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เสาร์ธันวาคม 3, 2011
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กลุ่มสิทธิตามกฎหมายว่าสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ไทยต้องการการปฏิรูป
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ที่เผยแพร่ : 3 ธันวาคม 2011 เวลา 06:03 ET
กรุงเทพฯ (AP) -- Watch สิทธิมนุษยชนเรียกร้องให้รัฐบาลเป็นของประเทศไทยในการแก้ไขกฎหมายที่รุนแรงเพื่อปกป้องสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์
กลุ่มสิทธินิวยอร์กตามเรียกมาเสาร์หลังจากที่ศาลพิพากษากรุงเทพฯคนไทยเมื่อ เดือนถึง 20 ปีในคุกเพื่อส่งข้อความโทรศัพท์มือถือไปเป็นเลขานุการส่วนตัวของแล้ว - นายกรัฐมนตรีอภิสิทธิ์เวชชาชีวะที่ได้เห็นความไม่พอใจให้กับพระราชินี เลขานุการได้ยื่นเรื่องร้องเรียนอย่างเป็นทางการและตำรวจควบคุมตัวชายคนนั้นในสิงหาคม 2010
เจ้าหน้าที่ฝ่ายไทยอาจไม่สามารถเข้าถึงได้ทันทีสำหรับความคิดเห็นเสาร์
ของประเทศไทยที่เรียกว่ากฎหมายหมิ่นพระบรมเดชานุภาพมีความเชื่อมั่นที่จะเป็นรุนแรงในโลก ที่พบความผิดของ defaming ใบหน้าสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ในสามถึง 15 ปีหลังบาร์ภายใต้ข้อประมวลกฎหมายอาญาของ 112
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กลับมองต่อไปที่ Great Scandal ไอวี่ลีกถ่ายภาพเปลือยกับการตอบสนองของผู้อ่านความคิดเห็นที่ »
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PM EX - ไทยลี้ภัยที่จะได้รับหนังสือเดินทางกลับเร็ว ๆ นี้ : รัฐมนตรีว่าการกระทรวง
กรุงเทพมหานคร |(รอย เตอร์) -- ของไทยที่ถูกเนรเทศตนเอง, ผู้ลี้ภัยอดีตนายกรัฐมนตรีทักษิณชินวัตรอาจจะออกใหม่หนังสือเดินทางไทยของ เขาในสัปดาห์ที่ผ่านมาเป็น"ปัจจุบันปีใหม่"จากรัฐบาลเป็นรัฐมนตรีต่างประเทศ ของประเทศกล่าวว่าในวันศุกร์
ทักษิณที่อาศัยอยู่ในดูไบเพื่อหลีกเลี่ยงการจำคุกใน ประเทศไทย ควรจะได้รับหนังสือเดินทางไทยปกติเพราะไม่มีคำสั่งศาลออกมาเพื่อยกเลิกมัน เมื่อตอนที่เขาหลบหนีไปในปี 2008, สุรพงษ์กล่าวว่า Towijakchaikul
"เรากำลังพิจารณาที่จะกลับหนังสือเดินทางที่อดีตนายกรัฐมนตรีทักษิณและเรา คาดว่าจะสามารถที่จะทำภายในสัปดาห์"นายสุรพงษ์กล่าวกับผู้สื่อข่าว
"เป็นธรรมที่เรากำลังทบทวนกฎหมายและเราพบว่าการกระทำที่เป็นไปได้ ... มันอาจจะนำเสนอขึ้นปีใหม่."
ทักษิณซึ่งเป็นครั้งที่สองได้รับการเลือกตั้งเศรษฐีโทรคมนาคมที่เคยเป็นเจ้า ของพรีเมียร์ลีกอังกฤษสโมสรฟุตบอลแมนเชสเตอร์ซิตี้เป็นหนึ่งในของโลกมากที่ สุดอพยพที่รู้จักกันดีและการเดินทางเกี่ยวกับหนังสือเดินทางที่ออกโดย นิการากัวและมอนเตเนโก
เขาก็ไปอยู่ที่อังกฤษไม่นานก่อนที่ศาลมือลงใน absentia ประโยคคุกสองปีสำหรับการละเมิดอำนาจในการช่วยภรรยาแล้วเขา Pojamarn นา Pombejra ซื้อที่ดินบางส่วนจากกรุงเทพฯที่สำคัญหน่วยงานของรัฐ
เขาได้รับการติดตามอย่างจริงจังโดยรัฐบาลก่อนหน้านี้ แต่หลายประเทศที่เขาเข้าชมละเว้นการร้องขอส่งผู้ร้ายข้ามแดน
โชคชะตาที่เปลี่ยนไปในเดือนกรกฎาคมเมื่อบุคคลที่ซ้อนกันกับพันธมิตรของเขา และนำโดยน้องสาวของเขา Yingluck ชินวัตร, กวาดของเขาคืออำนาจในการเลือกตั้งถล่มทลาย
แต่ย้ายไปยัง re - ปัญหาหนังสือเดินทางของเขามีแนวโน้มที่จะทำให้คนในประเทศไทยที่ทักษิณมี ศัตรูที่มีประสิทธิภาพในสถานประกอบการทหารและการอนุรักษ์ที่ทำให้เขากลาง เพื่อหกปีของความวุ่นวายทางการเมืองเกี่ยวกับการปิด
พวกเขากล่าวหาว่าทักษิณทุจริต, cronyism การก่อการร้ายและความไม่ซื่อสัตย์กับสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ แต่เขาปฏิเสธค่าใช้จ่ายและ"เสื้อแดง"ของเขาสนับสนุนคู่แข่งของเขาบอกว่า พล็อตที่จะโค่นเขาในปี 2006 รัฐประหารและกดดันศาลเพื่อคุมขังนักโทษของเขา
แผน mooted ในการแก้ไขกฎหมายนิรโทษกรรมที่จะได้ทำทักษิณมีสิทธิ์ที่จะเดินทางกลับประเทศ ไทยเป็นคนฟรีถูกยกเลิกโดยรัฐบาลของทั้งสองสัปดาห์ที่ผ่านมาหลังจากที่มันได้ รับแจ้งจากโวยพรรคฝ่ายค้านและกลุ่มที่ต่อต้านทักษิณ
ของประเทศที่รัฐมนตรีว่าการกระทรวงยุติธรรมกล่าวว่าแผนแก้ไขไม่เคยมีอยู่และได้รับการ"ฝันขึ้น"โดยเป็นสื่อที่"คลั่ง"
(รายงานโดยประชา Hariraksapitak; เขียนโดยมาร์ตินลหุโทษการแก้ไขโดย Paul Tait )
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การเชื่อมโยงผู้ให้การสนับสนุนเรายินดีต้อนรับความคิดเห็นที่ล่วงหน้าเรื่องที่ผ่านความเห็นที่เกี่ยวข้อง, anecdotes, การเชื่อมโยงและข้อมูล ถ้าคุณเห็นข้อคิดเห็นที่คุณเชื่อว่าเป็นที่ไม่เกี่ยวข้องหรือไม่เหมาะสมที่ คุณสามารถตั้งค่าสถานะถึงบรรณาธิการของเราโดยใช้การเชื่อมโยงการรายงานการ ละเมิด ชมการแสดงในความคิดเห็นที่ไม่ได้เป็นตัวแทนของรอยเตอร์ที่ สำหรับข้อมูลเพิ่มเติมเกี่ยวกับนโยบายการแสดงความคิดเห็นของเราความเห็น (0)เป็นคนแรกที่แสดงความคิดเห็นใน reuters.comเพิ่มของคุณโดยใช้กล่องดังกล่าวข้างต้น
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เวลาในการวางแผนพร้อมยูโรโซน B
เยอรมนียังคงมีความมุ่งมั่นที่จะลองแผนปัจจุบันสำหรับการแก้ปัญหาวิกฤตยูโรแม้ว่าจะมีโอกาสน้อยในการทำงาน มันมีดีกว่าใช้เวลาและความพยายาม readying แผน B เมื่อไม่ถ้าวางแผนไม่เพียงพอที่จะกลายเป็นหยุดวิกฤต บทความแบบเต็มรูป
แพลตฟอร์มข้อมูลของเรา Flagship การเงินรวมภายในรอยเตอร์โครงสร้างพื้นฐานที่แฝงต่ำพิเศษสำหรับการซื้อขายอิเล็กทรอนิกส์และการกระจายข้อมูลวิธีการเชื่อมต่อกับการกำกับดูแลความเสี่ยงและการปฏิบัติตามตามกฎหมายการวิจัยรุ่นแพลตฟอร์มของเราต่อไปเวิร์คสเตชั่ภาษีของเราทั่วโลกThomson Reuters เป็นใหญ่ที่สุดในโลกสำนักข่าวต่างประเทศมัลติมีเดียให้ ข่าวการลงทุน , ข่าวโลก , ข่าวธุรกิจ , ข่าวเทคโนโลยี , ข่าวพาดหัว, ข่าวธุรกิจขนาดเล็ก , การแจ้งเตือนข่าว, การเงินส่วนบุคคล , การลงทุนในตลาดหุ้น และ ข้อมูลกองทุนรวม ที่มีอยู่บน Reuters.com, วิดีโอ , มือถือ และแพลตฟอร์มโทรทัศน์แบบโต้ตอบ นักข่าว Thomson Reuters อาจมีการ บรรณาธิการคู่มือการ ดำเนินงานและการเปิดเผยข้อมูลที่น่าสนใจที่เกี่ยวข้อง
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navanavonmilita 
Rights Group Says Thai Monarchy Laws Need Reform
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: December 3, 2011 at 6:03 AM ET
BANGKOK (AP) — Human Rights Watch is urging Thailand's government to amend harsh laws aimed at protecting the monarchy.
The New York-based rights group's call Saturday comes after a Bangkok court sentenced a Thai man last month to 20 years in prison for sending mobile phone text messages to a personal secretary of then-Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva that were deemed offensive to the queen. The secretary filed an official complaint and police detained the man in August 2010.
Thai officials could not immediately be reached for comment Saturday.
Thailand's so-called lese majeste laws are believed to be the harshest in the world. Those found guilty of defaming the monarchy face three to 15 years behind bars under the penal code's Article 112.
The New York-based rights group's call Saturday comes after a Bangkok court sentenced a Thai man last month to 20 years in prison for sending mobile phone text messages to a personal secretary of then-Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva that were deemed offensive to the queen. The secretary filed an official complaint and police detained the man in August 2010.
Thai officials could not immediately be reached for comment Saturday.
Thailand's so-called lese majeste laws are believed to be the harshest in the world. Those found guilty of defaming the monarchy face three to 15 years behind bars under the penal code's Article 112.
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Fugitive ex-Thai PM to get passport back soon: minister
BANGKOK |
(Reuters) - Thailand's self-exiled, fugitive former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra could be reissued his Thai passport within weeks as a "New Year present" from the government, the country's foreign minister said on Friday.Thaksin, who lives in Dubai to avoid jail in Thailand, should be granted a regular Thai passport because no court order was issued to revoke it when he fled in 2008, Surapong Towijakchaikul said.
"We are considering returning the passport to former prime minister Thaksin and we expect to be able to do so within weeks," Surapong told reporters.
"To be fair we are reviewing the laws and we found that the action is possible ... it could be a New Year's present."
Thaksin, a twice-elected telecoms billionaire who once owned English Premier League soccer club Manchester City, is one of the world's most well-known fugitives and travels on passports issued by Nicaragua and Montenegro.
He went to England shortly before a court handed down in absentia a two-year prison sentence for abuse of power for helping his then wife, Pojamarn Na Pombejra, purchase some prime Bangkok land from a state agency.
He was pursued aggressively by the previous government, but many of the countries he visited ignored extradition requests.
His fortunes changed in July when a party stacked with his allies and led by his sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, was swept to power in an election landslide.
But the move to re-issue his passport is likely to cause a stir in Thailand, where Thaksin has powerful enemies among the military and conservative establishment, making him central to six years of on-off political turmoil.
They accuse Thaksin of corruption, cronyism, terrorism and disloyalty to the monarchy, but he denies the charges and his "red shirt" supporters say his rivals plotted to overthrow him in a 2006 coup and pressured the courts to convict him.
A mooted plan to amend an amnesty law that would have made Thaksin eligible to return to Thailand a free man was aborted by the government two weeks ago after it prompted an outcry from the opposition party and anti-Thaksin groups.
The country's justice minister said the amendment plan never existed and had been "dreamt up" by a "frantic" media.
(Reporting by Pracha Hariraksapitak; Writing by Martin Petty; Editing by Paul Tait)
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Thailand – United States relations are bilateral relations between the Kingdom of Thailand and the United States of America.
King Bhumibol Adulyadej, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Queen Sirikit and Mamie Eisenhower at the White House in June 1960.
The first recorded contact between Thailand (then known as Siam) and the United States came in 1818, when an American ship Captain visited the country, bearing a letter from U.S. President James Monroe.[1] In 1833 relations were formalized, with the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the administration of President Andrew Jackson and King Jessadabodindra (Rama III), concluded on March 20, 1833. The President gave the King a gold sword with a design of an elephant and an eagle chased on a gold handle. Edmund Roberts who negotiated the treaty was made the first American envoy in Siam.[2] This was affirmed by former prime minister Samak Sundaravej, who in 2008, met George W. Bush on the "occasion of the celebration of 175th anniversary of Thai–American relations."[3] Thai American immigration also dates to the 1830s. This makes Thailand the first east Asian nation to have a formal diplomatic agreement with the United States; eleven years before the Great Qing and twenty-one years before Tokugawa Japan. A Treaty of Amity and Commerce was concluded on May 29, 1856.
Thailand has received U.S. military equipment, essential supplies, training, and assistance in the construction and improvement of facilities and installations for much of the period since 1950. Over recent decades, U.S. security assistance included military training programs carried out in the United States and elsewhere. A small U.S. military advisory group in Thailand oversaw the delivery of equipment to the Royal Thai Armed Forces and the training of Thai military personnel in its use and maintenance. Funding for the International Military Education and Training and the Foreign Military Financing programs, along with selected other programs totaling $29 million, was suspended following the September 19, 2006 coup d'état in Thailand. As part of their mutual defense cooperation over the last decade, Thailand and the United States have developed a vigorous joint military exercise program, which engages all the services of each nation and averages 40 joint exercises per year.
Thailand's U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield is currently the "only facility in Southeast Asia capable of supporting large-scale logistical operations".[6] Thailand has allowed the US to use U-Tapao to land and refuel after traveling across the Pacific Ocean on the way to US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[6] According to Global Research, the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake served "for strengthening the U.S. military presence" in U-Tapao, which was used as a "command center" for US military and rescue aircraft.[7]
Abhisit Vejjajiva, Pimpen Vejjajiva, U.S. President Barack Obama and Michelle Obama on 23 September 2009, in New York
According to Barry McCaffrey, a US four-star general, "the excellent U.S.-Thai counter-narcotics relationship has been an enormous success and stimulus for greater regional cooperation".[8]
According to Shawn Crispin, the Asia Times Southeast Asia editor, Thailand represents one of the U.S.'s "once strong, now strained bilateral alliances".[10] Crispin surmises that the long history of bilateral cooperation and Thai fears of China's rise enabled Bush to have "his way with Thailand".[10] The US War on Terror combined with Thailand's southern Islamic insurgency has created tension, particularly with Thailand's People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD).[10] The U.S. has pressured and enabled Thailand to crack down on the insurgency with more proactive military force.[11]
In 2008, Thai courts refused to turn over Jamshid Ghassemi, an Iranian national accused of missile parts smuggling to the US, the "first-ever failed extradition" between Thailand and the US.[6] US-Thai friction also increased when Thailand refused to quickly extradite Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, according to Crispin, signaling that "Washington is slowly but surely losing influence over its long time strategic ally".[6] Crispin viewed it as "no doubt significant" that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chose to visit Indonesia, but not Thailand, on her first trip to southeast Asia.[6]
Rice production in Thailand employs approximately two-thirds of the population, causing friction over US rice subsidiesSince the 1980s, US farm subsidies for rice, along with copyright and patent issues, have constituted the "major problems in U.S.-Thai trade ties".[12] The rice subsidy was one of the primary obstacles to the negotiation of a bilateral FTA.[13] Approximately two-thirds of Thailand's population are rice farmers, and the U.S. subsidy "severely strains U.S.-Thai relations as Bangkok finds itself unable to explain the income lost to its 35 million rice farmers".[12] USDA-funded research to produce variants of Jasmine rice capable of growing in the US are viewed as biopiracy by many Thai rice farmers.[14] In 2005, Thai rice farmers gathered outside the US embassy to chant a "traditional ritual to bring misfortune to enemies".[14] Farmer protests also occurred outside the US embassy during the 2001 WTO ministerial meeting in Doha.[15]
Thai officials "sharply criticized" the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, and retaliated by joining two WTO dispute resolution cases against the US: one against anti-dumping subsidy offsets, and the Shrimp-Turtle Case.[16] According to Oxfam, the US spends $1.3 billion on rice subsidies annually for a crop that costs $1.8 billion to grow, allowing the US to become the second largest global rice exporter (after Thailand) and dump rice at 34% below the cost of production.[14] Following the election of Obama and the 2008 global financial crisis, there are Thai fears of renewed US protectionism.[10]
Principal U.S. Embassy Officials include:
This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Department of State (Background Notes).[1]
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Thailand–United States relations
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 | |
 Thailand |  United States |
Contents[hide] |
[edit] History
[edit] 19th century
Thailand is the oldest non-European ally of the United States of America. In Roger and Hammerstein's The King and I, this relationship is mentioned jokingly in passing when the King plans to sent war elephants to assist President Lincoln in his Great War.The first recorded contact between Thailand (then known as Siam) and the United States came in 1818, when an American ship Captain visited the country, bearing a letter from U.S. President James Monroe.[1] In 1833 relations were formalized, with the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the administration of President Andrew Jackson and King Jessadabodindra (Rama III), concluded on March 20, 1833. The President gave the King a gold sword with a design of an elephant and an eagle chased on a gold handle. Edmund Roberts who negotiated the treaty was made the first American envoy in Siam.[2] This was affirmed by former prime minister Samak Sundaravej, who in 2008, met George W. Bush on the "occasion of the celebration of 175th anniversary of Thai–American relations."[3] Thai American immigration also dates to the 1830s. This makes Thailand the first east Asian nation to have a formal diplomatic agreement with the United States; eleven years before the Great Qing and twenty-one years before Tokugawa Japan. A Treaty of Amity and Commerce was concluded on May 29, 1856.
[edit] 20th century
An agreement on relations between the two countries was signed in Washington D.C. on December 16, 1920.[4][edit] Treaty of Amity (1966)
Main article: U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity
Since World War II, the United States and Thailand have developed close relations, as reflected in several bilateral treaties and by both countries' participation in UN multilateral activities and agreements. The principal bilateral arrangement is the 1966 Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, which facilitates U.S. and Thai companies' economic access to one another's markets. Other important agreements address civil uses of atomic energy, sales of agricultural commodities, investment guarantees, and military and economic assistance.[edit] Proposed FTA (2004–present)
Main article: United States-Thailand Free Trade Agreement
In June 2004 the United States and Thailand initiated negotiations on a free trade agreement which, when concluded, will reduce and eliminate barriers to trade and investment between the two countries. These negotiations were placed on hold following the dissolution of the Thai Parliament in February 2006 and the subsequent coup in September. The new military government issued compulsory licenses for several anti-HIV drugs, effectively ending the FTA negotiations.[5] According to Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a political science professor at Chulalongkorn University, this has put bilateral relations on a "back burner".[5][edit] Security cooperation
The United States and Thailand are among the signatories of the 1954 Manila pact of the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Article IV(1) of this treaty provides that, in the event of armed attack in the treaty area (which includes Thailand), each member would "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." Despite the dissolution of the SEATO in 1977, the Manila pact remains in force and, together with the Thanat-Rusk communiqué of 1962, constitutes the basis of U.S. security commitments to Thailand. Thailand continues to be a key security ally in Asia, along with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. In December 2003, Thailand was designated a Major non-NATO ally (MNNA).Thailand has received U.S. military equipment, essential supplies, training, and assistance in the construction and improvement of facilities and installations for much of the period since 1950. Over recent decades, U.S. security assistance included military training programs carried out in the United States and elsewhere. A small U.S. military advisory group in Thailand oversaw the delivery of equipment to the Royal Thai Armed Forces and the training of Thai military personnel in its use and maintenance. Funding for the International Military Education and Training and the Foreign Military Financing programs, along with selected other programs totaling $29 million, was suspended following the September 19, 2006 coup d'état in Thailand. As part of their mutual defense cooperation over the last decade, Thailand and the United States have developed a vigorous joint military exercise program, which engages all the services of each nation and averages 40 joint exercises per year.
Thailand's U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield is currently the "only facility in Southeast Asia capable of supporting large-scale logistical operations".[6] Thailand has allowed the US to use U-Tapao to land and refuel after traveling across the Pacific Ocean on the way to US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[6] According to Global Research, the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake served "for strengthening the U.S. military presence" in U-Tapao, which was used as a "command center" for US military and rescue aircraft.[7]
[edit] Economic relations
[edit] Foreign assistance
Economic assistance has been extended in various fields, including rural development, health, family planning, education, and science and technology. The formal U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) program ended in 1995. However, there are a number of targeted assistance programs which continue in areas of mutually defined importance, including: health and HIV/AIDS programming; refugee assistance; and trafficking in persons. The U.S. Peace Corps in Thailand has approximately 100 volunteers, focused on primary education, with an integrated program involving teacher training, health education, and environmental education.[edit] Trade
The United States is Thailand's second largest trading partner after Japan; in 2006 merchandise imports from Thailand totaled $22.5 billion, and merchandise exports totaled $8.2 billion. The U.S., Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and the European Union are among Thailand's largest foreign investors. American investment, concentrated in the petroleum and chemicals, finance, consumer products, and automobile production sectors, is estimated at $21 billion.[edit] Current bilateral issues
[edit] Counter-narcotics
Thailand remains a trafficking route for narcotics from the Golden Triangle--the intersection of Burma, Laos, and Thailand—to both the domestic Thai and international markets. The large-scale production and shipment of opium and heroin shipments from Burma of previous years have largely been replaced by widespread smuggling of methamphetamine tablets, although heroin seizures along the border continue to take place with some frequency. The United States and Thailand work closely together and with the United Nations on a broad range of programs to halt illicit drug trafficking and use and other criminal activity. The U.S. supports the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, which provides counter-narcotics and anti-crime capacity-building programs to law enforcement and judicial officials from a number of regional countries.
According to Barry McCaffrey, a US four-star general, "the excellent U.S.-Thai counter-narcotics relationship has been an enormous success and stimulus for greater regional cooperation".[8]
[edit] War on Terrorism
Thailand has also been important to the US War on Terrorism, "providing access to military facilities, sharing information on the movements of terrorist organizations and suspected terrorists, offering military engineering and medical personnel to support reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan".[9] The most visible element of this cooperation was a joint operation between the CIA and Thai police which captured Riduan Isamuddin (better known by his nom de guerre, Hambali) in 2003.[6]According to Shawn Crispin, the Asia Times Southeast Asia editor, Thailand represents one of the U.S.'s "once strong, now strained bilateral alliances".[10] Crispin surmises that the long history of bilateral cooperation and Thai fears of China's rise enabled Bush to have "his way with Thailand".[10] The US War on Terror combined with Thailand's southern Islamic insurgency has created tension, particularly with Thailand's People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD).[10] The U.S. has pressured and enabled Thailand to crack down on the insurgency with more proactive military force.[11]
In 2008, Thai courts refused to turn over Jamshid Ghassemi, an Iranian national accused of missile parts smuggling to the US, the "first-ever failed extradition" between Thailand and the US.[6] US-Thai friction also increased when Thailand refused to quickly extradite Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, according to Crispin, signaling that "Washington is slowly but surely losing influence over its long time strategic ally".[6] Crispin viewed it as "no doubt significant" that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chose to visit Indonesia, but not Thailand, on her first trip to southeast Asia.[6]
[edit] Rice subsidies
Thai officials "sharply criticized" the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, and retaliated by joining two WTO dispute resolution cases against the US: one against anti-dumping subsidy offsets, and the Shrimp-Turtle Case.[16] According to Oxfam, the US spends $1.3 billion on rice subsidies annually for a crop that costs $1.8 billion to grow, allowing the US to become the second largest global rice exporter (after Thailand) and dump rice at 34% below the cost of production.[14] Following the election of Obama and the 2008 global financial crisis, there are Thai fears of renewed US protectionism.[10]
[edit] China's rise
According to Stratfor, "Bangkok's support could prove pivotal for the United States in the years to come, as it presses war against militant Islamic groups in the region and prepares for the expansion of Chinese power".[17] According to Crispin, however, it is "clear that Thailand fails to share the US's threat perception of China's rapid regional rise", trying to maintain strong relations with both the United States and China.[6][edit] Embassies
Main article: United States Ambassador to Thailand
The U.S. maintains an embassy in Bangkok, one of the largest in the world, and a consulate in the northern city of Chiang Mai. Thailand maintains an embassy in Washington, D.C. and consulates in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles.Principal U.S. Embassy Officials include:
- Ambassador – Kristie A. Kenney
- Deputy Chief of Mission – Judith B. Cefkin
- Political Affairs Counselor – George P. Kent
- Economic Affairs Counselor – Julie J. Chung
- Public Affairs Counselor – Kenneth Foster
- Consul General – Ronald Robinson
- Management Counselor – Gregory Stanford
- Transnational Crime Affairs Section -- Scott L. Rolston
- Regional Security Officer -- Randall Bennett
[edit] Notes
- ^ Duke, Pensri (1982). "Historical Perspective: 1833-1940". In Mungkandi, Wigwat; Warren, William. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn Press.
- ^ AmericanThai.net U.S.-Thai Relation Commemorating 175 years of U.S.-Thai Friendship
- ^ http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080806-7.html
- ^ Text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 6, pp. 292-305.
- ^ a b Channel News Asia. 2008, August 5. "US president's visit to Thailand will likely focus on Myanmar".
- ^ a b c d e f g Shawn W. Crispin. 2009, February 14. "When allies drift apart".
- ^ Global Research. 2005, February 7. "Tsunami Relief as a Subterfuge? The Pentagon Scrambles to Reenter its Old Thai Air Base”.
- ^ Barry R. McCaffrey. May 1997 “The Opium Kings”.
- ^ Xinhua. 2003, June 2. "News Analysis: Thai-US ties on an even keel despite difference on Iraq war".
- ^ a b c d Shawn W Crispin. 2008, September 7. “What Obama means to Bangkok”.
- ^ Gunarantna et al., 2005, pp. 94–96.
- ^ a b Kenneth J. Conboy. 1988, March 8. “Cracks Appear -in the U.S. -Thai Relationship”. Heritage Asian Studies Backgrounder #75.
- ^ Bangkok Post. 2005, July 11. “Free or even fair?”.
- ^ a b c Steward, Gene and Roggemann, Ellen. 2005. “Trading Away Livelihoods”. ENGAGE
- ^ AFP. 2001, November 9. “WTO-Thailand-protest: Thai farmers and activists rally against WTO, US”.
- ^ Wayne M. Morrison. 2003, March 28. “Thailand-U.S. Economic Relations: An Overview". Congressional Research Service.
- ^ Stratfor. 2003, October 18. “U.S.-Thai Relations To Improve Bangkok's Regional Standing."
[edit] References
- Gunaratna, Rohan, Acharya, Arabinda, and Chua, Sabrina. 2005. Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand. Marshall Cavendish Academic.
This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Department of State (Background Notes).[1][edit] External links
- History of Thailand - U.S. relations
- U.S. Embassy Bangkok
- The United States-Thailand Alliance: Issues for a New Dialogue by Catharin Dalpino (October 2011)
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* BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY *
This essay discusses a wide range of the secondary sources that have been used in researching and writing this dissertation. The essay is intended to survey existing scholarship on U.S. relations with Thailand, and to a lesser extent, American foreign policy elsewhere in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War era. It also serves to introduce to the reader some of the available secondary English language sources dealing with Thailand’s history, foreign relations, politics, culture.
A number of works provide helpful analysis of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia since World War Two. Peter A. Poole, The United States and Indochina From FDR to Nixon (1973) is solid, but is now rather dated. So too are Russell Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia: The Roots of Commitment (1973), and The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia 1945-1958 (1968). The best among more recent studies is Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II (1999), and Gary R. Hess, The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power 1940-1950 (1987), which unfortunately covers a limited time span. Similarly, Andrew Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia (1987), is very strong, but deals only with the late 1940s. Alan Levine, The United States and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, 1945-1975 (1995) offers a chronologically broad examination of American policy in the region. A good collection of essays dealing with American foreign policy in Asia can be found in Warren Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The Great Powers in East Asia 1953-1960 (1990).
Among the many excellent texts relating to American involvement in Vietnam, George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-1975 (1979) remains one of the most concise and readable. Along with his more recent LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (1994), it has proved to be an invaluable resource in setting the "backdrop" for this thesis. Also very useful has been Michael Hunt’s Lyndon Johnson's War: America's Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945-1968 (1996), which goes beyond the more traditional emphasis on national security developments in analysing the complex chain of events leading to U.S. involvement. Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 (1991) is comprehensive and integrates many personal accounts of the wars from both the American and Vietnamese perspectives. Light at the End of the Tunnel: A Vietnam War Anthology (1991), edited by Andrew J. Rotter, offers an interesting collection of essays on a wide range of topics, including presidential decision-making, military policy, and the war at home. Vietnam: A History (1983), by journalist Stanley Karnow, remains one of the most adept studies of the conflict. Also informative are Anthony Short, The Origins of the Vietnam War (1989), and R.B. Smith’s three volume An International History of the Vietnam War (1983-1991). For a more military-oriented perspective, consult Colonel Harry Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (1982), and Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (1978). Robert Buzzanco’s Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (1996) attacks the notion that the U.S. military fought the war "with one hand tied behind its back." Instead, Buzzanco argues military strategy was entirely lacking, and that top military officials were more concerned with politics than the war. Additional worthwhile broad surveys of the conflict include Gary R. Hess, Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War (1990); Paul Kattenburg, The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy 1945-75 (1980); Robert Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (1997); James Stuart Olson, Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945 to 1990 (1991), William Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (1994), and David L. Anderson, ed., Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975 (1993), which demonstrates that primary assumptions regarding the crisis remained essentially the same throughout successive administrations.
Though used sparingly in this thesis, David L. Anderson, Trapped By Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961 (1991), and James R. Arnold's The First Domino: Eisenhower, the Military, and America's Intervention in Vietnam (1991), are reliable accounts on decision-making in the 1950's. In Approaching Vietnam: From World War II Through Dienbienphu, 1941-1954 (1988), Lloyd C. Gardner contends that Eisenhower cast his Vietnam policy within the context of an American “liberal empire”, determined to “liberate” Indochina from French mismanagement. Both Gardner and Arnold stress the influence that Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had on shaping American foreign policy, and both argue that the decisions Eisenhower made on Vietnam inevitably led to the subsequent Americanisation of the conflict. John P. Burke, et al, How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965 (1989), deftly deals with the parallels and dissimilarities between Eisenhower’s and Johnson’s approaches to decision-making at critical junctions in Vietnam. The military’s role in influencing policy towards Vietnam during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations is also discussed in Ronald Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1941-1960 (1985).
Examinations of presidential decision-making regarding Vietnam in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations are plentiful, and have been extremely useful in understanding the broad context of U.S.-Thai relations. John Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power (1992) portrays a reluctantly interventionist President, who desperately searched for a peaceful solution. Less convincing, however, is Newman’s speculative contention that Kennedy would have pulled the U.S. out of Vietnam altogether. William J. Rust, Kennedy and Vietnam: American Foreign Policy, 1960-1963 (1985), offers a more balanced analysis, and agrees that Kennedy was at least preparing for American military disengagement from Vietnam. On the other hand, two excellent essays on Kennedy and Vietnam - one by Lawrence J. Bassett and Stephen E. Pelz in Kennedy's Quest for Victory; American Foreign Policy, 1961-63 (1989), edited by Thomas Paterson, and the other by Gary R. Hess in Anderson, Shadow on the White House - contend that JFK was more of an interventionist. Additional worthwhile assessments of the Kennedy administration with considerable discussion of Vietnam include Richard Reeves, Profile of Power (1993), and Herbert S. Parmet, JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (1983).
Two seminal works that pay close attention to decision-making with respect to Vietnam during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations are George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (1986), and Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (1979). The latter is particularly useful in establishing the domestic political and social context in which decision-makers worked. In Paying Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (1995), Lloyd C. Gardner avoids addressing the question of what Kennedy might have done in Vietnam had he lived, and instead focuses on the legacy he left Johnson. Gardner contends that Johnson was always mindful of comparisons between himself and Kennedy, especially with respect to foreign policy, and in this way was often obsessed with the idea that JFK would have avoided the quagmire in Vietnam. Johnson stressed the continuity in Vietnam policy between himself and his predecessor in an attempt to combat perception that he was solely responsible for the U.S. intervention. However, the more he struggled to make the connection between his own policy and JFK’s, the less room he allowed himself to change course. In this way, Gardner argues, JFK contributed to the tragedy in Vietnam even more than he did in life.
Among additional scholarly works examining the Johnson administration and Vietnam is Larry Berman, Planning A Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (1982), which offers a detailed account of LBJ’s decision-making on military intervention during 1965. Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (1989), carries forward his analysis to 1968. Brian VanDeMark,
Into the Quagmire; Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (1991), and Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (1994) are also very solid, and should not be overlooked. Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy 1963-1968 (1994), edited by Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, offers a collection of interesting essays on Johnson’s foreign policy with respect to other countries and regions in the world, as well as Vietnam.
Many top officials from the Kennedy and Johnson administrations have written of their experiences, and shed additional light on the Vietnam War era. Vietnam and Laos, though not Thailand, receive considerable attention in Robert McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (1995), and Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (1990). William H. Sullivan, Obbligato 1939-1979: Notes on a Foreign Service Career (1984), and U. Alexis Johnson (with Jef O. McAllister) The Right Hand of Power (1984), are more informative on Thailand because of the authors’ long and intimate association with Southeast Asia.. Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (1967) is much less worthwhile on Thailand. George Tanham, who served as a counter-insurgency chief in Thailand and Vietnam, offers some interesting personal insight in Trial in Thailand (1974), but there are no startling revelations.
Existing scholarship on U.S.-Thai relations since 1945 is relatively thin, no doubt mainly owing to the preoccupation with Vietnam. Still, very valuable studies do exist. The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985 (1986), by R. Sean Randolph, is certainly at the forefront. Arguing that national security interests were at the heart of both countries' policies throughout the Cold War, it focuses on Washington and Bangkok's anti-communist efforts. Three other works, also published by the University of California at Berkeley's Institute of East Asian Studies, adopt a similar approach. All are collaborations by Thai scholar Wiwat Mungkandi with American political scientists: Thailand-U.S. Relations: Changing Political, Strategic, and Economic Factors, with Ansil Ramsay (1988); U.S.-Thailand Relations in a New International Era, with Clark D. Neher (1990); and United States-Thailand Relations, with Karl D. Jackson (1986). Despite sometimes ahistorical analysis, all are essential reading, and complement the Randolph text well. A number of earlier studies on U.S.-Thai relations, though now superseded, are still worth examining. Frank Darling, Thailand and The United States (1965); Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (1965); and David A. Wilson, The United States and the Future of Thailand (1970).
A variety of works provide more detailed analyses of specific aspects of U.S.-Thai relations. R. Sean Randolph, in collaboration with W. Scott Thompson, explored the dynamics of the indigenous communist movement in Thailand in Thai Insurgency: Contemporary Developments (1981). In Unequal Partners: Philippines and Thai Relations With the United States 1965-75 (1975), W. Scott Thompson provides an excellent overview of American policy towards Thailand within a comparative framework. Robert J. Muscat, Thailand and the United States: Development, Security and Foreign Aid (1990), and J. Alexander Caldwell, American Economic Aid to Thailand (1974), both written by former USOM agents, cover their subjects very well, although the former is much stronger in providing detail and setting the historical background.
Daniel Fineman's 1993 Yale doctoral dissertation, “The United States and Military Government in Thailand 1947-1958,” and his subsequent monograph, A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958 (1997) offer an excellent in depth analysis of the dynamics of the relationship between the U.S. and Thailand during a crucial formative period, and in doing so also provide interesting insight into both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations' decision-making with respect to all of Southeast Asia. Fineman’s work, which draws on Thai as well as American sources, has been ground-breaking and has significantly contributed to this thesis, particularly in establishing major themes and in providing historical background.
Surachart Bamrungsuk, U.S. Foreign Policy and Thai Military Rule 1947-1977 (1988), is less detailed and broader in chronological scope than Fineman’s book, but presents a similar interpretation; it too has been important in setting some of the themes of this dissertation. T. Nok Xoomsai, Thailand's Policy Towards the U.S., 1950-1976 (1984), deals with similar themes, but from a different, occasionally nationalistic, perspective. By dealing with Thai decision-making in the context of the Cold War as a whole, he skirts the issue of military authoritarianism and its entrenchment through the American relationship. He supports the view that the United States "used" Thailand to prosecute the war in Vietnam, and that its withdrawal from the region left a legacy of drugs, graft, and prostitution. Adulyasak Soonthornrojana's doctoral dissertation, “The Rise of U.S.-Thai Relations 1945-1975” (University of Akron, 1986), is more balanced. However, it covers a much broader time frame and, consequently, lacks detail on the period covered in this thesis. Still, it offers a scholarly Thai perspective, and in this regard is an important overview.
Richard Randolph Sogn’s dissertation, “Successful Journey: A History of U.S.-Thai Relations, 1932-45” (University of Michigan, 1990), identifies major aspects of the relationship that remained pertinent to the 1960's. Dhanasarit Satawedin's thesis, “ Thai-American Alliance During the Laotian Crisis, 1959-62” (Northern Illinois University, 1984), gives an interesting account of how developments in Thailand's "little brother" shaped relations between Washington and Bangkok. Written from a political science perspective, it is a "case study" of small-state leverage with a superpower. In Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's "More Flags": The Hiring of Korean, Filipino and Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War (1994), Robert M. Blackburn argues that Thailand's contribution to American efforts in Indochina depended upon considerable military and economic aid from the U.S., and that without such aid, its participation in any anti-communist front would have been nearly impossible. As this thesis has contended, obtaining U.S. military and economic aid was not Thailand’s sole or primary motivation for siding with the U.S.. Nonetheless, Blackburn offers an interesting and well-written comparative analysis of Asian contributions to the American war effort, among which Thailand's was the most important.
Works written during the 1960s and early 1970s about Thailand, and in particular about the insurgency there, are worth close examination. Donald E. Weatherbee was among the first to study the origins and structure of the communist movement in his The United Front in Thailand: A Documentary Analysis (1970). Similarly, in China and "People's War" in Thailand, 1964-1969 (1971), Daniel Lovelace investigated the connections between Beijing and the Thai insurgency. Thailand: The War That Is, The War That Will Be (1967), by Louis E. Lomax, concluded that Thailand might be the next "domino" after Vietnam on the basis of an interesting, though superficial, comparison of the political situations in the two countries.
Studies of Thai history, culture, and politics have been extensively used in this dissertation, and surely one of the best among them is David Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (1982). Detailed and comprehensive, Wyatt's work traces the central themes in Thai political history from the 19th century, with ample attention to developments in the post-World War II era and particularly the country's role in the Cold War. Wyatt makes a convincing case that Thai culture has shaped, and continues to be integral to, the country's foreign relations, but he does not overlook other factors, such as national security and economic considerations. Another informed overview is Thailand: Society and Politics (1981) by John S. Girling, whose nearly thirty year academic association with the country ranks him as the dean of Thai studies. He is perhaps rivalled only by Charles Keyes, Isan: Regionalism in Northeastern Thailand (1967), and William Skinner, Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand (1958), both of whom pioneered sociological research on Thailand. Keyes focused on Buddhism, ethnic identity, and regionalism in the Northeast, and Skinner on the Chinese in Thai society. The contributions of both are essential to understanding the complex dynamics of Thai society, which has direct bearing on the threat that communism posed to the country during the 1960s.
The perspective found in Richard West, Thailand: The Last Domino (1991), is somewhere between that of an academic and an intrepid backpacker. It is a melange of sound historical analysis and recollections gleaned from personal travels throughout the country. Central to West's thesis is that Thai culture has endured as the primary dynamic in the country's external relations, and that for this reason, Thailand has avoided the fate of many neighbours in the region. William Klausner, Reflections on Thai Culture (1981), is also useful, although lacking in historical perspective. An important source on cultural and ideology, with specific reference to Thailand's political history, is Patterns and Illusions: Thai History and Thought (1993), edited by Gehan Wijeyewardene and EC Chapman. Craig J. Reynolds, ed., National Identity and Its Defenders (Thailand 1939-1989) (1991), offers valuable insight into nationalism and the roots of military authoritarianism. On Thai politics, Likhit Dhiravegin, Thai Politics: Selected Aspects of Development and Change (1985), is indispensable. Authored by one of Thailand’s leading academics, it includes key documents as well as informative analysis on just about every feature of the country's political landscape. Other valuable works on Thai politics are Thak Chaloemtiarana, ed., Thai Politics: Extracts and Documents 1932-1957 (1978), and the authoritative Government and Politics of Thailand (1987) edited by Somsakdi Xuto.
Two works by Corrine Phuangkasem, Determinants of Thailand's Foreign Policy Behaviour (1986), and Thailand's Foreign Relations 1964-80 (1984), provide a good starting point for understanding Thai foreign policy. Written from a political science perspective, they include pertinent historical discussion. Less useful is Gangnath Jna's Foreign Policy of Thailand (1979). A very good study on the early relationship between Beijing and Bangkok is Anuson Chinvanno, Thailand's Policies Towards China 1949-54 (1992), which pinpoints some of the enduring themes in Sino-Thai relations right up to the present. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, From Enmity to Alignment: Thailand's Evolving Relations with China (1987), covers the period after 1954. These two works are required reading, not only on Thailand's relations with China, but on Thai foreign policy in general. R.K. Jain, ed., China and Thailand, 1949-1983 (1984) is an interesting documentary history, and useful in exploring this crucial topic. Thailand's experiences in World War II were extremely important in laying the groundwork for its post-1945 foreign policy. Charivat Santaputra offers a good overview of this period in Thai Foreign Policy 1932-1946 (1985). However, the best study is Edward Bruce Reynold's doctoral dissertation, “Ambivalent Allies: Japan and Thailand, 1941-1945”, (University of Hawaii, 1988), which subsequently formed the basis of his book, Thailand And Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945 (1994).
English language studies of Sarit Thanarat, Thanom Kittachakorn, or Pridi Phanomyong are regrettably scarce. However, in Field Marshal Plaek Phibun Songkhram (1980), B.J. Terwiel presents a well-researched and even-handed, sometimes even sympathetic, assessment of Thailand's most controversial leader. Phibun and his legacy are also addressed by both Edward Bruce Reynolds and Daniel Fineman in their works. Another commendable biography is David Van Praagh, Alone on the Sharp Edge: The Story of M.R. Seni Pramoj and Thailand's Struggle for Democracy (1989), which covers over a half-century of developments in Thai politics.
An understanding of the Laotian crisis is vital to an understanding of U.S.-Thai relations in the late 1950s and 1960s. One of the best works on the crisis is Norman B. Hannah, The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War (1987) which, as the title suggests, puts the crisis in a much larger context. Hannah’s analysis benefits from his own personal experiences while serving in the American diplomatic missions in Laos and Thailand. Another work worth consulting is Laos: Beyond the Revolution (1991), edited by Joseph J. Zasloff and Leonard Unger, the former Deputy Mission Chief and later Ambassador in both Vientiane and Bangkok.
The best study of the origins of the crisis in Laos is Geoffrey C. Gunn, Political Struggles in Laos, 1930-54 (1988). Two older works are Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization (1971), and Charles A. Stevenson, The End of Nowhere: American Policy Towards Laos Since 1954 (1972). American military involvement in Laos is the focus of Timothy Neil Castle’s, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-73 (1993). In One Day Too Long: Top Secret Site 85 and the Bombing of Vietnam (1999), Castle meticulously details covert operations in Laos, and the U.S. government’s efforts to cover them up. Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992 (1993), should be compulsory reading for any student of modern Southeast Asia. For a solid general history of Laos, see Martin Stuart Fox, A History of Laos (1997).
The best introductions to Cambodia’s painful and complex history are A History of Cambodia (2nd Edition, 1992), and The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution Since 1945 (1991), both authored by David Chandler, a leading academic expert on that country who once served in the American diplomatic corps there. Chandler's Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot (1992) is also essential in comprehending a tortured period in Cambodian history. So is Arnold Isaac, Pawns Of War: Cambodia and Laos (1987), which also offers an illuminating overview of Indochinese history since 1945. Milton Osborne, Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness (1994) is an excellent biography, which gives a useful perspective on Cambodia's relations with the U.S. during the Vietnam War.
* NOTE ON PRIMARY SOURCES *
This dissertation relies mainly on research at several major archives in the United States. I conducted research at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, Massachusetts periodically over four years from 1992 to 1996. I examined materials at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas in 1994 and 1995, and at the National Archives (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland during the summers of 1995 and 1996, and early in 1998. Archival research also included visits to the British Public Records Office in London, England and the Library of Congress in Washington, as well as to a number of other depositories in Canada and the United States. While regrettably many official U.S. records dealing with U.S.-Thai relations during the 1961-1969 period remain sealed, ample research material exists for this study. In some instances I have been among the first researchers to examine newly declassified documents relating to the subject of this thesis.
Much of the research in primary materials for this study has focused on the U.S. State Department. The General Records for the Department of State, RG 59, for the period 1961-1968 that are available to researchers include the "Lot Files" for the period prior to 1963; the Alpha-Numeric series for 1963; and the Subject-Numeric, central foreign policy series for 1964-66 and 1967-69. Documents in RG 59 for the 1964-66 and 1967-69 periods were examined early in 1998, shortly after they opened to researchers, but many duplicated materials were already available at the Johnson Library. The records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, also at the National Archives, proved invaluable. Several other series at the National Archives, including the top secret files of the Regional Planning Adviser, were declassified and opened virtually as I arrived in the summer of 1995.
A good deal of military and intelligence information is in the latter collection, which to a large extent compensates for the dearth of records available from the Defense Department and the CIA. The country files of the State Department were indispensable for information not found in the decimal and alpha-numeric files, while the subject and name files shed some light on the nature of decision-making. National Security Agency files open to researchers are heavily censored, and deal with the U.S.-Thai relationship only infrequently.
The Kennedy and Johnson presidential libraries contain much useful material for this study. The Johnson library has a fairly comprehensive record of telexes and memoranda between Washington and Bangkok up to 1969 in the National Security Files, country series. Both the Kennedy and Johnson libraries have a variety of departmental and personal staff collections which offer valuable insight into the nature of the U.S.-Thai relationship throughout the decade. Roger Hilsman's papers at the Kennedy library are particularly helpful in this regard.
The presidential libraries also contain a wide range of oral histories, mostly for notable figures who served Kennedy and Johnson in senior appointments. Georgetown University's Foreign Affairs Programme has compiled a valuable collection of oral transcripts from lesser-known but more directly involved career diplomatic corps personnel. Similarly, the personal papers of Kennedy's Ambassador to Thailand, Kenneth T. Young, located at Harvard University’s Pusey Library, offer an interesting perspective on the U.S.-Thai relationship, particularly with respect to decision-making dynamics on the American side, as do Averell Harriman's papers at the Library of Congress.
I conducted research in the British Public Records Office (P.R.O.) primarily in the Fall of 1993, and again briefly in the summer of 1996. Especially informative for my purposes was material for the 1961-1963 period. The country file on Thailand offers revealing perspectives, especially on the Laotian crisis in which Great Britain played an important role as mediator.
While never garnishing the attention given to events in Vietnam, the U.S.-Thai relationship occasionally made the headlines in major American newspapers. The New York Times and Washington Post offered the most frequent coverage, and the former has been particularly useful to this study. English-language Thai newspapers have also been consulted, as have a wide array of periodicals and scholarly journals from the period. The Thai Foreign Ministry's publication during the 1960's, Foreign Affairs Bulletin, is especially useful in establishing the official Thai viewpoint on developments.
No study dealing with the crisis in Vietnam would be complete without reference to documentary compilations such as Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), the Department of State Bulletin, or the Pentagon Papers. The best organised and most readable edition of the latter is that by Senator Gravel (1971). Other published documentary sources of value include Vietnam and America: A Documented History (1995), edited by Marvin E. Gettleman, et al. It builds upon Gareth Porter, Vietnam: A History in Documents (1979), and the much earlier Gettleman, Vietnam: History, Documents, and Opinions On A Major World Crisis (1965). Transcripts of the tape recordings of Lyndon Johnson’s Oval Office conversations during the first two years of his presidency have been compiled and edited by Michael Beschloss in Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes 1963-64 (1997). The conversations regarding Vietnam are revealing, and well-worth examining.
Background and U.S. Relations
Updated September 6, 2005
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Thailand:
Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
U.S.-Thailand relations are of interest to Congress because of Thailand’s status
as a long-time military ally, a key country in the war against terrorism in Southeast
Asia, and a significant trade and economic partner. A proposed U.S.-Thailand Free
Trade Agreement (FTA), currently being negotiated, would require implementing
legislation to take effect.
Despite differences on Burma policy and human rights issues, shared economic
and security interests have long provided the basis for U.S.-Thai cooperation.
Bangkok and Washington coordinate closely on law enforcement, intelligence, and
security cooperation. Thailand contributed troops and support for U.S. military
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq and was designated as a major non-NATO
ally by President Bush in December 2003. Thailand’s airfields and ports play a
particularly important role in U.S. global military strategy, including having served
as the primary hub of the relief effort for the Indian Ocean tsunami. The high-profile
arrest of radical Islamic leader Hambali in a joint Thai-U.S. operation in 2003
underscores Thailand’s role in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. If negotiations for an
FTA are successful, the current U.S.-Thai bilateral trade total of $20 billion could
rise considerably. Thailand is the United States’ 19th largest trading partner.
Current Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his populist Thai Rak Thai
party have consolidated broad control of Thai politics, although opposition parties
and others have criticized his strongman style as a threat to Thailand’s democratic
institutions. The central government’s forceful response to a surge of violence in the
southern majority-Muslim provinces also has come under fire from many observers.
A series of attacks by insurgents, which has claimed over 800 lives since January
2004, has renewed concerns about both indigenous and transnational terrorism in the
country. Some commentators have speculated that southern Thailand could become
another front in the U.S.-led war on terrorism if more credible links to international
terror networks surface.
With its favorable geographic location and broad-based economy, Thailand is
poised to play a major leadership role in Southeast Asia and has been an aggressive
advocate of increased economic integration in the region. A founding member of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Thailand maintains close ties with
China, has reached out to India, and is actively pursuing FTAs with a number of
other countries. Given its ties with the United States, Thailand’s stature in the region
may affect broader U.S. foreign policy objectives and prospects for further
multilateral economic and security cooperation in Southeast Asia. In the context of
the Pentagon’s transformation and realignment initiatives, current logistical facilities
in Thailand could become more important to U.S. strategy in the region. This report
will be updated periodically.
Contents
Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Violence in the Southern Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Central Government Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Degree of Foreign Involvement Uncertain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Criticism of Thaksin’s Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Coping with Tsunami Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Background: Thailand Politics and Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Path to Democratization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Thaksin’s Government Consolidates Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Democracy Under Fire? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
U.S.-Thailand Political and Security Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Recent Military Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
U.S.-Thai Partnership Elevated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Bilateral Security Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Security Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Military Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Counter-Narcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Human Rights Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A Protracted Process for U.S.-Thailand FTA Negotiations? . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
An Aggressive FTA Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Thailand in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Growing Ties with China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Divergence with U.S. on Burma (Myanmar) Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
ASEAN Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Regional Health Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Potential Challenges and Opportunities in U.S.-Thai Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Progress in FTA Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Military Transformation in Asia-Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Direction of War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2002-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1 Thailand is the United States’ 19th largest trading partner.
2 See CRS Report RS21657, U.S. Trade Policy and Changing Domestic and Foreign
Priorities: A Historical Overview, by Raymond J. Ahearn.
Thailand:
Background and U.S. Relations
A long-time American ally in Asia, Thailand has continued to pursue close ties
to the United States as the political landscape of the region has evolved. Solidified
during the Cold War, the U.S.-Thai relationship strengthened on the basis of shared
economic and trade interests, and it has been further bolstered since the September
11, 2001 attacks by a common commitment to fight terrorism in Southeast Asia. At
the same time, Thailand enjoys a strong economic and political relationship with
China, positioning itself as a potential battleground for influence in the region.
Thailand has proven itself to be a significant partner for the United States and
an important element of U.S. strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific. Designated as
a major non-NATO ally in 2003, Thailand contributed troops and support for U.S.
military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Thailand has been an active partner
in the U.S.-led war on terrorism, a role highlighted by the high-profile 2003 arrest of
a radical Islamic leader in a joint Thai-U.S. operation. Other bilateral cooperation
on transnational issues such as narcotics trafficking reinforces Thailand’s standing
as a primary partner of the United States in maintaining stability in Southeast Asia.
The start of negotiations in June 2004 for a U.S.-Thailand Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) marked Thailand’s possible entry into the United States’
expanding web of trade pacts with political allies. If the negotiations are successful
in working out a host of controversial issues, the current U.S.-Thai bilateral trade
total of $20 billion is likely to rise considerably.1 Including Thailand for FTA
consideration follows a pattern of linking FTA negotiating status with support for
U.S. foreign policy and national security goals that former U.S. Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick noted in a 2003 address.2 In Asia, the United States has concluded
FTAs with Australia and Singapore, also strong political allies who have supported
U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism.
Thailand’s position within ASEAN makes it an appealing ally for the United
States. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has consolidated power at home and
positioned himself to be a major leader for Southeast Asia as well by shoring up
relations with neighboring countries, standing up for the ASEAN policy of noninterference
in the domestic affairs of other states, and maintaining strong ties with
regional giants China and India. Many analysts have predicted that Thaksin could
be “the next Mahathir,” referring to the charismatic former Malaysian Prime Minister
credited with leading Malaysia’s impressive development during his 22-year tenure.
CRS-2
3 “Thai Rebel Tactic: Divide the Faiths,” Christian Science Monitor. July 20, 2005.
4 Independent forensic experts said that the men died piled on top of each other with their
hands tied behind their backs. See Mydans, Seth, “Thai King Urges Premier to Be More
Lenient in the Muslim South,” New York Times, Nov. 2, 2004.
5 Chulalongkorn University professor Panitan Wattanyagorn, quoted in Christian Science
Monitor. July 20, 2005.
6 Davis, Antony, “No End in Sight for Southern Thailand’s Escalating Insurgency,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review. March 1, 2005.
The comparison with Mahathir also reflects concerns that Thaksin sometimes resorts
to authoritarian governing methods.
Recent Developments
Violence in the Southern Provinces
Since January 2004, sectarian violence between insurgents and security forces
in Thailand’s majority-Muslim provinces has left over 800 people dead. The civilian
victims include both Buddhist Thais, particularly monks and teachers, and local
Muslims. Over 34,500 residents fled the region in the first half of 2005 as a result
of the violence and over 20% of the local teachers have requested a transfer out of
the area.3 The southern region, which includes the provinces of Yala, Narathiwat,
Pattani, and Songhkla, has a history of separatist violence, though the major
movements were thought to have died out in the early 1990s. Thai Muslims have
long expressed grievances for being marginalized and discriminated against; the area
has lagged behind the rest of Thailand in economic development.
After a series of apparently coordinated attacks in early 2004, the central
government declared martial law in the region. A pattern of insurgent attacks —
targeted shootings or small bombs that claim a few victims at a time — and counterattacks
by the security forces has developed. The pattern crystallized into two major
outbreaks of violence in 2004: on April 28, Thai soldiers killed 108 insurgents,
including 34 lightly armed gunmen in a historic mosque, after they attempted to
storm several military and police outposts in coordinated attacks; and, on October 25,
84 local Muslims were killed: 6 shot during an erupting demonstration at the Takbai
police station and 78 apparently asphyxiated from being piled into trucks after their
arrest.4 The insurgents retaliated with a series of more gruesome killings, including
beheadings, following the Tak Bai incident. Facing a trend of more sophisticated and
coordinated attacks, observers note that such confrontations have led to an increasing
climate of fear and division along religious lines.5
Central Government Response. The number of security forces on the
ground has steadily increased, from an initial dispatch of 3,000 troops to close to
20,000 military personnel and an additional 10,000 police by mid-2005.6 In July
2005, Thaksin announced the lifting of martial law but replaced it with a new decree
allowing him to assume emergency powers, including authority to censor the media,
grant immunity to security officials, hold suspects without charge for up to 30 days,
CRS-3
7 “Thai Teachers Become Targets in the South,” Washington Post. August 12, 2005.
8 After public outcry over the deaths of Muslim youths by Thai troops, independent
investigations led to the dismissal or reassignment of some officials but largely acquitted the
government of any intentional misconduct.
9 Smith, Anthony L., “Trouble in Thailand’s Muslim South: Separatism, Not Global
Terrorism,” Asia Pacific Security Studies, vol. 3, no. 10 (Dec. 2004).
10 “Draconian Powers for Thaksin,” Economist Intelligence Unit - Business Asia. July 25,
2005.
11 Ibid.
12 Regional terrorism experts have pointed to linkages to JI in Thailand through the group
Jemaah Salafi, which reportedly had contact with Hambali as he was planning major
bombings in Bangkok; through personal ties with various secessionist leaders; and through
the participation in the attacks of several foreign nations with JI ties.
and a variety of other extraordinary measures that critics say impinge on civil
liberties.7
In addition to the sizable military dispatch, Thaksin has adopted measures
designed to soften criticism that his policy overly stressed the use of military force.
The government has proposed aid packages to the south, pledged to reform the
Islamic school system, and commissioned inquiries into the military’s response in the
April and October incidents.8 The Thaksin Administration approved a $500 million
economic development program for the region, although local sources complain that
the funds have yet to be dispersed.9 In March 2005, the government created the
National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), headed by former prime minister
Anand Panyarachun, to address the violence. The NRC has recommended lifting
martial law and has criticized the executive decree as ineffective.10
Degree of Foreign Involvement Uncertain. Many regional observers
view the movement as a confluence of different groups: local separatists, Islamic
radicals, organized crime, and corrupt police forces. The sophistication and
coordination of the attacks support the notion that broader networks are involved,
but, according to many experts, the history of resentment in the region among
minority Muslims toward the central government points to a domestic impetus.
Separatist groups in Pattani have reportedly received financial support from groups
in other Islamic countries, and some of the leaders trained in camps in Libya and
Afghanistan.11 There are indications of Jemaah Islamiah (JI) presence in Thailand,12
particularly given the 2003 arrests of Hambali, a radical figure with suspected ties to
Al Qaeda, and of three Islamic leaders suspected of planning to attack foreign
embassies and tourist destinations. However, most analysts stress that there is no
convincing evidence to date of serious JI involvement in the attacks in the southern
provinces.
Sectarian violence involving local Muslim grievances, however, provides a ripe
environment for JI to become more engaged in the struggle. Prominent experts have
warned that outside groups, including militant Indonesia-based groups and JI, may
attempt to exploit public outrage with events like the October 5 deaths to forge
CRS-4
13 “Thailand ‘The Next Battleground,” The Australian, Dec. 1, 2004.
14 See “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” International Crisis Group Asia Report.
May 18, 2005.
15 “Anand, Surayud Urge Peaceful Resolution,” The Nation (Bangkok), Nov. 16, 2004.
16 “Defusing the South,” The Nation (Bangkok), Nov. 15, 2004.
17 “Tackling the Thai Terror Threat,” Asian Wall Street Journal, Nov. 30, 2004.
18 State Department Press Releases and Documents, Oct. 29, 2004.
alliances between local separatists and regional Islamic militants.13 Some analysts
believe that the heavy-handed response by the security forces, with the open support
of Thaksin, could represent a tipping point for the movement.
Criticism of Thaksin’s Approach. The government’s handling of the
violence has been widely criticized as ineffective and inflammatory. The Thaksin
Administration has yet to put forth a sustained strategy to define and address the
problem, has repeatedly but arbitrarily shuffled leadership positions of those charged
with overseeing the region, and has failed to implement adequate coordination
between the many security and intelligence services on the ground.14
Parties outside of the Administration have expressed concern about the events.
The royal family, which commands strong loyalty from the Thai public, has taken the
unusual step of publicly intervening. In a move that may have forced Thaksin to
soften his statements, King Bhumibol Adulyadej encouraged him to take a more
measured approach. Dissent has emerged from within the elite as well: a former
prime minister and ex-Army chief have criticized the use of force and called for
campaign to restore peace in south,15 and a senior education official has urged the
creation of a new Ministry of Islamic Affairs to address the problem.16
Thailand’s neighbors also expressed alarm at the brewing insurgency, breaking
the ASEAN rule of broaching internal affairs at the November 2004 ASEAN summit
in Laos. Although Thaksin resisted attempts to add the discussion to the official
agenda, Indonesia and Malaysian leaders met with him on the sidelines to convey
their concern. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has noted the
mishandling and pointed out the potential for JI to exploit local grievances.17 The
U.S. State Department also has acknowledged its concern and intent to monitor the
situation closely.18
Coping with Tsunami Disaster
Six provinces on the western coast of southern Thailand, particularly the Phang
Nga province and the resort islands of Phuket and Phi Phi, were badly hit by sea
surges stemming from the underwater earthquake off of Sumatra on December 26,
2004. Nearly 5,400 died and over 2,800 remained missing in Thailand. Officials
said that about half of the dead were foreign vacationers, many from Europe. Despite
rapid reconstruction and government aid packages to the affected region, the tourism
industry, which brings in nearly 6% of Thailand’s GDP, has suffered following the
tsunami.
CRS-5
The emergency response in Thailand was praised by the international
community: United Nations and Australian relief agency officials described effective
and rapid coordination of grass-roots relief teams to distribute supplies and provide
first aid. Some credit Thaksin’s strong political authority to command the military
and police forces. Thaksin also has come out strongly in favor of establishing a
tsunami alert system in cooperation with other regional governments. Thailand also
appears to have met the unique diplomatic and logistical challenges of coordinating
the recovery and identification among the 38 countries that lost nationals in the
disaster. A huge effort was launched to collect DNA samples from the dead, with
several nations sending forensic experts to assist.
Thailand served as the logistics hub for much of the U.S. and international relief
effort. U.S. relief operations by air and sea for the entire region were directed out of
Thailand’s Utapao air base and Sattahip naval base. Thailand’s government
immediately granted full U.S. access to the bases following the disaster.
Representatives from several other countries and international organizations
providing relief also worked out of Utapao.
Background: Thailand Politics and Government
Path to Democratization
The Kingdom of Thailand, a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form
of government, is marked by an important historical dissimilarity from its regional
neighbors. Although occupied by Japan during World War II, Thailand was the only
country in Southeast Asia that was not colonized by Europeans, and also avoided the
wave of communist revolutions that took control of the neighboring governments of
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. Thailand followed a troubled
path to democracy, enduring a series of mostly bloodless coups and multiple changes
of government in its modern history. Although Thailand became a constitutional
monarchy in 1932, it was ruled primarily by military dictatorships until the early
1990’s. A military and bureaucratic elite controlled Thai politics during this period,
denying room for civilian democratic institutions to develop. Brief periods of
democracy in the 1970s and 1980s ended with reassertions of military rule. After
Thai soldiers killed at least 50 people in demonstrations demanding an end to
military dominance of the government, international and domestic pressure led to
new elections in 1992.
Thaksin’s Government Consolidates Power
Thailand’s government, composed of the executive branch (prime minister as
head of government and the king as chief of state), a bicameral National Assembly,
and the judicial branch of three court systems, is currently led by Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party. Until Thaksin’s election in
2001, the Democrat Party dominated Thai politics by instituting a series of reforms
that enhanced transparency, decentralized power from the urban centers, tackled
corruption, and introduced a broad range of constitutional rights. King Bhumiphol,
CRS-6
19 See Ganesan, N. “Thaksin and the Politics of Domestic and Regional Consolidation in
Thailand,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 26, no. 1 (Apr. 2004).
20 “Why They All Love Thaksin,” The Economist, February 12, 2005.
21 “Thaksin’s Way - Thailand’s Election,” The Economist. February 5, 2005.
22 “Thailand Risk: Alert — Corruption May Still Go Unchecked,” Economist Intelligence
Unit, July 19, 2004.
23 “One Party Rule: Opposition Does Not Need to Be Strong, Says PM,” The Nation
(Bangkok), Aug. 10, 2004.
who has served since 1946, commands tremendous respect and loyalty from the Thai
public and continues to exercise a degree of influence over politics in Thailand.
The TRT party, formed by Thaksin in 1999, benefitted politically from the
devastation of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on Thailand’s economy, and
subsequent loss of support for the ruling Democrats. Thaksin’s populist platform
appealed to a wide cross-section of Thais, and the TRT easily secured a clear
majority in the parliament by forming a coalition with a handful of smaller parties.
The Thaksin government has bolstered its standing by carefully courting several key
power centers: the military, the business and banking elite, provincial political
bosses, and the royal family. Many analysts contend that Thaksin and his party enjoy
power unprecedented in modern Thai politics.19
Fueled by positive coverage of Thaksin’s response to the tsunami, the TRT won
the February 2005 parliamentary elections outright — a first in Thai politics — by
capturing 376 of the 500 seats. The main opposition party, the Democrats, captured
only 96 seats, short of the 201 seats needed to propose a censure debate against the
prime minister. Only in the restive South did the Democrats dominate, winning 52
of 54 seats.20 TRT swiftly dropped its former coalition party and formed a singleparty
government. By summer 2005, however, Thaksin’s popularity was faltering
due to a weak economy in the face of rising oil prices, coverage of a corruption
scandal involving Cabinet members, and his failure to stem violence in the South.
Nevertheless, Thaksin has pushed ahead with ambitious public works spending
programs and a potent opposition force has yet to develop.
Democracy Under Fire?
Although Thaksin retains a strong grip on power, detractors have consistently
voiced concern that his strongman style is a threat to Thailand’s democratic
institutions. Suspicions of cronyism and charges of creeping authoritarianism have
surfaced since Thaksin took office. Previously independent watchdog agencies have
reportedly weakened under his rule.21 Some commentators have alleged that
Thaksin’s administration has undermined anti-corruption agencies by installing
political loyalists to protect the business interests of his family and members of his
cabinet — sometimes one and the same, as Thaksin has a record of appointing
relatives and friends to prominent posts.22 Thaksin insists that political strength
enhances development, citing Singapore’s economic success and lack of political
opposition as a model for Thailand to follow.23
CRS-7
24 “Rights Group Says Libel Suit Deepens Assault on Thailand’s Media,” Agence France
Press, Aug. 31, 2004.
25 “Thai Vote: Democratic Backslide?” Christian Science Monitor. February 4, 2005.
26 “Thailand: Libel Suit Deepens Assault on the Press,” Human Rights Watch. September
1, 2004.
27 See [http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/allied.shtml] (official public access
website for Department of Defense Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean
War).
28 The Eagle and the Elephant: Thai-American Relations Since 1833 (Bangkok: U.S. Agency
for International Development, 1997).
Outside groups have warned that press freedom has been squeezed in recent
years, documenting multiple cases in which critical journalists and news editors were
dismissed, and pointing to a libel suit against an outspoken editor filed by a
telecommunications corporation that Thaksin founded.24 Shin Corporation,
Thaksin’s family company, bought the only independent television station; the others
are owned by the government and armed forces.25 Human Rights Watch claims that
Thaksin has stifled criticism in the media of his Administration’s controversial
policies, such as the deaths of over 2,000 individuals in the government-sponsored
“war on drugs,” and allowed a cover-up of the government’s failure to address the
avian bird flu epidemic effectively.26
U.S.-Thailand Political and Security Relations
A Long-Standing Southeast Asian Ally
The 1954 Manila Pact of the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO), together with the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communique, forms the basis of the
long-standing U.S.-Thai security relationship. Although SEATO was dissolved in
1977, Article IV (1) of the Manila Pact, which calls for signatories to “act to meet the
common danger” in the event of an attack in the treaty area, remains in force.
Thailand is considered to be one of the major U.S. security allies in East Asia, along
with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines.
The U.S. security relationship with Thailand has a firm historical foundation
based on joint efforts in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 1991 Persian
Gulf War. Thailand sent more than 6,500 troops to serve in the United Nations
Command during the Korean War, where the Thai force suffered over 1,250
casualties.27 A decade later, the United States staged bombing raids and rescue
missions over North Vietnam and Laos from Thailand. During the Vietnam War, up
to 50,000 U.S. troops were based on Thai soil, and U.S. assistance poured into the
country to help Thailand fight its own domestic communist insurgency.28 Thailand
also sent troops to South Vietnam and Laos to aid the U.S. effort. The close security
ties continued throughout the Cold War, with Thailand serving as solid anti-
Communist ally in the region. More recently, Thai ports and airfields played a
CRS-8
29 “Thai Soldiers Help Rebuild Afghanistan,” The Nation (Thailand), July 4, 2003.
30 Under section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President can designate a
non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization state as a major ally for the purposes of the Foreign
Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.
31 Limaye, Satu P. “Minding the Gaps: The Bush Administration and U.S.-Southeast Asia,”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 26, no. 1 (Apr. 2004).
crucial role in maintaining the flow of troops, equipment, and supplies to the theater
in both the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars.
Recent Military Deployments. Thailand has strengthened its partnership
with the United States by contributing troops to two American military operations
since the September 11, 2001 attacks. Thailand sent 130 soldiers, largely engineers,
to Afghanistan to participate in the reconstruction phase of Operation Enduring
Freedom. Thai forces are responsible for the construction of a runway at Bagram
Airbase, medical services, and some special forces operations.29
Although Thailand remained officially neutral during the U.S.-led invasion of
Iraq, it contributed to reconstruction efforts in Iraq by dispatching over 450 troops,
including medics and engineers, to the southern city of Karbala. The deployment
proved unpopular with the Thai public, particularly after the deaths of two soldiers
in December 2003. In spring 2004, Thaksin threatened to withdraw the troops early
if the security situation continued to disintegrate and resisted U.S. calls to postpone
the withdrawal until after the January 2005 Iraqi elections. The withdrawal was
completed in September 2004.
U.S.-Thai Partnership Elevated. In October 2003, President Bush
designated Thailand as a “major non-NATO ally,” a distinction which allows more
access to U.S. foreign aid and military assistance, including credit guarantees for
major weapons purchases.30 An agreement concluded with the United States in July
2001 allows Thailand to purchase advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles for its
F-16 fighters, a first for a Southeast Asian state.31 Thaksin also authorized the
reopening of the Vietnam-era U.S. airbase in Utapao and a naval base in Sattahip,
from which the U.S. military can logistically support forces in Afghanistan and the
Middle East
Bilateral Security Cooperation
Security Assistance. The United States provides funds for the purchase of
weapons and equipment to the Thai military through the Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) program. As a major non-NATO ally, Thailand also qualifies for the Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) program, which allows for the transfer of used U.S. naval
ships and aircraft. The United States faces stiff competitors in the market for foreign
military sales in Thailand, particularly because other countries are more willing to
engage in barter trade for agricultural products. See Table 1 below for program
funding.
CRS-9
32 In 1997, over 20,000 had received IMET training. See The Eagle and the Elephant, p. 143.
33 Crispin, Shawn, and Leslie Lopez, “U.S. and Thai Agents Collaborate in Secret — Cold-
War-Style Alliance Strikes Jemaah Islamiyah Where It Least Expects It.” Asian Wall Street
Journal, Oct. 1, 2003.
34 Ibid.
35 ILEA-Bangkok is one of four ILEAs in the world. The others are located in Hungary,
Botswana, and Roswell, New Mexico.
Military Exercises. Thailand and the United States conduct over 40 joint
military exercises a year, including Cobra Gold, America’s largest combined military
exercise in Asia. The 2005 drill held in Chiang Mai, with a special emphasis on
relief operations following the Indian Ocean tsunami, featured over 6,300 troops
from the United States, Thailand, Singapore, and — for the first time — Japan.
Additional observers came from China, Pakistan, Cambodia, Israel and the United
Arab Emirates.
Training. Tens of thousands of Thai military officers, including many of those
in top leadership positions throughout the services and in the civilian agencies, have
received U.S. training under the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program.32 Designed to enhance the professionalism of foreign militaries as
well as improve defense cooperation with the United States, the program is regarded
by many as a relatively low-cost, highly effective means to achieve U.S. national
security goals. Thailand is one of the largest recipients of IMET funding in the
world, with approximately $2.5 million annually.
Intelligence. Intelligence cooperation between Thailand and the United States
has reportedly increased markedly since the September 11, 2001 attacks, culminating
in the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center (known as the
CTIC) in 2001. The CTIC, which combines personnel from Thailand’s intelligence
agency and specialized branches of the military and armed forces, provides a forum
for CIA personnel to work closely with their Thai counterparts, sharing facilities and
information daily, according to reports from Thai security officials.33 Close
cooperation in tracking Al Qaeda operatives that passed through Thailand reportedly
intensified into active pursuit of suspected terrorists following the 9/11 strikes.34 The
most public result of enhanced coordination was the arrest of suspected Jemaah
Islamiyah leader Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, outside of Bangkok in
August 2003. Other intelligence cooperation focuses on counter-narcotics or
specialized military intelligence.
Law Enforcement. In 1998, the International Law Enforcement Academy
(ILEA) Bangkok was established to provide legal training for officials to combat
transnational crime.35 The center is open to government officials from any Southeast
Asian country, with the exception of Burma (Myanmar), and had trained nearly 3,900
participants by December 2004. ILEA aims to enhance law enforcement capabilities
in each country, as well as to encourage cross-border cooperation. Instruction for the
courses is provided largely by the Royal Thai Police, the Thai Office of the Narcotics
Control Board, and various U.S. agencies, including the Diplomatic Security Service,
CRS-10
36 Course information from [http://www.ileabangkok.com].
37 Chambers, Paul, “U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, Issue 3. December 2004.
38 Thailand Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004, accessible at
[http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27790.htm].
39 See Human Rights Watch report, at [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/17/thaila8127.htm].
40 See the Office of United Nation High Commissioner for Human Rights website at
[http://www.ohchr.org/english/].
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the
Department of Homeland Security, and the Internal Revenue Service.36
Counter-Narcotics. Counter-narcotics cooperation between Thailand the
United States is extensive and pre-dates the foundation of ILEA-Bangkok.
Coordination between the DEA and Thailand’s law enforcement agencies, in
conjunction with a mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition treaty, has led to
many arrests of international drug traffickers. Specialized programs include the
establishment of Task Force 399, in which U.S. Special Forces train elite Thai units
in narcotics interdiction tactics.37
Human Rights Concerns
Some members of Congress and other U.S. officials have criticized Thailand’s
record on human rights. The 2004 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report
asserts that Thailand’s record worsened in 2003 and cites excessive use of force by
some members of the police and links these elements to extra-judicial killings.38
Thailand has neither signed the United Nations Convention Against Torture nor
joined the International Criminal Court. Human rights activists are particularly
critical of Thaksin’s 2003 anti-narcotics campaign, in which an estimated 3,000
suspected drug dealers were killed, according to press reports. There have been some
indications of internal attention to the issue in Thailand; the National Human Rights
Commission, formed in 2000 by a mandate from the 1997 constitution to protect civil
liberties, has called on the government to review suspected abuse by Thai police.
Concern by international human rights groups regarding abuse of criminal
suspects by Thai police forces has been exacerbated by the crackdown on Muslim
militants in the southern provinces since early 2004. Human rights groups have
particularly cited the disappearance of Somchai Neelapaijit, a prominent Muslim
human rights lawyer, in March 2004.39 The emergency decree on administrative rule
announced in summer 2005 alarmed international rights groups further: the United
Nations Human Rights Committee, among others, has voiced concern that the
executive order and other developments are undermining Thailand’s democratic
process and human rights record.40
CRS-11
41 “Thailand: Country Outlook,” Economist Intelligence Unit. August 26, 2005.
42 See CRS Report RS21478, Thailand-U.S. Economic Relations: An Overview, by Wayne
M. Morrison.
43 American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand press release, Oct. 22, 2003, available at
[http://www.amchamthailand.org/acct/asp/news.asp?SponsorID=60&NewsID=421].
44 See CRS Report RL32314, U.S.-Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations, by
Raymond J. Ahearn and Wayne M. Morrison.
45 “Ives to Leave USTR to Take Position in Medical Trade Association,” Inside U.S. Trade,
July 16, 2004.
46 “Talks on U.S.-Thai FTA to Kick Off in Hawaii; USTR Sees Drawn-Out Process,” Inside
U.S. Trade, June 25, 2004.
U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations
Thailand, like many other countries in the region, saw its economy devastated
by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. With loan and policy assistance from the
International Monetary Fund, Thailand has recovered substantially, although other
setbacks such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak have hurt
its progress. GDP growth is forecast to slow in 2005 due to high fuel costs (Thailand
relies on oil for two-thirds of its energy), and inflation is expected to increase.41 As
a major recipient of foreign direct investment, and with merchandise exports making
up over half of its GDP, Thailand’s economy depends heavily on its trading partners.
Economic relations with the United States are central to Thailand’s outwardlooking
economic strategy.42 In 2003, the United States was Thailand’s largest
export market and its third largest supplier of imports, after Japan and the EU.
According to the American Chamber of Commerce, the United States is second only
to Japan in foreign investment in Thailand, with cumulative investment at $20 billion
and over 200,000 Thai nationals on the payrolls.43 In 2004, bilateral trade in goods
totaled $23.9 billion. Many analysts and policymakers suggest that the proposed
FTA would further deepen economic ties.44
A Protracted Process for U.S.-Thailand FTA Negotiations?
Although studies indicate that a U.S.-Thailand FTA would increase trade and
investment for both countries and yield net benefit for Thailand, negotiations must
address a list of challenging issues to reach a successful conclusion. The agreement
sought by the United States is the most comprehensive of the multiple FTAs
Thailand has attempted; the agenda includes issues such as intellectual property
rights, investment, environment, labor rights, textiles, telecommunications,
agriculture, electronic commerce, and government procurement.45 In the four rounds
of talks held, market access for sugar, rice, and trucks are among the thorniest of the
differences between the two sides. Further, some sources have speculated that
Thaksin launched negotiations without consulting adequately with the bureaucracies
in charge of the controversial areas. These factors, combined with an inexperienced
Thai negotiating team, may slow the talks down considerably.46
CRS-12
47 Chirathivat, Suthiphand, and Sothitorn Mallikamas, “Thailand’s FTA Strategy: Current
Developments and Future Challenges,” ASEAN Economic Bulletin, vol. 21, no. 1 (Apr.
2004).
48 Chambers, Paul, “U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, Issue 3. December 2004.
49 “Thai Visa Refusal Aids Strains to Ties with Taiwan,” Financial Times, Jan. 22, 2003.
50 See R. Bates Gill, “China Looks to Thailand: Exporting Arms, Exporting Influence.”
Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 6. June 1991.
51 “Chinese, Thai Foreign Ministers Discuss Strategic Cooperation,” BBC Monitoring Asia
Pacific. August 26, 205.
An Aggressive FTA Strategy
Thailand has been aggressively pursuing FTAs with countries other than the
United States in its campaign to expand trading opportunities. Agreements have
been signed with Bahrain, China, Peru, Australia, and India; the largest FTA to date
is expected to be concluded with Japan by the end of 2005. Further deals are possible
with New Zealand, South Korea, Chile, and the European Union (EU). Thailand has
championed ASEAN regionalism, seeing the proposed ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement (AFTA) as a vehicle for investment-driven integration which will benefit
Thailand’s outward-oriented growth strategy.47 Many observers see Thailand’s
pursuit of FTAs as an indication of its shift away from multilateral approach, such
as working through the World Trade Organization (WTO), and toward a bilateral or
regional approach.
Thailand in Asia
Growing Ties with China
Chinese-Thailand ties have strengthened considerably under Thaksin’s
leadership. Thaksin came to power promoting a business-oriented, engagement
approach toward the rest of Asia that de-emphasized human rights and democracy.48
Even while re-asserting its alliance with the United States, Thailand has continued
to court China, including signing agreements on technology, environmental
protection, and strategic cooperation. In addition, the government has denied visas
to a group of Taiwanese legislators, a decision which Thaksin defended based on
Thailand’s close ties to China.49 Military-to-military ties have also increased through
both exchanges and arms sales: China exports major weapons and military equipment
to Thailand, continuing a practice originating in the 1980s when both countries
supported Cambodian resistance groups, including the Khmer Rouge, against the
Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh.50
Trade has boomed between Thailand and China: in 2004 bilateral trade totaled
over $17 billion, according to Chinese statistics.51 A limited free trade agreement
covering mostly agricultural goods has been in place since 2003. Both countries have
aggressively promoted the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Zone by
CRS-13
52 Masviriyakul, Siriluk, “Sino-Thai Strategic Economic Development in the Greater
Mekong Subregion. Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, Issue 2. August 2004.
53 Montaperto, Ron, “China-Southeast Asia Relations: Dancing with China.” Comparative
Connections, July 2005.
54 Vatikiotis, Michael, “Sino Chic: Suddenly, It’s Cool to Be Chinese,” Far Eastern
Economic Review, Jan. 11, 1996.
55 Vatikiotis, Michael, “Catching the Dragon’s Tail: China and Southeast Asia in the 21st
Century,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 25, no. 1 (Apr. 2003).
56 See CRS Report RS20749, Burma-U.S. Relations, by Larry Niksch.
pursuing joint infrastructure projects that link Thailand with China’s Yunnan
province.52 In May 2005, Thailand demonstrated its commitment to implement
promptly the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement by announcing it would open
four new consulates in China.53
Thailand’s strong relationship with China is based on a history far less
antagonistic than Beijing’s past with many other ASEAN countries. After the U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam, Bangkok pursued a strategic alignment with Beijing in
order to contain Vietnamese influence in neighboring Cambodia. Bangkok restored
diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1975, far before other Southeast Asian nations.
Thailand also has no territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, unlike
Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The sizeable overseas Chinese population
in Thailand assimilated relatively easily and became a strong presence in the business
world, and eventually in the political arena as well. Thaksin himself is the member
of a prominent Sino-Thai family. Thai companies were among the first to explore
investment opportunities after the Chinese economy opened up in the late 1970s,
pursuing ventures with China’s state-run enterprises. As other regional powers
tentatively began to explore commercial relationships with China, investment from
Sino-Thai companies flourished in the 1990s, fueling a rebirth of interest in Chinese
language and culture in Thailand.54
Given the simultaneous emphasis on building close relationships with the
United States and China, Thaksin’s foreign policy could be construed as a classic
hedging strategy designed to avoid dominance by any one power. Some analysts
suggest that Bangkok’s embrace of China indicates a slow move away from the Cold
War reliance on the United States, despite enhanced cooperation in the war on
terrorism, and could be an indicator of how Southeast Asia will manage China’s
increasing influence.55
Divergence with U.S. on Burma (Myanmar) Policy
Bangkok’s approach toward Burma has long been seen as conflicting with U.S.
policy. While the United States has pursued strict economic and diplomatic
sanctions against the regime, Thailand has led ASEAN’s “constructive engagement”
initiative, which favors integration and incentives to coax Burma into reform.56 For
Thailand, this policy minimizes the danger of a large-scale military struggle and
expands Thai business opportunities in Burma.
CRS-14
57 Chambers, Paul, “U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, Issue 3. December 2004.
58 See Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Thai Policy toward Burmese Refugees and Migrants,
Human Rights Watch Report, released Feb. 2004.
59 H.R. 4818, Foreign Operations Appropriations, Section II, Bilateral Assistance.
Thailand’s relationship with Burma has grown closer under Thakin’s
administration. During the 1990s, Thailand voiced harsh criticism of the military
junta ruling Burma, particularly its crackdown on the National League for
Democracy, the opposition party led by democratic activist Aung Sun Su Kyi.
Thailand also has chafed at the huge inflow of illegal drugs from Burma. But the
Thaksin government has placed special emphasis on maintaining normal relations
with Burma, even as European countries have tightened sanctions and other
Southeast Asian countries have distanced themselves from Rangoon. In December
2004, Thaksin called the continued detention of Aung Sun Su Kyi “reasonable,”
prompting angry reactions from some U.S. lawmakers and Administration officials.
Critics have also questioned whether Thaksin’s engagement with Burma is being
driven by his own commercial interests: Shin Corp, his family’s telecom company,
has secured lucrative contracts to provide Internet service and satellite stations in
Burma.57
Some congressional leaders also have criticized Bangkok for its treatment of
Burmese refugees, migrant workers, and political dissents living in Thailand. Backed
by human rights groups’ reports, some U.S. lawmakers have leveled charges of
arrests and intimidation of Burmese political activists, as well as the repatriation of
Burmese who seek political asylum.58 Congress has passed legislation that provides
money to refugees who fled Burma, particularly those in Thailand.59
ASEAN Relations
Thailand’s positive engagement with Burma complements its broader strategy
of strengthening relations with Southeast Asian countries for economic and political
gain. Bangkok has continued to develop strong relations with its Indochina neighbors
through infrastructure assistance and other aid. In turn, Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia provide raw materials, cheap manufacturing, and expanding markets for
Thailand. Thaksin also has pursued enhanced relations with Singapore based on a
common interest in liberalizing trade in the region and with the Philippines centered
on a mutual interest in combating terrorism.
Relations with Indonesia and Malaysia are more complex. Tensions grew when
Thaksin claimed that nationals of the two countries are involved in separatist
violence in the south. Bilateral cooperation with Malaysia, predicated on both
economic ties and political cooperation in dealing with border issues in Thailand’s
restive southern provinces, has strengthened under Thaksin. Although Kuala Lumpur
has pursued JI and other militant Islamic groups aggressively, it is aware that the
Malaysian public is largely sympathetic to Thai Muslim complaints of persecution
based on shared ethnic, linguistic, and religious bonds. Bangkok’s accusations of
CRS-15
60 “Thai ‘Proof’ of Malaysian Camps,” BBC News Online, Dec. 21, 2004.
61 Kiat Ruxrungtham, Tim Brown, and Praphan Phanuphak. “HIV/AIDS in Asia,” The
Lancet, vol. 364, no. 9428 (July 3-9, 2004).
62 “Lethal Bird Flu Reemerges in Four East Asian Countries,” Washington Post, Sept. 15,
2004.
63 “Thailand Uncovers New Outbreak of Bird Flu,” Asian Wall Street Journal. July12, 2005.
militant camps located just over the border in Malaysia has further strained bilateral
relations.60
Regional Health Issues
Thailand’s relationship with its neighbors is defined by not only traditional
security concerns but also by a series of transnational public health issues that have
afflicted the region. Thailand was among the earliest and hardest hit by the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 1990s, with infection spreading rapidly among the sex
worker industry and adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rates peaking at about 1.5% in 1996.
Rates are now falling, due largely to an extensive prevention campaign focused on
managing risk in the sex industry. Cambodia undertook similar measures, but
countries such as China and Vietnam are now threatened by equally dangerous
outbreaks, providing another potential arena for regional cooperation.61
In addition to its relative success in curbing the spread of AIDS, Thailand has
been largely commended by the international health community for its response to
outbreaks of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the avian bird flu.
Because of the importance of tourism to Thailand’s economy, government officials
have, by some accounts, been reluctant to admit a public health problem but are
generally effective once determined to address it. In 2003, seven cases and two
deaths from SARS were reported in Thailand, but the kingdom was removed quickly
from the World Health Organization’s list of at-risk countries in 2003 after taking
steps to curb the spread of the virus. The following year, Thailand killed millions of
potentially infected chickens to contain the bird flu outbreak. Despite the measures,
health officials caution that both diseases remain a threat to Thailand and the region.
In September 2004, several Asian countries reported a re-emergence of the bird flu,
including the death of a man in Thailand,62 and a new outbreak among fighting
roosters was discovered in July 2005.63
Potential Challenges and Opportunities
in U.S.-Thai Relations
Progress in FTA Negotiations
Four rounds of talks have been held on the proposed U.S.-Thailand FTA, the
latest in July 2005. If negotiations for the bilateral agreement are able to resolve the
sensitive issues outlined above, Thailand would be the third Asia-Pacific country
(after Singapore and Australia) to sign a comprehensive FTA with the United States.
CRS-16
64 The EAI aims to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with the ten ASEAN countries.
65 Chambers, Paul, “U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, Issue 3. December 2004.
66 “U.S. to Transform Military in Parallel with Allies — Capabilities Will Be Emphasized
Instead of Numbers of Troops,” State Department Press Releases and Documents. August
16, 2004.
67 Kaplan, Robert D., “How We Would Fight China,” The Atlantic Monthly. June 2005.
68 Lumbaca, J.C., “Use Special Forces in Thailand’s Troubled South,” Aug. S20, 2004,
published on the online PacNet Newsletter by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, [http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0435A.pdf].
A FTA would enhance Thailand’s position as a key economic as well as security
partner, advance President Bush’s Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI),64 and
encourage Thailand to support the U.S. agenda in multilateral WTO negotiations.
Failure to reach an agreement, however, would set back these initiatives and may
embarrass Prime Minister Thaksin, who has been a forceful advocate of bolstering
relations with the United States. Some members of Congress have tied an
improvement in Thailand’s human rights record with passage of the FTA, indicating
a difficult road ahead.65
Military Transformation in Asia-Pacific
The U.S. Department of Defense initiative to transform and re-align the U.S.
military around the globe provides potential opportunities for increased security
cooperation with Thailand. Pentagon planners are breaking with the quantitative
assurance of keeping 100,000 troops on the ground in East Asia in favor of a more
mobile, capability-based force. In the past few years, U.S. military planners have
emphasized a “places, not bases” concept in Southeast Asia in which U.S. troops can
temporarily use facilities for operations and training, without maintaining a lengthy
and costly permanent presence. In a State Department press release, a senior Defense
Department official points to current cooperation with Thailand as an example of the
military’s new approach, specifically citing the annual Cobra Gold exercises.66
Facilities used by the U.S. military in Thailand fall under the Pentagon’s “cooperative
security location” (CSL) concept, in which host countries provide access in exchange
for upgrades and other aid.67
Direction of War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia
Thailand has demonstrated its commitment to the U.S. campaign to fight
international terrorism in Southeast Asia over the past three years. Future
developments in the regional war on terrorism may take Thailand’s role further. If
violence in the southern provinces continues to escalate, or if links to radical Islamist
networks are revealed, Bangkok and Washington may re-evaluate the scale of the
insurgency, from a purely domestic movement to a more broadly-based effort. Some
analysts have suggested the use of U.S. Special Forces, for example, to help Thai
military and police officers combat the violence.68 If terrorists continue strikes
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, such as the September 2004 bombing at the Australian
embassy in Jakarta, Thailand may expand its cooperation with the United States on
CRS-17
a broader, regional level. Possible avenues for such coordination could include
further integration on intelligence and law enforcement work to target terrorist
operatives and financing.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2002-2006
(thousands of dollars)
Account FY2002 FY2003 FY2004
actual
FY2005
estimate
FY2006
request
CSH 1,000 1,500 0 0 0
DA 750 1,250 0 0 0
ESF* 0 0 0 992 0
FMF 1,300 1,990 881 1,488 1,500
IMET 1,650 1,768 2,572 2,500 2,400
INCLE 4,000 3,700 2,000 1,608 1,000
NADR 720 200 1,380 750 1,000
Peace Corps 1,267 1,818 1,840 2,243 2,373
PKO 0 0 500 0 0
Totals 10,687 12,226 9,173 9,581 8,273
Sources: U.S. Department of State, USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Notes: CSH = Child Survival Health; DA = Development Assistance; INCLE = International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF =
Foreign Military Sales Financing; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related.
*Foreign operations appropriations for FY2005 (P.L. 108-447) provided $1.5 million in FMF to
Thailand and $1 million in ESF for programs to promote democracy and press freedoms. The
State Department request for FY2005 had not included ESF for Thailand.
CRS-18
CHINA
MYANMAR
THAILAND
KAMPUCHEA
VIETNAM
LAOS
MALAYSIA
Andaman Sea
Str ai t of
Mal acca INDONESIA
Gul f of Thai land
South China
Sea
Phuket
Hat
Yai
Pattani
Yala
Narathiwat
Nakhon
Ratchasima
Ubon
Ratchathani
Phitsanulok
Nakhon
Sawan
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K.Yancey 3/23/04)
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