Everything you always wanted to know about India and more
← India’s Superpower Euphoria CCXX
India’s Superpower Euphoria CCXXI
http://cogitoergosum.co.cc/2011/01/23/indias-superpower-euphoria-ccxxi/
23/01/2011 by navanavonmilita
ANI
India, Pakistan were ‘near Kashmir dispute resolution’ during Musharraf regime: Kasuri
2011-01-21 11:00:00
India and Pakistan were near a resolution of their bilateral issues- including the Kashmir dispute- during the tenure of the then Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, former Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri has said.
Addressing the Indian Council of World Affairs on Thursday, Kasuri said one of the reasons for the continuing tensions between India and Pakistan was that both nations had not been able to resolve their bilateral disputes ever since their independence, and as a result, the rift had deepened, Online-International News Network reports.
Other than Kashmir, the issues of concern between both countries were water, Sir Creek, Siachen and terrorism, he said, adding that a lot of progress was made on settling these bilateral issues during the tenure of the past Pakistan government, during which he was the Foreign Minister.
The progress was so great that it was widely acknowledged in South Asia as well as abroad, Kasuri stressed, adding that Pakistan and India were near a resolution of their bilateral disputes- including that of Kashmir- which had caused many wars between the two countries.
He said that the main features of the draft agreement on Kashmir involved, inter alia, a gradual demilitarisation as the situation improved, self-governance and a joint mechanism involving the Kashmiris from both sides as well as the presence of Pakistani and Indian representatives in this process.
The purpose was to improve the comfort level of the Kashmiris, said Kasuri, adding that the joint mechanism envisaged cooperation in various fields, including exploitation of water resources and hydroelectric power.
Self-governance also provided the maximum possible powers to the Kashmiris to manage their political, economic, financial and social matters and also enhanced travel and economic interaction on both sides of the LOC, he said.
As far as the Kashmiris on both sides were concerned, the LOC would be made irrelevant for the movement of goods and people for practical purposes, he added.
The former Pakistan minister said the agreement, though not ideal, was the best possible one under the prevailing circumstances, and it was felt that it would be acceptable to the majority of the people of Kashmir, Pakistan and India.
The agreement was of an interim nature and provided for a review after 15 years, he added. (ANI)
Expert Roundup
How the Kashmir Dispute Affects Security in South Asia
Authors:
Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations
C. Raja Mohan, Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Independent political and defense analyst, Pakistan
Howard B. Schaffer, Deputy Director and Director of Studies, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University
M. Farooq Kathwari, Chairman, President and CEO, Ethan Allen Inc., Chairman, Kashmir Study Group
Interviewer(s):
Jayshree Bajoria, Senior Staff Writer
July 14, 2009
U.S. President Barack Obama has defined the elimination of terrorist networks in Pakistan and Afghanistan as crucial to U.S. national security interests. Yet some analysts say the territory of Kashmir could pose a problem to the administration’s counterterrorism efforts in the region. Often called one of the world’s most dangerous flashpoints, Kashmir has been at the root of two large-scale wars and one limited conflict between India and Pakistan since the August 1947 partition. Tensions between the countries escalated in the 1990s with a rise in militancy in the Indian-administered region. India accuses Pakistan’s premier intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of supporting militant groups in Kashmir, a charge Pakistan denies.
The two countries started a peace process in 2004 that explored options such as increasing trade and greater people-to-people contact across the disputed border but talks have been plagued by political crises in Pakistan and terrorist attacks in India. Analysts point out that the Kashmir dispute distracts Pakistan’s security forces from focusing on militants inside the country since a majority of Pakistan’s troops remain deployed on the eastern border with India. Five experts on South Asia–Daniel Markey, C. Raja Mohan, Hasan-Azkari Rizvi, Howard B. Schaffer, and M. Farooq Kathwari–discuss U.S. interests in Kashmir and propose policy options for the Obama administration to tackle this long-standing dispute.
Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations
Daniel MarkeyThere is little doubt that normalized relations between India and Pakistan, including a regionally acceptable settlement on Kashmir, would offer tremendous benefits to the United States. Indo-Pak tensions are especially dangerous because they bring two nuclear states toe-to-toe; they distract Islamabad from the urgent task of combating terrorists and militants on its own soil; and they contribute to Pakistani suspicions about India’s activities in Afghanistan. Thus, the long-standing dispute over Kashmir is one part of a wider regional dynamic that has direct implications for Washington’s ability to support a stable Afghan state and to address the threat posed by terrorist groups in South Asia.
Yet in spite of its central strategic importance, the United States is not well positioned to tackle the Kashmir issue. Washington should not seek to insert itself in the diplomacy between Islamabad and New Delhi or to press publicly for concessions from either side. These moves would backfire, since Indian and Pakistani leaders can ill-afford to appear to their domestic audiences as if they are caving to U.S. pressure over an issue as sensitive as Kashmir. Moreover, the recent history of back-channel dealings between Islamabad and New Delhi suggests that the basic contours of a Kashmir settlement are already well-known to both sides; no need for Washington to reinvent the wheel.
“[T]he long-standing dispute over Kashmir is one part of a wider regional dynamic that has direct implications for Washington’s ability to support a stable Afghan state and to address the threat posed by terrorist groups in South Asia.”- Daniel Markey
That said, the White House is understandably eager to promote Indo-Pak rapprochement. This urge is all the more desperate because the United States has every reason to fear that Pakistan-based terrorists will attempt another Mumbai-style attack in the near future. In that event, the Indian government might feel compelled to launch reprisal attacks inside Pakistan, prompting an escalating spiral of uncertain duration and violence.
Under these conditions, the Obama administration should seek to insulate the Indo-Pak rapprochement process by devoting greater attention to the specific group that masterminded last November’s Mumbai attack: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The United States should press for more extensive Pakistani investigations, arrests, and military action against LeT and its associated organizations, and Washington should also lend support where possible. Given the group’s history of close ties to Pakistani military and intelligence and the extensive sympathy it enjoys within segments of the Pakistani public, undertaking a true crackdown on LeT may well prove a difficult and bloody affair. But without tackling this threat, prospects for progress in Kashmir, for regional stability, and for U.S. success in its counterterror and counterinsurgency missions will remain extremely dim.
C. Raja Mohan, Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Raja MohanFrom the Indian perspective, there is a short answer to the question on what the Obama administration should do about Kashmir as part of its Af-Pak strategy: nothing. There is also a longer answer to the question–nothing direct–that I would like to develop.
First, the empirical evidence. The many direct U.S. interventions in Kashmir over the last six decades were not only unsuccessful but also prevented the construction of sustainable ties with India. New Delhi saw Washington’s Kashmir interest as part of a broader tilt toward Pakistan that began in the early years of the Cold War.
If Kashmir has been at the heart of India’s accumulated distrust of the United States, the Bush administration chose to ignore the issue as it tried to build a strategic partnership with India. Paradoxically, it was precisely during this period of American “neglect” that India and Pakistan made the biggest progress on resolving their conflict over Kashmir.
From 2003-2007, Delhi and Islamabad unveiled many confidence-building measures in Kashmir for the first time since the partition of the subcontinent. Above all, Indian and Pakistani leaders negotiated, through an official back channel, the framework of a political settlement on Kashmir. The talks, however, are stalled thanks to internal instability in Pakistan and the renewal of spectacular terror attacks on India like the kind we saw in Mumbai last November.
As it understood the costs to America’s blossoming ties with India, the Obama administration quickly stepped back from the initial impulse to reinject itself into Kashmir. The administration must nevertheless persist in building on Obama’s one important insight: The conflicts on the eastern and western borders of Pakistan are interconnected.
At the source of the trouble in Kashmir and Afghanistan has been the Pakistani army’s decades-old policy of nurturing extremist groups as strategic assets against New Delhi and Kabul. Under Obama, Washington has come to recognize that defeating al-Qaeda and the Taliban involves getting the Pakistani army to end its deliberate support of violent extremism. This, in turn, is possible only if the United States can help Pakistan’s civilian leaders wrest control over national security policy from the army. If and when he makes progress on these two objectives, Obama will find it no problem at all to convince Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to sign off on the Kashmir deal that he has already negotiated.
Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Independent political and defense analyst, Pakistan
Hasan Askari RizviImprovement of India-Pakistan relations and the resolution of the Kashmir conflict would strengthen Pakistan’s role in the ongoing U.S. efforts to eliminate extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan and stabilize those countries.
This is especially important because Pakistan’s civilian leadership and military top brass are now unanimous in viewing all Taliban groups and their allies as a threat to the stability of Pakistan and the region. The military operation in the Swat area [of Pakistan] has dislodged the Taliban and this area is now under the control of Pakistani civilian and military authorities. Pakistan has launched another military operation in South Waziristan and such operations will be launched in other parts of the tribal areas in the future.
Pakistan’s attention will be partly diverted from its tribal areas and northwestern border with Afghanistan to its eastern border with India if tension increases between India and Pakistan. This was the case after the Mumbai terrorist attack (in November 2008) when Indian leaders issued strident statements against Pakistan, moved their troops from peacetime locations up closer to the border, and toyed with the idea of strategic airstrikes in Pakistani territory.
Pakistan’s political right and Islamic elements take advantage of troubled India-Pakistan relations–especially the non-resolution of the Kashmir conflict–to argue that India, rather than the Taliban, is a threat to Pakistan. Further, the militant groups based in mainland Pakistan, known for their involvement in Indian-administered Kashmir, use the stalemate on Kashmir to mobilize popular support.
The Pakistan government finds it difficult to take a firm action against these militant groups when India-Pakistan relations are marked by high-level hostility and India is publicly demanding action against these groups. Improved India-Pakistan relations and resolution of major disputes, including Kashmir, will make these militant groups irrelevant and increase the Pakistani government’s ability to curb them.
The Obama administration is most suited to help ease tension between India and Pakistan and improve their bilateral relations because it has equally cordial relations with both countries. It needs to encourage India to revive the suspended “composite dialogue” comprising eight issue areas including Kashmir and terrorism.
Pakistan would like the United States to play a mediatory role on Kashmir. But, this is not possible because India is opposed to it. However, the Obama administration can help the two sides make the dialogue results oriented. If the less complicated issues–the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek boundary, and the water issue–are resolved, this would produce enough goodwill to resolve the Kashmir conflict. The U.S. administration should be more assertive in working toward improved India-Pakistan relations.
Howard B. Schaffer, Deputy Director and Director of Studies, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University
Howard B. SchafferThe unsettled Kashmir dispute poses a potentially serious threat to the expanding interests the United States now has in South Asia. Any conflict between India and Pakistan sparked by the dispute could escalate into a catastrophic nuclear war. Pakistan’s critical role since September 11, 2001, in shaping the future of Afghanistan has given the issue a further major dimension. The traditional focus of the Pakistan armed forces on combating a perceived threat from India and the continuing patronage that Pakistani intelligence agencies provide to Islamic extremists in Kashmir make it more difficult, both politically and militarily, for Islamabad to help the United States and its coalition partners combat the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda. These factors also heighten Pakistan’s own problems in contending with domestic extremists. Pakistani support for armed insurgents in Kashmir contributes significantly to tension with India and heightens Indian suspicion that Islamabad is responsible for perpetrating violence within India proper. And until a settlement is reached, there will be no dearth of “spoilers” eager for opportunities to inflame India-Pakistan relations.
“If Washington does find a propitious opportunity to play a more active role, the settlement it promotes should call for making the Line of Control a permanent border that is porous; autonomy for Kashmiris on both sides; and joint institutions on an all-Kashmir basis.”- Howard Schaffer
Washington should look for opportunities to play a more active role in helping resolve the dispute while recognizing that this won’t be easy. These opportunities will arise only when there are strong governments in both countries willing and able to make the difficult concessions necessary for a settlement. And before the United States becomes more involved, India-Pakistan relations must improve from their present dismal state.
Any eventual U.S. diplomatic involvement should be unobtrusive and avoid fanfare. For instance, assigning a high-profile special envoy would be fatal to U.S. efforts. If Washington does find a propitious opportunity to play a more active role, the settlement it promotes should call for making the Line of Control a permanent border that is porous; autonomy for Kashmiris on both sides; and joint institutions on an all-Kashmir basis.
These elements were under discussion in back-channel India-Pakistan negotiations until the talks were suspended following the Mumbai attacks in November 2008. Both sides state that they wish to resume the discussions on Kashmir and the broader composite bilateral dialogue. But New Delhi has served notice that it will be unwilling to do so until Pakistan has taken satisfactory action against the Mumbai [terrorist attack in November 2008] perpetrators. Washington has urged the Pakistanis to do so. Nothing is to be gained, at least at this point, in the U.S. calling on the two governments to hold substantive discussions.
M. Farooq Kathwari, Chairman, President and CEO, Ethan Allen Inc., Chairman, Kashmir Study Group
Farooq KathwariConflict in South Asia poses serious economic and security threats to U.S. interests. The ongoing war in Afghanistan and the fighting in Pakistan are serious and dangerous realities. In order to achieve stability, regional cooperation and trust must be established, especially between India and Pakistan. Resolving the Kashmir conflict will go a long way in bringing peace to South Asia.
There is greater realization in India and Pakistan that they need to settle the Kashmir dispute for their wellbeing and that of the region. The conflict over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir has been the chief source of tension between India and Pakistan, fueling three wars between the nations since 1947 and resulting in tremendous costs to the region–loss of life, impact on economic growth, large defense spending, and rise in extremism.
For Kashmir, the conflict has been a great tragedy and a disaster in all respects: a large death toll, human rights abuses, displacement of populations, a devastated economy, serious environmental damage, massive military buildup, and severe psychological distress.
The positive news is that in the last few years, through quiet, back-channel negotiations, the parties–India, Pakistan, and the peoples of the Kashmir region–have come close to a feasible solution. All sides now understand that their stated positions of the last sixty-two years are not realistic and that compromises have to be made.
In this regard, I was involved in forming the Kashmir Study Group in 1996 to help shape the debate toward a peaceful and honorable resolution to the conflict. The main features of the proposed solution, developed in consultation with the parties: the establishment of truly self-governing entities on both sides of the present Line of Control; guarantees of human and civil rights for the culturally diverse populations and minorities; and all parties committed to demilitarization and the renouncing of violence.
India and Pakistan need to engage in composite bilateral talks on all important issues. Recurrent tensions over Kashmir will undercut any initiative to bring stability to South Asia as well as perpetuate the risk of a nuclear war.
While the ultimate responsibility of negotiating a solution is with the involved parties, it is also the right time for the United States to pursue creative, persistent, and discreet high-level diplomacy to help move the peace process forward.
Backgrounder
Kashmir Militant Extremists
Author:
Jamal Afridi
Updated: July 9, 2009
Introduction
Militancy in the disputed region of Kashmir has been major fuel for discord between India and Pakistan since the 1980s. Attacks in the region began to increase in scale and intensity following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when foreign insurgents flooded the region to join the Afghan Mujahadeen. The majority Muslim region has its own local militant groups, but experts believe most of the recent Kashmir and Kashmir-based terrorism has been the work of foreign Islamists who seek to claim the region for Pakistan. A spate of Islamist cross-border attacks into Indian-held territory, the December 2001 storming of the Indian parliament in New Delhi, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks have all reinforced Kashmir’s standing as the significant bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Both states have nuclear weapons, making Kashmir one of the world’s most dangerous flashpoints.
Origins of the Conflict
Kashmir has been a constant source of tension since 1947, when the British partitioned their imperial holdings in South Asia into two new states, India and Pakistan. For Pakistan, incorporating the majority Muslim province of Kashmir is a basic national aspiration bound up in its identity as an Islamic state. Islamabad’s official line on Kashmir, which the United States echoed as recently as June 2009, is that incorporation into either India or Pakistan must be determined by Kashmiris. Meanwhile, India sees the province as vital to its identity as a secular, multiethnic state. Movements for an independent Kashmiri state, such as the Kashmir Freedom Movement and the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, also exist and have many supporters. India now holds about two-thirds of the disputed territory, which it calls Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan controls about one-third, which it calls Azad (meaning “free”) Kashmir. China also controls two small sections of northern Kashmir. India and Pakistan fought two wars over the region in 1947 and 1965, and a limited conflict in 1999. At least fifty thousand people have died in political violence in Kashmir since 1989.
Though flare-ups have occurred on both sides of the line, violence in Kashmir has decreased dramatically. According to the Indian Home Ministry, the number of violent incidents in 2008 was the lowest in twenty years (AFP) at seven hundred, a 40 percent drop compared to the number of incidents reported in 2007. The South Asia Terrorism Portal reports that 2008 also marks the first time civilian casualties have been under one hundred since 1990.
Terrorist Groups
The U.S. State Department lists three Islamist groups active in Kashmir as foreign terrorist organizations: Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Lashkar-e-Taiba. The first group has been listed for years, and the other two were added after the December 2001 Indian parliament attack. All three groups have attracted Pakistani members as well as Afghan and Arab veterans who fought the 1980s Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
* Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) was established in the mid-1980s. Based first in Pakistan and then in Afghanistan, it has several hundred armed supporters in Pakistan and Kashmir. The group is responsible for the December 1999 hijacking of an Indian airliner and numerous attacks on Indian troops and civilians in Kashmir. Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front Harakat members have participated in insurgent and terrorist operations in Myanmar, Tajikistan, and Bosnia.
* Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) was founded in 2000 by Maulana Masood Azhar, a Pakistani cleric. The group seeks to incorporate Kashmir into the state of Pakistan and has openly declared war on the United States. JEM has carried out attacks on Indian targets, the Pakistani government, and various sectarian minority groups within Pakistan. Acts of terrorism attributed to the group include the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament and a series of assaults in 2002 on Christian sites in Pakistan. The Pakistani government has also implicated JEM for the two assassination attempts on former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. According to the U.S. State Department, the group has at least several hundred armed supporters as well as tens of thousands of followers.
* Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), active since 1993, was formed as the military wing of the well-funded Pakistani Islamist organization Markaz-ad- Dawa-wal-Irshad. The group, one of the largest and most proficient of the Kashmir-based terrorist groups, has claimed responsibility for a number of high-profile attacks on Indian targets in Jammu and Kashmir, as well as within India. India says that over the last several years the group has split into two factions, al-Mansurin and al-Nasirin. There is wide speculation that LeT was responsible for the July 11, 2006 string of bombings on Mumbai’s commuter railroad, though a spokesman for the group denied any involvement. The Indian government alleges that LeT was responsible for coordinating the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
Since Pakistan outlawed these groups, attacks in Kashmir and Pakistan have been carried out under other guises as a tactic to avoid detection while still maintaining the same leadership and ideology. Often times these groups pose as charitable organizations to avoid government sanctions. One group calling itself al-Qanoon or Lashkar-e-Omar is thought to be a coalition of members of Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other Pakistan-based Islamist groups, including the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi organization.
Links to the Pakistani State
India has long accused Pakistan’s premier intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of arming, training, and providing logistical support to militants in Kashmir. Pakistan denies any ongoing collaboration between the ISI and militants, stressing a change of course after September 11, 2001. After the December 2001 attack on India’s parliament, former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf promised to crack down on terrorist groups active in Kashmir and purge ISI officials with ties to these groups. However, the Indian government implied the ISI’s involvement in a July 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, and again in the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai.
But as this Backgrounder points out, some experts believe the relationship between the Pakistani military and some Kashmiri groups has turned with the rise of militancy within Pakistan. Shuja Nawaz, author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within, says the ISI “has certainly lost control” of Kashmiri militant groups. According to Nawaz, some of the groups trained by the ISI to fuel insurgency in Kashmir have been implicated in bombings and attacks within Pakistan, therefore making them army targets.
The al-Qaeda Connection
Many terrorists active in Kashmir received training in the same madrasas, or Muslim seminaries, where Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters studied, and some received military training at camps in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Leaders of some of these terror groups also have al-Qaeda connections. The long-time leader of the Harakat ul-Mujahideen group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, signed al-Qaeda’s 1998 declaration of holy war, which called on Muslims to attack all Americans and their allies. Maulana Masood Azhar, who founded the Jaish-e-Mohammed organization, traveled to Afghanistan several times to meet Osama bin Laden. Azhar’s group is suspected of receiving funding from al-Qaeda, U.S. and Indian officials say. In 2006, al-Qaeda claimed to have established a wing in Kashmir.
Obstacle to Peace
Despite a resumption of formal peace talks between India and Pakistan in 2004, militant attacks continue to hinder progress towards a sustainable deal on Kashmir. After New Delhi and Islamabad agreed to launch a landmark bus service in February 2005 across the cease-fire line, militants vowed to target the service. In April of the same year, one bus survived a grenade attack. In March 2008, seventeen were wounded when a bomb exploded on a highway overpass in Indian-controlled Kashmir. A week later a gun battle erupted between Indian security forces and militants during a search-and-cordon operation, killing five. Both India and Pakistan have been accused of committing human rights violations in Kashmir, exacerbating the antagonism and mutual distrust both states have for one another. Talks were effectively put on hold in 2008 after India accused the ISI and Pakistani authorities of being complicit in the Mumbai attacks.
Backgrounder
Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists
Author:
Jayshree Bajoria, Senior Staff Writer
Updated: October 7, 2010
Introduction
As an increasing number of suicide attacks rock Pakistan’s major cities, concerns for the country’s security are rising. In recent years, many new terrorist groups have emerged, several existing groups have reconstituted themselves, and a new crop of militants has emerged, more violent and less conducive to political solutions than their predecessors. Links between many of these new and existing groups have strengthened, say experts, giving rise to fresh concerns for stability. A failed bombing attempt in New York’s Times Square in May 2010 with links to Pakistan also exposes the growing ambitions of many of these groups that had previously focused only on the region. The Pakistan-born U.S. citizen Faisal Shahzad who confessed to the bombing attempt was sentenced to life imprisonment by a U.S. court in October.
Pakistani authorities have long had ties to militant groups based on their soil that largely focused their efforts in Afghanistan and India. But with Pakistan joining the United States as an ally in its “war on terrorism” since 9/11, experts say Islamabad has seen harsh blowback on its policy of backing militants operating abroad. Leadership elements of al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, along with other terrorist groups, have made Pakistan’s tribal areas (the semi-autonomous region along the Afghan border) their home and now work closely with a wide variety of Pakistani militant groups. Security concerns are reverberating beyond Pakistan. In April 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said deteriorating security in nuclear-armed Pakistan “poses a mortal threat” to the United States and the world.
Terrorist Groups
Many experts say it is difficult to determine how many terrorist groups are operating out of Pakistan. Most of these groups have tended to fall into one of the five distinct categories laid out by Ashley J. Tellis, a senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in January 2008 testimony (PDF) before a U.S. House Foreign Affairs subcommittee.
* Sectarian: Groups such as the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Shia Tehrik-e-Jafria, which are engaged in violence within Pakistan;
* Anti-Indian: Terrorist groups that operate with the alleged support of the Pakistani military and the intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and the Harakat ul-Mujahadeen (HuM). This Backgrounder profiles these organizations which have been active in Kashmir;
* Afghan Taliban: The original Taliban movement and especially its Kandahari leadership centered around Mullah Mohammad Omar, believed to be now living in Quetta;
* Al-Qaeda and its affiliates: The organization led by Osama bin Laden and other non-South Asian terrorists believed to be ensconced in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Rohan Gunaratna of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore says other foreign militant groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad group, the Libyan Islamic Fighters Group and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement are also located in FATA;
* The Pakistani Taliban: Groups consisting of extremist outfits in the FATA, led by individuals such as Hakimullah Mehsud, of the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan, Maulana Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur, and Maulana Qazi Fazlullah of the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM).
Interactive Map: Pakistan’s Troubled Tribal Belt There are some other militant groups that do not fit into any of the above categories. For instance, secessionist groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army in the southwest province of Balochistan. BLA was declared a terrorist organization by Pakistan in 2006. Also, a new militant network, often labeled the Punjabi Taliban, has gained prominence after the major 2008 and 2009 attacks in the Punjabi cities of Lahore, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi.
Hassan Abbas, a fellow at the Asia Society, writes the Punjabi Taliban network is a loose conglomeration of members of banned militant groups of Punjabi origin-sectarian as well as those focused on Kashmir-that have developed strong connections with the Pakistani Taliban, Afghan Taliban, and other militant groups based in FATA and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The Punjabi Taliban provide logistical support for attacks on cities in Punjab province and include individuals or factions of groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and their various splinter groups, along with small cells unaffiliated with any large group. Abbas writes that many of these militants “directly benefited from state patronage in the 1990s and were professionally trained in asymmetrical warfare, guerrilla tactics, and sabotage.” The Punjabi Taliban are distinct from the traditional Pashtun Taliban, experts say. They are usually more educated and more technologically savvy.
In recent years, many new terrorist groups have emerged in Pakistan, several existing groups have reconstituted themselves, and a new crop of militants has emerged, more violent and less conducive to political solutions than their predecessors.
Since there is also greater coordination between all these groups, say experts, lines have blurred regarding which category a militant group fits in. For instance, the Pakistani Taliban, which were committed to fighting against the Pakistani state, are now increasingly joining insurgents fighting U.S. and international troops across the border in Afghanistan. U.S. Central Command Chief General David H. Petraeus, in a CFR interview, says the groups have long shared a symbiotic relationship. “They support each other, they coordinate with each other, sometimes they compete with each other, [and] sometimes they even fight each other,” making it difficult to distinguish between them.
The Pakistani Taliban
Supporters of the Afghan Taliban in the tribal areas transitioned into a mainstream Taliban force of their own as a reaction to the Pakistani army’s incursion into the tribal areas, which began in 2002, to hunt down the militants. In December 2007, about thirteen disparate militant groups coalesced under the umbrella of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, with militant commander Baitullah Mehsud from South Waziristan as the leader. After Mehsud was killed in August 2009 in a U.S. missile strike, his cousin and deputy Hakimullah Mehsud took over as leader of the TTP. Experts say most adult men in Pakistan’s tribal areas grew up carrying arms but it is only in the last few years that they have begun to organize themselves around a Taliban-style Islamic ideology pursuing an agenda much similar to that of the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan. Abbas writes (PDF) in a January 2008 paper that the Pakistani Taliban killed approximately two hundred tribal leaders and effectively established themselves as an alternative.
TTP not only has representation from all of FATA’s seven agencies (please refer to this interactive map of the area) but also from several settled districts of the NWFP. According to some estimates, the Pakistani Taliban collectively have around 30,000 to 35,000 members. Among their other objectives, the TTP has announced a defensive jihad against the Pakistani army, enforcement of sharia, and a plan to unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities accused the group’s former leader, Baitullah Mehsud, of assassinating former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. Some experts have questioned the ability of the different groups working under the Pakistani Taliban umbrella to stay united given the rivalries between the various tribes. However, the group has proved since its inception, through a string of suicide attacks, that it poses a serious threat to the country’s stability. TTP also expressed transnational ambitions when it claimed responsibility for a failed bomb attack in New York in May 2010.
Changing Face of Terrorism
Violence in Pakistan has been on the rise as more militant groups target the state. According to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), a terrorism database, 2,155 civilians were killed in terrorist violence in 2008 and nearly 1800 civilians have been killed in the first ten months of 2009 as compared to around 1600 civilian deaths from 2003 to 2006. This new generation of terrorists is also more willing to engage in suicide attacks; journalist Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy, in a new documentary (CBC), reports that the Taliban are recruiting younger and younger children to carry out suicide attacks. According to SATP, there were nearly sixty suicide attacks in Pakistan in 2009 as compared to only two in 2002. Gunaratna attributes this to the influence of al-Qaeda. He says bin Laden’s group is training most of the terrorist groups in FATA. “Al-Qaeda considers itself as the vanguard of the Islamic movement,” Gunaratna says, and has introduced its practice of suicide bombings to both the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban.
Besides providing militant groups in Pakistan with technical expertise and capabilities, al-Qaeda is also promoting cooperation among a variety of them, say some experts. Don Rassler, an associate at the Combating Terrorism Center, an independent research institution based at the U.S. military academy at West Point, writes al-Qaeda “has assumed a role as mediator and coalition builder among various Pakistani militant group factions by promoting the unification of entities that have opposed one another or had conflicting ideas about whether to target the Pakistani state.” Al-Qaeda’s greatest strength today, says counterterrorism expert Brian Fishman, is its “ability to infiltrate and co-opt other militant groups that have existing operational capability.” In Pakistan, he says, “There’s this whole milieu of militant groups, and individuals within those groups, that have come together ideologically and decided that they want to embark on this mission that al-Qaeda has set forth for them.”
Carnegie’s Tellis says the coordination between these different militant groups is ad-hoc and is driven by necessity. “The important point is that such coordination takes place through the entire spectrum of jihadi groups,” he says. “They are much more flexible in their cooperation now than they ever were historically.”
Bruce Riedel, the original coordinator of President Obama’s policy on the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, in a recent interview to CFR also stressed al-Qaeda’s growing cooperation with groups like the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and others. “The notion that you can somehow selectively resolve the al-Qaeda problem while ignoring the larger jihadist sea in which [al-Qaeda] swims has failed in the past and will fail in the future,” he said.
“Al-Qaeda has assumed a role as mediator and coalition builder among various Pakistani militant group factions by promoting the unification of entities that have opposed one another or had conflicting ideas about whether to target the Pakistani state.” – Don Rassler
However, some experts believe that Pakistani Taliban’s attacks against the government and the security establishment may have strained their relations with the Afghan Taliban who enjoy close relationship with the army and the ISI, the country’s premier intelligence agency. Richard Barrett, a former British intelligence officer who tracks al-Qaeda and the Taliban for the United Nations told the New York Times in October 2009 that the Afghan Taliban “don’t like the way that the Pakistan Taliban has been fighting the Pakistan government and causing a whole load of problems there.”
Experts say militants have also expanded their control over other parts of Pakistan such as in South Punjab, some settled areas of NWFP, and as far south as Karachi. Military analyst Ayesha Siddiqa writes “South Punjab has become the hub of jihadism (Newsline).” She argues South Punjabi jihadists have been connected with the Afghan jihad since the 1980s and the majority is still engaged in fighting in Afghanistan. According to some estimates, she says about 5,000 to 9,000 youth from South Punjab are fighting in Afghanistan and Waziristan. According to some experts, the Karachi wing of TTP provides logistics support and recruits new members.
Counterterrorism Challenges
Pakistan’s security forces are struggling to confront these domestic militants. As this Backgrounder points out, efforts are underway to reform the forces but challenges remain both in terms of willingness to fight some of these militant groups as well as capabilities. Security forces, especially the army and the police , have increasingly become the target for the militant groups. In October 2009, militants attacked the army headquarters in Rawalpindi and held around forty people hostage for over 20 hours much to the army’s embarrassment.
These attacks have heralded a new period in army and ISI relations with many of these militant groups, say analysts. Steve Coll, president of the New America Foundation, a Washington-based think tank, says since the bloody encounter between Pakistan’s security forces and militant Islamic students in Islamabad’s Red Mosque in 2007, there has been a pattern of some of these groups previously under state patronage, breaking away from the state. He says Pakistan’s security establishment is now trying to figure out how to control them.
Most analysts believe that even though the Pakistani army and the ISI are now more willing to go after militant groups, they continue some form of alliance with groups they want to use as a strategic hedge against India and Afghanistan. But Pakistan’s security establishment denies these charges. In October 2009, ISI Chief Ahmad Shuja Pasha said: “The ISI is a professional agency and does not have links (Daily Times) with any militant outfit including the Taliban.”
In particular, U.S. officials would like Pakistan to crackdown on the leadership of the Afghan Taliban believed to be based in Quetta and two major factions of the Afghan insurgency led by veteran Afghan warlords, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. These, U.S. officials believe, are actively engaged in supplying fighters in Afghanistan. Analysts believe these groups do not engage in direct attacks against the Pakistani state in lieu of political cover inside Pakistan. Pakistan denies these charges. However, Coll says, there is some shift in Pakistan’s strategy of supporting groups against India and to project influence in Afghanistan. “There is more debate and more ambivalence,” he says. “Overall, the Pakistani establishment is moving in the right direction but it will take a very long time to undo the pattern that has been established so far.”
Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network
By Hassan Abbas
Contents
FEATURE ARTICLE
1 Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network
By Hassan Abbas
Reports
4 The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s
Terrorist Pipeline
By Paul Cruickshank
8 President Obama’s Overseas Terrorism
Challenge
By Tom Sanderson
11 Improving India’s Counterterrorism
Policy after Mumbai
By Paul Staniland
14 Leveraging History in AQIM
Communications
By Lianne Kennedy Boudali
17 AQAP a Rising Threat in Yemen
By Brian O’Neill
19 The Role of the United Nations in
Defeating Al-Qa`ida and Associated
Groups
By Richard Barrett
22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity
24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts
april
2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4
About the CTC Sentinel
The Combating Terrorism Center is an independent educational and research institution based in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses the Center’s global network of scholars and practitioners to understand and confront contemporary threats posed by terrorism and other forms of political violence.
The views expressed in this report are those of
the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency
of the U.S. Government.
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Objective . Relevant . Rigorous
CTC Sentinntinel
On march 30, 2009, militants launched a deadly assault on a police training center outside Lahore, the capital of Pakistan’s Punjab Province. Eight police cadets were killed.1 Less than a month earlier, on March 3, gunmen in Lahore ambushed members of the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team, killing at least eight people. Punjab, the most populated of Pakistan’s provinces, has largely escaped the bloodshed plaguing the country’s troubled northwest.2 Yet since 2007, violence has escalated in the province. The bold terrorist attacks in Pakistan’s heartland—within Punjab Province and in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad—show that local logistical
1 Barry Newhouse, “Pakistani Taliban Claim Responsibility in Lahore Police Attack,” Voice of America, March 31, 2009.
2 This consists of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North-West Frontier Province, which both lie near the tumultuous border with Afghanistan.support for these attacks is attributable to what is often labeled the “Punjabi Taliban” network.3 The major factions of this network include operatives from Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan and Jaysh-i-Muhammad—all groups that were previously strictly focused on Kashmir and domestic sectarian violence.
Members of these groups are increasingly supporting Taliban elements from Pakistan’s tribal regions to conduct attacks in sensitive cities
3 Although Baitullah Mehsud, the head of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), accepted responsibility for the March 30 attack on the police academy, there are witnesses who heard some of the terrorists conversing in Seraiki—a Punjabi dialect spoken in southern Punjab. This suggests that Punjabi militants either orchestrated the attack, or at least collaborated with the TTP. See Sabrina Tavernise and Sharon Otterman, “Militants Claim Responsibility for Pakistan Attack,” New York Times, April 1, 2009.
Pakistani commandos respond to the March 30 attack on a police academy near Lahore. – Arif Ali/AFP/Getty Images
2
such as Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Lahore. Ongoing investigations into the Marriott Hotel bombing that rocked Islamabad in September 2008, in which dozens of Punjabi suspects were arrested and interrogated,4 demonstrate the role played by Punjabi militants.5 One investigator working on the Marriott attack revealed that “all evidences of the terrorist bombing led to South Waziristan via Jhang [a city in Punjab where Lashkar-i-Jhangvi has strong links]. The truck that was rammed into the hotel was also from Jhang.”
This article attempts to define the Punjabi Taliban network, in addition to profiling the three main factions that contribute to its ranks.
Who are the “Punjabi Taliban”?
The Punjabi Taliban network is a loose conglomeration of members of banned militant groups of Punjabi origin—sectarian as well as those focused on the conflict in Kashmir—that have developed strong connections with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Afghan Taliban and other militant groups based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).6 They shuttle between FATA and the rest of Pakistan, providing logistical support to FATA- and Afghan-based militants to conduct terrorist operations deep inside Pakistan. Between March 2005 and March 2007 alone, for example, about 2,000 militants from southern and northern Punjab Province reportedly moved to South Waziristan and started different businesses in an effort to create logistical support networks.7 Given their knowledge about Punjabi cities and security structure, they have proved to be valuable partners for the TTP as it targets cities in Punjab, such as Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad.8
4 The suspects included members of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam.
5 Tariq Butt, “Mastermind of Marriott Bombing Escapes,” The News, November 17, 2008.
6 Saeed Shah, “Pakistan Blames Taliban for Lahore Attack Which Leaves 11 Dead,” Guardian, March 31, 2009; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “And Now There is Tehrik-e-Taliban Baluchistan,” The News, March 4, 2009.
7 Aamir Latif, “Punjabi Taliban Rise in Waziristan,” IslamOnline.net, April 22, 2009.
8 This information is based on an assessment shared by a senior official of the Ministry of Interior, Islamabad.
Perhaps the best explanation of the Punjabi Taliban’s structure came from Tariq Pervez, the newly appointed head of Pakistan’s nascent National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA): “ideas, logistics, cash [comes] from the Gulf. Arab guys, mainly Egyptians and Saudis, are on hand to provide the chemistry. Veteran Punjabi extremists plot the attacks, while the Pakistan Taliban provides the martyrs.”9
The name “Punjabi Taliban” was first used for ethnic Punjabis associated with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam (HuJI) who, under the leadership of Qari Saifullah Akhtar, went to support and join the regime of Taliban leader Mullah Omar in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s.10 The second time the name was used was in 2001-2003 when former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf banned some militant and sectarian groups that had a support base in Punjab.11 As a result, some of these elements began moving to FATA to seek safe havens and establish new camps. These Punjabi militants also reportedly established separate training centers in FATA, especially in North Waziristan.12 The most recent use
9 Kaustav Chakrabarti, “Taliban Spreads into Pakistan’s Heart,” Rediff.com, February 13, 2009.
10 Amir Mir, “HUJI Chief Still at Large,” The News, September 23, 2008.
11 These groups include: Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Muhammad (SMP), Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Tehrik-i-Jafria (TeJ), Jaysh-i-Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-i-Tayyiba. When some of these groups started operating under new names—TeJ as Islami Tehrik Pakistan, SSP as Millat-i-Islami Pakistan, and JeM as Khudamul Islam—they were also banned in 2003.
12 Pir Zubair Shah and Salamn Masood, “U.S. Reported of the name began in 2007, when Maulvi Nazir, a militant leader who with some official Pakistani support challenged Uzbek foreign fighters residing in South Waziristan, was hailed by some as a leader of the Punjabi Taliban. This allegation arose because Maulvi Nazir attracted many Punjabi recruits from banned organizations to fight Uzbek foreign fighters.13 The plan worked, but not without creating another frightening menace in the shape of a reenergized “Punjabi Taliban.”
The current Punjabi Taliban network has a number of key features. First, it lacks any organization or command structure and operates as a loose network of elements from distinct militant groups. Members from Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Jaysh-i-Muhammad (JeM) and their various splinter groups are all considered to be part of this loose network. Small cells unaffiliated with any larger group are also involved. This designation, however, does not apply to all members of LeJ, SSP, and JeM; it only refers to individuals or factions who shifted to FATA or collaborate closely with the TTP, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat- e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and other militant groups from the tribal areas.
Second, many of these militants directly benefited from state patronage14 in the 1990s (and in some cases even later) and were professionally trained in asymmetrical warfare, guerrilla tactics and sabotage. The Punjabi Taliban are increasingly using heavy weapons and operating independent of the TTP or other militant groups that belong to the area. In late December 2008, for example, five Punjabi Taliban killed in a drone missile attack were observed “patrolling the area [South Waziristan] in pickup trucks mounted with heavy guns and had been firing at drones wherever they spotted them. The vehicles were camouflaged with mud and grass.”15 to Kill 12 in Pakistan,” New York Times, September 12, 2008.
13 Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Letter Explains Drive Against Foreign Militants in Waziristan,” The News, April 5, 2007.
14 This patronage developed because the country’s intelligence agencies utilized them for supporting the insurgency in Kashmir against India.
15 “Twin Drone Strikes Kill 5 Punjabi Taliban,” Daily Times, December 23, 2008.
“The purpose of undertaking operations under the moniker of the ‘Punjabi Taliban’ is that they have the freedom to operate without the level of command and control inherent when working for the more established militant outfits.”
3
Third, most of the groups are Sunni and Salafist in orientation. A recent International Crisis Group report maintained that “violent Deobandi networks in Punjab lie at the root of Pakistan’s militancy problem.”16 The various components of the Punjabi Taliban owe their ideological training to hardline Deobandi madrasa networks that were nurtured and expanded in Punjab during President Zia ul-Haq’s years in office from 1977-1988.
Fourth, Punjabi militants are distinct from traditional Pashtun Taliban—in terms of language, dress and other identifiable features. The Punjabi Taliban are comparatively more educated, better equipped and technologically savvier than their Pashtun counterparts.17 This is a result of their upbringing in Punjab Province (which has better educational facilities) and urban linkages where internet access and communications equipment are more readily available.
Fifth, unlike TTP cadres and Afghan Taliban, the Punjabi Taliban are purportedly more prone to mercenary actions. Pakistani intelligence sources claim that the Punjabi Taliban can be hired by domestic as well as regional operators to undertake freelance operations.18 For instance, it is widely known in Punjab law enforcement circles that many in the Punjabi Taliban began their careers as criminals.19 They originally moved to FATA (after their organizations were banned) to raise funds through drug smuggling and acquire weapons from the weapons markets of Dara Adam Khel.20
Finally, the Punjabi Taliban are more likely to conduct fidayin attacks, which, in the South Asian context, implies that the attacker comes equipped with weapons and ammunition and is willing to fight until death. This is in contrast to suicide bombings, where the death of the attacker is required.
16 International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge,” March 13, 2009.
17 “Why Mehsud is Claiming Responsibility for Attacks,” Daily Times, April 8, 2009.
18 According to this allegation, Punjabi Taliban groups could undertake operations for radical Muslim groups, or even the Afghan or Indian intelligence agencies.
19 Personal interviews, Pakistani police officers, Punjab Province, March 2009.
20 Ibid.
Major Factions of Punjabi Taliban Network
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LeJ)
Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
These two associated and banned groups are largely Punjab-based. Estimates place LeJ’s numbers at less than 1,000, and the group is almost entirely composed of militants. The SSP, which is also a political group, has been estimated to have around 100,000 active members, but the number of active fighters is probably in the 2,000-3,000 range.21 Although both groups are anti-Shi`a in essence, their members have been involved in pursuing other agendas vis-à-vis Kashmir and Afghanistan. For instance, one of the former members of the SSP, identified as “Commander Tariq,” reportedly heads the local Taliban in Darra Adam Khel, located between the Kohat area in the NWFP and Orakzai Agency in FATA.22 Tariq, who has been monitored by law enforcement for years, was previously primarily engaged in sectarian attacks on the Shi`a. Lately, however, he has been found involved in kidnappings-for-ransom and attacks on foreigners. He played a central role in the February killing of a Polish engineer who was working in the area for an NGO.23
Similarly, LeJ is believed to be the “lynchpin of the alignment between al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban and sectarian groups.”24 LeJ was the first Punjab-based militant group to shift its members to Afghanistan during the Taliban era. This allowed it to establish early connections with al-Qa`ida’s leadership in the mid-1990s.
Many mosques and madrasas linked with LeJ and SSP in Punjab operate as the networking centers for the Punjabi Taliban.25 After recent police interrogations of LeJ members, Karachi’s police chief publicly maintained that these militants “confessed to involvement in attacks on security forces and NATO suppliers in northern areas” of Pakistan while also admitting
21 These numbers are derived from various reports. They are only general estimates.
22 Personal interviews, Pakistani police officers, Punjab Province, March 2009.
23 Mazhar Tufail, “New Efforts Launched to Recover Remains of Polish Engineer,” The News, March 2, 2009.
24 “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge.”
25 Saeed Shah, “Pakistan Bombings Spur Hunt for New al Qaeda Boss,” Globe and Mail, April 5, 2009.that they select “prospective fighters from the city [Karachi] and trains them in Waziristan and Miranshah for combating security forces.”26 Despite being banned, both groups are active throughout Pakistan. Although LeJ has been targeted by Pakistan’s civil and military agencies, the SSP has largely managed to escape such targeting because of its larger support base, evident through the fact that prior SSP candidates have won national assembly seats.
Jaysh-i-Muhammad (JeM)
A splinter group of Harkat-ul Mujahidin (HuM),27 JeM derives its strength from Punjab Province. Although banned in 2001 and having faced internal divisions, it is still operative and changes its name every few years to evade scrutiny. General estimates place its active ranks at around 5,000, with about 1,500-2,000 fighters.28 Part of the reason its cadres are not pursued effectively is due to the incompetence of civilian law enforcement. Pakistani analyst Amir Rana, however, alleges that another factor explains why JeM has retained its strength: “The military wants to keep alive its strategic options in Kashmir.”29 Although the government of Pakistan claims they do not know the whereabouts of JeM’s chief, Masood Azhar, it is rumored that he is with Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan.30
Conclusion
More information is needed to fully understand the dynamics of the Punjabi Taliban network, but early indicators are that it is still in the initial stages of development. It caters to the aspirations, financial needs and worldview of those militants who believe that they were abandoned by the intelligence agencies in pursuance of Musharraf’s directives
26 Faraz Khan, “5 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Activists Arrested,” Daily Times, April 9, 2009.
27 HuM, largely dismantled, had linkages with the Kashmir theater as well as with al-Qa`ida. Its leader, Fazlur Rahman Khalil, was a signatory to Usama bin Ladin’s 1998 declaration of war. It largely remains committed to the Kashmiri cause.
28 These numbers are derived from various reports. They are only general estimates.
29 Chris Brummitt, “Pakistan Militants Strengthen in Heartland,” Associated Press, March 23, 2009.
30 A large JeM-controlled madrasa cum “physical activity center” in the heart of Masood Azhar’s home city of Bahawalpur is still operational. Azhar reportedly launched his new book from there in early 2008.
april2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4
4
after 9/11.31 Elements from groups such as Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (and its associated group, Jama`at-ud-Da`wa), however, are apparently not linked with the Punjabi Taliban because their command and control as well as hierarchical structure has remained intact over the years. In comparison, LeJ and JeM splintered into smaller groups due to policy differences among leaders and disagreements over properties and finances.
It is unlikely that the Punjabi Taliban network will transform itself into an organized group in the near future. Instead, it will remain a loose coalition of members from more prominent terrorist organizations. The purpose of undertaking operations under the moniker of the “Punjabi Taliban” is that they have the freedom to operate without the level of command and control inherent when working for the more established militant outfits.
Other analysts are less sanguine. Pakistani security analyst Zeenia Satti recently predicted that the “Punjabi chapter of the Tahrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan will emerge with a ferocity that may dwarf the Baitullah Mehsuds and the Mullah Fazlullahs of NWFP.”32 This development would amount to a significant danger to Pakistan because Punjab is not only the most populous and prosperous province, but is home to the army headquarters and sensitive nuclear installations. Furthermore, a major component of the Pakistan Army comes from the province; if civil strife or civil war were to escalate and the army was called in to control law and order, it could cause cracks in the army’s discipline. Although this is a worst case scenario, it is nevertheless critical to enhance Pakistan’s law enforcement capacity and counterterrorism strategy to prevent this outcome from becoming a reality.
Dr. Hassan Abbas is a fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Previously, he served in the administrations of Benazir Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan. He is also the author of Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror.
31 Amir Mir, The True Face of Jihadis: Inside Pakistan’s Network of Terror (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2005).
32 Zeenia Satti, “Post Mumbai Hype,” The News, March 26, 2009.
The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline
By Paul Cruickshank
on december 11, 2008, 14 individuals were arrested in Belgium and two in France in a major counterterrorism operation.1 The arrests, just hours before an EU Summit meeting in Brussels, made headlines around the world because one of the six charged by Belgian authorities was “al-Qa`ida living legend” Malika el-Aroud, the widow of the al-Qa`ida operative who assassinated Afghan Northern Alliance Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud two days before the September 11 attacks on the United States.2
Belgian authorities accuse her of having worked together with her new husband, Moez Garsallaoui, a Tunisian militant, to recruit individuals for training in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.3 Police launched the arrest operation after three young Belgian Moroccans allegedly recruited by el-Aroud and Garsallaoui returned from FATA to Belgium.4 According to Glen Audenaert, the director of the Belgian Federal Police, “We established there were contacts between members of the terrorist organization in Belgium and the highest levels of Al Qaeda…people in direct contact with Mr. Bin Laden.”5
Based on information drawn from interviews with senior U.S. and Belgian counterterrorism officials, lawyers involved in the case, and some of the suspects themselves, this article sheds new light on the “terror pipeline” connecting Europe and FATA in the context of the alleged Belgian cell.
1 Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “Belgian ‘Al Qaeda Cell’ Linked to 2006 Airline plot,” CNN, February 13, 2009; “Terrorisme: un Franco-Tunisien mis en examen pour ses liens présumés avec une filière afghane,” Agence France-Presse, December 15, 2008.
2 The six individuals were charged with “participation in a terrorist group.” For an in-depth profile of Malika el-Aroud, see Paul Cruickshank, “Love in the Time of Terror,” Marie Claire, March 2009.
3 Robertson and Cruickshank.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
A Europe-Wide Problem
Until recently, the FATA safe haven troubled British counterterrorism officials significantly more than their counterparts in other European countries. This was a result of the United Kingdom’s large Pakistani diaspora community.6 The British intelligence agency MI5 recently estimated that 75% of terrorist plots they investigate have ties to Pakistan.7 Those plots included a 2006 failed operation to blow up at least seven transatlantic airliners.8
Governments in continental Europe were more concerned about citizens gaining terrorist knowledge in Iraq and North Africa, a function of continental Europe’s large Arab diaspora. In the last year, however, that view has been changing. While travel flows to North Africa still cause serious concern, there has been a significant reduction in the number of European militants traveling to Iraq, a function of al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s (AQI) waning fortunes, the extreme barbarism that has tarnished its brand, and a crackdown on cross-border infiltration networks.9 Few plots in Europe have been tied to returnees from Iraq.10 Conversely, a growing number of terrorist plots, such as a plot to target the U.S. Ramstein Air Base in Germany in September 2007 and a plot to target the Barcelona metro in January 2008, have seen operatives train in FATA.11
Alain Grignard, who heads counterterrorist operations for the Belgian Federal Police, said that the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan have replaced Iraq as the destination
6 It is estimated that there are more than one million people in the United Kingdom of Pakistani ancestry.
7 Duncan Gardham, “MI5 Chief Warns of Threat from Global Recession,” Daily Telegraph, January 8, 2009.
8 Senior U.S. officials stated that several of the airline plotters trained in FATA. See Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, “Inside the Terror Plot that Rivaled 9/11,” NBC, September 15, 2008.
9 Elaine Sciolino, “Fears of Iraq Becoming a Terrorist Incubator Seem Overblown French Say,” New York Times, April 8, 2008; Karen DeYoung, “Fewer Foreigners Crossing Into Iraq from Syria to Fight,” Washington Post, September 16, 2007.
10 Ibid.
11 Souad Mekhennet and Michael Moss, “Europeans Get Terror Training Inside Pakistan,” New York Times, September 10, 2007; Elaine Sciolino, “Terror Threat from Pakistan said to Expand,” New York Times, February 10, 2008.
april2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4
5
of choice for aspiring jihadists from Belgium and other countries on the European continent. According to Grignard, “Not since the year before 9/11 have we seen as many people travel towards the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict region.”12 This view is echoed by U.S. intelligence agencies who have observed an “an influx of new Western recruits into the tribal areas since mid-2006.”13 In February 2009, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair warned that “the primary threat from Europe-based extremists stems from al-Qa`ida and Sunni affiliates who return from training in Pakistan to conduct attacks in Europe or the United States.”14
Unlike the Iraqi insurgency, fighting Americans in Afghanistan does not seem to have lost its luster for European militants. It appears that aspiring recruits have wised up to the notion that joining AQI means leaping aboard a rapidly moving conveyor belt for suicide bombing.15
Recruitment
The recent Belgian case provides a window into how young European militants are lured to Pakistan’s tribal areas. Belgian police claim that el-Aroud and her husband, Moez Garsallaoui, acted in tandem to encourage individuals to leave Belgium to fight in Afghanistan. El-Aroud, they argue, inspired radical-leaning youngsters to sign up for jihad through inflammatory postings on a website she ran called “Minbar SOS.” Garsallaoui, for his part, toured Brussels’ immigrant neighborhoods to physically recruit people.16
During an interview for CNN three years ago, el-Aroud explained how she administered Minbar SOS, her French language website. The website included postings of attacks on U.S. troops in
12 Robertson and Cruickshank.
13 J. Michael McConnell, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 5, 2008.
14 Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2009.
15 Personal interview, Alain Grignard, head of counterterrorist operations for the Belgian Federal Police, August 2008.
16 Robertson and Cruickshank.Iraq, along with a section dedicated to the speeches of top al-Qa`ida leaders.17 By the end of 2008, the site had more than 1,400 subscribers.18 Authorities in Belgium, however, could do little to prevent el-Aroud from administering the site due to strong freedom of speech protections under Belgian law.19
According to Grignard, websites such as Minbar SOS function as recruiting grounds for terrorist operatives who use them to identify individuals willing to fight jihad. “It’s a good way to get people together and then establish a more secret dialogue with people that are interesting to the organization,” he explained.20 Belgian counterterrorism officials said that monitoring her website helped identify the presence of a recruiting network for Afghanistan.21
El-Aroud’s iconic status appears to have attracted Hicham Beyayo, 23, one of the young Belgian Moroccans arrested in the case, who became a Minbar SOS site administrator before traveling to Pakistan.22 Beyayo claims that Garsallaoui recruited him to fight jihad in Afghanistan. Christophe Marchand, Beyayo’s lawyer, said that his client was approached by Garsallaoui in a mosque near his home in Anderlecht, a tough immigrant neighborhood, and that el-Aroud’s husband persuaded him
17 Personal interviews, Malika el-Aroud and Moez Garsallaoui, Guin, Switzerland, February 2006. For the video of Malika el-Aroud demonstrating her website, see Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “One Woman’s War,” CNN, February 10, 2009.
18 This figure is based on the author’s own monitoring of el-Aroud’s website, Minbar SOS. Many more individuals presumably regularly accessed the site.
19 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism officials, Brussels, January and February 2009.
20 Personal interview, Alain Grignard, head of counterterrorist operations for the Belgian Federal Police, February 2009.
21 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism officials, Brussels, January and February 2009.
22 Robertson and Cruickshank.to travel to Afghanistan to fight against Americans to restore the Taliban to power. Garsallaoui allegedly emphasized that jihad in Afghanistan was a religious duty and also cast the fighting in heroic and glamorous tones.23
Garsallaoui’s recruiting was not restricted to Belgium. He also recruited two French subscribers to Minbar SOS who for legal reasons can only be identified by their initials H.A. and W.O.24 W.O. claimed he was arrested by Turkish police in the summer of 2008 after he tried to return to Europe from FATA. When he was later interrogated by French authorities, he provided an extremely detailed account of his journey to the tribal areas of Pakistan. During the interrogation, W.O. stated that “calls to jihad” on Minbar SOS were “incessant” and the video propaganda he viewed on the site made him want to volunteer.
Travel to FATA
In December 2007, Garsallaoui’s recruits gathered in Istanbul, Turkey. There were six in total. Two from France and four from Belgium,25 including Beyayo and two friends who lived on his square in Anderlecht, Ali el-Ghanouti and Y. Harrizi.26 Garsallaoui’s plan was to bribe smugglers to take them illegally across the Iranian and Pakistani borders to FATA. Garsallaoui instructed each of the recruits to bring 2,000 euros for this purpose; he himself was carrying a significantly larger sum in cash.27 Garsallaoui set off first and the others followed two weeks later. They eventually arrived in Zahedan in eastern Iran, a border town described by the French recruit W.O. as a key
23 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, lawyer for Hicham Beyayo, Brussels, February 2009.
24 Details of W.O.’s interrogation by French authorities in January and February 2009 were made available to the author by Christophe Marchand, Hicham Beyayo’s lawyer. Under Belgian law, defense attorneys can make public details of the legal case against their clients in the interests of their defense.
25 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interrogation.
26 Gilbert Dupont, “Les six du réseau kamikaze,” La Dernière Heure, December 13, 2008; Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism officials, Brussels, January and February 2009. Ali el-Ghanouti and Y. Harrizi were also charged in the case.
27 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interrogation.
“Their accounts suggest that jihadist networks in FATA have relatively loose organizational structures.”
6
staging point for militants traveling to fight in the Afghan-Pakistan war zone.28 From there, smugglers took them across the Pakistani border into the tribal areas, which they entered on January 10, 2008, transiting through Bannu, a district that borders both South and North Waziristan.29 Beyayo later told his lawyer that he was amazed at the lack of controls and how easy it was to enter the area.30
Beyayo’s and W.O.’s accounts of their time in FATA, where they stayed for much of 2008, provide a rare glimpse into the terrorist safe haven. Their accounts suggest that jihadist networks in FATA have relatively loose organizational structures, a view shared by American and Belgian counterterrorism officials.31 In the 1980s and 1990s, several jihadist groups, including al-Qa`ida, had organizational structures in place, mainly centered around Peshawar, to process arriving volunteers. Yet when the Belgian and French recruits crossed into the tribal areas in early 2008, they received no such greeting. Nobody knew who they were.32 Although their smuggler introduced them to individuals linked to the “Arab camp” in FATA, they were initially met with open suspicion.33 Eventually, however, they were able to persuade their interlocutors of their jihadist bona fides. The fact that they were reunited with Garsallaoui, their recruiter, on January 13, presumably helped in this regard. For the next several months, a Syrian operative by
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, February 2009.
31 Personal interview, Belgian intelligence official, December 2008; Personal interview, U.S. counterterrorism official, March 2009.
32 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, February 2009.
33 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interrogation. the name of “Driss” was their principle handler.34
A senior counterterrorism source with detailed knowledge of the investigation told the author that during Garsallaoui’s time in the Afghan-Pakistan border region, he developed close connections with a senior al-Qa`ida operative who orchestrated the 2006 airline plot in the United Kingdom. The source could not reveal the al-Qa`ida operative’s name because of the ongoing investigation. Separately, Belgian counterterrorism officials believe that Garsallaoui was the main link between the Belgian cell and al-Qa`ida.35
W.O., the French recruit, stated that “the Arab camp” was for all intents and purposes run by al-Qa`ida. He said that the Arab camp was the smallest grouping of foreign fighters in FATA with about 300 to 400 recruits, mostly from Saudi Arabia but some from other parts of the Middle East and North Africa.36 According to W.O., al-Qa`ida’s fighters and zones where they conducted training were spread out across North and South Waziristan for security reasons. W.O. stated that al-Qa`ida’s military commander at the time of their arrival was Abu Laith al-Libi. Abu Laith was killed by a U.S. missile strike in the tribal areas in late January 2008.37 As for Bin Ladin, the “overall commander,” W.O. was told by their handler Driss that it was “impossible to approach” him.38
According to W.O., the Belgian and French recruits were asked to fill out a contract by their handlers, illustrating that al-Qa`ida’s penchant for paperwork has remained intact over the years.39
34 Ibid.
35 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism officials, Brussels, January and February 2009.
36 W.O. stated that the largest group of foreign fighters in FATA was from East Turkestan in northwest China. He also stated that there were two Uzbek groups operating in FATA numbering a total of around 3,000 fighters, and two Kurdish groups.
37 “U.S. Officials: CIA Kills Top Al Qaeda Terrorist in Pakistan,” CNN, January 31, 2008.
38 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interrogation.
39 In the years before 9/11, al-Qa`ida required recruits to fill out copious amounts of paperwork. See Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral history of Al Qaeda’s Leader (Washington, D.C.: Free Press, 2006).The three page form, which they signed, included questions on their marriage status, health, criminal convictions, and whether or not they wanted to become suicide bombers.40 It also set out precise rules for their conduct in FATA such as the need to unquestioningly obey orders. They were told that they would be punished if they failed to adhere to the contract.41
According to the interrogation report, W.O. stated that early on in their stay, their group, with the exception of Beyayo who had fallen ill, completed a two week training course, much of it inside a residence. They received both religious instruction and military training from Egyptian and Syrian instructors. Their military trainer taught them how to assemble weapons, fire rocket launchers, and how to handle explosives. He even set off a small charge of TNT in demonstration, telling them that the explosive was used to attack U.S. convoys in Afghanistan and in suicide vests. They each had to pay 400 euros for the course, which included rent for the dwelling. This illustrates the degree of self-motivation and self-organization that can be required in recruits traveling to FATA.
W.O. described the training as “an enrollment amongst the Taliban and Al Qaeda.” According to his account, Pakistani Taliban fighters mixed freely with al-Qa`ida operatives in FATA, illustrating the close connections between the two groups. According to both W.O. and Beyayo, most of the Belgian and French jihadists never received “approval” to fight
40 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interrogation. The contract did not have the insignia of any particular militant group.
41 Ibid.
“Al-Qa`ida propaganda led him to believe that fighters lived in groupings of more than 50 in an area; the reality was that fighters were grouped together in units of 10 or less.”
“They received both religious instruction and military training from Egyptian and Syrian instructors.”
7
in Afghanistan. During the next few months, they moved from dwelling to dwelling in the mountains of North and South Waziristan, frustrated at being kept away from the fighting over the border. Garsallaoui, according to both accounts, eventually received approval to fight in Afghanistan.42 W.O. stated that he was surprised by the lack of large groupings of fighters in the tribal areas. Al-Qa`ida propaganda led him to believe that fighters lived in groupings of more than 50 in an area; the reality was that fighters were grouped together in units of 10 or less.43
During his time in FATA, Beyayo claims he had to move frequently to avoid being targeted by U.S. Predator drones. The strikes had a reputation in jihadist circles of being “very effective.”44 Garsallaoui was almost hit by such a strike, according to an intercepted e-mail he sent his wife.45 The French and Belgian recruits were told not to venture outside their dwellings because spies would pass on the coordinates of suspected jihadists to the Americans.46 The accounts corroborate a recent judgment by U.S. intelligence agencies that the strikes, intensified in the second half of 2008, have put significant pressure on al-Qa`ida in FATA.47
Communications with Europe
The case reveals that terrorist operatives in the Afghan-Pakistan border region can maintain contact with the outside world relatively easily. Garsallaoui, for example, was in regular e-mail contact with his wife, Malika el-Aroud, from the Afghan-Pakistan border region, and sometimes even by Skype.48 He also periodically tuned in to the forums on his wife’s website Minbar SOS, even
42 Ibid.; Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, February 2009.
43 Ibid.
44 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, February 2009.
45 Ibid.
46 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interrogation.
47 Director of National Intelligence Blair testified in February 2009 that “in the FATA Al Qaeda lost significant parts of its command structure since 2008 in a succession of blows as damaging to the group as any since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001.”
48 Skype is an online communication website widely used around the world to make telephone calls by using Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology.sending an e-mail from Afghanistan explaining why he was fighting jihad.49
One of the e-mails Garsallaoui sent to his wife, intercepted by U.S. counterterrorism agencies in the first half of 2008, contained a photograph of himself firing a rocket launcher somewhere in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.50 The picture, later posted on el-Aroud’s website, was clearly useful for propaganda purposes. Garsallaoui, posing in a “Rambo” like stance, was glamorizing the fighting. In June, Garsallaoui sent el-Aroud an e-mail claiming to have killed five Americans in Afghanistan.51 According to W.O., Garsallaoui told him when they met in July in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, that he had killed the Americans by firing a bazooka on a U.S. camp near the Pakistani border.52
On September 26, 2008, Garsallaoui urged attacks in Europe in an online statement on Minbar SOS. “The solution my brothers and sisters is not fatwas but boooooooms,” the posting stated. His communication demonstrated al-Qa`ida’s ability to instigate violence in the West from the Afghan-Pakistan border region.53
49 This information is based on the author’s own monitoring of el-Aroud’s website, Minbar SOS. According to private Belgian counterterrorism sources, his e-mail was intercepted by U.S. counterterrorism agencies.
50 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism officials, Brussels, January and February 2009.
51 Robertson and Cruickshank.
52 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interrogation.
53 This information is based on the author’s own monitoring of Minbar SOS.
Return to Belgium
In the fall of 2008, Belgian security services were placed on alert after el-Ghanouti and Harrizi, Beyayo’s friends from Anderlecht, returned from FATA.54 On December 4, Beyayo returned to Belgium.55 The trigger for the arrests was an e-mail sent by Beyayo three days later,56 intercepted by U.S. counterterrorism agencies,57 suggesting he had received the go-ahead for an operation in Belgium.58 “It was impossible for Belgian authorities at this stage to take any risk,” said the director of Belgian intelligence.59
On December 11, a week after Beyayo’s return, police rounded up the alleged cell, including Malika el-Aroud. Yet when police raided 16 properties in Brussels and Liège, they found little evidence of an imminent attack.60 Beyayo’s lawyer, Marchand, said that the e-mail that triggered the arrests was just “tough” talk sent to an impress an ex-girlfriend and disputed the notion that the group may have been a “sleeper cell” sent back to Europe after deliberately being held back from the front lines.61 Beyayo told him he returned to Belgium because he was frustrated at not being able to fight in Afghanistan, the uncomfortable living conditions, and bouts of sickness.62 W.O., for his part, claimed that he grew frustrated with his handlers’ repeated demands of payment.63 Belgian authorities, however, insist that the alleged cell was a potential national
54 Dupont.
55 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, February 2009.
56 Ibid.
57 Jean-Pierre Stroobants, “La cible visée par le groupe belge démantelé n’a pas été identifiée,” Le Monde, December 18, 2008.
58 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism officials, Brussels, January and February 2009.
59 Personal interview, Alain Winants, director of Belgium’s State Security Service, Brussels, February 2009.
60 According to Belgian counterterrorism sources, no explosives, firearms, or attack blueprints were recovered.
61 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, February 2009.
62 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, New York, April 2009.
63 During his interrogation, W.O. said his handlers behaved like “hustlers.” He claimed that in addition to charging 400 euros for training, they charged 900 euros per person for equipment and weapons.
security threat. All those charged deny the allegations against them and are set to face trial within the next year.64 Garsallaoui is still at large and believed to be operating around the tribal areas of Pakistan, which is of great concern to Belgian counterterrorism officials.65
Conclusion
The Belgian case illustrates the continuing danger posed by al-Qa`ida’s safe haven in FATA and the urgent need to tackle it. Accounts by those who traveled there do, however, suggest that the CIA’s increased use of Predator strikes have put pressure on the Taliban and al-Qa`ida in FATA. While Belgian and U.S. intelligence agencies successfully tracked the Belgian cell, the increased numbers of Europeans traveling to FATA will require intensified efforts by Western intelligence agencies to track recruiting networks. “The big task for secret services,” stressed Winants, is to “identify the network by which these people leave, where they got the logistical support to go there, and what they intend to do when they come back.”66
Paul Cruickshank is a Fellow at the NYU Center on Law and Security and the Author of Al Qaeda: The Current Threat. His reporting on al-Qa`ida has appeared in The New Republic, the Washington Post and on NBC and CNN. In February 2009, CNN aired “One Woman’s War,” a documentary Mr. Cruickshank produced on the alleged Belgian terrorist cell, reported by CNN Senior International Correspondent Nic Robertson.
64 Robertson and Cruickshank.
65 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism officials, Brussels, January and February 2009.
66 Personal interview, Alain Winants, director of Belgium’s State Security Service, Brussels, February 2009.
President Obama’s Overseas Terrorism Challenge
By Tom Sanderson
president barack obama leads the United States at a time of heightened global insecurity. Economic hardship is increasing the ranks of weak and failing states that could serve as sanctuaries or incubators for terrorist groups. Although the U.S. homeland has not been attacked since September 11, 2001, extremists in Europe, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and South Asia remain a serious threat. With the election of President Barack Obama, the United States and the world are expecting a new approach to countering terrorism.1 Almost three months into his presidency, the Obama administration has “repackaged” some Bush administration strategies, while at the same time making it clear that development, diplomacy, and other policies will garner greater emphasis.
The administration should capitalize on a unique opportunity to emphasize Barack Obama’s widely admired personal story and interest in engaging the world to weaken key elements of the al-Qa`ida “narrative.” The weakening of this narrative could, in turn, reduce the terrorist group’s recruitment capabilities and capacity to garner sympathy from the Muslim world. This article reviews the landscape of transnational terrorist threats and examines the Obama administration’s early counterterrorism policies.
A Complex and Worsening Landscape
Despite the absence of an attack on U.S. soil since September 11, 2001, terrorism remains a threat and presents a great test for intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Since the September 11 attacks, al-Qa`ida has been damaged by effective Western policies to reduce its funding sources, the killing or capture of key personnel, and through its own excesses in Iraq. Nevertheless, it remains intact and potent. With proven global reach,
1 The anticipation for change was a result of Obama’s early statements about the planned closure of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, the closure of CIA secret detention centers, and the repudiation of controversial interrogation techniques such as waterboarding. a robust propaganda arm, training facilities, unrelenting motivation, and like-minded confederates in North Africa, the Middle East and beyond, it remains a direct threat to nation-states.
For the past several years, the primary focus of terrorist activity has been Iraq and South Asia. With a phased pullout of U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq underway, American attention has shifted to Afghanistan and Pakistan as both countries descend further into turmoil. With Pakistan’s lawless Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) serving as a terrorist safe haven, these two complex states play host to even more confounding insurgencies, elements of “al-Qa`ida central,” and criminal warlords, among other destabilizing forces. Former President George W. Bush’s deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism, Juan Zarate, described this conflict zone (in particular Pakistan) as “the greatest geo-political problem confronting the Obama administration with its FATA safe-haven, creeping radicalization, nuclear weapons, and accommodation of radicals.”2
Pakistan, for its part, is both unwilling and unable to keep its territory from being used to launch attacks into Afghanistan, and is itself a target of extremist groups—many of which Islamabad had a direct hand in creating. Preoccupied by the potential for a fourth major war with its rival India—a country that has strengthened its relationship with the United States, and also its presence in Afghanistan—this tense situation is unlikely to change. Given the distinct possibility that the United States and other members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) may depart Afghanistan without having achieved clear victory, it is possible that al-Qa`ida would be revitalized for being perceived as the group responsible for such a defeat.
In addition to the abundance of violent groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, there are a number of other trouble spots. In Bangladesh, extremist movements, which have already targeted the civilian leadership of Prime
2 This statement was made by Juan C. Zarate at a Center for Strategic and International Studies roundtable on March 11, 2009.
9
Minister Sheikh Hasina, could take advantage of a nation in turmoil that in February 2009 witnessed a mutiny by its own border guards.3 Coupled with severe stress on the environment, high levels of corruption, and a crowded population living in poverty and despair, Bangladesh is a dark cloud on the horizon.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has made strides in countering al-Qa`ida and its supporters since the attacks inside the kingdom began in earnest in May 2003. With thousands arrested and a “disengagement” program targeting young radicals, these developments, according to U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair, “have rendered the kingdom a harsh operating environment for al-Qa’ida.”4
The greater regional threat is on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula in lawless Yemen, home to the largest contingent of prisoners still detained at Guantanamo Bay. A weak state, Yemen is host to extremists who operate with relative impunity in towns and across large areas of ungoverned tribal territory. It is from Yemen that many experts inside and outside of the government anticipate future plots against the West and its Arab allies. There are also signs
3 Julfikar Ali Manik and Somini Sengupta, “Army’s Border Guards Rebel in Bangladesh,” New York Times, February 25, 2009.
4 Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2009. that Yemeni militants affiliated with al-Qa`ida have traveled to nearby Somalia to collaborate with an al-Qa`ida-affiliated group of Islamist militants known as al-Shabab.5
Despite the serious damage suffered by al-Qa`ida, the group continues to benefit from a widely held perception that the West is leading a “Crusade” to destroy Islam and to occupy and exploit traditional Muslim lands. The global downturn, widely blamed on American “greed” and “arrogance,” will serve to reinforce this argument and prove to be valuable propaganda for extremists. Usama bin Ladin himself has reportedly used the U.S. financial crisis as a propaganda tool, claiming that “the United States is staggering under the attacks of the mujahidin and their consequences…It is drowning in a financial crisis, so much so that it is begging from big and small countries alike.”6 With global unemployment surging, and crackdowns by anxious leaders worsening, this economic turn of events injects vigor and seeming validity into these arguments.7
Resetting the Counterterrorism Strategy?
With these conditions and threats facing the United States and its allies, the Obama administration needs an aggressive counterterrorism strategy, but one that is mindful of other foreign policy initiatives and of the message they deliver. It is to be expected that any new approach will be characterized by a more nuanced attitude from the White House. Much of Barack Obama’s popularity at home and abroad stems from his pre-election repudiation of certain Bush administration-era tactics and strategies against terrorist groups. Given the damaged reputation of al-Qa`ida—best visible by its erosion of support in Iraq—and the enthusiasm with which the world has greeted the new U.S. administration, there is an opportunity to make gains.
5 “Qaeda Bomber Behind Yemen Attack Trained in Somalia,” Reuters, March 17, 2009.
6 On January 14, 2009, a new audiotape purportedly by Usama bin Ladin appeared on Islamist web forums. Bin Ladin claimed that the United States is “drowning in a financial crisis,” partly as a result of “mujahidin” attacks.
7 Michael T. Klare, “A Planet at the Brink: Will Economic Brushfires Prove Too Virulent to Contain?” TomDispatch.com, February 24, 2009.
At first glance, the Obama administration’s initial few decisions might cause confusion as to where the president stands on controversial policies. While President Obama quickly ordered the closing of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, and directed all U.S. intelligence officers not to exceed the interrogation techniques found in the U.S. Army Field Manual, other decisions have signaled that some Bush administration policies will be kept in place or only altered slightly. A review of still emerging policies reveals broad objectives and continued, though modified, tactics.
President Bush’s 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism included four main pillars: 1) Prevent attacks by terrorist networks; 2) Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them; 3) Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; and 4) Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.8 The Bush administration also strongly stressed “democracy promotion” as the long-term antidote to terrorism. The military, intelligence, financial, law enforcement, and diplomatic arms of the United States played key roles in carrying out these policies, although too much emphasis was probably placed on the military options. Some of the most controversial tactics employed by the United States included “extraordinary renditions” of terrorism suspects (a policy begun under President William J. Clinton);9 the use of interrogation techniques, such as “waterboarding,” that have been described as “torture”; warrantless surveillance of communication between terrorism suspects and U.S. citizens; the indefinite detention of suspects at Guantanamo Bay or in CIA secret overseas prisons; the suspension of habeas corpus for suspects; and the designation of captured individuals as “enemy combatants.” Even though some of these tactics ended before President Obama entered office—including the
8 George W. Bush, “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” White House National Security Council, September 2006.
9 “Fact Sheet: Extraordinary Rendition,” American Civil Liberties Union, December 6, 2005; Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007).
“With a Kenyan father, a middle name of ‘Hussein,’ and a childhood education in Indonesia—the world’s largest Muslim-majority country—President Obama shatters much of the negative imagery that some associate with executive leadership and power in the United States.”
10
practice of waterboarding10 and the CIA’s use of secret prisons11—it has been widely recognized that they caused damage to the U.S. reputation abroad.
While President Obama is canceling some Bush administration counterterrorism policies, a complete scrapping is not likely. The differences between the two presidents do not extend to the core policy of preventing attacks on the United States and its citizens, but rather to some of the techniques noted above, and to the manner with which the United States pursues its goals. President Obama and his national security team, which includes several individuals who served in the Bush administration, recognize the threat posed by al-Qa`ida and other groups, especially those seeking WMD capabilities. The Obama administration, for example, has allowed the CIA to continue the practice of rendition to cooperating third countries, but is seeking stronger, more reliable assurances that suspects will not be tortured while in foreign custody.12 Other actions reflect the Obama administration’s acceptance of Bush administration views on the global, borderless nature of counterterrorism. This is evident from comments made during the U.S. Senate confirmation hearings for Attorney General Eric Holder and for U.S. Solicitor General Elena Kagan who both suggested that the terrorism “battlefield” extends to areas where individuals may be arrested for providing a range of support to terrorist groups.13
Additionally, while the Obama administration has halted the use of the most extreme interrogation tactics, his CIA Director Leon Panetta noted in his February 6, 2009 nomination testimony
10 The last known case of waterboarding in the United States occurred in 2003. See Renee Schoof, “CIA Director Acknowledges Use of Water Boarding,” McClatchy Newspapers, February 5, 2008.
11 Don Gonyea, “Bush Concedes CIA Ran Secret Prisons Abroad,” National Public Radio, September 6, 2006.
12 This is considered by many to be either naïve or disingenuous given the realities of interrogation practiced by some of the United States’ more aggressive partners. For more, see Greg Miller, “Obama Preserves Renditions as Counter-Terrorism Tool,” Los Angeles Times, February 1, 2009.
13 Charlie Savage, “Obama’s War on Terror May Resemble Bush’s in Some Areas,” New York Times, February 18, 2009.that “if we had a ticking-bomb situation, and obviously, whatever was being used I felt was not sufficient, I would not hesitate to go to the president of the United States and request whatever additional authority I would need.”14 The new administration has also continued—if not increased—Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) strikes, and is targeting the Pakistani Taliban, specifically the Baitullah Mehsud network.15 While this may arguably complicate counterinsurgency efforts by inflaming public sentiment and generating additional recruits for Taliban-affiliated militias, the Predator strikes are one of the only tools at America’s disposal for killing al-Qa`ida and Taliban leaders and operators who are attacking U.S., NATO, Afghan, and Pakistani targets.16
The Obama Administration’s Early Moves
While the new administration’s counterterrorism strategy is yet to be fully determined, the official White House webpage on homeland security provides the broad outlines of its approach to overseas radicalism and terrorism. The strategy pays particular attention to restoring widely-admired American values and standards that many allege were eroded during the last eight years of the unpopularly named “global war on terrorism.” Five key points of the strategy17 are:
1. Find, Disrupt, and Destroy Al-Qa`ida;
2. New Capabilities to Aggressively Defeat Terrorists;
3. Prepare the Military to Meet 21st Century Threats;
4. Win the Battle of Ideas;
5. Restore American Influence and Restore Our Values.
14 CIA Director Panetta did agree, however, that waterboarding constituted torture. For more, see Mark Mazzetti, “Pick for CIA Chief Leaves Open Idea of Harsher Interrogation,” International Herald Tribune, February 6, 2009.
15 Mark Mazzetti and David Sanger, “Obama Expands Missile Strikes Inside Pak,” New York Times, February 20, 2009.
16 “Kilcullen Weighs in on U.S. Strikes in Pakistan,” Weekly Standard, February 10, 2009.
17 This information is drawn from the White House’s Homeland Security Agenda, available at www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/homeland_security/.
Perhaps one of the most powerful and promising developments in counterterrorism is the direct challenge that Barack Obama’s ascendancy to power and collaborative approach represents to al-Qa`ida’s legitimacy. President Bush’s controversial policies and public persona appeared to serve as an effective recruiting and propaganda tool for Usama bin Ladin and the extremists who rallied young Muslim men and women on his behalf. President Obama was immediately and crudely insulted by Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa`ida’s second-in-command, upon his election victory in November 2008. Al-Zawahiri called President-elect Obama a “house negro,” suggesting that he would in fact be doing the bidding of a presumably racist, white America. This was a clear attempt to denigrate an individual whose personal story undermines the penetrating and persistent al-Qa`ida narrative.
Indeed, the new U.S. president is an American minority who has risen to the highest seat of power. With a Kenyan father, a middle name of “Hussein,” and a childhood education in Indonesia—the world’s largest Muslim-majority country—President Obama shatters much of the negative imagery that some associate with executive leadership and power in the United States. His personal background, combined with the traditional influence enjoyed by the United States, serves to multiply the power and authority typically available to a U.S. president. In fact, a 17-nation poll conducted by the British Broadcasting Corporation on the eve of Barack Obama’s inauguration showed “widespread and growing optimism that his presidency will lead to improved
“The Predator strikes are one of the only tools at America’s disposal for killing al-Qa`ida and Taliban leaders and operators who are attacking U.S., NATO, Afghan, and Pakistani targets.”
11
relations between the United States and the rest of the world,” with 67% of poll respondents expressing positive views of the president-elect.18
This could mark a great opportunity to weaken al-Qa`ida’s appeal. Just as fatawa by senior Muslim clerics around the world have questioned the legitimacy of al-Qa`ida’s actions and reduced its standing among some Muslim populations, so too can Barack Obama’s life story and worldwide admiration. Progress in reducing al-Qa`ida’s appeal began while President Bush was in office, and President Obama can quickly build on that momentum. Pointing to the weaknesses and contradictions in al-Qa`ida’s message, while dispensing with any self-defeating U.S. policies, will increase the chances of success by weakening Muslim support for al-Qa`ida. Furthermore, the bolstering of America’s image and cancellation or modification of some controversial policies could certainly lead more countries to cooperate with the United States.19
Conclusion
A multitude of stresses are impacting vulnerable populations around the world, leaving many open to extremist ideologies that energize marginalized people. It is clear that this trend will continue in the current economic climate.
18 “Global Poll Uncovers Growing Optimism that Obama Will Improve US Relations,” BBC, January 20, 2009.
19 On the other hand, it could also cause some governments to refrain from providing intelligence to a new U.S. administration that is critical of harsh tactics.
There is an unmistakable tension between the West and Muslim and Arab worlds where a sense of humiliation and exploitation remains strong. One of the most important goals of U.S. foreign and counterterrorism policy will be to “communicate to the Muslim world that the U.S. is not at war with them,” but rather is interested in greater partnership on many levels.20 Achieving this goal will reduce the ability of al-Qa`ida and similar organizations to garner sympathy from Muslim populations, and thereby limit their capacity to recruit new members. There is now an effort to redesign U.S. policy, and by doing so the Obama administration can maintain a strong campaign against terrorism while avoiding mistakes that indirectly assist U.S. adversaries. This efficiency of policy is essential given the continued advantages of extremist groups and the worsening global environment that supports their arguments. It is likely that the United States and the world will see an ever more enhanced and sophisticated terrorist threat, and an equally refined approach to counterterrorism.
Tom Sanderson serves as deputy director and senior fellow of the Transnational Threat Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Mr. Sanderson specializes in counterterrorism, intelligence, and open source information. For the last four years, he has led an effort to model collaboration between government analysts and non-governmental experts on terrorism and crime. Known as the Trusted Information Network project, the effort has organized and tapped expertise on threats in Europe and Southeast Asia. He teaches a range of courses for the intelligence community, and carries out extensive field interviews across dozens of countries annually. Mr. Sanderson holds degrees from Wheaton College and Tufts University (Fletcher School), both in Massachusetts.
20 Steve Simon and Daniel Byman et al., Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008).
Improving India’s Counterterrorism Policy after Mumbai
By Paul Staniland
india has emerged as one of the world’s most consistent targets of Islamist militants. Although the Mumbai attacks of November 2008 attracted the most global attention, they were merely the most recent and dramatic in a series of bloody terrorist incidents throughout urban India. On July 11, 2006, for example, terrorists planted seven bombs on the Suburban Railway of Mumbai, causing the deaths of more than 200 people. The November 2008 attacks, however, brought into clear focus the inability of the Indian security apparatus to anticipate and appropriately respond to major terrorist incidents. As one prominent analyst wrote, the government’s responses to the Mumbai attacks were “comprehensive failures from the point of view of India’s security establishment.”1 While some Indian analysts and politicians prefer to focus on Pakistan’s role as a haven for a variety of militant groups, it is clear that India needs to dramatically enhance its domestic counterterrorism infrastructure. Improvement will require significant infusions of resources, policy consistency, and political will that are often lacking in India.
This article outlines the current structure of counterterrorism policy in India, and then assesses some possible reforms. Thoroughgoing institutional reform in India will be challenging. The country suffers from a fragmented and inefficient bureaucracy, far fewer resources than developed countries even though it faces a higher threat level, and a political elite focused primarily on electoral politics. It is likely only a matter of time before another significant terrorist attack occurs. Nevertheless, focusing on a series of substantial but distinct tasks, with the support of India’s international partners, can slowly but steadily improve India’s counterterrorism capabilities.
1 Ajai Sahni, “The Uneducable Indian,” Outlook, December 1, 2008.
“Pointing to the weaknesses and contradictions in al-Qa`ida’s message, while dispensing with any self-defeating U.S. policies, will increase the chances of success by weakening Muslim support for al-Qa`ida.”
12
Domestic Structure and Capabilities
India’s police and internal security system is highly fragmented and often poorly coordinated. The country’s federal political system leaves most policing responsibilities to the states, which usually possess their own counterterrorism and intelligence units. These forces, especially local police, are often poorly trained and equipped. Local personnel are frequently hired on the basis of political patronage and are notorious for high levels of corruption.
There is also a variety of central investigative, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies. The Ministry of Home Affairs includes the Intelligence Bureau, Central Reserve Police Force, Indian Police Service, and new National Investigation Agency, while the Research and Analysis Wing and Central Bureau of Investigation are answerable to the prime minister.2 The military—which is primarily geared toward foreign threats, including terrorism—also generates intelligence with relevance to domestic terrorism, and there is a centrally controlled National Security Guard (NSG) that specializes in hostage and terrorist attack situations.
The combination of state and central authorities is ostensibly coordinated through joint committees, task forces, subsidiary intelligence bureaus, and a Multi-Agency Center. All of these coordinating mechanisms aim to harmonize the intelligence gathered by these agencies and to generate shared threat perceptions and associated responses, but they are often slow and
2 A critical analysis of the Ministry of Home Affairs forces can be found in K.S. Subramanian, Political Violence and the Police in India (New Delhi: Sage, 2007). For a brief overview of RAW, see Jayshree Bajoria, “RAW: India’s External Intelligence Agency,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 7, 2008.cumbersome. States and the central agencies frequently compete over resources and bureaucratic autonomy, and they both do a highly uneven job of cooperating with one another.3 In addition to these organizational challenges, many of the security institutions at all levels of government are understaffed, undertrained, and technologically backward.4
All of these pathologies were evident in the failure to prevent or appropriately respond to the Mumbai attacks.5 There was in fact significant intelligence suggesting a seaborne terrorist attack was likely, and even that prominent sites such as the Taj Hotel would be targeted. This information, however, was ignored by several key bureaucratic actors—including the Coast Guard and the Maharashtra state director-general of police—because it was deemed unactionable.6 Others, such as the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad, at least attempted some kind of preparation.7 The differences in readiness highlight the extent of fragmentation among the security apparatus. Even when Mumbai police tried to take preventive action, they lacked the manpower to sustain increased security at the hotels. Once the attack occurred, the security forces did not have sufficient night-vision equipment, heavy weaponry, or information about the attack sites, leading to a long response time and the emergence of a disastrous siege.8
Previous attempts at reform and improvement have been largely inadequate—politicians have made
3 “Securing the Home Front,” India Today, January 12, 2009.
4 On the understaffing of police, see P. Chidambaran, “A Clear Command Structure,” Outlook, January 6, 2009.
5 Vijay Oberoi, “Never Again,” Indian Express, December 2, 2008.
6 Saikat Datta, Smruti Koppikar and Dola Mitra, “The Armies of the Night,” Outlook, December 15, 2008.
7 The Mumbai police put extra guard on prominent sites and met with hotel officials. The extra guard was not maintained, however, because of the strain it put on manpower. Praveen Swami, “Pointed Intelligence Warnings Preceded Attacks,” Hindu, November 30, 2008.
8 “‘Rot’ at Heart of Indian Intelligence,” BBC, December 2, 2008; Praveen Swami, “Lethal Lapse,” Frontline, December 6-19, 2008; Saikat Datta, Smruti Koppikar and Dola Mitra, “The Armies of the Night,” Outlook, December 15, 2008.sweeping rhetorical claims, juggled personnel at all levels, and repeatedly promised better coordination at the national level, but key capacity has not improved. Mumbai finally triggered the resignation of Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil, on whose watch a series of previous attacks had occurred. Yet Patil’s resignation and his replacement by the more competent Palaniappan Chidambaram (who worked on internal security under Rajiv Gandhi) marks only the beginning of the necessary changes. India faces a “dire need to redress its numerous deficiencies in its internal security arrangements.”9
The Nature of the Threat: Domestic and Foreign
One common response to India’s counterterrorism failures has been a quick acknowledgement of domestic weaknesses, followed by a far more vocal demand to “get tough” on Pakistan. While Pakistan’s role as a sanctuary (both voluntary and involuntary) for militants is indisputable, India’s options are relatively limited. The coercive diplomacy following the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, named Operation Parakram, did not prevent Pakistan’s continued patronage of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and other militant groups operating in Kashmir.10 Pakistan’s nuclear weapon “shield” makes credible Indian coercive diplomacy difficult.
India’s current government has learned this lesson well, and instead engaged in a coordinated diplomatic offensive that has brought at least rhetorical results. Military threats against Pakistan are unlikely to bear fruit, while even successful diplomacy will have a limited impact.11 Pakistan simply lacks the capacity, and probably the will, to engage in the kind of domestic policies that will significantly lessen the threat posed to India. Improving India’s internal security apparatus must therefore be the primary focus of Indian security and
9 Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2009), p. 15.
10 On Parakram and its aftermath, see V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished (New Delhi: Sage, 2003); P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).
11 Rabasa et al., p. 21.
“Mumbai brought into clear focus the inability of the Indian security apparatus to anticipate and appropriately respond to major terrorist incidents.”
13
political elites.12 In addition to Pakistan, India also faces cross-border terrorism from Bangladesh. Attacks attributed to jihadist groups such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam (HuJI) are believed to have been launched from the country. Bangladesh’s political instability and weak state capacity, however, make it difficult for India to consistently shape Bangladeshi counterterrorism policy.
In addition to the limits of putting pressure on Pakistan and Bangladesh, a number of major attacks have been carried out with significant help from Indian Muslims under the aegis of the Indian Mujahidin (IM). This clearly shows that the problem is not simply one of containing Pakistan.13 The Indian police and intelligence agencies were forced to scramble in the wake of bombings in Jaipur, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and elsewhere claimed by the IM, which revealed a significant indigenous capability for terrorism. Bolstering domestic intelligence will become increasingly central if a trend of radicalization continues among small, but potentially growing portions of India’s Muslim community. Although there have been pockets of radicalization uncovered as far south as Kerala, on balance it seems that urban areas of north and west India have been the primary recruiting grounds for Islamist radicals.14
Therefore, India faces threats spilling out of porous borders and weak governments both to the east and to the west. These foreign threats coalesce with a troubled internal security apparatus and some level of domestic radicalization to create a dangerous situation.
12 As Shishir Gupta notes, “Pakistan is only part of the problem.” See Shishir Gupta, “Less Blame, More Action,” Indian Express, December 5, 2008.
13 Animesh Roul, “India’s Home-Grown Jihadi Threat: A Profile of the Indian Mujahideen,” Terrorism Monitor 7:4 (2009).
14 These are the areas of greatest Muslim demographic presence and also of communal rioting. Although firm data is elusive, many experts argue that the 2002 Gujarat riots have propelled Islamist recruitment. For more, see “India Fears that Some of its Muslims are Joining in Terrorism,” New York Times, August 9, 2006; “Ahmedabad Attacks: The Usual Suspects,” Hindu, August 1, 2008.
The Path Forward: Coordination and Capacity-Building
The major domestic response to Mumbai has been an emphasis on streamlined coordination between agencies across state and federal lines, and the creation of a new National Investigation Agency (NIA).15 The aim of the NIA is to empower a federal agency to investigate major crimes such as terrorism and organized crime without having to be asked to do so by the states. There will be special courts that can rapidly hear terror-related cases.16 The NIA will be filled out by new staff drawn from existing intelligence and law enforcement agencies throughout India. An infusion of funding and personnel into the overall security apparatus has also been promised, and the NSG has been deployed throughout the country to offer a quicker response to future attacks.17 These steps represent a useful beginning. These efforts on their own, however, will lead to little substantive results unless they have three major characteristics.
First, they will need to be sustained over a long period of time. Dramatically bolstering the institutional capacity of India’s counterterrorism apparatus is a task of at least half a decade, and probably longer.18 The training of new and current personnel alone is an enormous task, much less properly
15 The NIA is discussed in R.K. Raghavan, “Terror Trackers,” Frontline, January 3-16, 2009.
16 “Govt Tables Bill to Set Up National Investigation Agency,” Times of India, December 16, 2008.
17 “NSG Inks Agreements with Eight Airlines,” Hindu, March 1, 2009.
18 See the quote by Praveen Swami in “Will India’s Security Overhaul Work?” BBC, December 11, 2008.equipping them. A new federal agency or set of laws will contribute little to this fundamental task unless they are able to sustain the momentum necessary for years of unglamorous but crucial training and institution-building. Locking in lines of budgetary approval over a 5-10 year period will be critical to avoid the effort falling victim to the vicissitudes of domestic politics and elections.
Second, reform efforts must be properly resourced. India is a poor country with many pressing needs, and security funding reflects India’s lack of wealth. Compared to the budgets of even much smaller developed countries, India simply does not provide sufficient money for its security agencies on a per capita basis.19 This causes them to undertrain and understaff their personnel, leading to corruption and a reliance on crude and often counterproductive policing techniques. International assistance, in the form of grants for training and equipping police forces, could reduce the impact of this reform on India’s budget. In the current economic environment, large-scale international aid is unlikely, but small measures could make a significant difference, particularly if focused on the cities most likely to be attacked in the future (Delhi and Mumbai).
Finally, India’s political leadership must exert the will to push past bureaucratic and state-centric rivalries. This is an enormous challenge for a political class focused above all else on the cut-throat electoral competition that characterizes Indian politics. Despite these challenges, maintaining a degree of consistency and follow-through is essential so that the reform process does not stall or end up wasting huge amounts of time and money. Government ministers must not allow themselves to be used as pawns in bureaucratic battles over turf, resources, and responsibilities. Specialized task forces led by elected officials, and supported at the highest levels, must be given the power to engage in oversight over the security apparatus. This will involve overcoming a traditional aversion to transparency on the part of the police and intelligence agencies.
19 Sahni, “Uneducable Indian,” argues that the police-to-population ratio in India is 125:100,000.
“Once the attack occurred, the security forces did not have sufficient night-vision equipment, heavy weaponry, or information about the attack sites, leading to a long response time and the emergence of a disastrous siege.”
security threat. All those charged deny the allegations against them and are set to face trial within the next year.64 Garsallaoui is still at large and believed to be operating around the tribal areas of Pakistan, which is of great concern to Belgian counterterrorism officials.65
Conclusion
The Belgian case illustrates the continuing danger posed by al-Qa`ida’s safe haven in FATA and the urgent need to tackle it. Accounts by those who traveled there do, however, suggest that the CIA’s increased use of Predator strikes have put pressure on the Taliban and al-Qa`ida in FATA. While Belgian and U.S. intelligence agencies successfully tracked the Belgian cell, the increased numbers of Europeans traveling to FATA will require intensified efforts by Western intelligence agencies to track recruiting networks. “The big task for secret services,” stressed Winants, is to “identify the network by which these people leave, where they got the logistical support to go there, and what they intend to do when they come back.”66
Paul Cruickshank is a Fellow at the NYU Center on Law and Security and the Author of Al Qaeda: The Current Threat. His reporting on al-Qa`ida has appeared in The New Republic, the Washington Post and on NBC and CNN. In February 2009, CNN aired “One Woman’s War,” a documentary Mr. Cruickshank produced on the alleged Belgian terrorist cell, reported by CNN Senior International Correspondent Nic Robertson.
64 Robertson and Cruickshank.
65 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism officials, Brussels, January and February 2009.
66 Personal interview, Alain Winants, director of Belgium’s State Security Service, Brussels, February 2009.
President Obama’s Overseas Terrorism Challenge
By Tom Sanderson
president barack obama leads the United States at a time of heightened global insecurity. Economic hardship is increasing the ranks of weak and failing states that could serve as sanctuaries or incubators for terrorist groups. Although the U.S. homeland has not been attacked since September 11, 2001, extremists in Europe, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and South Asia remain a serious threat. With the election of President Barack Obama, the United States and the world are expecting a new approach to countering terrorism.1 Almost three months into his presidency, the Obama administration has “repackaged” some Bush administration strategies, while at the same time making it clear that development, diplomacy, and other policies will garner greater emphasis.
The administration should capitalize on a unique opportunity to emphasize Barack Obama’s widely admired personal story and interest in engaging the world to weaken key elements of the al-Qa`ida “narrative.” The weakening of this narrative could, in turn, reduce the terrorist group’s recruitment capabilities and capacity to garner sympathy from the Muslim world. This article reviews the landscape of transnational terrorist threats and examines the Obama administration’s early counterterrorism policies.
A Complex and Worsening Landscape
Despite the absence of an attack on U.S. soil since September 11, 2001, terrorism remains a threat and presents a great test for intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Since the September 11 attacks, al-Qa`ida has been damaged by effective Western policies to reduce its funding sources, the killing or capture of key personnel, and through its own excesses in Iraq. Nevertheless, it remains intact and potent. With proven global reach,
1 The anticipation for change was a result of Obama’s early statements about the planned closure of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, the closure of CIA secret detention centers, and the repudiation of controversial interrogation techniques such as waterboarding. a robust propaganda arm, training facilities, unrelenting motivation, and like-minded confederates in North Africa, the Middle East and beyond, it remains a direct threat to nation-states.
For the past several years, the primary focus of terrorist activity has been Iraq and South Asia. With a phased pullout of U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq underway, American attention has shifted to Afghanistan and Pakistan as both countries descend further into turmoil. With Pakistan’s lawless Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) serving as a terrorist safe haven, these two complex states play host to even more confounding insurgencies, elements of “al-Qa`ida central,” and criminal warlords, among other destabilizing forces. Former President George W. Bush’s deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism, Juan Zarate, described this conflict zone (in particular Pakistan) as “the greatest geo-political problem confronting the Obama administration with its FATA safe-haven, creeping radicalization, nuclear weapons, and accommodation of radicals.”2
Pakistan, for its part, is both unwilling and unable to keep its territory from being used to launch attacks into Afghanistan, and is itself a target of extremist groups—many of which Islamabad had a direct hand in creating. Preoccupied by the potential for a fourth major war with its rival India—a country that has strengthened its relationship with the United States, and also its presence in Afghanistan—this tense situation is unlikely to change. Given the distinct possibility that the United States and other members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) may depart Afghanistan without having achieved clear victory, it is possible that al-Qa`ida would be revitalized for being perceived as the group responsible for such a defeat.
In addition to the abundance of violent groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, there are a number of other trouble spots. In Bangladesh, extremist movements, which have already targeted the civilian leadership of Prime
2 This statement was made by Juan C. Zarate at a Center for Strategic and International Studies roundtable on March 11, 2009.
9
Minister Sheikh Hasina, could take advantage of a nation in turmoil that in February 2009 witnessed a mutiny by its own border guards.3 Coupled with severe stress on the environment, high levels of corruption, and a crowded population living in poverty and despair, Bangladesh is a dark cloud on the horizon.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has made strides in countering al-Qa`ida and its supporters since the attacks inside the kingdom began in earnest in May 2003. With thousands arrested and a “disengagement” program targeting young radicals, these developments, according to U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair, “have rendered the kingdom a harsh operating environment for al-Qa’ida.”4
The greater regional threat is on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula in lawless Yemen, home to the largest contingent of prisoners still detained at Guantanamo Bay. A weak state, Yemen is host to extremists who operate with relative impunity in towns and across large areas of ungoverned tribal territory. It is from Yemen that many experts inside and outside of the government anticipate future plots against the West and its Arab allies. There are also signs
3 Julfikar Ali Manik and Somini Sengupta, “Army’s Border Guards Rebel in Bangladesh,” New York Times, February 25, 2009.
4 Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2009. that Yemeni militants affiliated with al-Qa`ida have traveled to nearby Somalia to collaborate with an al-Qa`ida-affiliated group of Islamist militants known as al-Shabab.5
Despite the serious damage suffered by al-Qa`ida, the group continues to benefit from a widely held perception that the West is leading a “Crusade” to destroy Islam and to occupy and exploit traditional Muslim lands. The global downturn, widely blamed on American “greed” and “arrogance,” will serve to reinforce this argument and prove to be valuable propaganda for extremists. Usama bin Ladin himself has reportedly used the U.S. financial crisis as a propaganda tool, claiming that “the United States is staggering under the attacks of the mujahidin and their consequences…It is drowning in a financial crisis, so much so that it is begging from big and small countries alike.”6 With global unemployment surging, and crackdowns by anxious leaders worsening, this economic turn of events injects vigor and seeming validity into these arguments.7
Resetting the Counterterrorism Strategy?
With these conditions and threats facing the United States and its allies, the Obama administration needs an aggressive counterterrorism strategy, but one that is mindful of other foreign policy initiatives and of the message they deliver. It is to be expected that any new approach will be characterized by a more nuanced attitude from the White House. Much of Barack Obama’s popularity at home and abroad stems from his pre-election repudiation of certain Bush administration-era tactics and strategies against terrorist groups. Given the damaged reputation of al-Qa`ida—best visible by its erosion of support in Iraq—and the enthusiasm with which the world has greeted the new U.S. administration, there is an opportunity to make gains.
5 “Qaeda Bomber Behind Yemen Attack Trained in Somalia,” Reuters, March 17, 2009.
6 On January 14, 2009, a new audiotape purportedly by Usama bin Ladin appeared on Islamist web forums. Bin Ladin claimed that the United States is “drowning in a financial crisis,” partly as a result of “mujahidin” attacks.
7 Michael T. Klare, “A Planet at the Brink: Will Economic Brushfires Prove Too Virulent to Contain?” TomDispatch.com, February 24, 2009.
At first glance, the Obama administration’s initial few decisions might cause confusion as to where the president stands on controversial policies. While President Obama quickly ordered the closing of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, and directed all U.S. intelligence officers not to exceed the interrogation techniques found in the U.S. Army Field Manual, other decisions have signaled that some Bush administration policies will be kept in place or only altered slightly. A review of still emerging policies reveals broad objectives and continued, though modified, tactics.
President Bush’s 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism included four main pillars: 1) Prevent attacks by terrorist networks; 2) Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them; 3) Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; and 4) Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.8 The Bush administration also strongly stressed “democracy promotion” as the long-term antidote to terrorism. The military, intelligence, financial, law enforcement, and diplomatic arms of the United States played key roles in carrying out these policies, although too much emphasis was probably placed on the military options. Some of the most controversial tactics employed by the United States included “extraordinary renditions” of terrorism suspects (a policy begun under President William J. Clinton);9 the use of interrogation techniques, such as “waterboarding,” that have been described as “torture”; warrantless surveillance of communication between terrorism suspects and U.S. citizens; the indefinite detention of suspects at Guantanamo Bay or in CIA secret overseas prisons; the suspension of habeas corpus for suspects; and the designation of captured individuals as “enemy combatants.” Even though some of these tactics ended before President Obama entered office—including the
8 George W. Bush, “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” White House National Security Council, September 2006.
9 “Fact Sheet: Extraordinary Rendition,” American Civil Liberties Union, December 6, 2005; Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007).
“With a Kenyan father, a middle name of ‘Hussein,’ and a childhood education in Indonesia—the world’s largest Muslim-majority country—President Obama shatters much of the negative imagery that some associate with executive leadership and power in the United States.”
10
practice of waterboarding10 and the CIA’s use of secret prisons11—it has been widely recognized that they caused damage to the U.S. reputation abroad.
While President Obama is canceling some Bush administration counterterrorism policies, a complete scrapping is not likely. The differences between the two presidents do not extend to the core policy of preventing attacks on the United States and its citizens, but rather to some of the techniques noted above, and to the manner with which the United States pursues its goals. President Obama and his national security team, which includes several individuals who served in the Bush administration, recognize the threat posed by al-Qa`ida and other groups, especially those seeking WMD capabilities. The Obama administration, for example, has allowed the CIA to continue the practice of rendition to cooperating third countries, but is seeking stronger, more reliable assurances that suspects will not be tortured while in foreign custody.12 Other actions reflect the Obama administration’s acceptance of Bush administration views on the global, borderless nature of counterterrorism. This is evident from comments made during the U.S. Senate confirmation hearings for Attorney General Eric Holder and for U.S. Solicitor General Elena Kagan who both suggested that the terrorism “battlefield” extends to areas where individuals may be arrested for providing a range of support to terrorist groups.13
Additionally, while the Obama administration has halted the use of the most extreme interrogation tactics, his CIA Director Leon Panetta noted in his February 6, 2009 nomination testimony
10 The last known case of waterboarding in the United States occurred in 2003. See Renee Schoof, “CIA Director Acknowledges Use of Water Boarding,” McClatchy Newspapers, February 5, 2008.
11 Don Gonyea, “Bush Concedes CIA Ran Secret Prisons Abroad,” National Public Radio, September 6, 2006.
12 This is considered by many to be either naïve or disingenuous given the realities of interrogation practiced by some of the United States’ more aggressive partners. For more, see Greg Miller, “Obama Preserves Renditions as Counter-Terrorism Tool,” Los Angeles Times, February 1, 2009.
13 Charlie Savage, “Obama’s War on Terror May Resemble Bush’s in Some Areas,” New York Times, February 18, 2009.that “if we had a ticking-bomb situation, and obviously, whatever was being used I felt was not sufficient, I would not hesitate to go to the president of the United States and request whatever additional authority I would need.”14 The new administration has also continued—if not increased—Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) strikes, and is targeting the Pakistani Taliban, specifically the Baitullah Mehsud network.15 While this may arguably complicate counterinsurgency efforts by inflaming public sentiment and generating additional recruits for Taliban-affiliated militias, the Predator strikes are one of the only tools at America’s disposal for killing al-Qa`ida and Taliban leaders and operators who are attacking U.S., NATO, Afghan, and Pakistani targets.16
The Obama Administration’s Early Moves
While the new administration’s counterterrorism strategy is yet to be fully determined, the official White House webpage on homeland security provides the broad outlines of its approach to overseas radicalism and terrorism. The strategy pays particular attention to restoring widely-admired American values and standards that many allege were eroded during the last eight years of the unpopularly named “global war on terrorism.” Five key points of the strategy17 are:
1. Find, Disrupt, and Destroy Al-Qa`ida;
2. New Capabilities to Aggressively Defeat Terrorists;
3. Prepare the Military to Meet 21st Century Threats;
4. Win the Battle of Ideas;
5. Restore American Influence and Restore Our Values.
14 CIA Director Panetta did agree, however, that waterboarding constituted torture. For more, see Mark Mazzetti, “Pick for CIA Chief Leaves Open Idea of Harsher Interrogation,” International Herald Tribune, February 6, 2009.
15 Mark Mazzetti and David Sanger, “Obama Expands Missile Strikes Inside Pak,” New York Times, February 20, 2009.
16 “Kilcullen Weighs in on U.S. Strikes in Pakistan,” Weekly Standard, February 10, 2009.
17 This information is drawn from the White House’s Homeland Security Agenda, available at www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/homeland_security/.
Perhaps one of the most powerful and promising developments in counterterrorism is the direct challenge that Barack Obama’s ascendancy to power and collaborative approach represents to al-Qa`ida’s legitimacy. President Bush’s controversial policies and public persona appeared to serve as an effective recruiting and propaganda tool for Usama bin Ladin and the extremists who rallied young Muslim men and women on his behalf. President Obama was immediately and crudely insulted by Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa`ida’s second-in-command, upon his election victory in November 2008. Al-Zawahiri called President-elect Obama a “house negro,” suggesting that he would in fact be doing the bidding of a presumably racist, white America. This was a clear attempt to denigrate an individual whose personal story undermines the penetrating and persistent al-Qa`ida narrative.
Indeed, the new U.S. president is an American minority who has risen to the highest seat of power. With a Kenyan father, a middle name of “Hussein,” and a childhood education in Indonesia—the world’s largest Muslim-majority country—President Obama shatters much of the negative imagery that some associate with executive leadership and power in the United States. His personal background, combined with the traditional influence enjoyed by the United States, serves to multiply the power and authority typically available to a U.S. president. In fact, a 17-nation poll conducted by the British Broadcasting Corporation on the eve of Barack Obama’s inauguration showed “widespread and growing optimism that his presidency will lead to improved
“The Predator strikes are one of the only tools at America’s disposal for killing al-Qa`ida and Taliban leaders and operators who are attacking U.S., NATO, Afghan, and Pakistani targets.”
11
relations between the United States and the rest of the world,” with 67% of poll respondents expressing positive views of the president-elect.18
This could mark a great opportunity to weaken al-Qa`ida’s appeal. Just as fatawa by senior Muslim clerics around the world have questioned the legitimacy of al-Qa`ida’s actions and reduced its standing among some Muslim populations, so too can Barack Obama’s life story and worldwide admiration. Progress in reducing al-Qa`ida’s appeal began while President Bush was in office, and President Obama can quickly build on that momentum. Pointing to the weaknesses and contradictions in al-Qa`ida’s message, while dispensing with any self-defeating U.S. policies, will increase the chances of success by weakening Muslim support for al-Qa`ida. Furthermore, the bolstering of America’s image and cancellation or modification of some controversial policies could certainly lead more countries to cooperate with the United States.19
Conclusion
A multitude of stresses are impacting vulnerable populations around the world, leaving many open to extremist ideologies that energize marginalized people. It is clear that this trend will continue in the current economic climate.
18 “Global Poll Uncovers Growing Optimism that Obama Will Improve US Relations,” BBC, January 20, 2009.
19 On the other hand, it could also cause some governments to refrain from providing intelligence to a new U.S. administration that is critical of harsh tactics.
There is an unmistakable tension between the West and Muslim and Arab worlds where a sense of humiliation and exploitation remains strong. One of the most important goals of U.S. foreign and counterterrorism policy will be to “communicate to the Muslim world that the U.S. is not at war with them,” but rather is interested in greater partnership on many levels.20 Achieving this goal will reduce the ability of al-Qa`ida and similar organizations to garner sympathy from Muslim populations, and thereby limit their capacity to recruit new members. There is now an effort to redesign U.S. policy, and by doing so the Obama administration can maintain a strong campaign against terrorism while avoiding mistakes that indirectly assist U.S. adversaries. This efficiency of policy is essential given the continued advantages of extremist groups and the worsening global environment that supports their arguments. It is likely that the United States and the world will see an ever more enhanced and sophisticated terrorist threat, and an equally refined approach to counterterrorism.
Tom Sanderson serves as deputy director and senior fellow of the Transnational Threat Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Mr. Sanderson specializes in counterterrorism, intelligence, and open source information. For the last four years, he has led an effort to model collaboration between government analysts and non-governmental experts on terrorism and crime. Known as the Trusted Information Network project, the effort has organized and tapped expertise on threats in Europe and Southeast Asia. He teaches a range of courses for the intelligence community, and carries out extensive field interviews across dozens of countries annually. Mr. Sanderson holds degrees from Wheaton College and Tufts University (Fletcher School), both in Massachusetts.
20 Steve Simon and Daniel Byman et al., Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008).
Improving India’s Counterterrorism Policy after Mumbai
By Paul Staniland
india has emerged as one of the world’s most consistent targets of Islamist militants. Although the Mumbai attacks of November 2008 attracted the most global attention, they were merely the most recent and dramatic in a series of bloody terrorist incidents throughout urban India. On July 11, 2006, for example, terrorists planted seven bombs on the Suburban Railway of Mumbai, causing the deaths of more than 200 people. The November 2008 attacks, however, brought into clear focus the inability of the Indian security apparatus to anticipate and appropriately respond to major terrorist incidents. As one prominent analyst wrote, the government’s responses to the Mumbai attacks were “comprehensive failures from the point of view of India’s security establishment.”1 While some Indian analysts and politicians prefer to focus on Pakistan’s role as a haven for a variety of militant groups, it is clear that India needs to dramatically enhance its domestic counterterrorism infrastructure. Improvement will require significant infusions of resources, policy consistency, and political will that are often lacking in India.
This article outlines the current structure of counterterrorism policy in India, and then assesses some possible reforms. Thoroughgoing institutional reform in India will be challenging. The country suffers from a fragmented and inefficient bureaucracy, far fewer resources than developed countries even though it faces a higher threat level, and a political elite focused primarily on electoral politics. It is likely only a matter of time before another significant terrorist attack occurs. Nevertheless, focusing on a series of substantial but distinct tasks, with the support of India’s international partners, can slowly but steadily improve India’s counterterrorism capabilities.
1 Ajai Sahni, “The Uneducable Indian,” Outlook, December 1, 2008.
“Pointing to the weaknesses and contradictions in al-Qa`ida’s message, while dispensing with any self-defeating U.S. policies, will increase the chances of success by weakening Muslim support for al-Qa`ida.”
12
Domestic Structure and Capabilities
India’s police and internal security system is highly fragmented and often poorly coordinated. The country’s federal political system leaves most policing responsibilities to the states, which usually possess their own counterterrorism and intelligence units. These forces, especially local police, are often poorly trained and equipped. Local personnel are frequently hired on the basis of political patronage and are notorious for high levels of corruption.
There is also a variety of central investigative, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies. The Ministry of Home Affairs includes the Intelligence Bureau, Central Reserve Police Force, Indian Police Service, and new National Investigation Agency, while the Research and Analysis Wing and Central Bureau of Investigation are answerable to the prime minister.2 The military—which is primarily geared toward foreign threats, including terrorism—also generates intelligence with relevance to domestic terrorism, and there is a centrally controlled National Security Guard (NSG) that specializes in hostage and terrorist attack situations.
The combination of state and central authorities is ostensibly coordinated through joint committees, task forces, subsidiary intelligence bureaus, and a Multi-Agency Center. All of these coordinating mechanisms aim to harmonize the intelligence gathered by these agencies and to generate shared threat perceptions and associated responses, but they are often slow and
2 A critical analysis of the Ministry of Home Affairs forces can be found in K.S. Subramanian, Political Violence and the Police in India (New Delhi: Sage, 2007). For a brief overview of RAW, see Jayshree Bajoria, “RAW: India’s External Intelligence Agency,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 7, 2008.cumbersome. States and the central agencies frequently compete over resources and bureaucratic autonomy, and they both do a highly uneven job of cooperating with one another.3 In addition to these organizational challenges, many of the security institutions at all levels of government are understaffed, undertrained, and technologically backward.4
All of these pathologies were evident in the failure to prevent or appropriately respond to the Mumbai attacks.5 There was in fact significant intelligence suggesting a seaborne terrorist attack was likely, and even that prominent sites such as the Taj Hotel would be targeted. This information, however, was ignored by several key bureaucratic actors—including the Coast Guard and the Maharashtra state director-general of police—because it was deemed unactionable.6 Others, such as the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad, at least attempted some kind of preparation.7 The differences in readiness highlight the extent of fragmentation among the security apparatus. Even when Mumbai police tried to take preventive action, they lacked the manpower to sustain increased security at the hotels. Once the attack occurred, the security forces did not have sufficient night-vision equipment, heavy weaponry, or information about the attack sites, leading to a long response time and the emergence of a disastrous siege.8
Previous attempts at reform and improvement have been largely inadequate—politicians have made
3 “Securing the Home Front,” India Today, January 12, 2009.
4 On the understaffing of police, see P. Chidambaran, “A Clear Command Structure,” Outlook, January 6, 2009.
5 Vijay Oberoi, “Never Again,” Indian Express, December 2, 2008.
6 Saikat Datta, Smruti Koppikar and Dola Mitra, “The Armies of the Night,” Outlook, December 15, 2008.
7 The Mumbai police put extra guard on prominent sites and met with hotel officials. The extra guard was not maintained, however, because of the strain it put on manpower. Praveen Swami, “Pointed Intelligence Warnings Preceded Attacks,” Hindu, November 30, 2008.
8 “‘Rot’ at Heart of Indian Intelligence,” BBC, December 2, 2008; Praveen Swami, “Lethal Lapse,” Frontline, December 6-19, 2008; Saikat Datta, Smruti Koppikar and Dola Mitra, “The Armies of the Night,” Outlook, December 15, 2008.sweeping rhetorical claims, juggled personnel at all levels, and repeatedly promised better coordination at the national level, but key capacity has not improved. Mumbai finally triggered the resignation of Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil, on whose watch a series of previous attacks had occurred. Yet Patil’s resignation and his replacement by the more competent Palaniappan Chidambaram (who worked on internal security under Rajiv Gandhi) marks only the beginning of the necessary changes. India faces a “dire need to redress its numerous deficiencies in its internal security arrangements.”9
The Nature of the Threat: Domestic and Foreign
One common response to India’s counterterrorism failures has been a quick acknowledgement of domestic weaknesses, followed by a far more vocal demand to “get tough” on Pakistan. While Pakistan’s role as a sanctuary (both voluntary and involuntary) for militants is indisputable, India’s options are relatively limited. The coercive diplomacy following the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, named Operation Parakram, did not prevent Pakistan’s continued patronage of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and other militant groups operating in Kashmir.10 Pakistan’s nuclear weapon “shield” makes credible Indian coercive diplomacy difficult.
India’s current government has learned this lesson well, and instead engaged in a coordinated diplomatic offensive that has brought at least rhetorical results. Military threats against Pakistan are unlikely to bear fruit, while even successful diplomacy will have a limited impact.11 Pakistan simply lacks the capacity, and probably the will, to engage in the kind of domestic policies that will significantly lessen the threat posed to India. Improving India’s internal security apparatus must therefore be the primary focus of Indian security and
9 Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2009), p. 15.
10 On Parakram and its aftermath, see V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished (New Delhi: Sage, 2003); P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).
11 Rabasa et al., p. 21.
“Mumbai brought into clear focus the inability of the Indian security apparatus to anticipate and appropriately respond to major terrorist incidents.”
13
political elites.12 In addition to Pakistan, India also faces cross-border terrorism from Bangladesh. Attacks attributed to jihadist groups such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam (HuJI) are believed to have been launched from the country. Bangladesh’s political instability and weak state capacity, however, make it difficult for India to consistently shape Bangladeshi counterterrorism policy.
In addition to the limits of putting pressure on Pakistan and Bangladesh, a number of major attacks have been carried out with significant help from Indian Muslims under the aegis of the Indian Mujahidin (IM). This clearly shows that the problem is not simply one of containing Pakistan.13 The Indian police and intelligence agencies were forced to scramble in the wake of bombings in Jaipur, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and elsewhere claimed by the IM, which revealed a significant indigenous capability for terrorism. Bolstering domestic intelligence will become increasingly central if a trend of radicalization continues among small, but potentially growing portions of India’s Muslim community. Although there have been pockets of radicalization uncovered as far south as Kerala, on balance it seems that urban areas of north and west India have been the primary recruiting grounds for Islamist radicals.14
Therefore, India faces threats spilling out of porous borders and weak governments both to the east and to the west. These foreign threats coalesce with a troubled internal security apparatus and some level of domestic radicalization to create a dangerous situation.
12 As Shishir Gupta notes, “Pakistan is only part of the problem.” See Shishir Gupta, “Less Blame, More Action,” Indian Express, December 5, 2008.
13 Animesh Roul, “India’s Home-Grown Jihadi Threat: A Profile of the Indian Mujahideen,” Terrorism Monitor 7:4 (2009).
14 These are the areas of greatest Muslim demographic presence and also of communal rioting. Although firm data is elusive, many experts argue that the 2002 Gujarat riots have propelled Islamist recruitment. For more, see “India Fears that Some of its Muslims are Joining in Terrorism,” New York Times, August 9, 2006; “Ahmedabad Attacks: The Usual Suspects,” Hindu, August 1, 2008.
The Path Forward: Coordination and Capacity-Building
The major domestic response to Mumbai has been an emphasis on streamlined coordination between agencies across state and federal lines, and the creation of a new National Investigation Agency (NIA).15 The aim of the NIA is to empower a federal agency to investigate major crimes such as terrorism and organized crime without having to be asked to do so by the states. There will be special courts that can rapidly hear terror-related cases.16 The NIA will be filled out by new staff drawn from existing intelligence and law enforcement agencies throughout India. An infusion of funding and personnel into the overall security apparatus has also been promised, and the NSG has been deployed throughout the country to offer a quicker response to future attacks.17 These steps represent a useful beginning. These efforts on their own, however, will lead to little substantive results unless they have three major characteristics.
First, they will need to be sustained over a long period of time. Dramatically bolstering the institutional capacity of India’s counterterrorism apparatus is a task of at least half a decade, and probably longer.18 The training of new and current personnel alone is an enormous task, much less properly
15 The NIA is discussed in R.K. Raghavan, “Terror Trackers,” Frontline, January 3-16, 2009.
16 “Govt Tables Bill to Set Up National Investigation Agency,” Times of India, December 16, 2008.
17 “NSG Inks Agreements with Eight Airlines,” Hindu, March 1, 2009.
18 See the quote by Praveen Swami in “Will India’s Security Overhaul Work?” BBC, December 11, 2008.equipping them. A new federal agency or set of laws will contribute little to this fundamental task unless they are able to sustain the momentum necessary for years of unglamorous but crucial training and institution-building. Locking in lines of budgetary approval over a 5-10 year period will be critical to avoid the effort falling victim to the vicissitudes of domestic politics and elections.
Second, reform efforts must be properly resourced. India is a poor country with many pressing needs, and security funding reflects India’s lack of wealth. Compared to the budgets of even much smaller developed countries, India simply does not provide sufficient money for its security agencies on a per capita basis.19 This causes them to undertrain and understaff their personnel, leading to corruption and a reliance on crude and often counterproductive policing techniques. International assistance, in the form of grants for training and equipping police forces, could reduce the impact of this reform on India’s budget. In the current economic environment, large-scale international aid is unlikely, but small measures could make a significant difference, particularly if focused on the cities most likely to be attacked in the future (Delhi and Mumbai).
Finally, India’s political leadership must exert the will to push past bureaucratic and state-centric rivalries. This is an enormous challenge for a political class focused above all else on the cut-throat electoral competition that characterizes Indian politics. Despite these challenges, maintaining a degree of consistency and follow-through is essential so that the reform process does not stall or end up wasting huge amounts of time and money. Government ministers must not allow themselves to be used as pawns in bureaucratic battles over turf, resources, and responsibilities. Specialized task forces led by elected officials, and supported at the highest levels, must be given the power to engage in oversight over the security apparatus. This will involve overcoming a traditional aversion to transparency on the part of the police and intelligence agencies.
19 Sahni, “Uneducable Indian,” argues that the police-to-population ratio in India is 125:100,000.
“Once the attack occurred, the security forces did not have sufficient night-vision equipment, heavy weaponry, or information about the attack sites, leading to a long response time and the emergence of a disastrous siege.”
Assembly, and because its sanctions regime has given rise to legal challenges. Sanctioned parties have challenged the legality of the restrictions against them on the grounds that the procedures adopted by states to implement the Security Council directives ignore their basic rights, in particular the right to be heard and the right to an effective judicial review.
These legal challenges have not yet put any country in the uncomfortable position of being unable to implement a mandatory resolution of the Security Council without contravening its own laws. This may happen, however, and it is clearly a pressing task for the Security Council to find a way to maintain its authority without losing the willing support of the international community.8
The United Nations Bureaucracy
There are four main bodies that deal with counterterrorism within the United Nations bureaucracy: 1) the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) helps to monitor the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001),9 which obliges states to establish the legal means to take a range of counterterrorism measures; 2) the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team helps to oversee the sanctions regime established by Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) against al-Qa`ida and the Taliban; 3) the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna (UNODC) provides training and assistance to states in the legal sphere;10 and 4) the Secretary-General’s Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) helps to implement the global strategy adopted by the General Assembly in 2006.11 These four bodies cooperate closely and coordinate their work to provide member-states with a coherent
8 For an overview of the legal challenges and a discussion of their impact, see the Al-Qaida and Taliban Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’s reports, available at www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/monitoringteam.shtml.
9 The website for the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee can be accessed at www.un.org/sc/ctc/.
10 For more on the UNODC’s role in terrorism prevention, see www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/the-role-of-unodc-in-terrorism-prevention.html.
11 See www.un.org/terrorism/cttaskforce.shtml.picture of the international strategy to counter terrorism.
Exploiting Al-Qa`ida’s Weaknesses
National and international action has reduced the influence of the al-Qa`ida leadership and weakened its ability to launch attacks in all areas except South Asia.12 Pakistan appears to be al-Qa`ida’s base, and the success or failure of measures to defeat it there will decide its long-term future. Yet the task is exceptionally difficult, and the greatest burden by far will fall on authorities in Pakistan. In parallel to whatever military and political action Pakistan may take on its border with Afghanistan, there is much that the United Nations and others can do elsewhere to undermine al-Qa`ida’s image and appeal.
Al-Qa`ida has a number of weaknesses. First, it appears that it is losing credibility with potential sympathizers and supporters, highlighted by its present failures in Iraq. Furthermore, while it threatens major attacks against Western targets, it has done nothing successful in the West since the attacks in London in July 2005. Second, it lacks relevance. It has made no useful contribution toward resolving any of the main political issues affecting the Muslim community that it claims to defend. For instance, it has not helped the Palestinian people despite often repeating that their plight is a principal motivation for its actions.13 Its principal
12 More specifically, in all areas other than Afghanistan and Pakistan.
13 Usama bin Ladin issued an audiotape on March 14, affiliates have an equally poor track record of achievement, having failed to benefit the people of Iraq, Algeria, Saudi Arabia or Yemen. Third, it lacks legitimacy in parts of the Muslim world, even in extremist circles. It has no religious authority and its self-serving interpretation of Islam has come under increasing attack from radicals with better credentials.
The United Nations provides an ideal forum from which to expose and exploit these weaknesses. In fact, the United Nations is in many ways the natural global adversary to the global terrorism preached by al-Qa`ida. The values identified with the United Nations—such as democracy, individual human rights, the freedom of religion and the promotion of peace—are the exact values and fundamental freedoms that al-Qa`ida rejects.14 Not only does al-Qa`ida condemn the General Assembly and the Security Council as expressions of secularist state politics, it also criticizes the work of UN specialized agencies and peacekeepers—especially those operating in areas of conflict and weak government—as unwarranted and unwelcome interference on behalf of Western interests.15 Indeed, al-Qa`ida has mounted two direct attacks against the United Nations: in Baghdad in August 2003, and in Algiers in December 2007.
Five Steps for the United Nations
The United Nations can help to bring about the defeat of al-Qa`ida in five main ways. First, it must uphold and promote its core values in counterterrorism work. The United Nations is uniquely able to bring governments together to address topics of global concern in a neutral setting. It can also isolate an issue from any broader context to allow states to discuss joint work on terrorism even when they have deep bilateral differences on other issues. This convening power allows the United Nations some influence over the way that states plan and execute 2009 again asserting this, although admitting that al-Qa`ida had done little to help the Palestinian people.
14 Usama bin Ladin’s March 14, 2009 statement criticized freedom of opinion and freedom of speech.
15 For example, al-Zawahiri’s statement on Sudan, released on March 24, 2009, criticized the United Nations for inaction in Gaza while it “pretends to cry over the suffering of the people of Darfur.”
“The United Nations can best counter al-Qa`ida’s message by stressing repeatedly the criminal nature of its activity, its absence of any real vision for the future, and its lack of concern that the majority of its victims are Muslims.”
21
their counterterrorism strategies, and it can use this influence to promote the argument that any sacrifice of basic rights in the fight against terrorism not only hands the terrorists a victory, but pushes more people to support them.
Second, the United Nations can weaken the appeal of al-Qa`ida’s message by resolving long-standing political disputes. Al-Qa`ida exploits the sense of frustration and helplessness that exists where government is weak, where conflict prevails and where justice is arbitrary. The United Nations must, on the one hand, find solutions to these long-standing problems and, on the other hand, continue to explain why terrorism is counterproductive as a tactic. The more progress that the international community can make through discussion and negotiation, the more marginalized al-Qa`ida will become.
This means that the United Nations should use the range of tools available, from the imposition of sanctions to the deployment of peacekeepers and aid workers, in a coherent manner and within a strategic framework. This should include, for example, reconciliation talks in Afghanistan, development projects in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, support for the authority of Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad’s government in Somalia, capacity building in the Sahel and Yemen, and similar assistance in other vulnerable areas.
Third, the United Nations can highlight the real consequences of al-Qa`ida’s actions. It is easy enough to demonstrate that the victims of terrorism are members of the same community from which the terrorists themselves are drawn, whether in terms of immediate death and destruction or in terms of the longer lasting economic or other indirect consequences.16 When governments point this out, there may be a tendency for some audiences to discount the message as propaganda; less so when the message is promulgated by the United Nations. The CTITF has a working group that focuses on the victims of terrorism, and has projects agreed with three states to film repentant terrorists and their victims to demonstrate the
16 For example, the CTITF organized a symposium on Supporting Victims of Terrorism in September 2008.similarities between them; these will be ready for release through major national and regional networks in the second half of 2009. In addition, the film project will make brief clips of repentant terrorists for distribution through the internet, designed to dissuade others from following their course.
Fourth, the United Nations can undermine al-Qa`ida by attacking the legitimacy of its arguments. This should not be done by joining in a debate, which would give al-Qa`ida more standing than it deserves, but by providing support and encouragement for rehabilitation and reintegration programs that demonstrate the falsity of the arguments used by al-Qa`ida and its associates to justify their violence. People who leave terrorism behind are likely to return to the environments from which they were recruited and therefore may be able to influence others with similar vulnerabilities to the al-Qa`ida message. Several states have such programs and other countries have recently asked the United Nations for help in starting them. The United Nations can compile examples of best practices and help craft programs, while taking account of different cultural and social conditions.
Finally, the United Nations can attack the spread of al-Qa`ida’s message. This is the hardest target of all. Al-Qa`ida has managed to weave a seductive narrative that appeals to a wide audience. It offers meaning and action at a time when many people feel they lack purpose and opportunity. It preys on a wide range of grievances and knits them together in the single complaint that Western influences have undermined the political and social values of Islam. Al-Qa`ida has built an enduring myth around its leadership as men of purity and conviction, able to strike massive blows against a powerful enemy and successfully escape retribution. The United Nations can best counter al-Qa`ida’s message by stressing repeatedly the criminal nature of its activity, its absence of any real vision for the future, and its lack of concern that the majority of its victims are Muslims.
Al-Qa`ida’s appeal will decline if the leadership is captured or killed. Short of this, even if the leadership is forced into still more remote areas, use of the internet will continue to give it a wide audience. The CTITF has set up a working group to look at terrorist use of the internet. Its general conclusion concerning the promulgation of the al-Qa`ida message is that an open internet that allows the exposure of al-Qa`ida’s message to criticism, and even to ridicule, is more effective in limiting its appeal than any attempt to shut down forums and websites that promote it.17
Conclusion
The United Nations must work with others to expose the gap between the promises made by the al-Qa`ida narrative and the reality of what it delivers. It can also help to promote a counternarrative through the engagement of civil society, focusing this work on those who are tempted to join al-Qa`ida, rather than those who have already done so. Hardened al-Qa`ida supporters are more likely to retreat further into their closed groups in the face of criticism than question the basis of their beliefs.
To maximize its contribution to the defeat of al-Qa`ida, the United Nations must increase the credibility, relevance and legitimacy of its counterterrorism work as a contrast to the irrelevance, illegitimacy and ineffectiveness of al-Qa`ida. It must play the leading role in coordinating and promoting international action to overcome the threat from global terrorism.
Richard Barrett is the coordinator of a New York-based team appointed by the UN Secretary-General to advise the Security Council on the development and implementation of a sanctions regime aimed at individuals and groups associated with al-Qa`ida and the Taliban. He is also a member of the Secretary-General’s Task Force, established in 2005 to promote a coherent approach to counterterrorism within the UN system. In his Task Force role he has responsibility for issues to do with radicalization and extremism that lead to terrorism, terrorist use of the internet, and terrorist financing. Before working for the United Nations he had a full career with the British Government.
17 “Report of the Working Group on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes,” UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), February 2009.
22
Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity
March 1, 2009 (IRAQ): The mayor of Samarra, Mahmoud al-Khalaf, was wounded when a roadside bomb struck his convoy. – Reuters, March 1
March 1, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Suspected U.S. unmanned aerial drone strikes killed eight people in South Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. At least four of the dead were believed to be foreign fighters. Various press reports alleged that the strikes targeted the forces of Tehrik-i-Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud. – Dallas Morning News, March 2
March 2, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber killed six people at a religious school for girls in Balochistan Province. Pakistani press reports stated that the attacker wanted to assassinate a senior leader of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), who was scheduled to speak at the school. The JUI-F leader was not harmed in the attack. – Bloomberg, March 3; Daily Times, March 3
March 3, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Gunmen in Lahore, the capital of Punjab Province, attacked the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team as it was being driven to the Gadaffi Stadium. The attack, which occurred in daylight, left at least seven Pakistanis dead. Six members of the Sri Lankan team, along with a British coach, were injured. Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Jaysh-i-Muhammad were suspected of being behind in the attack. – Independent, March 4; Reuters, March 4; UPI, March 6
March 4, 2009 (IRAQ): Iraqi security forces claimed to have killed Hamza Ubid Idris, also known as Abu al-Ansar, an al-Qa`ida leader allegedly responsible for directing attacks in western Iraq. He was killed in Anbar Province. – The Age, March 6
March 4, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide car bomber killed two police officers in Mosul, Ninawa Province. – UPI, March 4
March 4, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Insurgents attacked Bagram Airbase. A car bomb exploded outside the base’s gates, quickly followed by a suicide bombing. At least three people were injured. – Guardian, March 4
March 4, 2009 (SOMALIA): Masked gunmen assassinated Shaykh Ali Afyare, a prominent cleric affiliated with the Sufi Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama movement. He was killed in Mudug region. – Garowe Online, March 5
March 5, 2009 (IRAQ): A pickup truck rigged with explosives detonated in a crowded livestock market in Babil Province, killing 12 people. – The Age, March 6
March 5, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Taliban militants blew up 16 stores selling DVDs and music in Takht Bhai town northwest of Peshawar. There were no casualties as the explosives were detonated during the night of March 4-5. – AFP, March 4
March 5, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Suspected Taliban militants blew up the mausoleum of 17th century Sufi saint Abdul Rahman Mohmand, also referred to as Rahman Baba, in Peshawar. According to one press report, “Caretakers of the complex said they had received a warning letter from purported Taliban militants three days before the attack threatening to blow up the mausoleum if women continued to visit it.” – Washington Times, March 14
March 6, 2009 (UNITED STATES): The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed accused al-Qa`ida operative Ali al-Marri’s appeal, which sought to challenge his indefinite military imprisonment. – Reuters, March 6
March 7, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide car bomber killed seven officers at a roadblock established to inspect vehicles traveling from Khyber Agency to Peshawar. – AP, March 7
March 7, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Tribal officials in South Waziristan claim that Taliban militants shot down a low-flying unmanned aerial drone. The U.S. military denied that one of its unmanned aircraft was shot down. – AFP, March 7
March 7, 2009 (SOMALIA): Shaykh Hassan Yaqob, spokesman for the al-Shabab factions that control Kismayo and the southern Jubba regions, told reporters that his fighters are “no threat” to neighboring Kenya. He said that “there is ongoing propaganda intended to destroy the security and order of the Jubba regions.” – Garowe Online, March 7
March 8, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber driving an explosives-laden motorcycle blew himself up near a police academy in Baghdad, killing 28 people. The Islamic State of Iraq later took credit for the operation in an online statement. – New York Times, March 8; AFP, March 11
March 8, 2009 (IRAQ): The Iraqi and U.S. governments announced that 12,000 U.S. troops will leave Iraq by the end of September 2009. – AFP, March 8
March 10, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber targeted tribal leaders in Abu Ghurayb, killing at least 30 people. – Bloomberg, March 10
March 10, 2009 (SOMALIA): Somalia’s cabinet voted to implement Shari`a law across the country. The proposal will now be presented to the parliament for final approval. – Reuters, March 10
March 11, 2009 (UNITED STATES): Officials at the FBI and National Counterterrorism Center testified before Congress that “tens” of Somali-Americans, primarily from Minneapolis, have traveled to Somalia to fight with the Islamist militant group al-Shabab. One of the recruits included a 27-year-old male who blew himself up in a suicide attack. According to FBI national security official Philip Mudd, however, “These folks aren’t going over there to become part of terrorist cells.” Nevertheless, officials could not rule out the possibility that some of the recruits could eventually return and attack the United States. – Reuters, March 11
March 11, 2009 (YEMEN): Yemen charged 16 suspected al-Qa`ida operatives with forming an al-Qa`ida cell that planned a series of attacks, including a March 2008 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sana`a. The men—14 Yemenis and two Syrians—were arrested on separate occasions during 2007 and 2008. – AP, March 11
March 12, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Suspected U.S. unmanned aerial drones launched approximately four missiles at a militant camp in Kurram Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. An estimated 24 suspected militants were killed in the strikes. – Reuters, March 13
23
March 12, 2009 (THAILAND): Thailand announced that it will be sending 4,000 additional troops to the south in an effort to quell an intensifying insurgency. The Thai prime minister acknowledged that the mission in the south has so far been “unsuccessful.” – TNA, March 12
March 14, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al-Jazira broadcast a new audiotape purportedly by al-Qa`ida chief Usama bin Ladin. During the recording, Bin Ladin accused some Arab leaders of being “complicit” with Israel and the West in a “Crusader-Zionist alliance against our people.” Bin Ladin urged a holy war to liberate the Palestinian Territories and also called on jihadists to liberate Iraq from the U.S. military. He called the recent Israeli intervention in Gaza a “holocaust.” – AFP, March 14
March 15, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suspected U.S. unmanned aerial drone strike killed two Arabs and three other people in Bannu District of the North-West Frontier Province. – Washington Post, March 16
March 15, 2009 (YEMEN): Four South Korean tourists were killed in a suicide bombing in Hadramawt Province. Two Yemenis were also killed. The Yemeni government blamed al-Qa`ida for the attack and claimed that the bomber was trained in neighboring Somalia. – AP, March 15; BBC, March 15; AFP, March 16; Reuters, March 17
March 15, 2009 (YEMEN): Yemen’s Interior Ministry announced that they recently captured Abdullah Abdul-Rahman Mohammed al-Harbi, one of the most wanted militants in Saudi Arabia. Al-Harbi was apprehended in Taiz Province. – Saba, March 15
March 16, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber wearing a police uniform detonated his explosives inside the main police building in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province. At least three policemen were killed. – AP, March 15
March 16, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber killed 14 people in the garrison city of Rawalpindi. The bomber detonated his explosives outside a restaurant. – AFP, March 16
March 16-17, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): Philippine troops fired on suspected Abu Sayyaf Group rebels who have been holding three Red Cross officers hostage since January 15 in the southern Philippines. A military spokesman said, “Two bodies of the Abu Sayyaf were recovered by the operating troops and have been positively identified as sub-leader Jul Asbi Jalmaani and Mudar Hadjail, his trusted man. Seven others are believed wounded or dead in the fighting.” The hostages, however, are still being held captive. – Reuters, March 16; Mindanao Examiner, March 17
March 18, 2009 (YEMEN): A suicide bomber attacked a convoy of South Korean officials investigating the March 15 attack that killed four Korean tourists in Yemen. The South Korean ambassador to Yemen was in the convoy at the time of the latest attack. No one in the convoy was injured. – AP, March 18
March 19, 2009 (GLOBAL): A new audio message purportedly from al-Qa`ida leader Usama bin Ladin appeared on Islamist web forums. Bin Ladin tells Somali fighters that President Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad should be “dethroned, fought and removed with armed force” because he has “changed to partner up with the infidel.” – RTTNews, March 19; CNN, March 19
March 19, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Dad Mohammad Khan, a key anti-Taliban lawmaker from Helmand Province, was killed along with four others after a bomb ripped through their vehicle in Helmand. According to one report, “The killing took to 10 the number of MPs who have died in attacks since they were elected in Afghanistan’s first democratic parliamentary vote in 2005.” – AFP, March 19
March 20, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban and police clashed in northern Jawzjan Province, on the border with Turkmenistan. Nine Afghan policemen and a district chief were killed. – AFP, March 19
March 21, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide car bomber detonated his explosives at a police checkpoint in Nangarhar Province, killing three civilians and one policeman. – AP, March 20
March 21, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): NATO forces killed senior Taliban commander Maulawi Hassan and nine of his associates in Helmand Province. – AP, March 23
March 23, 2009 (UNITED STATES): Alleged al-Qa`ida terrorist Ali al-Marri pleaded not guilty to conspiracy and supporting terrorism in a federal court in Peoria, Illinois. U.S. District Judge Michael Mihm set a tentative trial date for May 26. Al-Marri has been in U.S. custody since December 2001. – Los Angeles Times, March 24
March 23, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber detonated explosives in a Kurdish funeral tent in Jalula, Diyala Province, killing at least 15 people. – Independent, March 24
March 23, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban militants ambushed a police vehicle in Kandahar Province, killing eight policemen. – AFP, March 23
March 23, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber detonated his explosives in Islamabad, killing a policeman. It appeared the bomber wanted to enter a police station before detonating his explosives, but was stopped at the gate. – Washington Post, March 24
March 24, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri released a new videotape, in which he urged the Sudanese people to prepare for a “long guerrilla war” in light of the International Criminal Court’s decision to charge Sudanese President Umar al-Bashir with war crimes. “The Sudanese regime is too weak to defend the Sudan, so you must do what was done by your brothers in Iraq and Somalia,” al-Zawahiri said. He stated that he was “not defending Umar al-Bashir or his regime…the issue is one of making excuses for more foreign interference in the Muslims’ countries in the framework of the contemporary Zionist Crusade.” – Bloomberg, March 24; CNN, March 24
March 25, 2009 (GLOBAL): The U.S. government offered up to $11 million in rewards to find or capture Baitullah Mehsud, Sirajuddin Haqqani, and al-Qa`ida operative Abu Yahya al-Libi. All three men are believed to be operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. – AFP, March 25
24
with supplies for NATO forces in Afghanistan. The fighters besieged Farhad terminal on the outskirts of Peshawar, using rockets and petrol bombs to destroy the parked vehicles. – AFP, March 28
March 28, 2009 (ALGERIA): Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) demanded that 20 of its members be released from detention in Mali and other countries in exchange for the release of six Western hostages. AQIM says that it is holding two Canadian diplomats kidnapped in Niger in December, along with four European tourists kidnapped in Mali in January. – Reuters, March 28
March 30, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber in a police uniform detonated his explosives inside a government office in Kandahar Province, killing at least nine people. – AP, March 30; Reuters, March 30
March 30, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Militants attacked a police academy in Lahore, Punjab Province, killing seven cadets and one civilian. Four militants were killed in the eight hour gun battle with security forces. Tehrik-i-Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud claimed credit for the operation. – Reuters, March 31; AFP, March 30
March 30, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide car bomber rammed his vehicle into a Pakistani military convoy, killing three soldiers. The attack occurred in Bannu District of the North-West Frontier Province. – AFP, March 30
March 31, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide car bomber drove his explosives-laden truck into a police compound in Mosul, Ninawa Province, killing seven people. – Reuters, March 31
March 31, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik-i-Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud vowed to “amaze everyone in the world” with an attack on Washington, D.C. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, however, said Mehsud has made similar threats before and that they had not seen any indications of an imminent plot on Washington. – AP, March 31
March 25, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suspected U.S. unmanned aerial drone strike killed approximately seven militants in South Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Two vehicles were reportedly targeted. – AFP, March 25
March 25, 2009 (YEMEN): Yemen’s Interior Ministry released a statement claiming it had arrested six men for plotting attacks against foreigners in the country. The statement said that the men were recruited by al-Qa`ida. – AP, March 25
March 26, 2009 (IRAQ): A car bomb exploded on a commercial street in a Shi`a area of Baghdad, killing at least 20 people. – AP, March 26
March 26, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber prematurely detonated his explosives as he was “saying good-bye to his associates” before his mission, killing six militants. The incident occurred in Helmand Province. – Reuters, March 26
March 26, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban militants attacked a police convoy in Ghazni Province, wounding six policemen. Four militants were killed. – AP, March 26
March 26, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban militants attacked a police checkpoint in Helmand Province, killing nine policemen. – AP, March 26
March 26, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber detonated his explosives at a restaurant in South Waziristan Agency, killing 11 people. Pakistan’s Taliban movement claimed responsibility. – Voice of America, March 26
March 27, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): An Afghan soldier shot and killed two U.S. coalition soldiers in northern Afghanistan. The assailant killed himself immediately following the incident. – AP, March 27
March 27, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber blew himself up inside a mosque in Khyber Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, killing at least 50 people. – Voice of America, March 27
March 28, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Taliban militants destroyed 12 trucks loaded
CTC Sentinel Staff
Editor-in-Chief
Erich Marquardt
Senior Editor, CTC
Editorial Board
COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D.
Department Head
Department of Social Sciences (West Point)
COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D.
Deputy Department Head
Department of Social Sciences (West Point)
MAJ Reid Sawyer
Director, CTC
Brian Fishman
Director of Research, CTC
Christopher Heffelfinger
FBI Fellow, CTC
Contact
Combating Terrorism Center
U.S. Military Academy
607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall
West Point, NY 10996
Phone: (845) 667-6383
Email: sentinel@usma.edu
Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/
* For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383
support
The Combating Terrorism Center would like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1553.
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.
Kashmir conflict
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Page semi-protected
The disputed areas of the region of Kashmir. India claims the entire erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir based on an instrument of accession signed in 1947. Pakistan claims all areas of the erstwhile state except for those claimed by China. China claims the Shaksam Valley and Aksai Chin.
Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts
Kashmir conflict · 1947 War · 1965 War · 1971 War · Siachen · Operation Brasstacks · Operation Rakshak · Kargil War · Atlantique Incident · Operation Parakram
The Kashmir conflict (Hindi: कश्मीर विवाद, Urdu: کشمیر جھگڑا) is a current territorial dispute over the Kashmir region, the northwesternmost region of South Asia. The countries disputing are India, Pakistan, China, and the Kashmiri people.
India claims the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir and as of 2010, administers approximately 43% of the region, including most of Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, and the Siachen Glacier. India’s claim is contested by Pakistan, which controls approximately 37% of Kashmir, namely Azad Kashmir and the northern areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. China controls 20% of Kashmir, including Aksai Chin, which it occupied following the brief Sino-Indian War of 1962, and the Trans-Karakoram Tract (also known as the Shaksam Valley), which was ceded by Pakistan in 1963.
India has officially stated that it believes that Kashmir is an integral part of India. Pakistan says that Kashmir is a disputed territory whose final status must be determined by the people of Kashmir. China states that Aksai Chin is a part of Tibet, which is a part of China. Certain Kashmiri independence groups believe that Kashmir should be independent of both India and Pakistan.
India and Pakistan have fought at least three wars over Kashmir, including the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1947, 1965 and 1999. India and Pakistan have also been involved in several skirmishes over the Siachen Glacier.
Since 1987, disputed State elections[1] have resulted in some of the state’s legislative assembly forming militant wings, creating a catalyst for insurgency.[2][3][4] The Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir has been the site of conflict between the Indian Armed Forces, militants, and separatists. India alleges these militants are supported by Pakistan. The turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir has resulted in thousands of deaths,[5] but has become less deadly in recent years.[6][7] There have been protest movements in Indian Administered Kashmir since 1989. The movements were created to voice Kashmir’s disputes and grievances with the Indian government, specifically the Indian Military.[6][7] Elections held in 2008 were generally regarded as fair by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, had a high voter turnout in spite of calls by militants for a boycott, and led to the pro-India Jammu & Kashmir National Conference forming the government in the state.[8][9] According to Voice of America, many analysts have interpreted the high voter turnout in this election as a sign that the people of Kashmir have endorsed Indian rule in the state.[10]
In a 2001 report titled “Pakistan’s Role in the Kashmir Insurgency” from the American RAND Corporation, the think tank noted that “the nature of the Kashmir conflict has been transformed from what was originally a secular, locally based struggle (conducted via the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front – JKLF) to one that is now largely carried out by foreign militants and rationalized in pan-Islamic religious terms.” Most of the militant organizations are composed of foreign mercenaries, mostly from the Pakistani Punjab.[11] In 2010, with the support of its intelligence agencies, Pakistan has been again ‘boosting’ Kashmir militants, and recruitment of ‘martyrs’ in the Pakistani state of Punjab has increased.[12][13]
Timeline
Main article: Timeline of the Kashmir conflict
Early history
See also: History of Kashmir
In the 18th century, Kashmir was ruled by the Muslim Pashtun Durrani Empire. In 1819, Kashmir was conquered by the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh. Following the First Anglo-Sikh War in 1845 and 1846, Kashmir was first ceded by the Treaty of Lahore to the East India Company, and shortly after sold by the Treaty of Amritsar to Gulab Singh, Raja of Jammu, who thereafter was given the title Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. From then until the Partition of India in 1947, Kashmir was ruled by the Hindu Maharajas of the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu, although the majority of the population were Muslim, except in the Jammu region.
Partition and dispute
In 1947, British rule in India ended with the creation of two new nations: the Union of India and the Dominion of Pakistan, while British suzerainty over the 562 Indian princely states ended. According to the Indian Independence Act 1947, “the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States”,[14] so the states were left to choose whether to join India or Pakistan or to remain independent. Jammu and Kashmir, the largest of the princely states, had a predominantly Muslim population, while having a Hindu ruler (Maharaja Hari Singh.) On partition Pakistan expected Kashmir to be annexed to it.
In October 1947, Muslim revolutionaries in western Kashmir[15] and Pakistani tribals from Dir entered Kashmir, intending to liberate it from Dogra rule. Unable to withstand the invasion, the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession that was accepted by the government of India on 27 October 1947.[16]
Indo-Pakistani War of 1947
Main article: Indo-Pakistani War of 1947
After rumours that the Maharaja supported the annexation of Kashmir by India, militant Muslim revolutionaries from western Kashmir[15] and Pakistani tribesmen made rapid advances into the Baramulla sector. Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir asked the government of India to intervene. However, India and Pakistan had signed an agreement of non-intervention. Although tribal fighters from Pakistan had entered Jammu and Kashmir, there was no iron-clad legal evidence to unequivocally prove that Pakistan was officially involved. It would have been illegal for India to unilaterally intervene in an open, official capacity unless Jammu and Kashmir officially joined the Union of India, at which point it would be possible to send in its forces and occupy the remaining parts.
The Maharaja desperately needed military assistance when the Pakistani tribals reached the outskirts of Srinagar. Before their arrival into Srinagar, India argued that the Maharaja must complete negotiations for ceding Jammu and Kashmir to India in exchange for receiving military aid. The agreement which ceded Jammu and Kashmir to India was signed by the Maharaja and Lord Mountbatten of Burma.[6] In Jammu and Kashmir, National Conference volunteers worked with the Indian Army to drive out the Pakistanis.[17]
The Instrument of Accession of Kashmir to India was accepted by Viceroy Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma.
The resulting war over Kashmir, the First Kashmir War, lasted until 1948, when India moved the issue to the UN Security Council. Sheikh Abdullah was not in favour of India seeking UN intervention because he was sure the Indian Army could free the entire State of invaders.[17] The UN had previously passed resolutions for setting up monitoring of the conflict in Kashmir. Following the set-up of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNCIP), the UN Security Council passed Resolution 47 on 21 April 1948. The resolution imposed an immediate cease-fire and called on Pakistan to withdraw all military presence. The resolution stated that Pakistan would have no say in Jammu and Kashmir politics. India would retain a minimum military presence and “the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.” The ceasefire was enacted on 31 December 1948.
The Indian and Pakistani governments agreed to hold the plebiscite, but Pakistan did not withdraw its troops from Kashmir, thus violating the conditions for holding the plebiscite.[18] Over the next several years, the UN Security Council passed four new resolutions, revising the terms of Resolution 47 to include a synchronous withdrawal of both Indian and Pakistani troops from the region, per the recommendations of General Andrew McNaughton. To this end, UN arbitrators put forward 11 different proposals for the demilitarization of the region. All of these were accepted by Pakistan, but rejected by the Indian government.[19] The resolutions were passed by United Nations Security Council under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.[20] Resolutions passed under Chapter VI of the UN charter are considered non-binding and have no mandatory enforceability, as opposed to the resolutions passed under Chapter VII.[21]
Sino-Indian War
Main article: Sino-Indian War
In 1962, troops from the People’s Republic of China and India clashed in territory claimed by both. China won a swift victory in the war, resulting in the Chinese administration of the region called Aksai Chin, which has continued as of November 2010. Another smaller area, the Trans-Karakoram, was demarcated as the Line of Control (LOC) between China and Pakistan, although some of the territory on the Chinese side is claimed by India to be part of Kashmir. The line that separates India from China in this region is known as the “Line of Actual Control“.[22]
1965 and 1971 wars
Main articles: Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 and Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
In 1965 and 1971, heavy fighting broke out again between India and Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 resulted in the defeat of Pakistan and the Pakistani military’s surrender in East Pakistan. The Simla Agreement was signed in 1972 between India and Pakistan. By this treaty, both countries agreed to settle all issues by peaceful means using mutual discussion in the framework of the UN Charter.
1989 popular insurgency and militancy
Main article: Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir
In 1989, a widespread popular and armed insurgency[23][24] started in Kashmir. After the 1987 State legislative assembly election, some of the results were disputed. This resulted in the formation militant wings after the election and was the beginning of the Mujahadeen insurgency, which continues to this day.[25] India contends that the insurgency was largely started by Afghan mujahadeen who entered the Kashmir valley following the end of the Soviet-Afghan War. Pakistani and Kashmiri nationalists argue that Afghan mujahideen did not leave Afghanistan in large numbers until 1992, three years after the insurgency began.[26] Yasin Malik, a leader of one faction of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, was one of the Kashmiris to organize militancy in Kashmir, along with Ashfaq Majid Wani and Farooq Ahmad Dar (alias Bitta Karatay). Since 1995, Malik has renounced the use of violence and calls for strictly peaceful methods to resolve the dispute. He developed differences with one of the senior leaders, Farooq Siddiqui (alias Farooq Papa), for shunning the demand for an independent Kashmir and trying to cut a deal with the Indian Prime Minister. This resulted in a spilt in which Bitta Karatay, Salim Nanhaji, and other senior comrades joined Farooq Papa.[27][28] Pakistan claims these insurgents are Jammu and Kashmir citizens, and are rising up against the Indian army in an independence movement. Pakistan accuses the Indian army of committing serious human rights violations in Kashmir. Pakistan denies that it has or currently is supplying weapons and ammunition to the insurgents.
India claims these insurgents are Islamic terrorist groups from Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Afghanistan, fighting to make Jammu and Kashmir part of Pakistan.[29] They claim Pakistan is supplying munitions to the terrorists and training them in Pakistan. India states that the terrorists have been killing many citizens in Kashmir and committing human rights violations. They deny that their own armed forces are responsible for human rights abuses. On a visit to Pakistan in 2006 current Chief Minister of Kashmir Omar Abdullah remarked that foreign militants were engaged in reckless killings and mayhem in the name of religion.[30] Indian government has said militancy is now on the decline.[7]
The Pakistani government calls these insurgents “Kashmiri freedom fighters”, and claims that it gives only moral and diplomatic support to these insurgents, though India[31] believes they are Pakistan-supported terrorists from Pakistan Administered Kashmir. In October 2008, President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan called the Kashmir separatists terrorists in an interview with The Wall Street Journal.[32][dead link] these comments by Zardari sparked outrage amongs many Kashmiris, some of whom defied a curfew by the Indian army to burn him in effigy.[33]
There has been a “purely indigenous, purely Kashmiri”[6] peaceful protest movement alongside the insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir since 1989. The movement was created for the same reason as the insurgency; it began with the disputed rigged elections of 1987. The Kashmiris have grievances with the Indian government, specifically the Indian Military, which has committed human rights violations, according to the United Nations.[6][7][34]
Al-Qaeda involvement
Main article: Al-Qaeda
In a ‘Letter to American People’ written by Osama bin Laden in 2002, he stated that one of the reasons he was fighting America is because of its support of India on the Kashmir issue.[35][36] While on a trip to Delhi in 2002, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested that Al-Qaeda was active in Kashmir, though he did not have any hard evidence.[37][38] An investigation in 2002 unearthed evidence that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates were prospering in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir with tacit approval of Pakistan’s National Intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence.[39] A team of Special Air Service and Delta Force was sent into Indian-administered Kashmir in 2002 to hunt for Osama bin Laden after reports that he was being sheltered by the Kashmiri militant group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.[40] U.S. officials believed that Al-Qaeda was helping organize a campaign of terror in Kashmir in order to provoke conflict between India and Pakistan. Their strategy was to force Pakistan to move its troops to the border with India, thereby relieving pressure on Al-Qaeda elements hiding in northwestern Pakistan. U.S. intelligence analysts say Al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives in Pakistan-administered Kashmir are helping terrorists they had trained in Afghanistan to infiltrate Indian-administered Kashmir.[41] Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the leader of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, signed al-Qaeda’s 1998 declaration of holy war, which called on Muslims to attack all Americans and their allies.[42] In 2006 Al-Qaeda claim they have established a wing in Kashmir; this worried the Indian government.[43] Indian Army Lt. Gen. H.S. Panag, GOC-in-C Northern Command, said to reporters that the army has ruled out the presence of Al-Qaeda in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. He said that there no evidence that verifies reports from the media of an Al-Qaeda presence in the state. He stated that Al-Qaeda had strong ties with the Kashmir militant groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed in Pakistan.[44] While on a visit to Pakistan in January 2010, U.S. Defense secretary Robert Gates stated that Al-Qaeda was seeking to destabilize the region and planning to provoke a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.[45]
In September 2009, a U.S. Drone strike reportedly killed Ilyas Kashmiri, who was the chief of Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, a Kashmiri militant group associated with Al-Qaeda.[46][47] Kashmiri was described by Bruce Riedel as a ‘prominent’ Al-Qaeda member,[48] while others described him as the head of military operations for Al-Qaeda.[49] Waziristan had now become the new battlefield for Kashmiri militants, who were now fighting NATO in support of Al-Qaeda.[50] Ilyas Kashmiri was charged by the U.S. in a plot against Jyllands-Posten, the Danish newspaper which was at the center of Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy.[51]
Conflict in Kargil
Main article: Kargil War
Location of conflict.
In mid-1999, insurgents and Pakistani soldiers from Pakistani Kashmir infiltrated into Jammu and Kashmir. During the winter season, Indian forces regularly move down to lower altitudes, as severe climatic conditions makes it almost impossible for them to guard the high peaks near the Line of Control. The insurgents took advantage of this and occupied vacant mountain peaks of the Kargil range overlooking the highway in Indian Kashmir that connects Srinagar and Leh. By blocking the highway, they wanted to cut off the only link between the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh. This resulted in a high-scale conflict between the Indian Army and the Pakistan Army.
Fears of the Kargil War turning into a nuclear war provoked the then-United States President Bill Clinton to pressure Pakistan to retreat. Faced with mounting losses of personnel and posts, the Pakistan Army withdrew their remaining troops from the area, ending the conflict. India reclaimed control of the peaks, which they now patrol and monitor all year long.
Reasons behind the dispute
The Kashmir Conflict arises from the Partition of India in 1947 into modern India and Pakistan. Both the countries have made claims to Kashmir, based on historical developments and religious affiliations of the Kashmiri people. The state of Jammu and Kashmir, which lies strategically in the north-west of the subcontinent, bordering China and the former Soviet Union, was a princely state ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh under the paramountcy of British India. In geographical and legal terms, the Maharaja could have joined either of the two new Dominions. Although urged by the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten of Burma, to determine the future of his state before the transfer of power took place, Singh demurred. In October 1947, incursions and counter-incursions by Pakistan and India took place leading to a war, as a result of which the state of Jammu and Kashmir remains divided between the two countries.
Administered by Area Population % Muslim % Hindu % Buddhist % Other
India Kashmir valley ~4 million 95% 4% – –
Jammu ~3 million 30% 66% – 4%
Ladakh ~0.25 million 46% (Shia) – 50% 3%
Pakistan Northern Areas ~1 million 99% – – –
Azad Kashmir ~2.6 million 100% – – –
China Aksai Chin – – – – –
* Statistics from the BBC report. In Depth *There are roughly 1.5 million refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir in Pakistan administered Kashmir and Pakistan UNHCR
* About 300,000 Hindus in Indian Administered Kashmir valley are internally displaced due to militancy in Kashmir CIA
* Muslims are the majority in Poonch, Rajouri, Kishtwar, and Doda districts in Jammu region. Shia Muslims make up the majority in Kargil district in Ladakh region.
Two-thirds of the former princely state (known as the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir), comprising Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, and the sparsely populated Buddhist area of Ladakh are controlled by India; one-third is administered by Pakistan. The latter includes a narrow strip of land called Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, compromising the Gilgit Agency, Baltistan, and the former kingdoms of Hunza and Nagar. Attempts to resolve the dispute through political discussions were unsuccessful. In September 1965, war broke out again between Pakistan and India. The United Nations called for another cease-fire, and peace was restored once again following the Tashkent Declaration in 1966, by which both nations returned to their original positions along the demarcated line. After the 1971 war and the creation of independent Bangladesh, under the terms of the 1972 Simla Agreement between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan, it was agreed that neither country would seek to alter the cease-fire line in Kashmir, which was renamed as the Line of Control, “unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations”.
Numerous violations of the Line of Control have occurred, including the incursions by insurgents and Pakistani armed forces at Kargil leading to the Kargil war. There are also sporadic clashes on the Siachen Glacier, where the Line of Control is not demarcated and both countries maintain forces at altitudes rising to 20,000 ft (6,100 m).
Indian view
Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession in October 1947 under which he acceded the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Union of India.
The Indian viewpoint is succinctly summarized by Ministry of External affairs, Government of India[52][53] —
* India holds that the Instrument of Accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Union of India, signed by Maharaja Hari Singh (erstwhile ruler of the State) on 26 October 1947, was completely valid in terms of the Government of India Act (1935), Indian Independence Act (1947) and international law and was total and irrevocable.[53]
* The Constituent assembly of Jammu and Kashmir had unanimously ratified the Maharaja’s Instrument of Accession to India and had adopted a constitution for the state that called for a perpetual merger of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India. India claims that the Constituent assembly was a representative one, and that its views were those of the Kashmiri people at the time.
* United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 tacitly accepts India’s stand regarding all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan and urges the need to resolve the dispute through mutual dialogue and does not call for a plebiscite.[54]
* United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 cannot be implemented since Pakistan failed to withdraw its forces from Kashmir, which was the first step in implementing the resolution.[55] India is also of the view that Resolution 47 is obsolete, since the geography and demographics of the region have been permanently altered.[56] The resolution was passed by United Nations Security Council under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. It is therefore non-binding and has no mandatory enforceability, as opposed to the resolutions passed under Chapter VII.[20][21]
* India does not accept the two-nation theory that forms the basis of Pakistan and argues that Kashmir, despite being a Muslim-majority state, is in many ways an “integral part” of secular India.[57]
* The state of Jammu and Kashmir was provided significant autonomy in Article 370 of the Constitution of India.[58]
* All differences between India and Pakistan, including Kashmir, need to be settled through bilateral negotiations as agreed to by the two countries when they signed the Simla Agreement on 2 July 1972.[59]
Indian security personnel guard JUSBRL railway station in Anantnag, Kashmir. India has accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism in the region.
Additional Indian viewpoints regarding the broader debate over the Kashmir conflict include —
* In a diverse country like India, disaffection and discontent are not uncommon. Indian democracy has the necessary resilience to accommodate genuine grievances within the framework of India’s sovereignty, unity, and integrity. The Government of India has expressed its willingness to accommodate the legitimate political demands of the people of the state of Kashmir.[52]
* Insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir is deliberately being fueled by Pakistan to create instability in the region.[60] The Government of India has repeatedly accused Pakistan of waging a proxy war in Kashmir by providing weapons and financial assistance to terrorist groups in the region.[61][62][63][64]
* Pakistan is trying to raise anti-India sentiment among the people of Kashmir by spreading false propaganda against India.[65] According to the state government of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistani radio and television channels deliberately spread “hate and venom” against India to alter Kashmiri opinion.[66]
* India has asked the United Nations not to leave unchallenged or unaddressed the claims of moral, political, and diplomatic support for terrorism, which were clearly in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. This is a Chapter VII resolution that makes it mandatory for member states to not provide active or passive support to terrorist organizations.[67][68] Specifically, it has pointed out that the Pakistani government continues to support various terrorist organizations, such as Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, in direct violation of this resolution.[69]
* India points out reports by human rights organizations condemning Pakistan for the lack of civic liberties in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.[65][70] According to India, most regions of Pakistani Kashmir, especially Northern Areas, continue to suffer from lack of political recognition, economic development, and basic fundamental rights.[71]
Pakistani view
Map of Kashmir as drawn by the Government of Pakistan
Pakistan’s claims to the disputed region are based on the rejection of Indian claims to Kashmir, namely the Instrument of Accession. Pakistan insists that the Maharaja was not a popular leader, and was regarded as a tyrant by most Kashmiris. Pakistan maintains that the Maharaja used brute force to suppress the population.[72] Pakistan accuses India of hypocrisy, as it refused to recognize the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan and Hyderabad‘s independence, on the grounds that those two states had Hindu majorities (in fact, India had occupied and forcibly integrated those two territories).[73] Since he had fled Kashmir due to Pakistani invasion, Pakistan asserts that the Maharaja held no authority in determining Kashmir’s future. Pakistan argues that even if the Maharaja had any authority in determining the plight of Kashmir, he signed the Instrument of Accession under duress, thus invalidating the legitimacy of his actions.
Pakistan claims that Indian forces were in Kashmir before the Instrument of Accession was signed with India, and that therefore Indian troops were in Kashmir in violation of the Standstill Agreement, which was designed to maintain the status quo in Kashmir (although India was not signatory to the Agreement, which was signed between Pakistan and the Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir).[74][75]
From 1990 to 1999, some organizations reported that the Indian Armed Forces, its paramilitary groups, and counter-insurgent militias were responsible for the deaths 4,501 Kashmiri civilians. Also from 1990 to 1999, there were records of 4,242 women between the ages of 7–70 being raped.[76][77] Similar allegations were also made by some human rights organizations.[78]
In short, Pakistan holds that:
* The popular Kashmiri insurgency demonstrates that the Kashmiri people no longer wish to remain within India. Pakistan suggests that this means that Kashmir either wants to be with Pakistan or independent.[79]
* According to the two-nation theory, which is one of the theories that is cited for the partition that created India and Pakistan, Kashmir should have been with Pakistan, because it has a Muslim majority.
* India has shown disregard to the resolutions of the UN Security Council and the United Nations Commission in India and Pakistan by failing to hold a plebiscite to determine the future allegiance of the state.[80]
* The Kashmiri people have now been forced by circumstances to uphold their right of self-determination through militancy. Pakistan claims to give the Kashmiri insurgents moral, ethical and military support (see 1999 Kargil Conflict).
* Recent protests in Indian-administered Kashmir attracted a large number of people to massive rallies that took place to oppose Indian control of the state.[81]
* Pakistan points to the violence that accompanies elections in Indian Kashmir[82] and the anti Indian sentiments expressed by some people in the state.[83]
* Pakistan has noted the widespread use of extrajudicial killings in Indian-administered Kashmir carried out by Indian security forces while claiming they were caught up in encounters with militants. These encounters are commonplace in Indian-administered Kashmir. The encounters go largely uninvestigated by the authorities, and the perpetrators are spared criminal prosecution.[84][85]
* Pakistan points towards reports from the United Nations which condemn India for its human rights violations against Kashmiri people.[34] Human rights organizations have strongly condemned Indian troops for widespread rape and murder of innocent civilians while accusing these civilians of being militants.[86][87][88]
* Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari stated in October 2008 that Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters’ were terrorists. His remarks were met with widespread condemnation across Pakistan and Kashmir, including from prominent politicians.[89]
* The Chenab formula was a compromise proposed in the 1960s, in which the Kashmir valley and other Muslim-dominated areas north of the Chenab river would go to Pakistan, and Jammu and other Hindu-dominated regions would go to India.[90]
Chinese view
See also: Origins of the Sino-Indian border dispute
* China did not accept the boundaries of the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu north of the Aksai Chin and the Karakoram that were proposed by the British.[15]
* China settled its border disputes with Pakistan in the Trans Karakoram Tract in 1963 with the provision that the settlement was subject to the final solution of the Kashmir dispute.[91]
Cross-border troubles
See also: Line of Control and Siachen Conflict
The border and the Line of Control separating Indian and Pakistani Kashmir passes through some exceptionally difficult terrain. The world’s highest battleground, the Siachen Glacier, is a part of this difficult-to-man boundary. Even with 200,000 military personnel,[92] India maintains that it is infeasible to place enough men to guard all sections of the border throughout the various seasons of the year. Pakistan has indirectly acquiesced its role in failing to prevent “cross border terrorism” when it agreed to curb such activities[93] after intense pressure from the Bush administration in mid 2002.
The Government of Pakistan has repeatedly claimed that by constructing a fence along the line of control, India is violating the Shimla Accord. India claims the construction of the fence has helped decrease armed infiltration into Indian-administered Kashmir.
In 2002, Pakistani President and Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf promised to check infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir.
Water dispute
Another reason for the dispute over Kashmir is water. Kashmir is the origin point for many rivers and tributaries of the Indus River basin. They include the Jhelum and Chenab rivers, which primarily flow into Pakistan while other branches—the Ravi, Beas, and the Sutlej—irrigate northern India. The Boundary Award of 1947 meant that the headwaters of Pakistani irrigation systems were in Indian territory. Pakistan has been apprehensive that in a dire need, India (under whose portion of Kashmir lies the origins and passage of these rivers) would withhold the flow and thus choke the agrarian economy of Pakistan. The Indus Waters Treaty signed in 1960 resolved most of these disputes over water, calling for mutual cooperation in this regard. But the treaty faced issues raised by Pakistan over the construction of dams on the Indian side which limit water flow to the Pakistani side.
Human rights abuse
Indian administered Kashmir
In Jammu and Kashmir, the Islamic insurgency has specifically targeted the Hindu Kashmiri Pandit minority and violated their human rights. 400,000 Kashmiri Hindus have either been murdered or displaced.[94] U.S. congressman Frank Pallone stated “The conflict in Kashmir cannot be separated from the global war against terrorism, over the past fifteen years militant forces, including elements of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, have used violence against the Kashmiri Pandits in an effort to institute Islamic rule in this region”.[94] Indian Army Lt. Gen. H.S. Panag, GOC-in-C Northern Command told reporters that the army has ruled out the presence of Al-Qaeda in Jammu and Kashmir, and that there is no evidentce that confirms an Al Qaeda presence in the state.[95] The violence was condemned and labeled as ethnic cleansing in a 2006 resolution passed by the United States Congress.[96] In 2009, the Oregon Legislative Assembly passed a resolution to recognize 14 September 2007 as Martyrs Day to acknowledge ethnic cleansing and campaigns of terror inflicted on non-Muslim minorities of Jammu and Kashmir by militants seeking to establish an independent Islamic Kashmir.[97] The CIA has reported about 300,000 Pandit Hindus and over 100,000 Kashmiri Muslims from Indian Administered Kashmir are internally displaced due to the insurgency.[98][99] The United Nations Commission on Human Rights reports that there are roughly 1.5 million refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and in Pakistan.[100]
Claims of human rights abuses have been made against the Indian Armed Forces and the armed militants operating in Jammu and Kashmir.[101] A 2005 study conducted by Médecins Sans Frontières found that Kashmiri women are among the worst sufferers of sexual violence in the world, with 11.6% of respondents reporting that they had been victims of sexual abuse.[102] Some surveys have found that in the Kashmir region itself (where the bulk of separatist and Indian military activity is concentrated), popular perception holds that the Indian Armed Forces are more to blame for human rights violations than the separatist groups. According to the MORI survey of 2002, in Kashmir only 2% of respondents believed that the militant groups were guilty of widespread human rights abuses, while 64% believed that Indian troops were guilty of the same. This trend was reversed in other parts of the state.[103] Amnesty International has called on India to “unequivocally condemn enforced disappearances” and to ensure that impartial investigation is conducted on mass graves in its Kashmir region. The Indian state police confirms as many as 331 deaths while in custody and 111 enforced disappearances since 1989.[104][105][106][107] Amnesty International criticised the Indian Military regarding an incident on 22 April 1996, when several armed forces personnel forcibly entered the house of a 32-year-old woman in the village of Wawoosa in the Rangreth district of Jammu and Kashmir. They reportedly molested her 12-year-old daughter and raped her other three daughters, aged 14, 16, and 18. When another woman attempted to prevent the soldiers from attacking her two daughters, she was beaten. Soldiers reportedly told her 17-year-old daughter to remove her clothes so that they could check whether she was hiding a gun. They molested her before leaving the house.[107]
Several international agencies and the UN have reported human rights violations in Indian-administered Kashmir. In a recent press release the OHCHR spokesmen stated “The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is concerned about the recent violent protests in Indian-administered Kashmir that have reportedly led to civilian casualties as well as restrictions to the right to freedom of assembly and expression.”[34] A 1996 Human Rights Watch report accuses the Indian military and Indian-government backed paramilitaries of “committ[ing] serious and widespread human rights violations in Kashmir.”[108] One such alleged massacre occurred on 6 January 1993 in the town of Sopore. TIME Magazine described the incident as such: “In retaliation for the killing of one soldier, paramilitary forces rampaged through Sopore’s market, setting buildings ablaze and shooting bystanders. The Indian government pronounced the event ‘unfortunate’ and claimed that an ammunition dump had been hit by gunfire, setting off fires that killed most of the victims.”[109] There have been claims of disappearances by the police or the army in Kashmir by several human rights organizations.[110][111] Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978:[112][113] Human rights organizations have asked Indian government to repeal[114] the Public Safety Act, since “a detainee may be held in administrative detention for a maximum of two years without a court order.”[105]
A soldier guards the roadside checkpoint outside Srinagar International Airport in January 2009.
Many human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch (HRW) have condemned human rights abuses in Kashmir by Indians such as “extra-judicial executions”, “disappearances”, and torture.[106] The “Armed Forces Special Powers Act” grants the military wide powers of arrest, the right to shoot to kill, and to occupy or destroy property in counterinsurgency operations. Indian officials claim that troops need such powers because the army is only deployed when national security is at serious risk from armed combatants. Such circumstances, they say, call for extraordinary measures. Human rights organizations have also asked Indian government to repeal[114] the Public Safety Act, since “a detainee may be held in administrative detention for a maximum of two years without a court order.”[105] A 2008 report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees determined that Indian Administered Kashmir was only ‘partly free’.[104] [105][106][107][115][116]
Pakistan administered Kashmir
Pakistan, an Islamic Republic, imposes multiple restrictions on peoples’ religious freedom in areas of Kashmir under its control.[117] Shias and Ismailis are subject to discrimination and have been targets of sectarian violence.[117] The majority of the population of the Northern Areas is Shia, unlike the rest of Pakistan, in which the majority is Sunni.[118] The constitution of Azad Kashmir specifically prohibits activities that may be prejudicial to the state’s accession to Pakistan, and as such regularly suppresses demonstrations against the government.[117] A number of Islamist militant groups operate in this area including Al-Qaeda, with tacit permission from Pakistan’s intelligence.[117] As in Indian administered Kashmir, there have been allegations of human rights abuse. The Balawaristan National Front has a stated goal of seeking independence from Pakistan. Abdul Hamid Khan, chairman of the Balawaristan National Front, states that “the Pakistani administration has also been involved in efforts to alter the demographic profile of Pakistan-occupied Gilgit Baltistan, reducing the indigenous people to a minority. The Gilgit-Baltistan area is administered directly by Islamabad. The population, primarily Shia Muslims, was brought under one federally-administered territory (administered by Pakistan) on 16 November 1947, in the name of Islam.’[119] Other groups like Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement are demanding full autonomy for the areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. On 8 January 2005, 11 people were killed following an armed attack on a Shia leader.[120] A two-day conference on Gilgit Baltistan was held on 8–9 April 2008 at the European Parliament in Brussels under the auspices of the International Kashmir Alliance. Several members of the European Parliament expressed concern over the human rights violation in Gilgit Baltistan, and urged the government of Pakistan to establish democratic institutions and rule of law in the area. Abdul Hamid Khan, speaking at the same conference, said “no democratically elected representative (from Gilgit Baltistan) was included when Karachi Agreement was signed between Pakistan and Muslim Conference leaders in 1949.”[121] According to Shaukat Ali, chairman of the International Kashmir Alliance, “On one hand Pakistan claims to be the champion of the right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people, but she has denied the same rights under its controlled parts of Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan”.[121] Gilgit Baltistan region has been described a “simmering cauldron of discontent”.[122] Continued deprivation of their human rights has driven people to desperation.[122] Many people think that they are under the colonial rule of the Pakistani government and have boycotted independence day celebrations. Since independence, the Pakistan government has made no attempts to provide basic human rights in the region and no democratic setup exists.[122]
A report titled “Kashmir: Present Situation and Future Prospects”, which was submitted to the European Parliament by Emma Nicholson, Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne, was critical of the lack of human rights, justice, democracy, and Kashmiri representation in the Pakistan National Assembly.[123]
International Crisis Group stated that “Almost six decades after Pakistan’s independence, the constitutional status of the Federally Administered Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan), once part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and now under Pakistani control, remains undetermined, with political autonomy a distant dream. The region’s inhabitants are embittered by Islamabad’s unwillingness to devolve powers in real terms to its elected representatives, and a nationalist movement, which seeks independence, is gaining ground. The rise of sectarian extremism is an alarming consequence of this denial of basic political rights”.[122]
In 2009, the Pakistan government implemented an autonomy package for the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. The package was rejected as an “eyewash” by the Balawaristan National Front, whose spokesperson stated, “It’s meant to distract the international community from the violation of human rights in this region.”[124] Manzoor Hussain Parwana, chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement, stated “The so-called provincial setup aims at concealing the human rights violations and continue the colonial control over the region.”[124] The first step was an election to elect a Gilgit-Baltistan assembly, amidst criticism of this move by Pakistan. Reuters has reported that many of the people from the region would rather join Pakistan as a province than integrate into Kashmir, but many people protested the elections, with some carrying banners reading “Pakistan’s expansionist designs in Gilgit-Baltistan are unacceptable”.[125] In December 2009, activists of nationalist Kashmiri groups staged a protest in Muzaffarabad to condemn the rigging of elections and “state terrorism” by Pakistani forces.[126]
The 2008 report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees determined that Pakistan-administered Kashmir was ‘Not free’.[117]
Map issues
United Nations‘ map of Jammu and Kashmir, accepted by the Kashmiris and the Pakistani government
As with other disputed territories, each government issues maps depicting their claims in Kashmir territory, regardless of actual control. It is illegal in India to exclude all or part of Kashmir in a map. It is illegal in Pakistan not to include the state of Jammu and Kashmir as disputed territory, as permitted by the United Nations. Non-participants often use the Line of Control and the Line of Actual Control as the depicted boundaries, as is done in the CIA World Factbook, and the region is often marked out in hashmarks, although the Indian government strictly opposes such practices[citation needed]. When Microsoft released a map in Windows 95 and MapPoint 2002, a controversy was raised because it did not show all of Kashmir as part of India as per the Indian claim. All the neutral and Pakistani companies claim to follow the UN’s map and over 90% of all maps containing the territory of Kashmir show it as disputed territory.[127]
The boundaries, names, and designations used on the map prepared by the United Nations o not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations, the Commonwealth Secretariat, or the publishers concerning the legal status of any country, territory or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. There is no intention to define the status Jammu and/or Kashmir, which has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. A dotted line represents the Line of Control agreed upon by the Republic of India and the Government of Pakistan since 1972. Both parties have not yet agreed upon the final status of the region, and nothing significant has been implemented since the peace process began in 2004.
The Government of Pakistan maintains unprovisionally and unconditionally that the informal accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or to the Republic of India remains to be decided by UN plebiscite. It accepts the UN’s map of the territory.
The Government of India states that “the external artificial boundaries of India, especially concerning the Kashmir region under its jurisdiction created by a foreign body are neither correct nor authenticated”.[citation needed]
Recent developments
Recentism.svg
This article or section may be slanted towards recent events. Please try to keep recent events in historical perspective. (March 2009)
India continues to assert their sovereignty or rights over the entire region of Kashmir, while Pakistan maintains that it is a disputed territory. Pakistan argues that the status quo cannot be considered as a solution. Pakistan insists on a UN sponsored plebiscite. Unofficially, the Pakistani leadership has indicated that they would be willing to accept alternatives such as a demilitarized Kashmir, if sovereignty of Azad Kashmir was to be extended over the Kashmir valley, or the “Chenab” formula, by which India would retain parts of Kashmir on its side of the Chenab river, and Pakistan the other side – effectively re-partioning Kashmir on communal lines. The problem is that the population of the Pakistan-administered portion of Kashmir is for the most part ethnically, linguistically, and culturally different from the Vale of Kashmir part of Indian-administered Kashmir. Therefore a Partition on the Chenab formula is opposed by most Kashmiri politicians from all spectrums, though some, such as Sajjad Lone, have suggested that the non-Muslim part of Jammu and Kashmir be separated from Kashmir and handed to India. Some political analysts say that the Pakistan state policy shift and mellowing of its aggressive stance may have to do with its total failure in the Kargil War and the subsequent 9/11 attacks. These events put pressure on Pakistan to alter its position on terrorism.[128] Many neutral parties to the dispute have noted that the UN resolution on Kashmir is no longer relevant.[129] The European Union has viewed that the plebiscite is not in Kashmiris’ interest.[130] The report notes that the UN conditions for such a plebiscite have not been, and can no longer be, met by Pakistan.[131] The Hurriyat Conference observed in 2003 that a “plebiscite no longer an option”.[132] Besides the popular factions that support either parties, there is a third faction which supports independence and withdrawal of both India and Pakistan. These have been the respective stands of the parties for long, and there have been no significant change over the years. As a result, all efforts to solve the conflict have been futile so far.
The Freedom in the World 2006 report categorized Indian-administered Kashmir as “partly free”, and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, as well as the country of Pakistan, as “not free”.[133] India claims that contrary to popular belief, a large proportion of the Jammu and Kashmir populace wish to remain with India. A MORI survey found that within the Kashmir Valley, 9% of respondents said they felt they would be better off as Indian citizens, with 78% saying that they did not know, and the remaining 13% favouring Pakistani citizenship.[134] According to a 2007 poll conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in New Delhi, 87% of respondents in the Kashmir Valley prefer independence over union with India or Pakistan.[135]
The 2005 Kashmir earthquake, which killed over 80,000 people, led to India and Pakistan finalizing negotiations for the opening of a road for disaster relief through Kashmir.
Efforts to end the crisis
The 9/11 attacks on the United States resulted in the U.S. government wanting to restrain militancy in the world, including Pakistan. They urged Islamabad to cease infiltrations, which continue to this day, by Islamist militants into Indian-administered Kashmir. In December 2001, a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament linked to Pakistan resulted in war threats, massive deployment, and international fears of nuclear war in the subcontinent.
After intensive diplomatic efforts by other countries, India and Pakistan began to withdraw troops from the international border on 10 June 2002, and negotiations began again.[citation needed] Effective 26 November 2003, India and Pakistan agreed to maintain a ceasefire along the undisputed International Border, the disputed Line of Control, and the Siachen glacier. This is the first such “total ceasefire” declared by both powers in nearly 15 years. In February 2004, Pakistan increased pressure on Pakistanis fighting in Indian-administered Kashmir to adhere to the ceasefire. The neighbours launched several other mutual confidence-building measures. Restarting the bus service between the Indian- and Pakistani- administered Kashmir has helped defuse the tensions between the countries. Both India and Pakistan have decided to cooperate on economic fronts.
On 5 December 2006, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf told an Indian TV channel that Pakistan would give up its claim on Kashmir if India accepted some of his peace proposals, including a phased withdrawal of troops, self-governance for locals, no changes in the borders of Kashmir, and a joint supervision mechanism involving India, Pakistan, and Kashmir.[136] Musharraf stated that he was ready to give up the United Nations’ resolutions regarding Kashmir.[137]
2008 militant attacks
In the week of 10 March 2008, 17 people were wounded when a blast hit the region’s only highway overpass located near the Civil Secretariat—the Indian-controlled Kashmir seat of government—and the region’s high court. A gun battle between security forces and militants fighting against Indian rule left five people dead and two others injured on 23 March 2008. The battle began when security forces raided a house on the outskirts of the capital city of Srinagar. The Indian Army has been carrying out cordon-and-search operations against militants in Indian-administered Kashmir since the violence broke out in 1989. While the authorities say 43,000 persons have been killed in the violence, various rights groups and non-governmental organizations have put the figure at twice that number.[138]
According to the Governmentt of India Home Ministry, 2008 was the year with the lowest civilian casualties in 20 years, with 89 deaths, compared to a high of 1,413 in 1996.[139] 85 security personnel died in 2008 compared to 613 in 2001, while 102 militants were killed. The human rights situation improved, with only one custodial death, and no custodial disappearances. Many analysts say Pakistan’s preoccupation with jihadis within its own borders explains the relative calm.[140]
2008 Kashmir protests
Main article: Amarnath land transfer controversy
Massive demonstrations occurred after plans by the Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir state government to transfer 100 acres (0.40 km2) of land to a trust which runs the Hindu Amarnath shrine in the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley.[141] This land was to be used to build a shelter to house Hindu pilgrims temporarily during their annual pilgrimage to the Amarnath temple.
Indian security forces and the Indian army responded quickly to keep order. More than 40 unarmed protesters were killed[142][143] and at least 300 were detained.[144] The largest protests saw more than a half million people waving Pakistani flags and crying for freedom at a rally on 18 August, according to Time magazine.[145] Pro-independence Kashmir leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq warned that the peaceful uprising could lead to an upsurge in violence if India’s heavy-handed crackdown on protests was not restrained.[146] The United Nations expressed concern on India’s response to peaceful protests and urged investigations be launched against Indian security personnel who had taken part in the crackdown.[34]
Separatists and workers of a political party were believed to be behind stone-pelting incidents, which led to retaliatory fire by the police.[147][148] An autorickshaw laden with stones meant for distribution was seized by the police in March 2009. Following the unrest in 2008, secessionist movements gained a boost.[149][150]
2008 Kashmir elections
Main article: Jammu and Kashmir state assembly elections, 2008
State Elections were held in Indian-held Kashmir in seven phases, starting 17 November and finishing on 24 December 2008. In spite of calls by separatists for a boycott, an unusually high turnout of almost 50% was recorded.[151] The National Conference party, which was founded by Sheikh Abdullah and is regarded as pro-India, emerged with a majority of the seats.[152] On 30 December the National Congress Party and the National Conference agreed to form a coalition government, with Omar Abdullah as Chief Minister.[153] On 5 January 2009 Abdullah was sworn in as the eleventh Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.[154]
In March 2009, Abdullah stated that only 800 militants were active in the state and out of these only 30% were Kashmiris.[155]
2009 Kashmir protests
In 2009, protests started over the alleged rape and murder of two young women in Shopian in South Kashmir. Suspicion pointed towards the police as the perpretrators. A judicial enquiry by a retired High Court confirmed the suspicion, but a CBI enquiry reversed their conclusion. It gave a fresh impetus to the popular agitation against India. Significantly, the unity between the separatist parties was lacking this time.[156]
Obama on the conflict
In an interview with Joe Klein of Time magazine in October 2008 Barack Obama expressed his intention to try to work with India and Pakistan to resolve the crisis.[157] He said he had talked to Bill Clinton about it, as Clinton has experience being a mediator. In an editorial in The Washington Times, Selig S Harrison,[158] director of the Asia Programme at the Center for International Policy and a senior scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International called it Obama’s first foreign policy mistake.[159] In an editorial, The Australian called Obama’s idea to appoint a presidential negotiator “a very stupid and dangerous move indeed”.[160] In an editorial in Forbes, Reihan Salam, associate editor for The Atlantic, noted “The smartest thing President Obama could do on Kashmir is probably nothing. We have to hope that India and Pakistan can work out their differences on Kashmir on their own”.[161] The Boston Globe called the idea of appointing Bill Clinton as an envoy to Kashmir “a mistake”.[162] President Obama appointed Richard Holbrooke as special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan.[163] President Asif Ali Zardari hoped that Holbrooke would help mediate to resolve Kashmir issue.[164] Subsequently Kashmir was removed from the mandate of Holbrooke.[165] “Eliminating … Kashmir from his job description … is seen as a significant diplomatic concession to India that reflects increasingly warm ties between the country and the United States,” The Washington Post noted in a report.[166] Brajesh Mishra, India’s former national security adviser, was quoted in the same report as saying that “No matter what government is in place, India is not going to relinquish control of Jammu and Kashmir”. “That is written in stone and cannot be changed.”[167] According to The Financial Times, India has warned Obama that he risks “barking up the wrong tree” if he seeks to broker a settlement between Pakistan and India over Kashmir.[168]
In July 2009, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert O. Blake, Jr. stated that the United States had no plans of appointing any special envoy to settle the dispute, calling it an issue which needs to be sorted out bilaterally by India and Pakistan.[169] According to Dawn this will be interpreted in Pakistan as an endorsement of India’s position on Kashmir that no outside power has any role in this dispute.[170]
See also
* History of Jammu and Kashmir
* Indo-Pakistani Wars
* Balochistan
* Islamic terrorism
Further reading
* Drew, Federic. 1877. The Northern Barrier of India: a popular account of the Jammoo and Kashmir Territories with Illustrations.&;#8221; 1st edition: Edward Stanford, London. Reprint: Light & Life Publishers, Jammu. 1971.
* Dr. Ijaz Hussain, 1998, Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective, National Institute of Pakistan Studies
* Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846–1990 (Hertingfordbury, Herts: Roxford Books, 1991)
* Kashmir Study Group, 1947–1997, the Kashmir dispute at fifty : charting paths to peace (New York, 1997)
* Jaspreet Singh, Seventeen Tomatoes– an unprecedented look inside the world of an army camp in Kashmir (Vehicle Press; Montreal, Canada, 2004)
* Navnita Behera, State, identity and violence : Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh (New Delhi: Manohar, 2000)
* Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge : Cambridge U.P., 1997)
* Sumantra Bose, The challenge in Kashmir : democracy, self-determination and a just peace (New Delhi: Sage, 1997)
* Robert Johnson, A Region in Turmoil (London and New York, Reaktion, 2005)
* Hans Köchler, The Kashmir Problem between Law and Realpolitik. Reflections on a Negotiated Settlement. Keynote speech delivered at the “Global Discourse on Kashmir 2008.” European Parliament, Brussels, 1 April 2008.
* Prem Shankar Jha, Kashmir, 1947: rival versions of history (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1996)
* Manoj Joshi, The Lost Rebellion (New Delhi: Penguin India, 1999)
* Alexander Evans, “Why Peace Won’t Come to Kashmir”, Current History (Vol 100, No 645) April 2001 p170-175.
* Younghusband, Francis and Molyneux, E. 1917. Kashmir. A. & C. Black, London.
* Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict I.B. Tauris, London.
* Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, I.B. Tauris, London.
* Andrew Whitehead, A Mission in Kashmir, Penguin India, 2007
* Muhammad Ayub, An Army; Its Role & Rule (A History of the Pakistan Army from Independence to Kargil 1947–1999). Rosedog Books, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania USA. 2005. ISBN 0-8059-9594-3
* Kashmir Conflict, Homepage Washington Post.
References
1. ^ Elections in Kashmir
2. ^ “India Pakistan | Timeline”. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1989.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
3. ^ “Kashmir: A History Littered With Rigged Elections (by Mushtaq A. Jeelani) – Media Monitors Network”. Mediamonitors.net. http://www.mediamonitors.net/jeelani4.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
4. ^ Hussain, Altaf (2002-09-14). “South Asia | Kashmir’s flawed elections”. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2223364.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
5. ^ “A Good Voice Silenced: Kashmir’s Loss Is Also Mine”. Mea.gov.in. 2002-06-09. http://mea.gov.in/bestoftheweb/2002/06/09bow01.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02. [dead link]
6. ^ a b c d Emily Wax (28 August 2008). “Peaceful Protests In Kashmir Alter Equation for India”. Washingtonpost.com. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/27/AR2008082703195.html?nav=rss_world. Retrieved 23 November 2010.
7. ^ a b c d Trofimov, Yaroslav (2008-12-15). “A New Tack in Kashmir — WSJ.com”. Online.wsj.com. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122930169820005503.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
8. ^ “Freedom in the World 2009 – Kashmir (India)”. UNHCR. July 16, 2009. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,ANNUALREPORT,IND,,4a6452aa2d,0.html. Retrieved 1 May 2010.
9. ^ “Pro-India parties win majority in Kashmir elections”. CNN. December 28, 2008. http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/28/indian.kashmir.vote/. Retrieved 1 May 2010.
10. ^ “Regional Party Enters Talks for Coalition Government in Jammu and Kashmir”. Voice of America. December 29, 2008. http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2008-12-29-voa15-66803742.html. Retrieved 9 May 2010.
11. ^ Pakistan’s Role in the Kashmir Insurgency by Peter Chalk, RAND,2001-09-01
12. ^ Why Pakistan is ‘boosting Kashmir militants’, BBC, 2010-03-03
13. ^ “Kashmir militants ‘regrouping’ in Pakistan”. BBC. 2010-05-14. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8683367.stm. Retrieved 14 May 2010.
14. ^ Revised Statute from The UK Statute Law Database: Indian Independence Act 1947 (c.30) at opsi.gov.uk
15. ^ a b c “Kashmir (region, Indian subcontinent) :: The Kashmir problem – Britannica Online Encyclopedia”. Britannica.com. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/312908/Kashmir/214223/The-Kashmir-problem#ref673547. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
16. ^ Death in the Vale, TIME, 1947-11-10
17. ^ a b Sayyid Mīr Qāsim. My Life and Times. Allied Publishers Limited. http://books.google.com/books?id=KNFJKap8YxwC&printsec=frontcover&dq=My+life+and+times+By+Sayyid+M%C4%ABr+Q%C4%81sim&source=bl&ots=QelHViveYB&sig=59zRr-XTYB8srl0zs3A_CyfCabI&hl=en&ei=OAnCTM3rKsT48Aa7rajhCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false. Retrieved 2010-07-01. “On the battlefield, the National Conference volunteers were working shoulder-to-shoulder with the Indian army to drive out the invaders. On December 31, 1947, India filed a complaint with the United Nations against the Pakistani aggression and its help to the invading tribesmen. Sheikh Abdullah was not in favour of India seeking the UN intervention because he was sure the Indian army could free the entire State of the invaders. As the subsequent events showed, the UNO by procrastinating, only messed up the Kashmir issue. Unwilling to call a spade a spade, it called for withdrawal of troops on April 21, 1948. The Indian army had driven the Pakistani invaders up to Uri in Kashmir and Poonch in Jammu when ceasefire was ordered in December 1948. Mr. Jinnah, the promoter of this invasion, had (in September) died by then. Both India and Pakistan accepted the ceasefire.”
18. ^ Schofield, Victoria (2002-01-17). “Kashmir’s forgotten plebiscite”. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1766582.stm. Retrieved 2009-01-03.
19. ^ “India Grabs It”. Time (Time Inc.). 1957-02-04. http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,723783,00.html. Retrieved 2009-01-03.
20. ^ a b “Foreign Minister of Pakistan, on the role of the Security Council in the Pacific Settlement of Disputes”. Pakun.org. http://www.pakun.org/statements/Security_Council/2003/05132003-01.php. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
21. ^ a b Kashmir policy: an overview by Shamshad Ahmad, Dawn 2004-08-05
22. ^ Nick Easen CNN (2002-05-24). “CNN.com – Aksai Chin: China’s disputed slice of Kashmir – 24 May 2002″. Edition.cnn.com. http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/05/24/aksai.chin/. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
23. ^ 1989 Insurgency
24. ^ Contours of Militancy
25. ^ Timeline of the conflict
26. ^ Timeline of the conflict – BBC
27. ^ PMO in secret talks with secessionists, The Hindu, 2006-01-25
28. ^ Malik Under Fire, Rebels Call For ‘less Autocratic’ JKLF, The Indian Express, 2005-12-23
29. ^ Kashmir insurgency is being ‘Talibanised’Jane’s Information Group, 2001-10-05
30. ^ Foreign militants creating mayhem in Kashmir: Omar Abdullah , The Hindu, 2006-03-12
31. ^ “FBI has images of terror camp in Pak”. Tribuneindia.com. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060802/world.htm#1UN. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
32. ^ Zardari expects world to come up with $100bn,Dawn (newspaper)
33. ^ “Fury over Zardari Kashmir comment”. BBC News. 2008-10-06. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7654480.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
34. ^ a b c d http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/1058F3E39F77ACE5C12574B2004E5CE3?opendocument
35. ^ Osama bin Laden “letter to the American people”, GlobalSecurity.org, 2002-11-20
36. ^ Full text: bin Laden’s ‘letter to America’, The Guardian, 2002-11-24
37. ^ Analysis: Is al-Qaeda in Kashmir?, BBC, 2002-06-13
38. ^ Rumsfeld offers US technology to guard Kashmir border, The Sydney Morning Herald, 2002-06-14
39. ^ Al Qaeda thriving in Pakistani Kashmir, The Christian Science Monitor, 2002-07-02
40. ^ SAS joins Kashmir hunt for bin Laden, The Telegraph, 2002-02-23
41. ^ Taliban, al-Qaeda linked to Kashmir, USA Today, 2002-05-29
42. ^ Kashmir Militant Extremists, Council on Foreign Relations, 2009-07-09
43. ^ Al-Qaeda claim of Kashmir link worries India, The New York Times, 2006-07-13
44. ^ “No Al Qaeda presence in Kashmir: Army”. Chennai, India: Hindu.com. 2007-06-18. http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/18/stories/2007061801191400.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
45. ^ Al Qaeda could provoke new India-Pakistan war: Gates, Dawn, 2010-01-20
46. ^ US drones killed two terrorist leaders in Pak, Dawn, 2009-09-17
47. ^ Chicago Man Pleads Not Guilty in Terror Cases, The New York Times, 2010-01-25
48. ^ Al Qaeda’s American Mole, Brookings Institution, 2009-12-15
49. ^ Ilyas Kashmiri alive, lays out future terror strategy, Daily Times (Pakistan), 2009-10-15
50. ^ Ilyas Kashmiri had planned to attack COAS, The News International, 2009-09-18
51. ^ US charges Ilyas Kashmiri in Danish newspaper plot, Dawn, 2010-01-15
52. ^ a b “Ministry of External Affairs, India – Kashmir Issue”. Meaindia.nic.in. Archived from the original on June 16, 2008. http://web.archive.org/web/20080616161619/http://meaindia.nic.in/jk/kashmirissue.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
53. ^ a b “Kashmir: The true story, Ministry of External Affairs, India” (PDF). Archived from the original on January 6, 2007. http://web.archive.org/web/20070106084737/http://meaindia.nic.in/jk/19jk01.pdf. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
54. ^ “Full Text of Resolution 1172″ (PDF). http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1172(1998).pdf. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
55. ^ Published: 12:00PM BST 24 Sep 2001 (2001-09-24). “A brief history of Kashmir conflict”. London: Telegraph.co.uk. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1399992/A-brief-history-of-the-Kashmir-conflict.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
56. ^ “Indian Embassy, Washington, D.C. – A Comprehensive note on Jammu & Kashmir”. Indianembassy.org. http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/kashmir/kashmir_mea/UN.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
57. ^ Hardgrave, Robert. “India: The Dilemmas of Diversity,” Journal of Democracy, pp. 54–65
58. ^ M.J. Akbar Monday (2002-09-30). “Exerting Moral Force”. TIME. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501021007-356124,00.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
59. ^ “Ministry of External Affairs, India – Simla Agreement”. Meaindia.nic.in. Archived from the original on June 20, 2008. http://web.archive.org/web/20080620061456/http://www.meaindia.nic.in/jk/sim-ag.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
60. ^ “Pakistan, India meet on Kashmir”. Cnn.com. 2005-04-18. http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/04/17/pakistan.india.talks/index.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
61. ^ World: South Asia Vajpayee: Pakistan a ‘terrorist’ state, BBC, 1999-08-09
62. ^ “India Renews Call for U.S. to Declare Pakistan a Terrorist State”, The New York Times, 2002-07-17
63. ^ COMMENTARY: Qualifying as a terrorist state, Asia Times, 2002-02-05
64. ^ Congress wants Pakistan declared terror state, Dawn, 2009-02-08
65. ^ a b “Pakistan’S Anti-India Propaganda”. Indianembassy.org. http://www.indianembassy.org/Policy/Kashmir/Kashmir_MEA/Paki_propaganda.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
66. ^ “Pak media being anti-India: J&K CM”. Expressindia.com. 2006-04-13. http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=66049. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
67. ^ STATEMENT BY MR. V.K. NAMBIAR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, ON THREATS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY CAUSED BY TERRORIST ACTS AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON MARCH 4, 2004, United Nations, 2004-03-04
68. ^ UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), United States Department of State
69. ^ STATEMENT BY MR. KAMALESH SHARMA, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY CAUSED BY TERRORIST ACTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JANUARY 18, 2002, United Nations 2002-01-18
70. ^ “No freedom in PoK: Human Rights Watch”. Chennai, India: Hindu.com. 2006-09-24. http://www.hindu.com/2006/09/24/stories/2006092404141200.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
71. ^ “A Comprehensive Note on Jammu & Kashmir THE NORTHERN AREAS”. Indianembassy.org. http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/kashmir/Kashmir_MEA/Northern_Areas.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
72. ^ “Azad Kashmir Regiment”. Pakistanarmy.gov.pk. 1947-08-15. http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=159&rnd=460. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
73. ^ Azad Jammu & Kashmir Governmen[dead link]
74. ^ “Kashmir: The origins of the dispute, Victoria Schofield”. BBC News. 2002-01-16. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1762146.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
75. ^ “Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs”. Mofa.gov.pk. http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Pages/Brief.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
76. ^ “Cry and Anguish for Freedom in Kashmir (by Anver Suliman) – Media Monitors Network”. Mediamonitors.net. http://www.mediamonitors.net/suliman1.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
77. ^ “Conflict Rape Victims: Abandoned And Forgotten By Syed Junaid Hashmi”. Countercurrents.org. http://www.countercurrents.org/kashmir-hashmi310307.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
78. ^ “Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: India: Human Rights Developments”. Hrw.org. http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/asia/india.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
79. ^ Kashmiris want accession to Pakistan: Attique[dead link]
80. ^ Schofield, Victoria (2002-01-17). “South Asia | Kashmir’s forgotten plebiscite”. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1766582.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
81. ^ “Search – Global Edition – The New York Times”. International Herald Tribune. 2009-03-29. http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/08/18/asia/OUKWD-UK-KASHMIR-PROTESTS.php. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
82. ^ “Violence marks Kashmir election”. BBC News. 2008-11-23. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7744724.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
83. ^ “Clashes mar new phase of Kashmir election”. Dawn.com. 2008-12-08. http://www.dawn.com/2008/12/08/top10.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
84. ^ “South Asia | Kashmir’s extra-judicial killings”. BBC News. 2007-03-08. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6367917.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
85. ^ Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch (2007-01-31). “India: Prosecute Police for Killings in Jammu and Kashmir | Human Rights Watch”. Hrw.org. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/01/29/india-prosecute-police-killings-jammu-and-kashmir. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
86. ^ India: Hold Abusers in Kashmir Accountable | Human Rights Watch
87. ^ “Kashmir’s extra-judicial killings”. BBC News online (BBC). 8 March 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6367917.stm. Retrieved 27 March 2010.
88. ^ Somini Sengupta (6 February 2007). “Indian Army and Police Tied to Kashmir Killings”. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/06/world/asia/06kashmir.html. Retrieved 27 March 2010.
89. ^ Fury over Zardari Kashmir comment, BBC, 2008-10-06
90. ^ . BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/html/7.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
91. ^ “Factbox: all about India, China’s border dispute”. IBN Live. 8 November 2009. http://ibnlive.in.com/news/factbox-all-about-india-chinas-border-dispute/104799-3.html. Retrieved 13 April 2010.
92. ^ “Leading News Resource of Pakistan”. Daily Times. 2004-11-23. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_23-11-2004_pg7_59. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
93. ^ “Pakistan wants to curb terrorism: Straw’s assurance to Jaswant -DAWN – Top Stories; 30 May 2002″. DAWN. 2002-05-30. http://www.dawn.com/2002/05/30/top1.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
94. ^ a b Pallone introduces resolution condemning Human rights violation against Kashmiri Pandits, United States House of Representatives, 2006-02-15
95. ^ “National : No Al Qaeda presence in Kashmir: Army”. The Hindu (Chennai, India). 2007-06-18. http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/18/stories/2007061801191400.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
96. ^ Expressing the sense of Congress that the Government of the Republic of India and the State Government of Jammu and Kashmir should take immediate steps to remedy the situation of the Kashmiri Pandits and should act to ensure the physical, political, and economic security of this embattled community. HR Resolution 344, United States House of Representatives, 2006-02-15
97. ^ “Senate Joint Resolution 23, 75th OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY—2009 Regular Session” (PDF). http://www.leg.state.or.us/09reg/measpdf/sjr1.dir/sjr0023.intro.pdf. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
98. ^ [1]
99. ^ Ka Leo The Voice – Kashmir: The Predicament
100. ^ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2008-07-02). “Refworld | Freedom in the World 2008 – Kashmir [Pakistan]“. UNHCR. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,469f2dcf2,487ca21a2a,0.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
101. ^ [2][dead link]
102. ^ Wailing Woes
103. ^ Kashmiris Reject War In Favour Of Democratic Means[dead link]
104. ^ a b “Thousands lost in Kashmir mass graves | Amnesty International”. Amnesty.org. 2008-04-18. http://www.amnesty.org/en/appeals-for-action/thousands-lost-kashmir-mass-graves. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
105. ^ a b c d “Behind the Kashmir Conflict: Undermining the Judiciary (Human Rights Watch Report: July 1999)”. Hrw.org. http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kashmir/judiciary.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
106. ^ a b c “Behind the Kashmir Conflict – Abuses in the Kashmir Valley”. Hrw.org. 1998-04-20. http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kashmir/abuses.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
107. ^ a b c http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA20/024/1997/en/15411f3b-ea77-11dd-b05d-65164b228191/asa200241997en.pdf
108. ^ [3][dead link]
109. ^ Monday, Jan. 18, 1993 (1993-01-18). “Blood Tide Rising – TIME”. Time.com. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,977469,00.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
110. ^ “India”. State.gov. 2007-03-06. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78871.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
111. ^ “World | South Asia | Kashmir’s extra-judicial killings”. BBC News. 2007-03-08. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6367917.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
112. ^ “India: The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act- a threat to human rights | Amnesty International”. Amnesty.org. 2000-05-15. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA20/019/2000. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
113. ^ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Refworld | Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (Act No. 6 of 1978)”. UNHCR. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,NATLEGBOD,,IND,3ae6b52014,0.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
114. ^ a b “India: Repeal the Armed Forces Special Powers Act”. Hrw.org. 2007-11-20. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/11/20/india17381.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
115. ^ Freedom in the World 2008 – Kashmir (India), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2008-07-02
116. ^ [4]
117. ^ a b c d e Freedom in the World 2008 – Kashmir (Pakistan), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2008-07-02
118. ^ Pakistan’s Fragile Foundations, Council on Foreign Relations, 2009-03-12
119. ^ Pakistan’s heart of darkness, Asia Times, 2002-08-22
120. ^ 11 kiled in Gilgit violence, Dawn, 2005-01-09
121. ^ a b European Parliamentarians express concern for Gilgit Baltistan, German Information Center, New Delhi, 2008-04-12
122. ^ a b c d Political unrest in Gilgit-Baltistan, Dawn, 2009-07-26
123. ^ EU Report Rattles Pakistan, Outlook (magazine), 2006-12-08
124. ^ a b Gilgit-Baltistan package termed an eyewash, Dawn, 2009-08-30
125. ^ [Pakistan's disputed Northern Areas go to polls http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AB1ZE20091112]
126. ^ Killing of youth in GB by-polls condemned, Dawn, 2009-12-27
127. ^ “Microsoft’s Geopolitical Bug Experts: The company’s Geopolitical Product Strategy Team helps Microsoft understand and address worldwide geographical, political and cultural issues that affect its products”. Microsoft.com. 2000-12-06. http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2000/Dec00/12-06gps.asp. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
128. ^ Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy after the Bush Visit to South Asia Strategic Insights Volume V, Issue 4 (April 2006) by Peter R. Lavoy
129. ^ Kickstart Kashmir – Times of India.
130. ^ EU: Plebiscite not in Kashmiris’ interest – 30 November 2006, Pak Observer
131. ^ REPORT on Kashmir: present situation and future prospects Committee on Foreign Affairs Rapporteur: Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne
132. ^ Plebiscite no longer an option; Kashmir row must be resolved within two years’ — — Hurriyat Conference Chairman, Mr Abdul Gani Bhat, The Hindu, 2003-07-01
133. ^ http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/Charts2006.pdf
134. ^ The Milli Gazette, OPI, Pharos Media. “Full Text of the MORI Survey on Kashmir”. Milligazette.com. http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/15062002/1506200229.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
135. ^ “87 pct in Kashmir Valley Want Independence”. Reuters.com. 2007-08-13. http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSDEL291796. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
136. ^ “South Asia | Musharraf pushes Kashmir proposal”. BBC News. 2006-12-05. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6208660.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
137. ^ “Musharraf’s Bold Initiative on Kashmir”. Arabnews.com. http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7§ion=0&article=90157&d=18&m=12&y=2006. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
138. ^ From journalist Mukhtar Ahmad (2008-03-23). “Five dead after Kashmir gun battle — CNN.com”. Edition.cnn.com. http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/03/23/kashmir.battle/index.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
139. ^ [5][dead link]
140. ^ “Level of violence in Kashmir dips”. Washingtontimes.com. 2008-03-28. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/mar/28/briefing-level-of-violence-in-kashmir-dips/. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
141. ^ “South Asia | Kashmir – missed chances for peace”. BBC News. 2008-08-22. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7576393.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
142. ^ “BBC World Service – News – Non-violent protest in Kashmir”. Bbc.co.uk. 2008-10-14. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/news/2008/10/081016_kashmir_arney_dm.shtml. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
143. ^ “South Asia | Top Kashmir separatists detained”. BBC News. 2008-09-05. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7600982.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
144. ^ “After Uprising, 300 Protestors Arrested in Indian Kashmir”. Newsblaze.com. 2008-09-06. http://newsblaze.com/story/20080906092021kash.nb/topstory.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
145. ^ Thottam, Jyoti (2008-09-04). “Valley of Tears”. TIME. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1838586,00.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
146. ^ “Mirwaiz warns of violent upsurge -DAWN – Top Stories; 8 September 2008″. DAWN. 2008-09-08. http://dawn.com/2008/09/08/top7.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
147. ^ “Stones And Psyches”. Kashmirobserver.net. http://www.kashmirobserver.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1051:stones-and-psyches&catid=7:editorial&Itemid=8. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
148. ^ “The Tribune, Chandigarh, India – Jammu & Kashmir”. Tribuneindia.com. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20090311/j&k.htm#1. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
149. ^ Avijit Ghosh (2008-08-17). “In Kashmir, there’s azadi in air”. Online edition of The Times of India, dated 2008-08-17. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/In_Kashmir_theres_azadi_in_the_air/articleshow/3372070.cms. Retrieved 2009-01-28.
150. ^ Thottam, Jyoti (2008-09-04). “Valley of Tears”. Time. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1838586,00.html. Retrieved 2010-05-07.
151. ^ “Kashmiris vote despite boycott call”. English.aljazeera.net. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2008/11/20081117232949276497.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
152. ^ Whitehead, Andrew (2009-01-01). “Kashmir crisis comes full circle”. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7806153.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
153. ^ Pro-India parties to take power in Indian Kashmir, International Herald Tribune, 2008-12-30
154. ^ Omar Abdullah sworn in, Tara Chand to be deputy CM, Rediff.com, 2009-01-05
155. ^ 800 ultras active in state: Omar, The Tribune, 2009-03-02
156. ^ The changing character of the Kashmir movement, Al-Jazeera July 20, 2010
157. ^ The full Obama Interview, Time
158. ^ “SELIG S. HARRISON, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy”. Ciponline.org. http://www.ciponline.org/asia/Seligbio.html. Retrieved 2010-02-02.
159. ^ Kashmir issue leading Obama into first ‘tar pit’, The Washington Times, 2009-01-06
160. ^ Asia’s Islamism engine, The Australian, 2008-12-04
161. ^ What Should Obama Do On Kashmir, Forbes, 2008-12-01
162. ^ A wrong role for Bill Clinton, The Boston Globe, 2008-12-28
163. ^ Holbrooke Plans First Trip as Afghanistan-Pakistan Envoy, Voice of America
164. ^ Partnering With Pakistan, The Washington Post, 2009-01-28
165. ^ Will Kashmir Be an Obama Foreign Policy Focus?, Time 2009-01-28
166. ^ Kashmir taken out of Holbrooke’s brief, says report, Dawn, 2009-01-31
167. ^ “U.S. Removes Kashmir From Envoy’s Mandate; India Exults”, The Washington Post, 2009-01-30
168. ^ “India warns Obama over Kashmir”, The Financial Times, 2009-02-03
169. ^ US has no plans to appoint special envoy on Kashmir: Blake, The News International, 2009-07-16
170. ^ US to sign $20 billion defence accords with India, Dawn, 2009-07-17
External links
* The Future of Kashmir, Matthew A. Rosenstein et al., ACDIS Swords and Ploughshares 16:1 (winter 2007-8), Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
* Centre for Contemporary Conflict on Kargil War
* BBC articles on Kashmir
* Recent Kashmir developments
* The Political Economy of the Kashmir Conflict U.S. Institute of Peace Report, June 2004
* The Jammu and Kashmir issue
* The Kashmir dispute-cause or symptom?
* LoC-Line of Control situation in Kashmir
* Introduction of the Kashmir dispute
* An outline of the history of Kashmir
* News Coverage of Kashmir
* Accession Document
* Conflict in Kashmir: Selected Internet Resources by the Library, University of California, Berkeley, USA; University of California at Berkeley Library Bibliographies and Web-Bibliographies list
* Timeline since April 2003
* Conflict in Kashmir: Selected Internet Resources by the Library, University of California, Berkeley, USA; University of California at Berkeley Library Bibliographies and Web-Bibliographies list
* Kashmir resolution of the European Parliament, 24 May 2007
v · d · e
India Indo-Pakistani relations Pakistan
Treaties and summits
Karachi Agreement · Liaquat–Nehru Pact · Indus Waters Treaty · Tashkent Declaration · Simla Agreement · Lahore Declaration · Agra summit
Events and conflicts
Partition of India · Kashmir conflict · Integration of Junagadh · 1947 War · Sir Creek · Operation Gibraltar · 1965 War · 1971 War · Line of Control · Maritime trespassing · Siachen conflict · Operation Brasstacks · Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir · Pokhran-II / Chagai-I · Kargil War · Atlantique Incident · Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline · 2001 Indian Parliament attack · 2001–2002 Military standoff · 2007 Samjhauta Express bombings · 2008 Mumbai attacks
Initiatives
Transport · Samjhauta Express · Delhi–Lahore Bus · Srinagar–Muzaffarabad Bus · Thar Express · Indo-Pak Confederation · Indo-Pak Joint Judicial Committee
Personalities
Jawaharlal Nehru · Lal Bahadur Shastri · Liaquat Ali Khan · Ayub Khan · Indira Gandhi · Zulfikar Ali Bhutto · Zia-ul-Haq · Atal Bihari Vajpayee · Nawaz Sharif · Pervez Musharraf · Asif Ali Zardari · Manmohan Singh
Related templates
Foreign relations of India · Foreign relations of Pakistan · Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts ·
Retrieved from “http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir_conflict“
Categories: Disputed territories in Asia | History of Azad Kashmir | History of Jammu and Kashmir | Independent India | Kashmir | Kashmir conflict | Resource conflict | Territorial disputes of India | Territorial disputes of Pakistan | Mountain warfare
Powered by MediaWiki
Wikimedia Foundation
* This page was last modified on 19 January 2011 at 20:24.
* Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License;
Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.
…and I am Sid Harth
Filed under News, Views and Reviews
0 comments:
Post a Comment