police’s heavy use
of firearms was seen as totally unjustified.
That some in the crowd had sticks and
knobkerries, and that some of them threw
stones, did little to challenge the perception
that the police had used massive lethal force
inappropriately. Albert Luthuli, leader of the
ANC, commented that
The guns of Sharpeville echoed across
the world, and nowhere except among
totalitarians was there any doubt about
the true nature of what had occurred.
The Government had placed beyond
question the implacable, wanton brutality
of their régime.16
From the police point of view, though, the
real threat came from the black population,
especially from the organizers of the rally.
This perception persisted after the shootings.
Police went through Sharpeville making many
arrests, including the supposed leaders of the
“disturbances” as well as many others. The
police beat many of those arrested as well as
others who were not arrested. According to
Frankel,
In the initial hours after the massacre
most of the police simply combed the
streets and vented their anger on often
hapless people who were treated ‘as if
they [the police] were the victims,’
15. Ibid., 147–48, 154–56.
16. Luthuli, Let My People Go, 222.
according to Saul Moise, an unfortunate
who fell foul of the patrols, was beaten
senseless for no apparent reason, thrown
into prison and then released three weeks
later without charges.17
Adding to the repression, armed groups of
white citizens ran patrols in black areas. The
police did not try to monitor these extra-legal
initiatives.
The international reaction to the massacre
was powerful and extensive. Peter Calvocoressi,
in his book South Africa and World
Opinion, said that, “First emotions were
everywhere much the same — horror, indignation,
disgust.”18 Governments condemned
the massacre. Anti-apartheid activists were
galvanized, obtaining much more support than
previously. Supporters of the regime were put
on the defensive. For example:
In Norway flags were flown at half-mast
on public buildings on the day of the
funeral of the Sharpeville victims. … the
Brazilian government banned a football
match in Rio de Janeiro against a South
African team; it also recalled its ambassador
from Pretoria. At a conference in
New Zealand the Prime Minister, Mr.
Walter Nash, asked his audience to stand
in silent memory of the dead and the
Indian House of Representatives also
paid this tribute …19
By comparison, the reaction inside South
Africa was muted. In the face of a government
clampdown on activists and all dissent, the
black population was demoralized rather than
17. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 156–57.
Frankel’s original quotation includes the
bracketed clarifier “[the SAP]” which I have
changed to “[the police].”
18. Calvocoressi, South Africa and World
Opinion, 34.
19. Ibid., 3–4.
12 Justice Ignited
energized by the events. Within Sharpeville
itself, apathy was more typical than outrage.20
The difference between international outrage
and the subdued response within South
Africa can be explained by several factors.
Black South Africans were already aware of
the iron fist of the apartheid state, through dayto-
day encounters with violence and humiliation.
For many, the massacre only confirmed
what they already knew and so did not cause
an explosion of resentment and further action.
Some critics of apartheid saw the massacre
as an expression of the true nature of the South
African state and immediately assumed the
Sharpeville events had been consciously
orchestrated by the police as an exercise of
premeditated killing for the purposes of
intimidation and brutality. Frankel, whose
views I have followed here, rejects both this
interpretation and the opposite one, promoted
by the police and government, that put the
blame on the demonstrators.
Unlike South African blacks, few international
observers were aware of the day-to-day
brutality of apartheid, given the carefully
managed image of legality and order conveyed
by the South African government and the
willingness of foreign governments and corporations
to ignore evidence that might disturb
their political and trading relationships with
South Africa. The Sharpeville killings broke
through this conventional image, nurtured by
ignorance and convenience, with a picture of
unmistakable and unconscionable violence.
“Sharpeville,” a word which became synonymous
with the massacre, served as an icon of
everything wrong with apartheid.
A second factor distinguishing South
African and foreign responses to the massacre
was racism. Within white South Africa, blacks
were commonly considered inherently inferior.
Apartheid was a system of institutionalized
oppression — with political, economic, legal,
social, and psychological dimensions — that
both reflected and enhanced perceptions of
white racial superiority and justified privilege.
The black population was so devalued that the
20. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 160–61.
killings did not generate widespread abhorrence.
The victims were perceived as
unworthy. Consequently, South African whites
“were staggered by the unanimity of the
world’s reaction to Sharpeville,” reacting with
“dazed incomprehension or truculent selfjustification.”
21
In contrast, in many foreign countries white
racism was neither so virulent nor so widespread.
To be sure, white racism was potent
internationally, but it had to confront an
increasingly powerful worldwide movement
for racial equality, which was supported by
ringing endorsements from the United Nations
and other bodies. The extermination policies
of Nazi Germany had discredited white racism
in the eyes of many, making it much harder to
overtly endorse racist policies, though much
overt and de facto racism persisted. Speaking
generally, many more people outside South
Africa saw the Sharpeville victims as equal
members of the human community, in other
words as victims worthy of respect and
empathy.
A third factor affecting the South African
and foreign responses was the potential for
intimidation. Within South Africa, police arrested
activists as the government strengthened
its capacity for repression, declaring a state of
emergency. This seems to have discouraged a
larger mobilization of resistance. Had the
ANC and PAC and other opponents of
apartheid been better organized, the massacre
might have triggered an expansion of resistance,
but, as noted, demoralization was more
common. Outside the country, on the other
hand, the South African police and state had
virtually no capacity for threatening or repressing
dissent. The risks of opposing
apartheid were far less, making possible a
rapid and very public expansion of opposition.
Peer pressure also played a role. Among
white South Africans, open support for black
equality was not easy. L. F. Beyers Naudé, a
South African minister and supporter of white
21. Colin Legum and Margaret Legum, South
Africa: Crisis for the West (London: Pall Mall
Press, 1964), 75.
Sharpeville 13
supremacy, began to reconsider his views after
the Sharpeville killings. In 1963 he resigned
from the ministry “to become a director of a
multi-racial Christian Institute.” As a result of
this challenge to apartheid, he and his family
suffered “the fate of every dissenter of
prominence in the Church: social ostracism,
reinforced by public attack.”22 Ambrose
Reeves, Bishop of Johannesburg, who wrote a
powerful book about the massacre, was
deported from the country.
In summary, there were three factors that
helped the massacre trigger a much larger
reaction outside South Africa than inside: less
familiarity outside the country with the
brutality of apartheid; a lower level of institutionalized
racism; and less vulnerability to
reprisals from the South African state.
Immediately after the massacre, the South
African government decided to hold an inquiry
into the events. Internally, the government
wanted to show the white population it was in
control of the situation. Externally, it wanted
to demonstrate that South Africa was not an
authoritarian state, to prevent damage to the
country’s reputation in diplomatic and trading
circles. So the Wessels Commission was set
up.
In setting up this commission, there was a
dilemma for the government. If the commission
was too independent, it might come up
with strong conclusions damning the police
and government, thus adding to the bad
publicity from the massacre. On the other
hand, if the commission was too subservient to
the government — if, for example, it
completely exonerated the police and put all
the blame on the protesters — then it would
have reduced its own credibility and done
nothing to placate international opinion.
According to Frankel, the government’s
preference for the commission was towards the
subservient end of the spectrum:
A pliant (or partially pliant) commission
which confirmed the vicious intent of the
Sharpeville mob and presented police
22. Ibid., 31.
responses as a natural, if over-reactive,
case of self defence could connect very
positively with the prevailing persecution
mentality among white South
Africans in the aftermath of the massacre
— including many who would not, other
than in these exceptional circumstances,
lend their support to the Nationalist
government … Ultimately, a sympathetic
commission — indeed any commission
— was essential to smoothing
the panic and fears of a vast array of
international interests with stakes in a
post-Sharpeville South Africa.23
The Wessels Commission did pretty much as
the government had hoped: it whitewashed the
massacre. It did not go into the details of
police’s shooting or use of ammunition; the
issue of dumdums was hardly pursued.
Potential black witnesses to the commission
came under strong pressures. Because of
police intimidation, few of them were willing
to testify, for fear of reprisals. They also came
under pressure from the PAC to follow a
“party line” that blamed the police for
premeditated murder and did not acknowledge
the role of fear and poor leadership among the
police. Finally, police simply lied to the
commission, having no fear of any punishment.
Police also destroyed, hid, and fabricated
evidence.
According to Frankel, the government
wanted the commission to move quickly, both
to reassure the international community about
the government’s concern and to catch the
victims while they were still in a state of shock
and therefore less able to testify effectively.
The commission seems to have lived up to
most of the government’s expectations, at least
in relation to its marginalization of the
victims’ voices. Concerning the commission’s
report, Frankel comments that:
its overall findings, read four decades
later, are so densely unintelligible, so
ridden with double-talk, qualifications,
23. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 188.
14 Justice Ignited
and refutable logic as to defy both legal
reasoning and ordinary comprehension.24
The commission’s report was both obscure
and relatively favorable to the police.
Sometimes it seems events are so obvious
that they “speak for themselves.” The Sharpeville
massacre became such a symbol of the
brutal reality of apartheid that it is easy to
assume its meaning was transparent to all but
the most prejudiced of observers. Yet a closer
look reveals complexities. What “actually
happened” was quickly obscured by the
divergent agendas of black activists and the
police, each of whom adopted simplistic, selfserving
accounts. It is fair to say there was a
struggle over the interpretation of events. Of
course, more nuanced treatments such as
Frankel’s are not faultless; history is always
open to rewriting on the basis of new evidence
and ways of thinking. But in the aftermath of
the massacre, the struggle over interpretation
was a matter of dire urgency for both supporters
and opponents of apartheid, with caricatures
serving as tools in a struggle for
allegiance.
But the struggle was more than a matter of
interpretation of an event. Also involved were
cover-ups and attempted cover-ups. A totally
effective cover-up makes an event invisible to
outsiders and makes interpretation irrelevant to
them (though still relevant to those in the
know); a partially effective cover-up, such as
concerning the use of dumdums, slants the
basis for making interpretations. Devaluation
of the victims profoundly affects the meaning
of the events. Similarly, an official investigation
such as the Wessels Commission transforms
meanings by giving the stamp of
approval to a particular interpretation.25
24. Ibid., 192.
25. Austin T. Turk, Political Criminality: The
Defiance and Defense of Authority (Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 146, says “The
Republic of South Africa may well have the
world’s most elaborate legal structure for the
repression of political resistance of all kinds.”
This is compatible with the role played by the
Finally, intimidation transforms both the
willingness of participants to contribute to a
struggle over meaning, as well as intervening
on one side in the struggle.
My account here mentions only a small part
of the copious detail provided in Frankel’s
book An Ordinary Atrocity. I’ve given special
attention to material relevant to backfire. One
thing is clear: the massacre did indeed backfire
on the South African government in the
international arena, energizing apartheid’s
opponents and putting its supporters on the
back foot. Had the government and the police
anticipated events in Sharpeville, there is little
doubt they would have done everything
possible to avoid the unprovoked and uncontrolled
shooting at an unarmed crowd that
appeared unconscionable to most neutral
observers, and turned “Sharpeville” into a
symbol of the brutality of apartheid.
Conclusion
The Sharpeville massacre was a disaster for
the South African government, particularly
because it damaged its international reputation.
The shooting of protesters, though intimidating
to them, had the wider long-term effect of
weakening the position of the white police and
government in ruling a majority black population.
So it is reasonable to say the shooting
backfired: it was worse for the government
than if it had not happened.
The police and government took a range of
steps to reduce outrage from the shooting.
These can be readily classified into the five
categories presented in chapter 1, as follows.
Cover-up. South African police cordoned
Sharpeville and tried to control communication
out of the town. This effort largely failed,
with information and photographs about the
massacre made available to the world.
The police removed evidence of the use of
dumdum bullets. Dead bodies with evidence of
dumdums were removed from the protest site,
surviving victims of dumdums were taken
Wessels Commission. I thank Jeff Ross for
this reference.
Sharpeville 15
from the hospital, and evidence of the issue
and firing of dumdum rounds was removed or
destroyed. This cover-up was fairly successful:
the issue of dumdums did not play a significant
role in the outrage over the massacre.
Devaluation. South African blacks were
devalued in the eyes of most South African
whites due to overt and institutionalized
racism. International observers, though, were
much less likely to have such a low opinion of
South African blacks. Indeed, the fact that the
massacre was carried out by white police
against black protesters made it a potent
symbol of racist brutality. White South
African racism thus muted outrage within the
country, whereas international anti-racism
magnified it.
Reinterpretation. The police perceived the
Sharpeville crowd as physically menacing and
the product of a deeper anti-white threat. Thus
it was easy for the authorities to endorse the
view that the primary responsibility for the
events was held by the crowd and its organizers,
dubbed “agitators.”
The Sharpeville protest was part of the
wider mobilization organized by PAC activists.
Again, this was perceived as a serious
threat to law-abiding citizens. However, this
picture of the crowd as the aggressor and the
police as victims who inadvertently used too
much firepower did not sell well in other
countries. On the other hand, PAC activists
and other black sympathizers portrayed the
Sharpeville events as premeditated murder.
This interpretation resonated with those
inclined to believe the worst about apartheid.
Official channels. After the massacre, the
government quickly established the Wessels
Commission to serve as a symbol of the
government’s commitment to justice, due
process, and the search for truth. In order to
reduce outrage without disturbing the status
quo, the commission had to be seen to be fair
and independent yet in reality produce a
whitewash. This seems to be pretty much what
happened, though it is unclear how much
effect the commission had on opinion inside
and outside the country.
Intimidation. Immediately after the massacre,
the police went through Sharpeville
beating and arresting residents. The government
soon declared a state of emergency,
giving legal backing for the increased repression
that was already occurring. Arrests and
threats also reduced the ability and willingness
to report on the use of dumdums. However,
intimidation had little effect on international
opinion.
Intimidation was effective in limiting testimony
to the Wessels Commission, helping
turn its report into a whitewash. Likewise,
cover-up reduced the commission’s access to
information.
Although the police and government used all
five methods of inhibiting outrage, in the end
they were mostly unsuccessful: the massacre
turned out to be counterproductive for them.
Shooting protesters in cold blood was widely
perceived as a gross injustice; once information
and images about the shooting were
communicated internationally, the efforts of
the government to blame the protesters and
give a semblance of justice through the
Wessels Commission were too little and too
late to undo the damage.
Acknowledgements
I thank Truda Gray, Philip Kitley, Jeff Ross,
Greg Scott, and Tom Weber for valuable
comments on drafts of this chapter
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Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)
Origins: Formation, Sharpeville and banning, 1959-1960
Table of Contents:
- Origins: Formation, Sharpeville and banning, 1959-1960
- The PAC moves underground (1960s - 1976)
- Increased activity after Soweto Riots (1976-1994)
- The PAC in exile (1976-1983)
- PAC Camps
Africanist - An ideology that says that black people should determine their own future - Africa for the Africans. It was first expressed by a Xhosa missionary, Tiyo Siga, in the 19th century.
During the 1950's, the apartheid government was continually introducing new means to suppress the liberation struggle. Many members of the African National Congress (ANC) had become impatient with the inability of peaceful protest to achieve results. In November 1958, at the Transvaal provincial congress, some of the more 'Africanist' members of the ANC were excluded from the hall. Rather than cause a confrontation, they decided to break away, and on 6 April 1959 the PAC was formed. They elected Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe as their first president and Potlako Leballo as secretary and decided to follow the route of the ANC's Programme of Action and Defiance Campaign (committed to open defiance of the laws of the land). The reasons cited by many sources for this split are that the PAC promulgated policies that were contrary to the 'multi-racial' policies of the ANC (at the time the ANC was made up of different race groups) and that members were frustrated by the policies of the ANC, expressed in the Freedom Charter in 1955.
Robert Sobukwe's leadership of the PAC was based on a vision of an 'Africa for Africans' movement, which promoted mass action against discrimination. It is inaccurate to say however that Sobukwe's Africanism was 'racial' or in direct opposition to the ANC's 'multi-racial policies'. Sobukwe, believed that instead of adopting a policy of 'multi-racialism', or a party made up of different groups, those wanting to join the PAC should do so on an individual or 'non-racial' basis in united support for an African movement.
This standpoint is supported by an extract from Sobukwe's inaugural speech which was given when the PAC was formed in 1959, and advocated 'non-racialism':
"...Further, multi-racialism is in fact a pandering to European bigotry and arrogance. It is a method of safeguarding white interests, implying as it does, proportional representation irrespective of population figures. In that sense it is a complete negation of democracy.
To us the term "multi-racialism" implies that there are such basic insuperable differences between the various national groups here that the best course is to keep them permanently distinctive in a kind of democratic apartheid. That to us is racialism multiplied, which probably is what the term truly connotes. We aim, politically, at government of the Africans by the Africans, for the Africans, with everybody who owes his only loyalty to Afrika and who is prepared to accept the democratic rule of an African majority being regarded as an African.
We guarantee no minority rights, because we think in terms of individuals, not groups".
The PAC became a rival of the ANC in terms of support, and this lead to strong competition. Therefore, when the ANC announced that they were planning an anti-pass campaign on the 31 March 1960, the PAC decided to spearhead their efforts by planning a similar protest for the 21 March.
The anti-pass campaign turned out to be very important for the PAC, and for South African politics in general. The date for the campaign was finalised on 18 March, and set for 21 March 1960. The weekend was spent handing out pamphlets about the campaign and appealing to supporters to voluntarily leave their passes at home and offer themselves up for arrest at the nearest police station on 21 March. Protests took place in Sharpeville and in the Western Cape in townships such as Langa.
The protest was of a non-violent nature, but turned violent in Sharpeville where police opened fire on a crowd of protestors, killing 69 and injuring 180. In Langa, near Cape Town, the police also opened fire and killed two people. PAC member Philip Kgosana led a protest march in Cape Town two days later.
The Sharpeville Incident resulted in international criticism and concern and increased suppression from the National Party (NP) government. The negative thing for the PAC was that Sobukwe had also taken part in the campaign, together with other leaders of the PAC, and they were all placed under arrest. Many other leaders were arrested in the aftermath of the incident; they were detained for 2-3 years. Sobukwe was not released until 1969. A state of emergency was declared on 30 March after other marches took place in Cape Town and Durban. As a result of the Sharpeville Incident both the PAC and ANC were banned on 8 April 1960, a year after PAC was formed.
References
- Karis, T.G. & Gerhart, G.M. (1997). From Protest to Challenge. A documentary history of African politics in South Africa, 1882-1990. Volume 5: Nadir and Resurgence, 1964- 1979, Pretoria: Unisa Press.
- Beinart, W. (1994) Twentieth century South Africa, Oxford: OUP.
- Davenport, T.R.H. (1991). South Africa. A modern history, London: Macmillan.
- The Pan Africanist Congress, history [online], available at: pac.org.za
- Kondlo Kwandiwe Merriman (2003) ?In the Twilight of the Azanian Revolution: The Exile History of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa): (1960-1990)?, D. Litt thesis, Historical Studies, Faculty of Arts, Rand University.
- 6. Johnson Mlambo [online], available at: wikipedia.org [accessed 2 April 2009]
Related resources
- All That Glitters by Emilia Potenza
- A Crime Against Humanity: Analysing the repression of the apartheid state by Max Coleman
- A Documentary History of South African Indians: Part 1: 1860-1914 and Part2: 1914 - 1982 edited by Surendra Bhana & Bridglal Pachai
- Black Student Politics: From SASO to SANSCO 1968 - 1990 - By Saleem Badat
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On 21 March 1960 at least 180 black Africans were injured (there are claims of as many as 300) and 69 killed when South African police opened fire on approximately 300 demonstrators, who were protesting against the pass laws, at the township of Sharpeville, near Vereeniging in the Transvaal. In similar demonstrations at the police station in Vanderbijlpark, another person was shot. Later that day at Langa, a township outside Cape Town, police baton charged and fired tear gas at the gathered protesters, shooting three and injuring several others. The Sharpeville Massacre, as the event has become known, signalled the start of armed resistance in South Africa, and prompted worldwide condemnation of South Africa's Apartheid policies.
A build-up to the massacre
On 13 May 1902 the treaty which ended the Anglo-Boer War was signed at Vereeniging; it signified a new era of cooperation between English and Afrikaner living in Southern Africa. By 1910, the two Afrikaner states of Orange River Colony (Oranje Vrij Staat) and Transvaal (Zuid Afrikaansche Republick) were joined with Cape Colony and Natal as the Union of South Africa. The repression of black Africans became entrenched in the constitution of the new union (although perhaps not intentionally) and the foundations of Grand Apartheid were laid.
After the Second World War the Herstigte ('Reformed' or 'Pure') National Party (HNP) came into power (by a slender majority, created through a coalition with the otherwise insignificant Afrikaner Party) in 1948. Its members had been disaffected from the previous government, the United Party, in 1933, and had smarted at the government's accord with Britain during the war. Within a year the Mixed Marriages Act was instituted – the first of many segregationist laws devised to separate privileged white South Africans from the black African masses. By 1958, with the election of Hendrik Verwoerd, (white) South Africa was completely entrenched in the philosophy of Apartheid.
There was opposition to the government's policies. The African National Congress (ANC) was working within the law against all forms of racial discrimination in South Africa. In 1956 had committed itself to a South Africa which "belongs to all." A peaceful demonstration in June that same year, at which the ANC (and other anti-Apartheid groups) approved the Freedom Charter, led to the arrest of 156 anti-Apartheid leaders and the 'Treason Trial' which lasted until 1961.
By the late 1950s some of ANCs members had become disillusioned with the 'peaceful' response. Known as 'Africanists' this select group was opposed to a multi-racial future for South Africa. The Africanists followed a philosophy that a racially assertive sense of nationalism was needed to mobilise the masses, and they advocated a strategy of mass action (boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience and non-cooperation). The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) was formed in April 1959, with Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe as president.
The PAC and ANC did not agree on policy, and it seemed unlikely in 1959 that they would co-operate in any manner. The ANC planned a campaign of demonstration against the pass laws to start at the beginning of April 1960. The PAC rushed ahead and announced a similar demonstration, to start ten days earlier, effectively hijacking the ANC campaign.
The PAC called for "African males in every city and village... to leave their passes at home, join demonstrations and, if arrested, [to] offer no bail, no defence, [and] no fine."1
On 16 March 1960 Sobukwe wrote to the commissioner of police, Major General Rademeyer, stating that the PAC would beholding a five-day, non-violent, disciplined, and sustained protest campaign against pass laws, starting on 21 March. At a press conference on 18 March he further stated: "I have appealed to the African people to make sure that this campaign is conducted in a spirit of absolute non-violence, and I am quite certain they will heed my call. If the other side so desires, we will provide them with an opportunity to demonstrate to the world how brutal they can be." The PAC leadership was hopeful of some kind of physical response.
References:
1. Africa since 1935 Vol VIII of the UNESCO General History of Africa, editor Ali Mazrui, published by James Currey, 1999, p259-60.
Next page > Part 2: The Massacre > Page 1, 2, 3
A build-up to the massacre
On 13 May 1902 the treaty which ended the Anglo-Boer War was signed at Vereeniging; it signified a new era of cooperation between English and Afrikaner living in Southern Africa. By 1910, the two Afrikaner states of Orange River Colony (Oranje Vrij Staat) and Transvaal (Zuid Afrikaansche Republick) were joined with Cape Colony and Natal as the Union of South Africa. The repression of black Africans became entrenched in the constitution of the new union (although perhaps not intentionally) and the foundations of Grand Apartheid were laid.
After the Second World War the Herstigte ('Reformed' or 'Pure') National Party (HNP) came into power (by a slender majority, created through a coalition with the otherwise insignificant Afrikaner Party) in 1948. Its members had been disaffected from the previous government, the United Party, in 1933, and had smarted at the government's accord with Britain during the war. Within a year the Mixed Marriages Act was instituted – the first of many segregationist laws devised to separate privileged white South Africans from the black African masses. By 1958, with the election of Hendrik Verwoerd, (white) South Africa was completely entrenched in the philosophy of Apartheid.
There was opposition to the government's policies. The African National Congress (ANC) was working within the law against all forms of racial discrimination in South Africa. In 1956 had committed itself to a South Africa which "belongs to all." A peaceful demonstration in June that same year, at which the ANC (and other anti-Apartheid groups) approved the Freedom Charter, led to the arrest of 156 anti-Apartheid leaders and the 'Treason Trial' which lasted until 1961.
By the late 1950s some of ANCs members had become disillusioned with the 'peaceful' response. Known as 'Africanists' this select group was opposed to a multi-racial future for South Africa. The Africanists followed a philosophy that a racially assertive sense of nationalism was needed to mobilise the masses, and they advocated a strategy of mass action (boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience and non-cooperation). The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) was formed in April 1959, with Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe as president.
The PAC and ANC did not agree on policy, and it seemed unlikely in 1959 that they would co-operate in any manner. The ANC planned a campaign of demonstration against the pass laws to start at the beginning of April 1960. The PAC rushed ahead and announced a similar demonstration, to start ten days earlier, effectively hijacking the ANC campaign.
The PAC called for "African males in every city and village... to leave their passes at home, join demonstrations and, if arrested, [to] offer no bail, no defence, [and] no fine."1
On 16 March 1960 Sobukwe wrote to the commissioner of police, Major General Rademeyer, stating that the PAC would beholding a five-day, non-violent, disciplined, and sustained protest campaign against pass laws, starting on 21 March. At a press conference on 18 March he further stated: "I have appealed to the African people to make sure that this campaign is conducted in a spirit of absolute non-violence, and I am quite certain they will heed my call. If the other side so desires, we will provide them with an opportunity to demonstrate to the world how brutal they can be." The PAC leadership was hopeful of some kind of physical response.
References:
1. Africa since 1935 Vol VIII of the UNESCO General History of Africa, editor Ali Mazrui, published by James Currey, 1999, p259-60.
Next page > Part 2: The Massacre > Page 1, 2, 3
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