- I am sad. I ought to be mad. Usually, I am. Not sad but mad. However, as I recall the past. Both, distant and the recent past, I see things. The things are things. They are not any different, if you take one thing and replace it with another thing. The results would be identical.
- I was never considered as a presidential material. Who cares? Judging from the past few months of intense politicking by the GOP presidential nominees' singular and collective contributions to the world peace, progress and general prosperity, not disparity, I am glad, thank God for small mercies.
- Get it from me. Donald Rumsfeld gave, practically, all his life in the service of his country, USA. It so happens that I did my duty to serve my country, as well. I am not going to write my Memoir and made fool in public, press and media, in general. I got better things to do.
- For instance, make a comment on the book: Known and Unknown: A Memoir, Rumsfeld, Donald, Sentinel, New York, The Penguin Group, 2011
- ...and I am Sid Harth@topcogitoergosum.com
- Thursday December 29th 2011Welcome, SiDevilIam
Donald Rumsfeld's memoir
Ducking and diving
His study in self-defence
Feb 17th 2011 | from the print edition
Known and Unknown: A Memoir. By Donald Rumsfeld. Sentinel; 815 pages; $36. Penguin; £25. Buy from Amazon.com, Amazon.co.ukfrom the print edition | Books and arts
IT WILL surprise no one that Donald Rumsfeld emerges well from his long memoir. The quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan, it appears, were everyone’s fault but his; ditto the failure to make timely use of America’s armed forces when Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005 and ditto a whole string of lesser blunders, such as Gerald Ford’s snubbing of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, which occurred while Mr Rumsfeld was chief of staff at the White House back in 1975.
By George
Expecting a mea culpa from a political memoir is like expecting modesty from Lady Gaga: it entirely misses the point. People like Mr Rumsfeld don’t write books for the money; they want to justify themselves. And this Mr Rumsfeld does reasonably well. Beyond the failure to admit any guilt, which will disappoint only those who were expecting the improbable, this book is interesting and even enjoyable. Mr Rumsfeld is the man who, in February 2002, used the phrase “unknown unknowns” to describe the main dangers in any possible confrontation with Iraq. Nearly a decade later, he is still attached to it, as is clear from the book’s title. He is rather less proud of his only other memorable line, said in response to the orgy of destruction that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein: “Stuff happens.”
In this sectionThe reason why this book is still a good read is the extraordinary amount that the author has contrived to pack into his life: a long spell in Congress, a varied series of jobs in Richard Nixon’s dysfunctional White House and then Gerald Ford’s, the ambassadorship to NATO and two turns as defence secretary—as both the youngest and the oldest holder of that office—plus a reasonably illustrious business career in periods of enforced political idleness.- Clashing with the foreign devils
- »Ducking and diving
- The roads to perdition
- Prickly original
- Years of fire
- Marathon training
Related topics
If only Mr Rumsfeld had not responded to George Bush junior’s call-up in 2001, his career would have been judged by history as valuable and successful. Iraq, of course, has ruined all of that, and Mr Rumsfeld will go down, along with Robert McNamara, as one of the two most calamitous holders of his position. His attempt to shift most of the blame on to others—mainly Condoleezza Rice, the then national security adviser, and Paul Bremer, the civilian administrator of Iraq—is successful up to a point. It is abundantly clear that Ms Rice badly failed to serve up the right policy options to the president. And it is equally clear that Mr Bremer’s two first edicts as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority—to fire every member of the Ba’ath party and to disband the Iraqi army—were catastrophic. Valiantly though he tries in these memoirs, Mr Rumsfeld cannot avoid complicity in both of these debacles.
He was, of course, a central participant in the policy meetings that Ms Rice chaired. And it really is no good blaming Mr Bremer: Mr Bremer worked for him, and if Mr Rumsfeld had any argument with the two decisions, he could and should have taken them to the president. One amusing oddity emerges. In his quest to exonerate himself, Mr Rumsfeld is quite prepared to include Mr Bush—rightly—in his list of the guilty, the latest instalment in a lingering feud between Mr Rumsfeld and both generations of Bushes.
Yet despite the vast influence he wielded, especially in the original decision to go to war on flawed evidence, Dick Cheney (who once upon a time was Mr Rumsfeld’s assistant) escapes with no hint of blame. A final judgment on how America came to blunder so badly in Mesopotamia is still pending: but this book, as well as being a fascinating history, is a clear statement by one of the defendants.Advertisement
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- Hello bakulaji
Decline and Fall: Donald Rumsfeld's Dramatic End
GalleryDonald Rumsfeld came to the Pentagon with a plan to transform the Defense Department. Then America went to war with Iraq.
TOOLBOXBy Bradley GrahamSunday, June 14, 2009Face time with the president is political gold in Washington, so Donald Rumsfeld moved quickly after taking charge at the Pentagon to secure weekly private meetings with President George W. Bush. Now, nearly six years and many meetings later, the defense secretary arrived in the Oval Office prepared to raise a delicate, and personal, matter.
His opportunity came as the talk that day, in September 2006, turned to Iraq. The conflict there was going badly. Violence had metastasized into a civil war. Plans to begin a major drawdown of U.S. troops had stalled. Iraqi forces still appeared unready to assume charge of security, and the Iraqi government, riven by sectarian strife, was doing little to unite the nation. In Washington, much of the responsibility for the mess in Iraq had fallen on Rumsfeld. He had failed to plan adequately for the occupation, was slow to develop a counterinsurgency campaign and had alienated too many people with his combative, domineering personality.
By then, Rumsfeld had hung onto office longer than most of his predecessors in the top Pentagon job. But with congressional elections approaching in the fall, he had become a campaign target, vilified by Democrats and considered a political liability by many Republicans. If, as increasingly anticipated, Democrats won control of one or both chambers of Congress, it would mean more hearings for Rumsfeld and more punishing interrogations. In recent days, Rumsfeld and his wife, Joyce, had discussed the prospect of his stepping down.
"We said there's no way he would stay if either the House or the Senate went Democratic because he would be the issue," Joyce recounted months later. The criticism "would have been relentless until he was gone."
Sitting with Bush, Rumsfeld broached the possibility of his departure. A "fresh pair of eyes" on Iraq might not be a bad thing, the secretary said. He made no explicit offer to resign. Still, his inference was unmistakable.
Or so the president thought. Although Bush didn't pursue the point, he told a senior White House official afterward what Rumsfeld had said. Bush took the comment as a sign of Rumsfeld's own recognition of the political realities closing in on him. "In the president's mind, Rumsfeld had cracked the door open," the official recalled. "And whether the president wanted to kick it open or not was up to him."
The question of whether to keep Rumsfeld had dogged Bush and his senior advisers for months. It had been raised after the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in early 2004, and several months later in the wake of Bush's reelection. It had come up again as the Iraq war worsened during 2005, and once more in the spring of 2006 when a number of retired generals publicly appealed for Rumsfeld's dismissal.
Each time, Bush resisted letting Rumsfeld go, even rebuffing several suggestions that he do so by some senior aides and advisers and rejecting the secretary's resignation letters. Bush worried that the disruption caused by replacing a secretary in wartime could be risky. Moreover, Rumsfeld had been unfailingly loyal to the president, and he had a powerful ally in Vice President Richard B. Cheney, who owed his own rise in the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford four decades earlier to Rumsfeld. Cheney and his aides maintained that it was unfair to hang the blame for Iraq on Rumsfeld alone and noted that the secretary had been right on a number of things where others had been wrong.
Also important, the Pentagon leader had championed the administration's signature drive to reform the U.S. military. From the beginning of his tenure, he had proclaimed "transformation" his main slogan and had pushed to create a more agile, adaptable military. He had relentlessly challenged existing assumptions and had advocated new principles of warfare, insisting on the need for change in confronting new and evolving threats to the United States. Outside the Pentagon, in interagency deliberations, he had emerged as a forceful conservative voice on a range of national security policies and a fierce guardian of the chain of command and what he considered military prerogatives, such as troop deployments. All in all, Rumsfeld had become the most powerful secretary of defense since Robert S. McNamara.
But he also was the most controversial. His methods offended many. Senior officers complained that he treated them harshly. Legislators groused that he was either unresponsive to their requests or disrespectful in personal dealings. And senior officials at the State Department and the White House portrayed him as uncompromising, evasive and obstructive.
As the chaos and bloodshed in Iraq worsened in the middle of 2006, Bush and his White House team began challenging, in a way they had not before, their basic approach to Iraq. Intensified efforts over the summer to secure Baghdad by relying on Iraqi forces as well as U.S. troops failed to quell the violence for long. The failure called into further question Rumsfeld's strategic premise that Iraqi forces could be trained and rushed into service to take over the counterinsurgency fight so that U.S. troops could go home. As Bush started exploring the notion that significantly more U.S. forces might be needed to enhance security, Rumsfeld remained fixated on finding ways to facilitate the turnover of responsibility to Iraqi troops.
It was in this context that the president finally decided to replace Rumsfeld, according to interviews with former officials involved in the process. The decision came before Bush had settled on a plan to send a surge of more U.S. troops into Iraq but after he was resolved that a new approach was required.
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Dan Fesperman reviews 'Donald,' by Eric Martin and Stephen Elliott
VideoDuring a discussion of "Donald" by Eric Martin and Stephen Elliott at 826DC in Columbia Heights, the authors discussed what the real Donald Rumsfeld would think of their book. "Donald," which imagines the former Secretary of Defense being treated like a detainee found on a battlefield, was released on Tuesday, Feb. 8 -- the same day Donald Rumsfeld released his memoir "Known and Unknown." (Feb. 8)
Your Feedback
Corrections, suggestions?
TOOLBOXBy Dan FespermanSpecial to The Washington Post
Tuesday, February 8, 2011; 12:05 AMIt is tempting at first to dismiss "Donald" as a mere literary guerrilla action, a publication-day ambush by two clever writers whose narrative voice, to their credit, may sound more authentically like Donald Rumsfeld than the former defense secretary's memoir.
If you were to cast this stunt as a war movie, co-authors Eric Martin and Stephen Elliott would be the wily tricksters who don fake uniforms to slip behind enemy lines, speaking the language like natives and clearing all checkpoints until they vanquish the opposing general with his own diabolical weaponry.
The premise of their novella is this: What if Rumsfeld, who oversaw the creation of America's most elaborate system of extralegal imprisonment and interrogation since, well, maybe forever, what if he were captured and hooded one night and thrown into the maw of this same system, and then subjected to its pains and indignities, from Bagram to Guantanamo Bay?
While it's easy to imagine such an idea at the heart of a T.C. Boyle short story or a comic essay in the New Yorker, Martin and Elliott - they do sound like a comedy team - have attempted something far more daring and risky than a brief flight of revenge fantasy. The length alone poses a challenge. At 110 pages, the shock effect of their subversive joke is bound to wear off. Not that there isn't plenty of levity for a while.
In the opening pages, Rumsfeld snarks his way into our bad graces with the same bristly, self-justifying manner he often employed from the Pentagon lectern. We come upon His Crankiness in a library, doing research for his memoir. When an earnest young man approaches to ask questions, Martin and Elliott capture Rumsfeld's disdain:
"Down there in the kid's eyes, Donald sees broad leaves of intelligence but rooted in such soft soil that it might as well be sand. A zen garden. With a few green wisps that will blow flat at the first breath of wind. The world they live in is a blustery place. This is the son of a father who never went to war."
This is all great fun, at least for those who might be rubbing their hands together at the idea of his impending comeuppance, but when Rumsfeld meets his wife and some rather louche friends for dinner, love and nostalgia turn him into a bit of a softy. On a family level, at least, he's already eager to make amends.
Only after Rumsfeld is kidnapped from his waterfront estate on the Maryland Eastern Shore do the authors' deeper intentions become evident. It is also the moment when, in the wrong hands, the tone of this brief story might easily have become either too preachy (a Scrooge-like Donald seeing the error of his ways after his visitation of horrors) or too empty of humanity in its welter of detail (a chilly field report from Human Rights Watch).
Not that Rumsfeld doesn't get a full-frontal education on the idiocy and futility of the interrogation regime he helped create. He is questioned nonstop, teased with false hope, forced to stand for hours, shackled uncomfortably and besieged 24-7 by noise and harsh lighting. Interestingly, he is neither waterboarded nor sexually taunted, as some inmates have been. It is to the authors' credit that his softer treatment nonetheless comes across as debilitatingly hellish.
But his awakening to the ineffectiveness of these tactics - many of which he approved and endorsed - is never expressed overtly. It comes in the context of his deepening addlement and frustration, such as when, after months of captivity, a questioner asks if he can tell them anything about attacks being planned against cities.
" 'Do you know how long I've been here?' he says. He would like her to answer, because he's not sure he knows, but she waits him out. 'If I did know anything at one point, what would I know now? Where would the information come from?' "
Four pages later he is still learning, and still not aware of it: "Three men he's never seen before question him for hours, rotating one at a time. Can this still be part of a strategy? He doesn't even know what he's saying anymore."
© 2011 The Washington Post Company
- Hello bakulaji
Correction to This Article
Earlier versions of this review of Donald Rumsfeld's memoir "Known and Unknown" misstated the length of time between his being passed over as a 1976 running mate for Gerald Ford and his being forced out as George W. Bush's defense secretary. The events were 30 years, not 20 years, apart. The review also incorrectly described Eric Shinseki as a former Army secretary. Shinseki was the Army's chief of staff. This version has been corrected.
Earlier versions of this review of Donald Rumsfeld's memoir "Known and Unknown" misstated the length of time between his being passed over as a 1976 running mate for Gerald Ford and his being forced out as George W. Bush's defense secretary. The events were 30 years, not 20 years, apart. The review also incorrectly described Eric Shinseki as a former Army secretary. Shinseki was the Army's chief of staff. This version has been corrected.
Gwen Ifill reviews Donald Rumsfeld's memoir, "Known and Unknown"

Gallery
Donald Rumsfeld came to the Pentagon with a plan to transform the Defense Department. Then America went to war with Iraq.

Your FeedbackCorrections, suggestions?TOOLBOX |
By Gwen Ifill
Special to The Washington PostTuesday, February 8, 2011; 12:05 AM
By definition, memoirists get to tell their stories the way they remember them. The retellings can be gentle or scorching, illuminating or concealing.
Donald Rumsfeld has chosen all of the above in "Known and Unknown," a hefty and heavily annotated accounting and defense of his life in public service.
"Never much of a handwringer, I don't spend a lot of time in recriminations, looking back or second-guessing decisions made in real time with imperfect information by myself or others," he writes.
But hand-wring he does, in repeated blasts of Rumsfeldian score-settling that come off as a cross between setting the record straight and doggedly knocking enemies off pedestals.
There is, indeed a lot about Rumsfeld himself that is known and unknown. Who recalls now that he was considered (and passed over) for vice president three times in three years? Who knew that he was inspired to public service by a liberal Democrat, Adlai Stevenson, and wrote a campaign check to New Jersey Democrat Bill Bradley when he ran for president in 2000? That he, Dick Cheney and Frank Carlucci - all future secretaries of defense - ran Richard Nixon's anti-poverty agency in 1969?
The book is full of little nuggets like that, but at its heart, it is a revenge memoir.
Most readers who came to know of Rumsfeld during the last stage of his remarkable career as secretary of defense for George W. Bush will not be surprised at the tone that runs through much of the book. Rumsfeld, according to Rumsfeld, was prescient, clear-headed, loyal and almost always right.
But he is also acerbic, dismissive and reluctant to admit that he occasionally missed the policy mark. As a member of Congress in 1964, for example, he concedes he should have thought twice before voting for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Later in the volume, he skates over one of the reasons he was essentially fired as defense secretary in 2006: He did not agree that more troops were needed in Iraq.
Mostly, Rumsfeld is certain - never more so than when he is chronicling the deficiencies of others. His list of disdain runs long - from former secretaries of state Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell, to Coalition Provisional Authority chief Paul Bremer ("It remained difficult to get him to accept the idea that Iraq belonged to the Iraqis"), to former Army chief of staff Eric Shinseki, to former Joint Chiefs chairman Hugh Shelton, Powell aide Richard Armitage, Sen. John McCain and, of course, the news media.
The most consistent censure is reserved for Powell, Rice and anyone who operated in their diplomatic orbit. Powell and his supporters, he writes, were skeptical of the administration's initiatives to the point of disloyalty. Apparently, it did not help that Democrats like then-Delaware Sen. Joe Biden described Powell to a newspaper reporter as a "good guy," but Rumsfeld as a "unilateralist."
Rumsfeld is especially piqued about what he saw as Powell's behavior after the case he made to the United Nations about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq later proved untrue.
"Powell was not duped or misled by anybody," Rumsfeld asserts sternly. "Nor did he lie about Saddam's suspected WMD stockpiles. The President did not lie. The Vice President did not lie. Tenet did not lie. Rice did not lie. I did not lie. The Congress did not lie. The far less dramatic truth is that we were wrong."
"Never much of a handwringer, I don't spend a lot of time in recriminations, looking back or second-guessing decisions made in real time with imperfect information by myself or others," he writes.
But hand-wring he does, in repeated blasts of Rumsfeldian score-settling that come off as a cross between setting the record straight and doggedly knocking enemies off pedestals.
There is, indeed a lot about Rumsfeld himself that is known and unknown. Who recalls now that he was considered (and passed over) for vice president three times in three years? Who knew that he was inspired to public service by a liberal Democrat, Adlai Stevenson, and wrote a campaign check to New Jersey Democrat Bill Bradley when he ran for president in 2000? That he, Dick Cheney and Frank Carlucci - all future secretaries of defense - ran Richard Nixon's anti-poverty agency in 1969?
The book is full of little nuggets like that, but at its heart, it is a revenge memoir.
Most readers who came to know of Rumsfeld during the last stage of his remarkable career as secretary of defense for George W. Bush will not be surprised at the tone that runs through much of the book. Rumsfeld, according to Rumsfeld, was prescient, clear-headed, loyal and almost always right.
Mostly, Rumsfeld is certain - never more so than when he is chronicling the deficiencies of others. His list of disdain runs long - from former secretaries of state Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell, to Coalition Provisional Authority chief Paul Bremer ("It remained difficult to get him to accept the idea that Iraq belonged to the Iraqis"), to former Army chief of staff Eric Shinseki, to former Joint Chiefs chairman Hugh Shelton, Powell aide Richard Armitage, Sen. John McCain and, of course, the news media.
The most consistent censure is reserved for Powell, Rice and anyone who operated in their diplomatic orbit. Powell and his supporters, he writes, were skeptical of the administration's initiatives to the point of disloyalty. Apparently, it did not help that Democrats like then-Delaware Sen. Joe Biden described Powell to a newspaper reporter as a "good guy," but Rumsfeld as a "unilateralist."
Rumsfeld is especially piqued about what he saw as Powell's behavior after the case he made to the United Nations about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq later proved untrue.
"Powell was not duped or misled by anybody," Rumsfeld asserts sternly. "Nor did he lie about Saddam's suspected WMD stockpiles. The President did not lie. The Vice President did not lie. Tenet did not lie. Rice did not lie. I did not lie. The Congress did not lie. The far less dramatic truth is that we were wrong."
© 2011 The Washington Post Company









donkeyshit10 January 2011 07:47PM
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